FIRST DIVISION
URSULA
MAGLENTE, CONSOLACION G.R. No. 148182
BERJA,
MERCEDITA FERRER,
THELMA
ABELLA and ANTONIO NGO,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s
- CORONA,
AZCUNA* and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. PRISCILLA BALTAZAR-
PADILLA, in her capacity
as the
Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Manila
Branch 38, VISITACION
GABELO,
ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA
PEREZ,
ERLINDA TRAQUENA, BEN
CARDINAL,
EDUARDO TRAQUENA, LEOPOLDO
TRAQUENA, MARIFE TUBALAS,
ULYSIS MATEO, JOCELYN
FERNANDEZ,
ALFONSO PLACIDO, LEONARDO
TRAQUENA, SUSAN RENDON and
MATEO TRINIDAD,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March
7, 2007
x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the order[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 20, 2001, denying
petitioners’ motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in their favor.
The antecedent facts follow.
On January 15, 1985, Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a 687.80-square meter parcel of land at 400
Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, entered into a
contract of lease for three years with one of the petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was stated that, if PRC were to
sell the leased property, Maglente would be given the
first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Both parties likewise agreed
that the lessee was prohibited from subleasing any portion of the property
without the consent of the lessor. However, after the
execution of the lease contract, petitioner Maglente subleased
portions of the property to respondents.
On March 9, 1987, when the lease
contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the leased property
to Maglente. In response, the latter intimated that
she would exercise her right of first refusal to purchase the property with
co-petitioners as her co-buyers. In February 1989, PRC received a letter from
respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same property.
On February 23, 1989, PRC filed a
complaint for interpleader[2] in the
RTC against both petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among
themselves on who had the right to purchase the property.[3] On March
11, 1991, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as
the rightful parties to purchase PRC’s property. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Declaring [petitioners] Ursula Maglente,
Consolacion Berja, Mercedita Ferrer, Thelma Abella and Antonio Ngo as the rightful [parties] to
purchase the land in controversy; and
2.
Ordering…[PRC] to execute the corresponding contract of sale/contract to sell
in favor of [petitioners] aforementioned in accordance with this Decision
within 30 days from notice hereof.[4]
Dissatisfied
with the above decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Undaunted,
respondents found their way to this Court, assigning as sole error the ruling
of the CA upholding the right of petitioners. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
111743.
On October
8, 1999, we affirmed the decision of the CA and denied respondents’ petition
for lack of merit.[5] We declared:
In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was
already perfected – PRC offered the subject lot for sale to [petitioners] Maglente and her group… Respondent Maglente
and her group accepted such offer…manifesting their intention to purchase the
property as provided for under the lease contract. Thus, there was already an
offer and acceptance giving rise to a valid contract. As a matter of fact,
[petitioners] have already completed payment of their downpayment
of P100,000. Therefore, as borne by evidence on record, the requisites
under Article 1318 of the Civil Code for a perfected contract have been met.
On April 11, 2000,[6] we ordered
entry of judgment.
On motion of
petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued by the RTC directing PRC to
execute the contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners.
As ordered, PRC
executed a “deed of sale” in favor of petitioners. The latter then filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession but respondents (who were
occupying the property) objected on the ground that the trial court’s decision
on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners’
right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners
entitled to possession. The trial court sustained respondents’ argument and
denied petitioners’ motion.[7]
Petitioners are
now before us via this special civil action for certiorari raising this sole query:
whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged
(in the interpleader case) as the proper parties to
buy the subject property, considering that a “deed of sale” has already been
executed in their favor.[8]
In this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners assail the Manila RTC’s
denial of their motion for the issuance of the writ of possession. However,
they do not allege that the trial court was without jurisdiction or exceeded
its jurisdiction, or that it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
said motion, as required in all Rule 65 petitions.
The remedy
of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial
functions without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.[9]
It must be based on jurisdictional grounds like want of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion; otherwise, any error committed by it will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be questioned only on ordinary
appeal.[10]
Considering,
however, that a question of law[11] is
involved, that is, whether a writ of possession should be granted to a party
with the right of first refusal in an interpleader
case, we give due course to this petition.
Indeed,
should petitioners be granted the writ of possession they seek? We rule in the negative.
A writ of
possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration
proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3)
judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and
no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.[12] Here, petitioners seek the writ as a
consequence of the trial court’s decision ordering the execution of a contract
of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.
Furthermore,
the trial court’s decision in the interpleader case (affirmed
by both the CA and the SC) merely resolved the question of who, between
petitioners and respondents, had the right to purchase PRC’s
property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in
favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else. The trial court’s
writ of execution read:
NOW THEREFORE, [PRC] is hereby ordered to execute a
contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of [petitioners] within thirty (30)
days from the date of execution hereof. The Branch Sheriff shall return
this Writ to the Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt… until
the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity
expires. The returns of periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken and shall be filed with the Court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties…[13]
(emphasis supplied)
It was clear
that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The
execution of the “deed of sale” in their favor was only preliminary to their
eventual acquisition of the property.[14]
Likewise, although we stated in G.R. No. 111743[15] that the
contract of sale between petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained
from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale
or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.[16]
Thus, petitioners’
argument that the trial court’s writ of execution[17] in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a
writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ
of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been
validly determined in a case directly relating to either.[18] The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
Furthermore,
the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor
of the judgment but must strictly conform to it.[19] It should
be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life and not exceed it.[20] We thus
cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to
petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the trial court’s judgment
in the interpleader case.
Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession
of the property via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in
court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay
their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method without
subverting the rules and processes established for the orderly administration
of justice.
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On official leave)
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Issued by Judge Priscilla Baltazar Padilla (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals), dated April 20, 2001; rollo, pp. 27-29.
[2] Rule 62. Section 1. When interpleader proper.― Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
[3] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-48037.
[4] Decided by Judge Arturo U. Zarias, Jr., rollo, pp. 31-39.
[5] Penned by Justice Fidel P. Purisima (retired), with the concurrence of (retired) Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Jose C. Vitug, Artemio V. Panganiban and Minerva Reyes, Third Division; rollo, pp. 40-48.
[6] Id., p. 50.
[7] Id., pp. 27-29.
[8] Petition, rollo, p. 14.
[9] Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 615 (1999).
[10] Jalandoni v. Drilon, 383 Phil. 855 (2000).
[11] BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 507 (1988).
[12] Canlas v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160; See also Idolor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161028, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 396.
[13] Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[14] Petitioners later on obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title over the subject property.
[15] Supra note 5.
[16] Under Article 1478 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
[17] Supra note 8.
[18] Eternal Garden Park v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 369 (1998); See also Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131641, 23 February 2000, 326 SCRA 338, Isaguirre v. De Lara, G.R. No. 138053, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 803.
[19] Paylago v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 38152, 20 September 1990, 189 SCRA 727; Laingco v. Camilo, No. L-35883, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 144.
[20] Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, supra.