THIRD
DIVISION
|
BARSTOWE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus- REPUBLIC OF
THE
Respondent. |
|
G.R. No.
133110 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,*J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR.,** CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside the
Decision,[2]
dated 8 August 1997, and Resolution,[3]
dated 18 March 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47522, which in
turn, reversed and set aside the Decision,[4]
dated 22 December 1992, of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806.
Antecedent
Facts
This case
involves the conflicting titles to the same parcels of land (subject lots) of
petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation (BPC) and
the respondent Republic of the
BPC traces its titles to the subject lots
back to Servando Accibal (Servando) who was supposedly issued on 24 July 1974, at
3:20 p.m., Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 200629
and 200630 over the subject lots.
TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were purportedly
signed by Nestor N. Pena, Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. On P6,000,000.00.[5] About a year after the death of Servando on P49,000,000.00.[6] Due to the fire that gutted the Office of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds on
Meanwhile, according to the
Republic, prior to P2,757,360.00. Thus, on P9,575,920.00. On
Civil Case
No. Q-92-11806
Counsel for Antonio and the late Servando filed two successive Motions for extension of time
to file the proper pleading, dated 17 June 1992 and 1 July 1992, but despite
the grant thereof by the RTC,[7]
no such responsive pleading on behalf of Antonio and the late Servando was ever filed.
Hence, on
In another Order,[9]
also dated
Considering the plight of
[BPC] and the possible irreparable damage that may be caused against the
residents in the surrounding developed subdivision, even as said corporation is
possessed of a good title, the court in the exercise of its discretion grants
the motion. More importantly,
consideration of equity demands that the titled owner [BPC] herein must be able
to exercise all its dominical right bloosoming [sic]
forth from its ownership of the land in suit.
WHEREFORE, under cool
reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the
motion is hereby granted. [BPC] is
hereby permitted and allowed to continue with the improvement and development
of the controverted property into a residential
subdivision.[10]
On
While Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 was
still pending before the RTC, there were two intervenors.
Gloria Accibal Rettoriano (Gloria) filed with the RTC a Motion for
Intervention, with a Complaint in Intervention, both dated P2,000,000.00; the RTC, Branch 76, after finding that the said
Compromise Agreement was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy, approved the same, thus putting an end to Civil Case
No. Q-91-10933;[11] Gloria’s cause of action
to intervene in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 was already barred by prior judgment
in Civil Case No. Q-91-10933 and Gloria’s Complaint in Intervention is
tantamount to a collateral attack against a TCT. In rejecting Gloria’s intervention in Civil
Case No. Q-92-11806, the RTC found as follows –
The motion for intervention must be denied and the
complaint in intervention therein attached must be rejected.
For one thing, herein movant Gloria Accibal Rettoriano, was the plaintiff in the first case (RTC Br. 76
No. Q-91-10933) and with “eyes wide open” she entered into a compromise
agreement with [BPC], which was the basis of the 26 February 1992 decision
rendered therein and it being based on a compromise agreement, said decision
became immediately final and executory.
Whether or not the decision
rendered in the first case was satisfied is of no moment in the present case,
as herein movant intervenor
has all the remedies to protect her rights therein.
For another, movant intervenor Gloria Accibal Rettoriano, from her
complaint in intervention would ask for the cancellation of the titles issued
to their [sic] relative Servando Accibal and those titles duly issued and registered in the
name of [BPC]. Certainly, this can not
be done, as it constitutes a collateral attack on the questioned titles which
the law and settled jurisprudence do not allow.
Perforce, a separate action against the questioned titles is the remedy
available for intervenor Gloria A. Retoriano [sic].
Accordingly, the Court finds
the opposition of [BPC] to be impressed with merit and the motion for
intervention does not inspire confidence.
WHEREFORE, the subject
motion for intervention is denied and the complaint in intervention attached
thereto must be rejected.[12]
Another intervenor in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 was EL-VI Realty
and Development Corporation (ERDC) which filed with the RTC a Motion for Leave
to Intervene, dated
After all the parties had submitted
their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[14]
and upon motion by the BPC,[15]
the RTC decided the case on
3. To the third issue, we rule that the
title of [BPC] must prevail over that of the [Republic].
There
is no dispute that the titles of the First Philippine Holdings Corporation,
predecessor-in-interest of [Republic] were either issued in the year 1979 and
1981 (Exh. “A” and “B”). On the other hand, there is likewise no
dispute that the titles of defaulted defendant Servando
Accibal, and predecessor-in-interest of [BPC], were
both issued and registered much earlier on
MORE,
Servando Accibal, the
predecessor-in-interest of [BPC] has been in the actual and peaceful physical
possession of the lots in suit before he sold them to [BPC] on
It is
true [Republic] acquired the land in suit on
Simply
stated, [Republic] may be guilty of LACHES.
x x x x
Perforce,
the claim of [Republic] which was probably originally VALID became a
STALE claim as the years went by.
Verily, the titles of [Republic] must be cancelled and the titles of
[BPC] must be upheld and declared as good and valid titles and [BPC] is
entitled to all the rights bloosoming [sic]
fourth from its dominical right of ownership.
More
importantly, the predecessor-in-interest of [BPC] had been long in the actual
and physical possession of the lands in suit, while that of the
predecessor-in-interest of [Republic] was not in the actual possession of the
land before the sale to [Republic]. On
the other hand, [BPC] immediately after the sale in its favor took actual,
physical and peaceful possession of the land in suit to the exclusion of all
others. It has no knowledge, actual or
constructive that said parcels of land were sold to the [Republic]. When it registered the sale, there was no
inscription in the Land Registry that the same parcels of land were earlier
sold to the [Republic]. Hence, there was
and is – a continuing good faith on the part of [BPC]. (Article 1544, NCC; Cruz
vs Cabana, 129 SCRA 656).
