THE
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
HENRY
TOGAHAN, EMELDO LAURO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
DANILO
BALINDO (at large) and
MARCO
TURGA (at large),
Appellants. Promulgated:
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Appellants
Henry Togahan (Togahan) and Emeldo Lauro (Lauro) assail the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
On
Criminal
Case No. L-1674
That on the 12th day of May 2000, at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening more or less, in Purok 1, Spring, [B]arangay Amaga, [M]unicipality of Barobo, [P]rovince of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with .38 caliber pistol, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felon[i]ously shot one Ananias Villar, Sr. with the use of said deadly weapon, as a result thereof the latter was hit and sustained the following wounds or injuries:
Gunshot wound[,] suprasternal area
Gunshot wound[,] left flank at the level of umbilicus
Gunshot wound[,] right upper quadrant parasternal
Lacerated wound[,] on left post auricular area
which wounds or injuries caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the following amount:
P50,000.00 as
life indemnity of the victim
P15,000.00 as
moral damages
P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code).
Criminal
Case No. L-1675
That on the 12th day of May 2000, at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening more or less, in Purok 1, Spring, [B]arangay Amaga, [M]unicipality of Barobo, [P]rovince of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with .38 caliber pistol, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with evident prem[e]ditation, treachery and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felon[i]ously shot one David Gene Richardson, an [A]merican national, with the use of said weapon, as a result thereof the latter was hit and sustained the following wounds or injuries:
Gunshot wound[,] right lower quadrant
Hematoma[,] right leg lateral aspect
Abrasion, [l]inear right shoulder
Abrasion, linear lumbar area
which wounds or injuries caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the following amount:
P100,000.00 as
life indemnity of the victim
P15,000.00 as
moral damages
P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code).
Custody
only of appellants Togahan and Lauro was acquired. Their co-accused Balindo and
Turga remained at large then and to this day. Upon being arraigned separately, both
appellants pleaded not guilty.[5] Trial
on the merits ensued with the prosecution espousing the following narration of
facts:
On
12 May 2000, at around 6:30 p.m., Magdalena Villar (Mrs. Villar), her daughter
Vilma Villar-Richardson (Mrs. Richardson), son-in-law Richardson, grandchildren
Kenneth, Kevin, Junelyn, Jovelyn and Michelle, and brother Pedro Castillo were
all watching television in the living room of their residence in Spring, Amaga,
Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Without
warning, two armed men wearing bonnets suddenly arrived. At that time, the
victim Villar, husband of Mrs. Villar, was in his room. When Villar heard the
commotion, he went to the door and tried to prevent the armed men from
entering, but he was shot twice, pulled towards the balcony and clubbed to
death.[6]
One
of the armed men, later identified as Togahan, pointed a gun at Mrs. Richardson
and pulled the trigger thrice. The gun did not fire however. The other man,
later identified as Lauro, approached
In
her testimony, Mrs. Richardson narrated that during the struggle between her
husband and Togahan for the gun, the mask of the latter was removed by
Eyewitness
Lowelito Villar (Lowelito), grandson of victim Villar, testified that on the
evening of the incident, he was in his home about fifteen (15) meters away from
his grandparents’ house when he heard a gun burst. He immediately ran towards
the house of his grandparents and hid behind a coconut tree, also about fifteen
(15) meters from victim Villar’s house. He claims to have seen three (3) armed
and masked men he identified as Togahan, Lauro and Balindo enter the victims’
house. According to the witness, Lauro shot
The
prosecution likewise presented witnesses to fortify the charges of
participation against appellants. Witness Rosemarie Enriquez, a former
sweetheart of Togahan, testified that the pair of slippers recovered from the
scene of the crime belonged to the latter.[12] It was witness Federico Sayson, Barangay
Kagawad of Purok 1, Spring, Amaga, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, who discovered the
pair of slippers and a dirty white jacket about thirty (30) meters from the
house of Villar.[13]
SPO2
Santo Ocate, the firearm examiner of the Philippine National Police, Caraga
Region who conducted the physical examination of two bullets recovered from the
crime scene, testified that the bullets were discharged from a .38 caliber
revolver.[14]
Upon
request of Mrs. Richardson, Dr. Edgar Savella, Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation–Caraga Region, conducted an autopsy of the bodies of
the victims. Dr. Savella testified that the gunshot wound sustained by
Dr.
