MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners, -
versus - THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Respondents. |
G.R. No. 148117 Present: PUNO, c.j., Chairperson,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: March 22, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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Assailed
in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The
facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:
In
an Information dated
That
on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema
National Highway at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other
and without any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft.
of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging
to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the
GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The
case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet
(presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.
When
arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
then ensued.
The
evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6,
1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station
received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No.
AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.
SPO2
Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1
Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly
established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
At
around
The
police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables,
like womboc[3] and
chili.
When
SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under
it. The driver and his companions admitted
they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and
investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos.
Only petitioners were charged with
violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
After
the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a “Motion
to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution” on the ground that the pieces of
Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.
In
a Resolution[4] dated
Petitioners
then filed a motion for reconsideration.
Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated
Subsequently,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions of
the trial court.
On
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a Resolution[5] dated
Hence,
the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have
a probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal
cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant.
In
this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the
right of a person to privacy against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of
the State. This right to undisturbed
privacy is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Section
3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of
the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Hence,
as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial
warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a
constitutional right.[6]
The
above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,[7] we
listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without warrant,
thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence
in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances. The only
requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.[8] In People v. Aruta,[9] we
ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed. There is no hard
and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its
determination varies according to the facts of each case.
Here,
the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search
and seizure may be conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether
there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and seizure.
We
recall that at around
In
People v. Vinecarao,[10] we
ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade
the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause
to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the
persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle
contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present
case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless
search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 27-37. Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos concurring (all retired).
[2] The Revised Forestry Code, as amended by P.D. No. 865, P.D. No. 1559, Batas Pambansa Blg. 83, P.D. No. 1775 (January 14, 1981), Executive Order No. 277, s. 1987, and Republic Act No. 7161.
[3] Chinese cabbage,
also known in Cordillera dialects as “wongbok.”
[4] Rollo, pp. 81-86.
[5]
[6] Lui v. Matillano, G.R. No.
141176,
[8] Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Español, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005, 453 SCRA 360, 371, citing People v. Aruta, infra note 9.
[10] G.R. No. 141137,