EN BANC
|
NELSON T. LLUZ and CATALINO C. ALDEOSA, Petitioners, |
G.R.
No. 172840 Present: |
|
|
PUNO,* C.J., |
QUISUMBING,**
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus
-
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and CAESAR O. VICENCIO,
Respondents. June 7, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - x
D E C I S
I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The
Case
This petition for certiorari[1] seeks to
annul the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc
dated
The Facts
Private respondent was a candidate for
the post of punong barangay
of Barangay 2, Poblacion, Catubig,
Sometime after private respondent’s proclamation,
petitioners charged him before the Law Department of the COMELEC (Law
Department) with violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P.
881. Petitioners claimed they had proof that private respondent misrepresented
himself as a CPA. Attached to petitioners’ complaint was a Certification signed
by Jose Ariola, Director II, Regulations Office of
the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), stating that private respondent’s
name does not appear in the book of the Board of Accountancy. The book contains
the names of those duly authorized to practice accountancy in the
In his Answer, private respondent
maintained that he was a CPA and alleged that he passed the CPA Board
Examinations in 1993 with a rating of 76%. Private respondent argued that he
could not be held liable for an election offense because his alleged
misrepresentation of profession was not material to his eligibility as a
candidate.
On
Nevertheless, the Law Department
recommended the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint. Citing the rulings of this Court in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC[2] and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,[3] the
Law Department held that the misrepresentation in private respondent’s
certificate of candidacy was not material to his eligibility as a candidate and
could not be a ground for his prosecution.
However, upon motion of petitioners,
the COMELEC En Banc by Resolution dated
On
On
After a careful
evaluation x x x [w]e rule
to grant the motion for reconsideration.
Criminal intent is not absolutely
disregarded in election offense cases. A good example is the provision of
Section 261(y)(17) of [B.P. 881], which requires
malicious intent in order that a person may be charged for omitting, tampering,
or transferring to another list the name of a registered voter from the
official list of voters posted outside the polling place.
In relation thereto, the fact that
an offense is malum prohibitum
does not exempt the same from the coverage of the general principles of
criminal law. In this case, the provisions of Section 261 of [B.P. 881] must
not be taken independent of the concepts and theories of criminal law.
The offense allegedly committed by
the respondent is for failure to disclose his true occupation as required under
Section 74 of [B.P. 881]. Apparently, respondent misrepresented himself as a
CPA when in fact he is not. The misrepresentation having been established,
the next issue posited by the parties is whether or not the misrepresentation
should be material before it can be considered as an election offense.
We answer in the affirmative.
Violation of Section 74 is a species of perjury, which is the act of knowingly
making untruthful statements under oath. Settled is the rule that for perjury
to be committed, it must be made with regard to a material matter.
Clearly, the principle of
materiality remains to be a crucial test in determining whether a person can be
charged with violating Section 74 of [B.P. 881] in relation to Section 262
thereof.
The case of [Salcedo]
sheds light as to what matters are deemed material with respect to the
certificate of candidacy, to wit: citizenship, residency and other
qualifications that may be imposed. The nature of a candidate’s occupation is
definitely not a material matter. To be sure, we do not elect a candidate on
the basis of his occupation.[4]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the COMELEC En Banc denied in the assailed Resolution dated
Hence, this
petition.
The Issues
Petitioners argue that:
1. The assailed resolutions failed to consider that a violation
of Section 262 in relation to
Section 74 of B.P. 881 is malum prohibitum;
2. The ruling in Salcedo is
not applicable to petitioners’ complaint, that
is, a fact misrepresented in a certificate of candidacy need not be material in order to constitute a
violation of Section 262 in relation to
Section 74 of B.P. 881; and
3. Assuming arguendo
that materiality of a misrepresentation is required
to constitute a violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881, the assailed resolutions
should have
held
material private respondent’s misrepresentation because it increased his chances of winning in the elections.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners come to us on a single
question of law: is an alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation on
a certificate of candidacy punishable as an election offense under Section 262
in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881?
We rule in the negative.
In urging the Court to order the
COMELEC to file the necessary information against private respondent,
petitioners invoke Sections 262 and 74 of B.P. 881, which we reproduce below:
Section 262.
Other election offenses.—Violation
of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the following sections of this
Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74,
75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129,
132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186,
189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231,
233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and 240. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his
oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a candidate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or he has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case [of] a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of
candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a statement in
duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires. (Emphasis supplied)
The penal coverage of Section 262 is
limited.
From a
cursory reading of Sections 262 and 74 of B.P. 881, one may possibly conclude
that an act or omission in violation of any of the provisions of Section 74 ipso
facto constitutes an election offense. Indeed, petitioners
point out that private respondent’s misrepresentation of profession having been
proved before the COMELEC, the latter is compelled to prosecute him for
violation of Section 262. Petitioners argue that such a violation being an
election offense, it is malum
prohibitum and immediately gives rise to
criminal liability upon proof of commission.
Petitioners’ stance assumes
that Section 262 penalizes without qualification the violation of the sections it enumerates. This
assumption is uncalled for in view of the wording of Section 262.
The listing of sections in Section 262 is introduced
by the clause: “Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of
the following sections shall constitute election offenses: x x x.” The phraseology of this introductory clause alerts us that
Section 262 itself possibly limits its coverage to only pertinent portions of
Section 74. That such a possibility exists must not be taken lightly for two
reasons. First, were the phrase not necessary, the law’s framers would have instead
directly declared that violation of “the provisions” or “any provision” of the
enumerated sections — without any qualification — would constitute an election
offense. It is a settled principle in statutory construction that whenever
possible, a legal provision, phrase, or word must not be so construed as to be
meaningless and a useless surplusage in the sense of
adding nothing to the law or having no effect on it.[5] Second, equally well-settled
is the rule that a statute imposing criminal liability should be construed narrowly in its
coverage such that only those offenses clearly included, beyond reasonable
doubt, will be considered within the operation of the statute.[6]
A
return to Section 74 is thus imperative.
Section
74 enumerates all information which a person running for public office must
supply the COMELEC in a sworn certificate of candidacy. Section 74 specifies
that a certificate of candidacy shall contain, among others, a statement that
the person is announcing his or her candidacy for the office and is eligible
for such office, the unit of government which the person seeks to represent,
his or her political party, civil status, date of birth, residence, and
profession or occupation. Section 74 further requires that the person make
several declarations: “that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance” to it, “that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities,” “that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country,” “that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,” and
“that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of
his knowledge.”
Section 74
does not expressly mention
which portion in its provisions is pertinent to Section 262, or which among its
provisions when violated is
punishable as an election offense. Nothing in Section 74 partakes
unmistakably of a penal clause or a positive prohibition comparable to those
found in other sections[7]
also mentioned in Section 262 that use the words “shall not.” The Court is then
left to interpret the meaning of Section 74 to determine which of its
provisions are penalized under Section 262, and particularly if disclosure of
profession or occupation is among such provisions.
Our rulings in Abella v. Larrazabal
and Salcedo clarify the concept of
misrepresentation under B.P. 881.
The issue in this case is novel, yet
the facts and provisions of law now before us call to mind the cases of Abella v. Larrazabal[8] and Salcedo, perhaps the closest this case has to a
relevant precedent.
