Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
BARANGAY SINDALAN,
SAN G.R. No. 150640
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
rep. by BARANGAY CAPTAIN
ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Present:
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
MAGTOTO
III, and PATRICIA Promulgated:
SINDAYAN,
Respondents. March 22, 2007
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D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Expropriation,
if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals
without due process of law.
The Case
For review before the Court in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 are the May 30, 2001 Decision[1] and
October 26, 2001 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), reversing and setting aside the August 2, 1990 Order[3] of
the
The Facts
On
WHEREAS, said
parcels of land shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the
agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their
basic needs;
WHEREAS, presently,
residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road before they can reach the
concrete provincial road, entailing so much time, effort and money, not to
mention possible damage and/or spilage [sic] on the products consigned to or
coming from, the market outside the barangay; and
WHEREAS, said lots,
used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute greatly to the general welfare
of the people residing therein social, cultural and health among other things,
beside economic.[4]
Petitioner claimed that respondents’
property was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road. Pending the resolution of the case at the
trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value
of the property.[5]
On the other hand, respondents stated
that they owned the 27,000- square meter property, a portion of which is the
subject of this case. In their
Memorandum,[6] they
alleged that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by
Dr. Felix David and his wife. Prior to
the filing of the expropriation case, said subdivision was linked to
Respondents alleged that the
expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit
of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision.
They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the name of Davsan
II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit
of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in
order to conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built
across the respondents’ land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and
those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed out
that under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is
obliged to provide a feeder road to the subdivision residents.[7]
After trial, the court a quo
ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises duly considered, the herein plaintiff is hereby declared as having a lawful right to take the property hereinabove described and sought to be condemned for the public purpose or use as aforestated, upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the Complaint in this [sic] expropriation proceedings.
Upon the entry of this Order of Condemnation, let three (3) competent and disinterested persons be appointed as Commissioners to ascertain and report to the Court the just compensation for the property condemned.[8]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Upon respondents’ appeal, the CA
held:
We are convinced that it is the duty of the subdivision owner to provide the right of way needed by residents of Davsan II Subdivision as provided for in Section 29 of P.D. 957. Records show that Purok Paraiso, which is supposed to benefit from this [sic] expropriation proceedings is in reality Davsan II Subdivision as per the testimony of Ruben Palo, plaintiff’s own witness (TSN, p. 12, December 115, 1986) [sic]. Appellants correctly stated that:
“The act of Bo. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, in effect relieved the owners of Davsan II Subdivision of spending their own private funds for acquiring a right of way and constructing the required access road to the subdivision. It spent public funds for such private purpose and deprived herein defendants-appellants of their property for an ostensible public purpose x x x.”
x x x x
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Complaint for Eminent Domain is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[9]
The Issues
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA
for (1) allegedly violating its power of eminent domain, (2) finding that the
expropriation of the property is not for public use but for a privately owned
subdivision, (3) finding that there was no payment of just compensation, and
(4) failing to accord respect to the findings of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue in this case
is whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a
public purpose.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined
as “the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the
taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation.”[10] It is acknowledged as “an inherent political
right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property
of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the whole
community.”[11]
The exercise of the power of eminent
domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under
Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be
deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law under
Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning
of “public use” and the term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on
diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to “public use” is “use by the
public” or “public employment,” that “a duty must devolve on the person or
corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish
the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the part of
the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on
behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned.”[12] The more generally accepted view sees “public
use” as “public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything which
tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote
the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section
of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new
resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.”[13]
In this jurisdiction, “public use” is defined as “whatever is beneficially
employed for the community.”[14]
It is settled that the public nature
of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on the “numerical
count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to
be benefited.”[15] The number of people is not determinative of
whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in
common and is not limited to particular individuals.[16]
Thus, the first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is
for the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality
of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated that expropriation ends with an
order of condemnation declaring “that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation.”[17]
Another vital requisite for a valid
condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the
recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[18]
just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator,” and that the gauge for
computation is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. In order for the payment to be “just,” it
must be real, substantial, full, and ample.
Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also,
the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed
that the payment should be made within a “reasonable time” from the taking of
the property.[19] It succinctly explained that without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property
owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of
the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally
determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner.
In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest
per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid.[20]
Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12%
interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the
Court enunciated the rule that “where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property.”[21]
Since the individual stands to lose the
property by compulsion of the law, the expropriation authority should not
further prejudice the owner’s rights by delaying payment of just
compensation. To obviate any possibility
of delay in the payment, the expropriator should already make available, at the
time of the filing of the expropriation complaint, the amount equal to the BIR
zonal valuation or the fair market value of the property per tax declaration whichever
is higher.
The delayed payment of just
compensation in numerous cases results from lack of funds or the time spent in
the determination of the legality of the expropriation and/or the fair
valuation of the property, and could result in dismay, disappointment,
bitterness, and even rancor on the part of the lot owners. It is not uncommon for the expropriator to
take possession of the condemned property upon deposit of a small amount equal
to the assessed value of
the land per tax declaration and then challenge the valuation fixed by the trial
court resulting in an “expropriate now, pay later” situation. In the event the expropriating agency
questions the reasonability of the compensation fixed by the trial court before
the appellate court, then the latter may, upon motion, use its sound discretion
to order the payment to the lot owner of the amount equal to the valuation of
the property, as proposed by the condemnor during the proceedings before the
commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, subject to the final
valuation of the land. This way, the damage and prejudice to the property owner
would be considerably pared down.