Tomas Centino testified that he conducted the examination of the bodies of the
victims who were both clinically dead upon arrival at the DO
To
counter the prosecution, Togahan presented the defense of alibi. He testified
that on
To
corroborate Togahan’s alibi, his father-in-law, Segundo Andalan, testified that
on
Similarly,
Lauro denied the charges made against him. Appellant maintains that on
On
rebuttal, the prosecution presented two witnesses, the first of whom negated
the claims of Lauro that he had never set foot in Barangay Amaga, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur. According to witness Restituto Basada, for about four (4) to
five (5) years commencing in 1980, Lauro and his family lived on his property
in the said barangay. However, Lauro later fled as Basada filed a case against the
former for stoning him.[25]
The
second rebuttal witness of the prosecution, Luzviminda Villar Sabaysabay, was
the daughter of victim Villar. She testified that in March and June 2001, they
received letters from Togahan, requesting them to visit him in the provincial
jail where he was then incarcerated. In
Togahan’s second letter, she claimed, he requested a visit to reveal to them that
Lauro was one of his companions in killing Villar.[26]
The
RTC found appellants guilty of murder on both charges and sentenced each of them
to suffer in each case the penalty of death and to indemnify the respective heirs
of the victims in each case in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages and costs.[27]
With
the death penalty imposed on appellants, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. However, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v.
Mateo,[28] the
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals.
On
“WHEREFORE,
in view of the above disquisitions, the decision under review is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua
for each of the accused-appellants, and in line with recent jurisprudence the
following amounts are awarded to the heirs of the victims in each case, to wit:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Conformably to the
ruling in People vs. Mateo, We
refrain from entering judgment therein. The Division Clerk of Court is directed
to elevate the records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court for final
disposition.
SO ORDERED.”[30]
In
their brief,[31] appellants
challenge their conviction for murder, stressing that there is a great doubt as
to the identities of the persons who perpetrated the crime.
The
issue of whether or not appellants were in fact identified by the prosecution
witnesses is a question of credibility. It is well-settled that factual
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court was in a
better position to decide the question of credibility.[32]
After an exhaustive review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they were able to identify appellants and their co-accused as perpetrators of the crime.
Mrs.
Richardson, in recounting her horrifying experience in the hands of the
appellants, categorically identified appellants as the perpetrators of the
vicious crimes, viz:
x x x x
Court:
Few clarificatory question (sic)
from the Court.
Q In
Exh. “A-1”, which is the question and answer of your sworn statement, you said
that you could not identify the culprit in this case?
A Yes,
sir.
Q But in the direct examination now, you were able to identify the suspects as Emeldo Lauro and Henry Togahan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why is it now that your testimony is now in conflict with that of your sworn statement?
A Because
they asked me a lot of questions. I was then depressed. I don’t (sic) know what
to do. I lost my husband and when I was told to go to Barobo, I was in a hurry
to call my family in
Q The height of your husband is 6’2 inches?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he tried to grab the bonnet from the assailants?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was he able to grab the bonnets (sic)?
A One of them, sir.
Q Which one of them that (sic) your husband able to grab the bonnets (sic)?
A That guy. (Witness pointing to accused Henry Togahan)
Q Was the bonnet Togahan was wearing held by your husband out of his face?
A Not all the way, sir.
Q Until what part of the face of Henry Togahan?
A Up to the eyebrow, sir.
Q Before the incident, you had not met Henry Togahan?
A No, sir.
Q The other accused Emeldo Lauro, was he wearing also a bonnet at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your husband was not able to pull the bonnet out from his face?
A No, sir.
Q How could you identify Emeldo Lauro as the very person who was responsible in killing your husband and your father?
A Because when I came here, when I saw his appearance and everything, I remembered I heard his voice. You’re the one who said we’re here for war. Don’t you. You can’t deny it.
Q You can identify him?
A Yes, sir, by his voice and his appearance.
Q As you said, it was Henry Togahan who pointed a gun to your head?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he the same person who shot to death also (sic) your husband?
A No, sir.
Q Who was the person who shot your husband?
A That guy there. The one in the middle. (Witness pointing to accused Emeldo Lauro)
Q That guy?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who shot your father also (also)?
A Same guy, sir.
x x x[33]
Two other prosecution witnesses, Mrs. Villar and Lowelito, similarly identified appellants as the malefactors.[34]
Appellants
failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were prompted by any ill motive
to falsely testify or accused them of so grave a crime as murder. The Court
adheres to the established rule that, in the absence of any evidence showing
reason or motive for the witness to perjure, their testimony and identification
of the assailant should be given full faith and credit.[35]
We
cannot see ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Mrs. Villar and Mrs. Richardson. As widows of the victims, they have more
reason to desire punishment for the real perpetrators of the crime. It is unnatural
for a victim’s relative interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody
other than the real culprit.[36] Human nature tells us that the aggrieved
relatives would want the real killer punished for their loss, and not accept a
mere scapegoat to take the rap for the real malefactor.[37]
Concomitantly,
witnesses need not know the names of the malefactors so long as they recognize
their faces. What is imperative is that the witnesses are positive as to the
perpetrators’ physical identification from the witnesses’ own personal
knowledge, as is obtaining in this case.[38] It is the natural reaction of victims of
criminal violence to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and to observe
the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot easily be erased
from their memory.[39]
Insofar
as the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of Mrs. Richardson and her
sworn testimony on identifying the appellants are concerned, suffice it to say
that the affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but
by others, and affiants are only made to sign them. Certain discrepancies
between declarations made in the affidavit and those made at the witness stand
seldom discredit the declarant.[40]
Moreover, Mrs. Richardson was able to satisfactorily explain such inconsistency
during her testimony.
Appellants likewise attack the seeming
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Mrs. Villar, Mrs. Richardson and
Lowelito. They point to two alleged conflicts in those testimonies which, to
their mind, are fatal and discredit the reliability of the witnesses: the
number of assailants and the identification of whom among the culprits shot the
victims. These inconsistencies, in our view, are not sufficiently substantial
to impair the veracity of the prosecution’s evidence.
While
witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not
necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them should be
disbelieved as liars and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless.[41]
As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing
statements neither dilute the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of their
testimony,[42] for indeed, such inconsistencies are but
natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the
responses are honest and unrehearsed.[43]
Witnesses
cannot be expected to remember all the details of the harrowing event which
unfolded before their eyes. Minor discrepancies might be found in their
testimony, but they do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in
its material whole, nor should they reflect adversely on the witness’
credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was perjured.[44]
The
trial court is correct in disregarding appellants’ defense of alibi and denial.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he
was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[45] Apart
from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of the
victims’, appellants were unable to explain and show that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime.
Between
the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on one hand, and the
bare denial of appellants, on the other, the former must perforce prevail.[46]
An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and
always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and
unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted.[47]
The
culpability of appellants and their co-accused is undeniable. Lauro was
consistently identified by the witnesses as the person responsible for shooting
both victims. At the same time, the existence of conspiracy among the
assailants is patent. Conspiracy has been deduced by the Court in a case where three
malefactors jointly lifted, carried and dumped their victim in a deep well
filled with water head first and threw rocks inside the well to cover him;[48] by
the successive acts of three appellants in shooting, clubbing and piercing the
eye of the victim;[49]
where one appellant put his arms around the body of the victim while his
co-appellant held the thighs of the victim and while they held him down, one
poked and fired the gun at the back of the head of the victim;[50]
when two accused chased their victim into his house, kicked open the door to
enter and then shot him;[51]
and when one malefactor hacked the victim and two others chased after the
latter to finish up the aggression they had started.[52]
In
the instant case, by the concurrent acts of barging into the residence of the
victims, holding them at gunpoint and shooting and attacking the victims, Lauro,
Togahan and their co-accused are deemed to have agreed to commit the crime of
murder. Each of their contributory acts without semblance of desistance
reflected their resolution to commit the crime.[53] From a legal standpoint, there is conspiracy
if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the appellants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.[54] Direct proof of previous agreement to commit
a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the appellants themselves when such acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent.[55]
Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.[56]
We
agree with the trial court that treachery qualified the killing of the victims.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on
an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[57] In the case at bar, four armed men entered the
home of the innocent victims and together used this advantage to facilitate
their crime. Aggravating this was the fact that Villar was a 68-year old man
who could not have been reasonably able to put up a defense against the much
younger and armed men.
Thus,
we reach the inescapable conclusion that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were correct in finding appellants guilty of two counts of murder and
affirm the imposition of reclusion
perpetua upon them for each of the murders committed. Likewise, in line
with recent jurisprudence,[58] we affirm the award of damages in favor of the
heirs of the victims.
WHEREFORE,
the P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, pp. 4-28. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Ramon R. Garcia.
[32]People v. Hate, 438 Phil. 363, 369-370 (2002). See also People v. SPO3 Mendoza, 401 Phil. 496 (2000).
[35]People v. Hate, 438 Phil. 363, 373
(2002), citing People v. Baniega,
G.R. No. 139578,
[36]Lucas v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil. 530, 541 (2002), citing People v. Dimailig, G.R. No. 120170, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 340, 350.
[38]People v. Hate, 438 Phil. 363, 372
(2002), citing People v. Dinamling,
G.R. No. 134605,
[39]People v. SPO3
[40]People v. Hate, supra note 35, citing People v. Bulan, et al. G.R. No. 133224,
[41]People v. Eligino, G.R. Nos. 70113-14, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA 320, 331, citing People v. Manalansan, 189 SCRA 619 (1990).
[43]
[44]People v. Comadre, supra note 35 at 375, citing People v. Del Valle, G.R. No. 119616, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 297. See also People v. Mendoza, 401 Phil. 496, 511 (2000).
[45]
[46]Id. at 376,
citing People v. Francisco,
G.R. Nos. 134566-67,
[47]People v. Baniega, 427 Phil. 405, 418
(2002). See also People v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 125898,
[54]
[55]Id., citing People v. Pama, 216 SCRA 385, 401 (1992); People v. Buntan, Sr., 221 SCRA 421, 428-429 (1993); People v. Canillo, G.R. No. 106579, 30 August 1994, 236 SCRA 22, 41-42.
[57]People v. Hate, supra note 35, citing People v. Ciron, et al., G.R. No. 139409, 18 March 2002, 379 SCRA 376. See also People v. Caboquin, 420 Phil. 744 (2001); People v. Arca, 452 Phil. 386 (2003).