In the same Decision, the RTC found
certain irregularities in TCTs No. 200629 and 200630
in the name of Servando and that the said TCTs should be cancelled, without prejudice to the rights
and interests of BPC. The RTC discussed
the matter in this wise –
We shall now dwell on the
validity of the titles – TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630, issued in the name of Servando Accibal on
However, the cancellation of
the titles of Servando Accibal,
would not affect the rights and interests of [BPC] as the latter is declared to
be a purchaser in good faith and for value.
MORE, under the circumstances of the case, and even when the titles of Servando Accibal are cancelled,
the titles of [BPC] are still good and indefeasible titles, as it is settled
rule that good titles may be sustained even when the seller has spurious
titles.
As for the
intervention of ERDC, the RTC addressed the same as follows –
Finally,
we shall next discuss the claim of intervenor EL-VI
Realty and Development Corporation. A
close reading from the Joint Venture Agreement dated P1,500,000.00 was received
by [BPC] as advance payment of the 50-50 sharing basis in the sales
proceeds. During the pre-trial
conference, herein intervenor tried to enforce a
supplemental agreement dated
MORE,
due to the filing of the present case, herein intervenor
was reluctant to further finance the project because of its big exposure
already made. Hence, intervenor’s
works and other activities in the area was suspended in accordance with their Joint
Venture Agreement.
Perforce,
there is compelling necessity for a proper accounting, more particularly its
substantial exposure to the project, on a quantum meruit
basis, in fairness to all concerned and involved parties in the project,
including but not limited to the present contractor-developer of the area.
Finally, the RTC concluded that –
A
FORTIORARI, the environmental setting and factual scenario of the case, in
relation to its legal ambience will show that the great preponderance of
evidence lies in favor of [BPC]. (Section 01, Rule 133, Revised Rules of
Court), and the motion for summary judgment is granted. The hearing as to damages, including
attorney’s fees shall be scheduled soonest possible.
WHEREFORE,
under cool reflection and prescinding from the
foregoing, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Transfer Certificates
of Title No. 275443 and 288417 issued in the name of the [Republic] covering
the lots in suit. However, [Republic] being
a purchaser in good faith, and based on considerations of equity and justice Barstowe Philippine[s] Corporation is ordered to re-imburse and pay [Republic], the sum of P12,333,280.00
representing the purchase price from the vendor, First Philippine Holdings
Corporation soonest possible;
2. Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to officially and finally cancel
from his records, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 200629 and 200630 issued
in the name of Servando Accibal,
on
3. Declaring herein defendant Barstowe Philippines Corporation as the absolute owner in
fee simple title over the lots in suit, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 30829, 30830, 30831 and 30832 of the land records of Quezon City, all issued on February 19, 1991 and the said
titles are further more declared valid, existing and indefeasible titles of
[BPC] and as such is entitled to all the dominical rights bloosoming
[sic] forth from its ownership over the lots in suit.
4. Ordering [BPC] to abide by
and strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the supplemental Agreement
entered into by it with herein intervenor EL-VI
Realty and Development Corporation dated
5. Perforce, the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City is likewise ordered to cancel
any and all encumbrances annotated on said titles of defendant corporation
including, but not limited to the lis pendens notice filed by the [Republic], if any;
6. The hearing as to damages,
including the claim for attorney’s fees shall be scheduled soonest.
7. Considering the admissions
and agreements of the parties during the pre-trial conference, which are
considered judicial admissions, this decision acquires the nature of one based
on a compromise agreement. Perforce, the
Court declares this decision to be immediately final and executory.
8. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Despite the
promulgation of the foregoing Decision by the RTC on
ERDC sought
the execution of paragraph 4 of the dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision dated P18,543,000.00, representing 65% of
the total claims (prior to proper accounting) of ERDC, which amounted to P28,787,306.32. However, ERDC refused the offer of BPC and
demanded that it be paid the total amount of its claims. It also brought to the attention of the RTC
that, in violation of their Joint Venture Agreement, BPC contracted another
realty developer for the development of Parthenon Hills. Thus, ERDC opposed the lifting of the notice
of levy on execution on the subject lots for the protection of its interests. In an Order,[19]
dated P18,543,000.00, representing 65% of the total
claims of ERDC. Unfortunately, the
records no longer show the succeeding incidents concerning these motions.
In a Motion
for Leave to Intervene[25]
dated
New intervenor
Kadakilaan Estate alleges that the titles of the
[Republic] and [Antonio, Servando, and BPC] are all
falsified, spurious in origin and null and void ab initio, as the property in question were already registered
as private properties of [Kadakilaan Estate’s]
predecessors-in-interest, under Spanish Mortgage law since May 18, 1891, and
under the Torrens System, Act No. 496, as amended, in Titulo
dela propriedad de Terrenos No. 01-4.
If this is clearly so, then
[Kadakilaan Estate] is attacking the validity of the
titles of [Republic] and [Antonio, Servando, and BPC]
in this case. It is settled rule that
titles registered under the Torrens System cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack. Perforce, the remedy
of [Kadakilaan Estate] is to file a separate
action. For, if the intervention is
allowed at this late stage of the proceedings, then it will cause unnecessary
delay in the soonest termination of this case.
MORE, the law and the rules
as well as jurisprudence on the matter, will only allow in the court’s
discretion, intervention, before or during the trial. Certainly NOT after the trial and with more
reason intervention may no longer be allowed after the decision has been
rendered as in the present case.
In the
meantime, on
Considering these judicial
dimensions and acquiescence of the [Republic] in open court during the hearings
held and during the pre-trial conference, the court in its dispositive
portion of the questioned decision, declared it to be a judgment based on a
compromise agreement which by operation of law becomes immediately executory.
It is unfortunate that
despite the above declarations of the court [Republic] failed to ask for a
clarification of the said declarations, by way of a motion for reconsideration
of the decision based on fraud, mistake or duress mandated by the rules.
The notice of appeal must be
denied due course.
x x
x x
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, the notice of appeal filed
by plaintiff is rejected and denied due course.