On due process, it is likewise basic
under the Constitution that the property owner must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard on the issues of public use and just compensation and
to present objections to and claims on them.[22] It is settled that taking of property for a
private use or without just compensation is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.[23] Moreover, it has to be emphasized that taking
of private property without filing any complaint before a court of law under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or existing laws is patently felonious,
confiscatory, and unconstitutional. Judicial notice can be taken of some
instances wherein some government agencies or corporations peremptorily took
possession of private properties and usurped the owner’s real rights for their
immediate use without first instituting the required court action. Running roughshod over the property rights of
individuals is a clear and gross breach of the constitutional guarantee of due
process, which should not be countenanced in a society where the rule of law
holds sway.
In the case at bar, petitioner harps
on eminent domain as an inherent power of sovereignty similar to police power
and taxation. As a basic political unit,
its Sangguniang Barangay is clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and other facilities for
public use and welfare. Petitioner
relied on the following cases which held a liberal view of the term “public
use” in recognition of the evolving concept of the power of eminent domain: Seña
v. Manila Railroad Co.; Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis; Sumulong
v. Guerrero; Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals; and Manosca
v. Court of Appeals.[24]
Petitioner’s delegated power to
expropriate is not at issue. The legal
question in this petition, however, is whether the taking of the land was for a
public purpose or use. In the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property
must be for a public purpose. A
corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by law from one person
and given to another in the guise of public purpose.
In this regard, the petition must
fail.
Petitioner alleges that there are at
least 80 houses in the place and about 400 persons will be benefited with the
use of a barangay road. The trial court believed that the
expropriation “will not benefit only the residents of the subdivision, but also
the residents of Sitio or Purok Paraiso and the residents of the entire
Barangay of Sindalan x x x.”[25] The trial court held that the subdivision is
covered by Sitio or Purok Paraiso which is a part or parcel
of Barangay Sindalan. However, this finding was not supported by
evidence. On the contrary, it is Sitio Paraiso which is within Davsan II
Subdivision based on the testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Ruben Palo, as
follows:
Atty. Mangiliman: Mr. Palo, you said that you have been residing at Sitio Paraiso since 1973, is this Sitio Paraiso within the Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Atty. Mangiliman: And before you purchased that or at the time you purchased it in 1972, I am referring to the lot where you are now residing, the Davson [sic] Subdivision did not provide for a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road, am I correct?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And despite [sic] of that you purchased a lot inside Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not demand from the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision that he should provide a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: No, sir, because I know they will provide for the road.
Atty. Mangiliman: And when you said that they will provide for that road, you mean to tell us that it is the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision who will provide a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Now, Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the proposed road which will connect from Davson [sic] Subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan would benefit mainly the lot buyers and home owners of Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And you also agree with me that there is no portion of Davson [sic] Subdivision which is devoted to the production of agricultural products?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: When the road which is the subject of this case and sought to be expropriated has not yet been opened and before a Writ of Possession was issued by the Court to place the plaintiff in this case in possession, the residents of Davson [sic] Subdivision have other way in going to the barrio road?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: In that case Mr. Witness, how do you negotiate or go out of the subdivision in going to the barrio?
Witness: We passed to the lot own [sic] by Mr. Torres which is near the subdivision in going to the barrio road, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not complain to the owner/developer of the subdivision that he should provide for a road linking to [sic] his subdivision to the barrio road because there is no available exit from the said subdivision to the barrio road?
Witness: We have been telling that and he was promising that there will be a road, sir.[26]
Firstly, based on the foregoing
transcript, the intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the
subdivision only. It has not been shown
that the other residents of Barangay
Sindalan,
The intended expropriation of private
property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly proscribed by the
Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose. In Charles
River Bridge v. Warren, the limitation on expropriation was underscored,
hence:
Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property, public as well as private, for public purposes, making compensation therefore; yet it has never been understood, at least never in our republic, that the sovereign power can take the private property of A and give it to B by the right of eminent domain; or that it can take it at all, except for public purposes; or that it can take it for public purposes, without the duty and responsibility of ordering compensation for the sacrifice of the private property of one, for the good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642) (emphasis supplied).[28]
Secondly, a compelling reason for the
rejection of the expropriation is expressed in Section 29, PD 957, which
provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned.
Considering that the residents who
need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the
Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. However, the failure of the subdivision owner
to provide an access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive respondents of their property
instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under
the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently
illegal. Without doubt, expropriation
cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.
Thirdly, public funds can be used
only for a public purpose. In this
proposed condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a
private individual without any legal mooring.
In criminal law, this would constitute malversation.
Lastly, the facts tend to show that
the petitioner’s proper remedy is to require the Davsan II Subdivision owner to
file a complaint for establishment of the easement of right-of-way under
Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code.
Respondents must be granted the opportunity to show that their lot is
not a servient estate. Plainly,
petitioner’s resort to expropriation is an improper cause of action.
One last word: the power of eminent
domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a
deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good—which is public
use—and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of
property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also
constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right
to property as well.
For this reason, courts should be
more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property owner and must perform a
more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the
expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for
condemnation, such that when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed
public use of property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the property
owner and against the State.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and
the October 26, 2001 Resolution of the CA, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice