ESTATE OF LIM CHING, Represented by
ATTORNEY JOSE LIM, Petitioner, – versus – FLORENCIA BACALA, DOLORES L. MENDOZA,
JUANITA ALVAREZ AND APOLINARIO LAURENA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 149603 Present: pUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Before us
for resolution is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2001 Decision[1]
and August 17, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62495,
entitled “Estate of Lim Ching, represented by Attorney Jose Lim, versus
Florencia L. Bacala, Dolores L. Mendoza, Juanita L. Alvarez and Apolinario C.
Laurena.”
The facts
are:
On
Sometime in 1936, Ireneo filed with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Maasin,
On
On appeal by Lim Ching, docketed as T-A
G.R. No. 2647, the Tribunal de Apelacion (now Court
of Appeals) rendered a Decision[3] dated
Lim Ching then continued exercising his
right of ownership. Upon his death, his
heirs, including Atty. Jose Lim, representing the estate of Lim Ching, herein
petitioner, inherited the land.
After 57 years, or in February 1996,
Ireneo’s heirs, herein respondents Florencia Bacala, Dolores L. Mendoza,
Juanita Alvarez, and Apolinario Laurena, took possession of the property
without the consent of Lim Ching’s heirs.
Respondents claimed they inherited it from Ireneo.
Several times, petitioner demanded that
respondents vacate the land but they refused.
Hence, on
In their answer to the complaint,[6] respondents
countered that petitioner has no cause of action as the land it is claiming is
different from the lot they have been occupying.
On
On
On
On October
16, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for summary judgment[9] based
on the Commissioner’s Report[10] and
the August 19, 1939 Decision of the Tribunal de Apelacion
(now Court of Appeals) in T-A G.R. No.
2647 declaring Lim Ching the owner of the property. As mentioned earlier, Lim Ching is the
predecessor of Atty. Jose Lim representing herein petitioner.
On
On
On
x x
x
As borne out by the
evidence adduced by both parties during the trial, it was admitted that there
was a prior case that involved the predecessors in interests of both parties
and that the land or subject property is located at Barangay Cabagawan, St. Bernard, Sourthern
Leyte. Plaintiff averred and anchored
their claim of ownership over the subject property or a decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals dated
After examining and
evaluating the conflicting claim of the plaintiff and defendants, the
plaintiff’s claim deserves more
credence.
The RTC further
held that respondents failed to substantiate their defense that the area they
are claiming is different from the land in controversy.
The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] reads:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT
OF THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants. The plaintiff is declared
as the legal owner and possessor of the land in litigation and the defendant is
hereby ordered to:
1. To respect said ownership and
possession by the plaintiff;
2. To vacate from the land in question
immediately and demolish all structures built on the premises of the subject
property;
3. To jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff the sums of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, P1,691.50 as exemplary damages to deter others from committing the same
act.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 62495.
On
The issue raised
in this petition is whether a summary judgment may be rendered by the trial
court.
Summary judgment
is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, reproduced hereunder:
SECTION
1. Summary judgment for claimant.
– A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time, after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
The
theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear
to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or
fictitious, the court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment.[17] It was devised to aid parties in avoiding
the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.[18]
In this case,
the parties agreed that a committee be formed to conduct an ocular inspection
to determine whether they are claiming the same property. The
trial court approved the finding of the committee, stated in the Commissioner’s
Report, that respondents are claiming a property which is also being claimed by
petitioner. Considering that the parties
agreed to the formation of a committee, they are bound by its finding. It is settled that when a referee (the
commissioners in this case) is appointed, he becomes for the time being an
accredited agent and an officer of the court, and the reference is clearly a
judicial proceeding. What the referee
does while acting within the scope of his official duty is, therefore, in the
contemplation of law, done by the court itself. Hence, his conclusions must be assumed to
be correct until error is properly shown,[19]
which is not so in the present case.
It must be
recalled that respondents’ main defense is that they are occupying a property
different from that being claimed by petitioner. Consequently, based on the Commissioner’s
Report, respondents failed to prove that they are the rightful owners of the
disputed land considering that what they own is a different area.
At any rate, petitioner
has shown that as early as
Clearly, a
summary judgment was correctly rendered by the trial court since there was no
more genuine factual issue to be resolved.
It is settled
that a court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on
motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved,
except the amount of damages. In such
event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[20]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62495 are REVERSED.
The Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-448 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO AZCUNA Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate
Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (both
retired).
[2] Records,
pp. 294-297.
[3]
[4] Rollo,
pp. 50-56.
[5] Records,
pp. 2-8.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
Annex “E,” Rollo, pp. 50-56.
[17] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 152154,
[18] Cotabato
Timberland Company, Inc. v. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 145469,
May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 227.
[19] Justice
Jose Y. Feria (Ret.) and Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Civil Procedure,
Annotated, Vol. 1, pp. 591-592, citing Kriedt v. E.C. McCullough &
Co., 37 Phil. 482 (1918).
[20] Cotabato
Timberland Company, Inc. v. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc., supra,
citing Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 88,
95 (1997).