From the foregoing RTC Order, the
Republic filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus (with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 30647. The Republic primarily questioned the denial
of its Notice of Appeal by the RTC in its Order, dated
We find the stance of
[Republic] and [BPC] well-grounded. Not
only is [Kadakilaan Estate] precluded by estoppel from filing the present motion, after failing to
challenge before this Court or the Supreme Court the trial court’s denial of
subject motion for intervention, on
In a Decision,[32]
dated
We rule for [Republic]. Respondent Court’s conclusion lost sight of the
nature of a compromise agreement, and the circumstances under which a judgment
based on a compromise may be rendered.
x x
x x
Guided by the aforecited law and jurisprudence in point, it can be safely
concluded that neither mere silence or acquiescence by the [Republic] in open
court during the hearing nor [Republic’s] stipulation of facts, marking of
exhibits, alleged admission of Exhibit 6 which contains [BPC’s]
offer of compromise during the pre-trial, be properly considered as a
compromise agreement. Had the parties
really intended to enter into a compromise to end their case, they could have
executed and submitted a compromise agreement for the approval of the trial
court. But no such step was taken.
x x
x x
Records readily show that
due to lack of an amicable settlement or any compromise agreement, the
respondent judge directed the parties to present their documentary exhibits so
as to facilitate the trial; no longer for the purpose of settling the
case. Evidently, there was no explicit
agreement nor any reciprocal concession between the parties with an end in view
of terminating the litigation. Absence
of these essential elements of a compromise inevitably results in the absence
of a valid compromise agreement. (Merced vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop,
L-24614, August 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1077).
Consequently, the opinion of respondent Judge that his December 22, 1992
Decision had the nature of a judgment based on compromise, cannot be upheld.
So also, the doctrine relied
on by respondents that a compromise agreement constitutes the law between the
parties and a judgment based thereon is immediately final, executory
and not appealable, is inapplicable under the
premises.
x x
x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED; the questioned order dated
This Court,
in its Resolution, dated
CA-G.R. CV
No. 47522
Finally, the Republic was allowed to
appeal the RTC Decision, dated
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, plaintiff-appellant Republic of the
(a) declaring and affirming the validity of TCT
Nos. 288417 and 275443 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in the name of appellant Republic of the Philippines and that appellant
Republic has indefeasible title to the property covered thereby;
(b) declaring TCT Nos. 30829,
30830, 30831 and 30832 also of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in the name of Barstowe Philippines Corporation
null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel said titles;
(c) ordering Barstowe
Philippines Corporation to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City the owner’s duplicate certificates of title of
TCT Nos. 30829, 30830, 30831 and 30832 for cancellation;
(d) enjoining defendant-appellee Barstowe Philippines
Corporation and intervenor EL-VI Realty Development
Corporation from exercising any act of ownership or possession of the land in
question; and
(e) remanding the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings for determination of the crossclaim of intervenor EL-VI
Realty and Development Corporation against defendant-appellee
Barstowe Philippines Corporation.
There is no pronouncement as
to costs.
The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by BPC was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution,[34]
dated
G.R. No.
133110
Aggrieved, BPC came before this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari[35]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THE GOOD FAITH OF [BPC] THOUGH
IT WAS ADMITTED BY [REPUBLIC] DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF
[REPUBLIC] OVER THAT OF [BPC.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ORDERING [BPC] TO SURRENDER ITS TITLE TO THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR CANCELLATION[.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ENJOINING [BPC] FROM EXERCISING ACTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND[.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALES [sic] ERRED IN APPLYING THE CALALANG CASE (231 SCRA 88) AS IT
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR[.]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [REPUBLIC] GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES[.]
After the Republic filed its Comment, dated
Winnie U. Nicolas (Nicolas), through her sister and
attorney-in-fact, Ditas Felicitas
Nicolas-Agbulos (Nicolas-Agbulos),
and Edgardo Q. Abesamis (Abesamis), filed their respective Petitions for
Intervention, dated 22 October 1998 and 9 December 1998, respectively.
Nicolas-Agbulos invokes
the provisions of the Rules of Court on the joinder
of indispensable parties and necessary parties for the complete determination
of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as
regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. Nicolas-Agbulos
contends that she was a buyer in good faith of Lots No. 27 and 28, Block 13, of
Parthenon Hills, covered by TCTs No. 76497 and 76498,
respectively, of the Quezon City Register of Deeds,
derived from TCTs No. 30830, 30831, and 30832 in the
name of BPC. Nicolas-Agbulos
had already partially paid BPC for Lots No. 27 and 28 in the amount of P1,500,000.00,
and the balance of P800,000.00 was already deposited in a trust account
in the name of BPC with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). She bought Lots No. 27 and 28 after relying
on the face of the TCTs of BPC which were intact and
subsisting in the records of the Quezon City Register
of Deeds, and on the authority granted to BPC by several government agencies,
such as the HLURB, LRA, and the Register of Deeds, for the subdivision,
development, and sale of the subject lots to private individuals. She only came to know, through her sister and
attorney-in-fact, Nicolas-Agbulos, that the TCTs of BPC covering the subject lots, which comprised the
Parthenon Hills, were being assailed in Civil Case No. Q-92-11806 pending
before the RTC. Nicolas’ inquiry on the
matter was answered by BPC with an assurance that despite the “bad publicity,”
Parthenon Hills was an on-going project and that she should continue paying her
installments. Acting cautiously, Nicolas-Agbulos decided that instead of paying the balance of the
purchase price for Lots No. 27 and 28 directly to BPC, she would open a trust
account with FEBTC in the name of BPC where she would deposit Nicolas-Agbulos’ succeeding installment payments. Nicolas-Agbulos was
compelled to intervene in the instant case because BPC made no mention of the
fact that it had already sold numerous subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills to
innocent purchasers for value, either through absolute or installment
sales. She thus sought a ruling
upholding the title of BPC, and recognizing and protecting the rights of
Nicolas as an innocent purchaser for value of Lots No. 27 and 28.[36]
Abesamis seeks to intervene in the present case as an
indispensable party since no complete and conclusive determination can be had
therein, which shall be legally binding and effective on Abesamis,
unless he be allowed to intervene. Abesamis claims to have acquired by purchase Lot No. 16,
Block 4, of Parthenon Hills, for the purchase price of P720,000.00, and
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
A third Petition in Intervention, dated
BPC supports the intervention in the case by Nicolas-Agbulos
and Abesamis.
It explains that its failure to mention that it has already practically
sold all the subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills was not by design, but by mere
oversight.[39] However, BPC opposes the intervention of the
spouses Santiago claiming that the latter are not indispensable parties to the
case; they acquired their TCTs through fraudulent
means; and Civil Case No. 93-18231 which it instituted against the spouses
Santiago was dismissed by the Quezon City RTC, Branch
84, without prejudice. According to BPC,
the supply agreement for construction materials was between the spouses
The Republic opposed all efforts of other parties to intervene in the
case. The legal interests of Nicolas-Agbulos, Abesamis, and the
spouses
In the interim, BPC filed its Reply dated
This Court,
in a Resolution, dated
Thereafter, BPC,[43]
the Republic,[44]
spouses
However,
even before the case could be submitted for decision, Servando’s
heirs, namely Virgilio V. Accibal
(Virgilio), Virginia A. Macabudbod
(
Without formally intervening in the
case at bar, Sariling Sikap
Pabahay (SSP), through its President, Elias V. Esraita, submitted to this Court a letter,[49]
dated 26 August 2002, together with other documents to disprove the validity of
the titles of Servando and his heirs to the subject
lots. SSP is a cooperative formed by the
urban poor to help secure for its members award from the government of titles
to the portions of the subject lots which they are presently occupying. It presented the affidavit of a certain Edith
C. Mantaring,[50]
who attests that the Accibals are still
misrepresenting themselves as owners of the subject lots and fraudulently
selling portions thereof to unsuspecting buyers.
This
Court’s Ruling
Ultimately,
this Court is called upon to determine which party now has superior title to
the subject lots: the Republic, BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, and
spouses
BPC,
the intervenors Abesamis,
Nicolas-Agbulos, spouses
It is alleged by BPC and Servando’s heirs that Servando
was issued TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 on
An investigation conducted by the LRA
revealed even more irregularities which raised serious doubts as to the
validity and authenticity of TCTs No. 200629 and
200630. The LRA Report, dated
First, it should be noted that
despite letters sent by Investigator Flestado to BPC
President Ipo, Servando,
and Antonio, requesting copies of documents to support the issuance of TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, they failed to file a reply and
furnish him with the documents requested.
A certain Atty. Justino Z. Benito (Atty. Benito)
appeared before Investigator Flestado claiming to be
the counsel for BPC and promising to contact Servando’s
heirs. Yet, even by the time the LRA
Report was finalized on
Second, although the 109-D
forms on which TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were
printed appeared to be genuine, and determined to have been issued to the Quezon City Register of Deeds on
A. At a glance, I am definitely sure that
the signatures appearing here are not mine.
My attention is invited on the loop, on the starting point of the signature. The loop should be sharp on the last portion
of my signature. The portion going-up
starts from a point and is also sharp because that represents hypen [sic] on letter ‘n’. I notice in these titles my surname is typed
as ‘PENA’ and not ‘PEÑA’. If ever there
is no ‘ñ’ in the typewriter, I used to add hypen [sic]
over the letter ‘n’. Besides, my
position here is indicated as Deputy Register of Deeds. I never signed titles as Deputy Register of
Deeds, during my time; and if ever a title was presented indicating my position
as Deputy Register of Deeds, I would erase the word ‘Deputy’. Moreso, the pen
used here was a sign-pen. I never used a signpen, as
shown in the other 5 titles I identified earlier.
His
employment records revealed that Atty. Peña was
appointed as the Quezon City Register of Deeds on 27
May 1968, and served as such until his retirement in August of 1980, so that at
the time when he supposedly signed TCTs No. 200629
and 200630 on 24 July 1974, he was the Quezon City
Register of Deeds, not the Deputy Register of Deeds.
Third, even the then incumbent
Fourth,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), upon request of Investigator Flestado, conducted an examination and issued Questioned
Documents Report No. 636-991, dated 31 March 1992, wherein it noted significant
differences in the handwriting characteristics between the standard/sample
signatures of Atty. Peña and those appearing on TCTs No. 200629 and 200630, i.e., in the manner of
execution, direction/movement of strokes, and other identifying details. The NBI concluded that “[t]he questioned and
the standard/sample signatures of ‘[N]estor
Finally,
Investigator Flestado made inquiries with the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) regarding the consolidation-subdivision plan Pcs-2480
and plan Psu-32606 of Lots 34 and 40 (the subject lots) as described in TCTs No. 200629 and 200630.
LMB Geodetic Surveys Division Chief Privadi
J.G. Dalire, in a letter, dated
To rebut the
foregoing findings of LRA Investigator Flestado, BPC
presented, in support of the authenticity and validity of TCTs
No. 200629 and 200630, the LRA Resolution,[52]
dated
The LRA Resolution in Consulta No. 1957 merely allowed the registration of the rescission of a Joint Venture Agreement on TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 despite the initial adverse finding that the said certificates were of doubtful authenticity. It did not make any categorical finding as to the authenticity or validity of the TCTs. In fact, the last paragraph of the said Resolution elucidated that –
This resolution, however,
should be understood to be limited to the issue of registrability
of the instrument sought to be registered and is without prejudice
to any action, if warranted, that may be filed in court assailing the validity
or authenticity of the certificate of titles.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 585-891 was even in accordance with the finding in the LRA Report that the 109-D forms on which TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were printed seemed to be genuine. The NBI concluded that the words “109-D” and the serial numbers printed on the forms were not altered. The NBI did a very limited examination of the genuineness of the forms on which TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were printed, but it did not look into the authenticity of Atty. Peña’s signature (which was the subject of NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 636-991, dated 31 March 1992, mentioned in the LRA Report) or the accuracy of the entries made therein.
The LRA Report,
dated
It having been
established that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were
forged and spurious, their reconstitution was also attended with grave
irregularities. Once more, this Court
relies on the findings in the LRA Report, dated
In contrast, the Republic was able to supply Investigator Flestado with the documents supporting the transfer of the titles to the subject lots from FPHC to the Republic, among which were the TCTs of FPHC, the Deeds of Sale executed by FPHC to the Republic, notice to the real property owners within 300-meter radius from the area, receipts for payment of registration fees, and payment order for the documentary stamp tax on the sales. TCTs No. 275443 and 288417 in the name of the Republic were included in LRA Folder No. 1976-B, together with other certificates of title in the name of the Republic. One of the applications filed by the Republic was docketed as Application for Reconstitution No. 41869. The Chief of the LRA Micrographics and Computer Division confirmed that the applications for reconstitution of TCTs No. 275443 and 288417 by the Republic were recorded in the computerized Administrative Reconstitution System.
BPC was unable to attack the authenticity and validity of the titles of the Republic to the subject lots, and could only interpose the defense that it was a buyer in good faith. Only Servando’s heirs, in their Petition for New Trial, attempted to raise doubts as to the titles of the Republic to the subject lots by averring that the transfer thereof from FPHC to the Republic was highly irregular because the latter could have acquired the property by expropriation. Such an averment is totally baseless. Expropriation as the means by which the State can acquire private property is always the remedy of last resort. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner of the property to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price.[55] There being, in the present case, valid and subsisting contracts between the FPHC, the previous owner, and the Republic, the buyer, for the purchase of the subject lots at an agreed price, there was no reason for the expropriation.
.
In consideration of all the foregoing findings, it is indubitable that TCTs No. 275443 and 288417 of the Republic covering the subject lots are authentic and valid, while TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 of Servando covering the same property are not.
However, BPC
maintains that it was a purchaser in good faith, for value and without any
inkling about any flaw from Servando’s titles. It points out that it purchased the subject
lots from Servando on
Under Section 55 of the Land
Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an
original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof
on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the
rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.
A purchaser in good faith
and for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and
fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the property. In consonance with this accepted legal
definition, petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio
is a purchaser in good faith. There is no showing whatsoever nor even an
allegation that herein petitioner had any participation, voluntarily or
otherwise, in the alleged forgery.
x x
x x
The main purpose of the
Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need
of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonable cautious man to make
such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness
of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the
x x
x x
It has been consistently
ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an
innocent purchaser for value intervenes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor
without the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and
registration will not validate what otherwise is an invalid document. However,
where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the
true owner to the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely
upon what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
Now the question is whether BPC qualifies as an innocent purchaser for value which acquired valid titles to the subject lots, despite the fact that the titles of its predecessor-in-interest were found to be forged and spurious.
This Court finds in the negative.
Foremost
is the fact that there seem to be two documents by which titles to the subject
lots were transferred from the Accibals to BPC: (1) A
Deed of Conveyance, dated 8 February 1989, executed by Servando
in favor of BPC, transferring to the latter titles to the subject lots in
exchange for 51% of its capital stock; and (2) A Deed of Conveyance, dated 10
October 1990, executed by Antonio in favor of BPC, transferring to the latter
the very same property in exchange for 2,450 shares in BPC. It should be noted that even prior to these
Deeds of Conveyance, Servando already transferred the
subject lots by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 10 June 1988, in favor of
his son Antonio, with the concurrence of his other heirs. Thus, by the time Servando
executed the Deed of Conveyance over the subject lots in favor of BPC on
Furthermore,
BPC cannot really claim that it was a purchaser in good faith which relied upon
the face of Servando’s titles. It should be recalled that the Quezon City Register of Deeds caught fire on
In addition,
without the original copies and owner’s duplicate copies of TCTs
No. 200629 and 200630, BPC had to rely on the reconstituted certificates,
issued on
x x x
The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate Of Title of registered land
is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate Of Title.
Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation of the
registered owner that the original of the said TCT or the original of the
Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be located or found
despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore, are
subsequent copies of the originals thereof. A cursory examination of these
subsequent copies would show that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing with
such copies are put on notice of such fact and thus warned to be extra-careful.
x x x.[60]
The fact that the TCTs were reconstituted should have alerted BPC and its officers to conduct an inquiry or investigation as might be necessary to acquaint themselves with the defects in the titles of Servando.[61]
What
is more, BPC again invokes LRA Resolution, dated
Lastly,
there are serious doubts that BPC acquired the subject lots for value. The Republic bought the subject lots from
FPHC for the combined price of P12,333,280.00. BPC, on the other hand, supposedly acquired
the subject lots from Servando on P6,000,000.00. In the LRA Report, dated 10 June 1992,
Investigator Flestado pointed out that in the
Articles of Incorporation, dated 16 January 1989, of BPC, submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 20 January 1989, BPC had an
authorized capital stock of only P1,000,000.00, which was divided into
10,000 shares, with a par value of P100.00 each; and the amount of
capital stock actually subscribed was P250,000.00. Therefore, in 1989, fifty-one percent of the
capital stock of BPC would be 5,100 shares, with an aggregate value of only P510,000.00. BPC is not saved by the second Deed of
Conveyance, executed more than a year later by Antonio, again transferring to
BPC the subject lots in exchange for 2,450 shares in the latter, with the
alleged value of P49,000.000.00.
Unless BPC is able to present proof that it applied for, and the SEC
approved, a substantial increase in its capital stock, then this Court can only
assume that its capital stock remained the same as the year before, 2,450
shares in BPC, with a par value of P100.00 each, amount only to P245,000.00. This Court cannot find a plausible
explanation for the discrepancy in the value of 2,450 shares of BPC between the
P245,000.00 it has hereby computed and the P49,000,000.00 claimed
by BPC.
For the above-stated reasons, this Court cannot declare BPC an innocent purchaser for value, and it acquired no better titles to the subject lots than its predecessors-in-interest, Servando and Antonio.
At this point, it would seem that the Republic does hold better titles to the subject lots. Nonetheless, another level of transactions involving the subject lots was brought by intervenors to the attention of this Court.
From the reconstituted TCTs No. RT-23687 (200629)
and
Except for the spouses
It is true that the general rule is that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title.[63] A forged deed may be defined as an instrument which purports to have been executed by the person or persons whose signatures appear thereon, but which, in fact, was not executed, and the signatures thereon had been merely imitated so as to give them the deceptive appearance of genuineness.[64] In the case at bar, it was not any of the deeds of transfer or conveyance of the subject lots which was forged, but TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 themselves. The forged TCTs, nevertheless, just as a forged deed, can make it appear that one had title, right, or interest to the land, when in truth, he had none, to the deprivation of the rightful owner. It has been recognized that while a forged instrument is null and void and of no effect as between the parties, it may nevertheless be the root of a good title; so that the title of a registered owner who has taken it bona fide and for value, is not affected by reason of his claiming through someone, that the registration was void because it had been procured by the presentation of a forged instrument.[65]
The forged TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were later administratively
reconstituted, and although an investigation would show that their
reconstitution was also attended with irregularities, TCTs
No. RT-23687 (200629) and RT-23688 (200630) appear, on either face, to have
been duly approved by the LRA and issued by the Quezon
City Register of Deeds. With the
cancellation of the reconstituted TCTs and the issuance
of new ones, TCTs No. 30829, 30830, 30831, and 30832,
in the name of BPC, any trace of forgery or irregularity as to BPC’s titles was eliminated. TCTs No. 30829,
30830, 30831, and 30832 were clean, at least, until the annotation therein of
the notice of lis pendens
of the Republic on
This is
definitely a situation which constitutes an exception to the general rule that estoppel cannot lie against the government. The Republic v. Court of Appeals,[67]
provides an illuminating discourse on when such an exception applies, thus –
Is the immunity of the government from laches
and estoppel absolute? May it still recover the
ownership of lots sold in good faith by a private developer to innocent
purchasers for value, notwithstanding its approval of the subdivision plan and
its issuance of separate individual certificates of title thereto?
x x x x
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also
subject to exceptions, viz:
"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not
be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted
to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x
x the doctrine of equitable estoppel
may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals."
x x x x
Significantly, the other private respondents – Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya – bought such
"expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificates of
St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and
reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel
by laches against the government to avoid an
injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third
persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights
over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair public
confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to
the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all
persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or
the courts do not oblige, them to go behind the certificate in order to
investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only charged
with notice of the lions and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the
certificate.
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude,
they did not have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or
search for hidden defects or inchoate rights that could defeat their rights to
said lots. Although they were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the
titles, private respondents purchasers could not have had notice of defects
that only an inquiry beyond the face of the titles could have satisfied. The
rationale for this presumption has been stated thus:
"The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible
conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions, relative
thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc,
77 SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of
the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot
disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache,
et al., 73 Phil. 606)."
In another case, this Court further said:
"The Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece
of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should
not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after
all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were
permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would
be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System, should be
the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder
once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. [Italics supplied.]
Petitioner never presented
proof that the private respondents who had bought their lots from St. Jude were
buyers in bad faith. Consequently, their claim of good faith prevails. A
purchaser good faith and for value is
one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has
a right to or an interest in such property; and who pays a full and fair price
for the same at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person. Good faith is the honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another.
It also
bears to emphasize that the subject lots covered by TCTs
No. 30829, 30830, 30831, and 30832 were already subdivided, and new TCTs were issued in the names of the buyers of each
subdivision lot. To order the
cancellation of all these derivative titles and the return of the subdivision
lots to the Republic shall irrefragably be unjust to the innocent purchasers
for value and shall wreak havoc on the Torrens System.
Anyway, the
Republic is not without recourse. It can
claim damages from BPC, found herein not to be a buyer of the subject lots in
good faith. For its loss of portions of
the subdivision lots to innocent purchasers from BPC, the Republic may recover
from BPC the purchase price it paid to FPHC corresponding to such subdivision
lots, with interest at 6% per annum from 26 March 1992 (the date when the
Republic instituted its petition for the cancellation of the TCTs of Servando, Antonio, and
BPC) until finality of this Decision, and 12% per annum thereafter until fully
paid.[68]
Although this
Court allowed in the case at bar the intervention of Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, and
recognized their title to their respective subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills
as purchasers in good faith and for value from BPC, it could not do the same
for the spouses Santiago, for the reason that BPC contested their claim that
they had acquired titles to the subdivision lots in Parthenon Hills in good
faith and for value, and further asserted that the spouses Santiago acquired
the said subdivision lots by fraudulent means.
The allegations by the spouses
Though estoppel by laches may lie against the Republic when titles to the subdivision lots are already in the names of the respective innocent purchasers for value from BPC, it may not be used by BPC to defeat the titles of the Republic as regards the subdivision lots which remain unsold and the titles to which are still in the name of BPC. It must be recalled that BPC is not a purchaser in good faith. Estoppel, being an equitable principle, may only be invoked by one who comes to court with clean hands.[69]
Pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code concerning builders in bad faith provide that –
ART. 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work,
or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or
he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
ART. 451. In cases of the two preceding articles, the
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower
in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of
preservation of the land.
Hence, as far as the subdivision
lots still in the name of BPC are concerned, the Republic has the option to
either (1) recover the said lots and demand that BPC demolish whatever
improvements it has made therein, to return the lots to their former condition,
at the expense of BPC; or (2) compel BPC to pay the price of the land. The choice can only be made by the Republic,
as the rightful owner of the said subject lots.
Should the Republic choose the first option, BPC is under the obligation
to return the possession of the subdivision lots to the Republic and surrender
its corresponding TCTs for cancellation and issuance
of new ones in the name of the Republic.
Should the Republic select the second option, then BPC shall pay the
Republic the purchase price that the latter had paid to FPHC corresponding to
such subdivision lots, with interest at 6% per annum from
As for the Petition for New Trial filed by Servando’s heirs, this Court dismisses the same for lack of legal basis. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court reads –
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for
new trial or reconsideration. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the
aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final
order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of the said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved
party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented
would probably alter the result.
Servando’s heirs themselves admit that the
period allowed for the filing of a motion to set aside the judgment and grant a
new trial under the afore-quoted provision had already lapsed, but they still
pray that this Court give due course to their Petition on the grounds of justice
and equity.
In Malipol v. Lim Tan,[70] this Court
ruled that –
It is within the sound
discretion of the court to set aside an order of default and to permit a
defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the
reglementary period for the filing of the answer has expired, but it is not
error, or an abuse of discretion, on the part of the court to refuse to set
aside its order of default and to refuse to accept the answer where it finds no
justifiable reason for the delay in the filing of the answer. In the motions
for reconsideration of an order of default, the moving parry has the burden of
showing such diligence as would justify his being excused from not filing the
answer within the reglementary period as provided by the Rules of Court,
otherwise these guidelines for an orderly and expeditious procedure would be
rendered meaningless. Unless it is shown clearly that a party has justifiable
reason for the delay, the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in
his favor.
In the
present case, the late Servando and Antonio were
already declared in default by the RTC on
According to Servando’s heirs, due to the extrinsic fraud committed by the President and counsel of BPC, they were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the trial court. They allegedly relied on the assurance of the President and counsel of BPC that the latter shall also represent them and their interests in the subject lots in the case.
This allegation of fraud by Servando’s heirs has no leg to stand on. It should be recalled that the late Servando and Antonio were represented by a counsel at the beginning of the proceedings before the RTC. Their counsel even submitted two consecutive motions for extension of time to file the appropriate pleadings. There was no explanation provided as to why, despite the grant of said motions, the counsel still failed to file an answer to the Republic’s petition for cancellation of title. It is also contrary to common human experience that Servando’s heirs, by the mere assurance of the President and counsel of BPC, adopted a totally hands-off attitude in a case where they supposedly have substantial interest. There is no showing during the nine years when they were not participating in the court proceedings, that they, at least, inquired into or followed-up on the status of the case with BPC. Such blind trust in the President and counsel of BPC is surely difficult to comprehend, especially if this Court takes into account the contention of Servando’s heirs that BPC failed to deliver the shares of stock in exchange for the subject lots. What is apparent to this Court is not the alleged fraud committed by BPC but, rather, the inexcusable negligence of Servando’s heirs when it came to protecting their titles, rights, and interests to the subject lots, if indeed, there were still any.
Worth reproducing herein, is the conclusion[71] made by the Court of Appeals on Servando’s titles –
On the strength of the LRA
report, Exhibit H (Record, pp. 214-258), the court a quo found TCT Nos.
200629 and 200630, in the name of Servando Accibal and from which the titles of defendant-appellee Barstowe Philippines
Corporation were derived, spurious, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City “to officially and finally cancel (said titles)
from his records…” (Par. 2, dispositive portion,
Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 71). As explained by the court a quo:
“We shall now dwell on the
validity of the titles, – TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630, issued in the name of Servando Accibal on
This portion of the decision
ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. 200629 and 200630 in the name of Servando Accibal was not appealed
nor assigned as a counter-assigment of error in the
brief of Barstowe Philippines Corporation; hence, is
now final.
Thus, the findings of this Court as to the rights of the parties involved in the present case are summarized as follows –
(1)
The certificates of title acquired by Servando over the subject lots were forged and spurious,
and such finding made by both the RTC and Court of Appeals is already final and
binding on Servando’s heirs;
(2)
BPC did not acquire the subject lots in
good faith and for value, and its certificates of title cannot defeat those of
the Republic’s;
(3)
As between BPC and the Republic, the
latter has better titles to the subject lots being the purchaser thereof in
good faith and for value from FPHC;
(4)
However, considering that the subject lots had already been subdivided
and the certificates of title had been issued for each subdivision lot, which
were derived from the certificates of title of BPC, it is more practical,
convenient, and in consonance with the stability of the Torrens System that the
certificates of title of BPC and its derivative certificates be maintained,
while those of the Republic’s be cancelled;
(5)
Estoppel lies against the Republic for granting BPC
governmental permits and licenses to subdivide, develop, and sell to the public
the subject lots as Parthenon Hills.
Relying on the face of the certificates of title of BPC and the licenses
and permits issued to BPC by government agencies, innocent individuals,
including intervenors Nicolas-Agbulos
and Abesamis, purchased subdivision lots in good
faith and for value;
(6)
The claims of the intervenor spouses
(7)
Certificates of title over portions of the subject lots, acquired by
purchasers in good faith and for value, from BPC, are valid and indefeasible,
even as against the certificates of title of the Republic. The Republic, however, is entitled to recover
from BPC the purchase price the Republic paid to FPHC for the said portions,
plus appropriate interests; and
(8)
As portions of the subject lots are still unsold and their corresponding
certificates of title remain in the name of BPC, the Republic may exercise two
options: (a) It may recover the said portions and demand that BPC demolish
whatever improvements it has made therein, so as to return the said portions to
their former condition, at the expense of BPC.
In such a case, certificates of title of BPC over the said portions
shall be cancelled and new ones issued in the name of the Republic; or (b) It
may surrender the said portions to BPC and just compel BPC to reimburse the
Republic for the purchase price the Republic paid to FPHC for the said
portions, plus appropriate interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision, dated
(1) In
view of the finding that the Transfer Certificates of Title No. 200629
and 200630 in the name of Servando Accibal are forged and spurious, the Quezon
City Register of Deeds is ORDERED to officially and finally cancel the same
from his records;
(2) In view of the finding that
the respondent Republic of the Philippines was a purchaser in good faith of the
subject lots from Philippine First Holdings Corporation, but also taking into
consideration the functioning and stability of the Torrens System, as well as
the superior rights of subsequent purchasers in good faith and for value of
portions of the subject lots – subdivided, developed, and sold as Parthenon
Hills – from petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation –
(a) The Quezon City
Register of Deeds is ORDERED to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title No.
275443 and 288417 in the name of respondent Republic of the
(b) The respondent Republic of the
(c) Petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation is ORDERED to pay respondent Republic of the Philippines for
the purchase price the latter paid to First Philippine Holdings Corporation
corresponding to the portions of the subject lots which are already covered by
certificates of title in the name of purchasers in good faith and for value
from petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation,
plus appropriate interest;
(d) The respondent Republic of the Philippines is ORDERED to choose one of the options
available to it as regards the portions of the subject lots which remain unsold
and covered by certificates of title in the name of petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation, either (i) To recover the said portions and demand that petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation demolish whatever
improvements it has made therein, so as to return the said portions to their
former condition, at the expense of the latter, or (ii) To surrender the said
portions to petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation and compel the latter to reimburse the respondent Republic of the
Philippines for the purchase price it had paid to First Philippine Holdings
Corporation for the said portions, plus appropriate interest. Regardless of the option chosen by the
respondent Republic of the
(2)
In view of the finding that petitioner Barstowe
Philippines Corporation is not a purchaser and builder in good faith, and
depending on the option chosen by respondent Republic of the Philippines
concerning the portions of the subject lots which remain unsold and covered by
certificates of title in the name of petitioner Barstowe
Philippines Corporation, as enumerated in paragraph 2(d) hereof –
(a) In case the respondent Republic of the Philippines chooses the
option under paragraph 2(d)(i) hereof, petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation is ORDERED to demolish whatever
improvements it has made on the said portions, so as to return the same to
their former condition, at its own expense.
The Quezon City Register of Deeds is also ORDERED to cancel the
certificates of title of petitioner Barstowe
Philippines Corporation over the said portions and to issue in lieu
thereof certificates of title in the name of respondent Republic of the
(b) In case the respondent Republic of the Philippines chooses the
option under paragraph 2(d)(ii) hereof, petitioner Barstowe
Philippines Corporation is ORDERED to reimburse the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines for the purchase price it had paid to First Philippine Holdings
Corporation for the said portions, plus appropriate interest;
(c) Petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporaton is ORDERED to pay appropriate damages to respondent Republic
of the
(3)
In view of the finding that intervenors Winnie
U. Nicolas-Agbulos and Edgardo Q. Abesamis are purchasers in good faith and for value of
portions of the subject lots – subdivided, developed, and sold as Parthenon
Hills – from petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation, it is DECLARED that their certificates of title are valid
and indefeasible as to all parties;
(4) In view of the finding that the Petition for
New Trial filed by the heirs of Servando Accibal, namely, Virgilio V. Accibal, Virginia A. Macabudbud,
and Antonio V. Accibal, lacks merit, the said
Petition is DISMISSED; and
(5) The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for determination of the following –
(a) The validity of the claims, and identification of the
purchasers, in good faith and for value, of portions of the subject lots from
petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation, other
than intervenors Winnie U. Nicolas-Agbulos and Edgardo Q. Abesamis,
whose titles are to be declared valid and indefeasible;
(b) The
identification of the portions of the subject lots in the possession and names
of purchasers in good faith and for value and those which remain with
petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation;
(c) The
computation of the amount of the purchase price which respondent Republic of
the Philippines may recover from petitioner Barstowe
Philippines Corporation in consideration of the preceding paragraphs hereof;
(d) The
types and computation of the damages recoverable by the parties; and
(e) The
computation and award of the cross-claim of EL-VI Realty and Development
Corporation against petitioner Barstowe Philippines
Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
(No part)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
On leave
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* No part.
** On leave.
[1] Rollo, 6-34.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro with Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Maximiano C. Asuncion, concurring; id. at 38-51.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice
Eduardo G. Montenegro with Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-
[4] Penned by Judge Efren N. Ambrosio; records, 273-288.
[5] Land Registration Authority
Report, dated
[6]
[7] See Orders, dated
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Decision in Civil Case No.
Q-91-10933, dated
[12] Order, dated
[13]
[14] Republic of the
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P.
Purisima with Associate Justices Justo
P. Torres, Jr. and Eduardo G.
[32]
[33] Supra note 2.
[34] Supra note 3.
[35] Supra note 1.
[36] Rollo, pp. 90-107.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43] Dated
[44] Dated
[45] Dated
[46] Dated
[47] Dated
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51] Transfer Certificates of Title No. 199013, 200427, 200744, 202028, and 202476.
[52] Penned by LRA Administrator Teodoro C. Bonifacio; records, pp. 34-40.
[53]
[54] Dolfo v.The Register of Deed of Cavite, 395 Phil. 241, 248-249 (2000).
[55]
[56] Tenio-Obsequio
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967,
[57] An Act Providing a Special Procedure
for Reconstitution of
[58] Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. and Lednicky, 120 Phil. 495, 499 (1964).
[59] Gallardo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67742,
[60] Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 96141,
[61]
[62] Calalang
v. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. 76265,
[63] Director of Lands v. Addison, 49 Phil. 19, 23 (1926).
[64] Antonio H. Noblejas and Edilberto H. Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds (1992 ed.), 330.
[65]
[66] Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 48, 60 (1996).
[67] 361 Phil. 319, 329-333 (1999).
[68] Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 97, 112; Liu v. Loy, Jr., G.R. No. 145982, 3 July 2003, 405 SCRA 316, 338.
[69] Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 216 Phil. 533, 535 (1984).
[70] 154 Phil. 193, 199-200 (1974).
[71] Supra note 2, 45-46.