Abella dwelt on the issue of
misrepresentation of residence in a certificate of candidacy. Petitioner Abella had filed a case against private respondent Larrazabal before the COMELEC on the ground that the latter
falsely claimed to be a resident of
We held that the dismissal was
improper. There we reasoned that the issue of residence having been squarely
raised before the COMELEC —
x
x x it should not have been
shunted aside to the Law Department for a
roundabout investigation of [Larrazabal’s]
qualification through the filing of a criminal prosecution, if found to be
warranted, with resultant disqualification of the accused in case of
conviction. The COMELEC should have opted for a more direct and speedy process
available under the law, considering the vital public interest involved and the
necessity of resolving the question at the earliest possible time for the
benefit of the inhabitants of Leyte.[9]
By
“direct and speedy process,” the Court referred to Section 78 of B.P. 881,
which states:
Section 78. Petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.— A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus,
upon considering the facts and seeing that Larrazabal’s
misrepresentation of her residence put her qualification as a candidate at
issue,[10] the
Court found that the case fell squarely within the provisions of Section 78 and
directed the COMELEC to determine the residence qualification of Larrazabal. Notably, the Court did not make a finding that Abella had no cause of action under Section 262, but only
characterized the criminal case as involving a “roundabout investigation”
seeking an end — Larrazabal’s disqualification — that could be achieved
more speedily through an administrative proceeding under Section 78. The ruling
in Abella recognized that Larrazabal’s
act of misrepresenting her residence, a fact required to be stated in her
certificate of candidacy under Section 74 and which was also a qualification
for all elective local officials, gave rise to two causes of action against her
under B.P. 881: one, a criminal complaint under Section 262; and second, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78.
The case of Salcedo
six years after Abella tested the limits of
Section 78 on the specific question of what constitutes a material
misrepresentation. In Salcedo, petitioner Victorino Salcedo prayed for the
disqualification of private respondent Emelita Salcedo (Emelita) from the
mayoralty race in Sara,
In case there is a material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec
is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing
of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78 x x
x.
x x x x
As stated in the law, in order to
justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it
is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a
material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the
substantive rights of
a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which he
filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what
would be considered as a “material representation,” the Court has interpreted
this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
x x x x
Therefore,
it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section
78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion
is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate
guilty of having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy
are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving,
or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.
It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a
basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just
any innocuous mistake.
x x x x
Aside from the requirement of
materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
“deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public
office. x x x[11] (Emphasis
supplied)
From these two cases several
conclusions follow. First, a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is
material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the
candidate’s eligibility. Second, when a candidate commits a material
misrepresentation, he or she may be proceeded against through a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, or
through criminal prosecution under Section 262 for violation of Section 74. Third,
a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate’s
certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or canceled by the COMELEC,
the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office sought
by the candidate.
Profession or occupation is not a qualification
for
elective office, and therefore not a material
fact
in a certificate of candidacy.
No elective office, not even the
office of the President of the Republic of the
Section 39. Qualifications.
–
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
x x x x
Profession or occupation not being a
qualification for elective office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a situation where a
candidate misrepresents his or her profession or occupation in the certificate
of candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified from running for office
under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot be denied due
course or canceled on such ground.
In interpreting a law, the Court must avoid
an
unreasonable or unjust construction.
Were we to follow petitioners’ line of thought,
for misrepresentation of a non-material fact, private respondent could be
prosecuted for an election offense and, if found guilty, penalized with imprisonment and other
accessory penalties. B.P. 881 prescribes a uniform penalty for all election
offenses under it to cover those defined in Sections 262 and 261, to wit:
Section 264.
Penalties. –— Any person found guilty of any
election offense under this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not
less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to
probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which
shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party
found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand
pesos, which shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has been
instituted in which their corresponding officials have been found guilty.
The position taken by
petitioners merely highlights for us the absurdity of not applying here the
reasons given by the Court in Salcedo, a mere
disqualification case. In the present case, private respondent not only could
be disqualified from holding public office and from voting but could also be
deprived of his liberty were the COMELEC to pursue a criminal case against him.
If in Salcedo
the Court could not conceive the law to have intended that a person be deprived
“of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public
office upon just any innocuous mistake” on the certificate of candidacy,
weightier considerations here demand that materiality of the misrepresentation
also be held an essential element of any violation of Section 74. Otherwise,
every detail or piece of information within the four corners of the certificate
of candidacy, even that which has no actual bearing upon the candidate’s
eligibility, could be used as basis for the candidate’s criminal prosecution.
Further compelling us to dismiss this
petition is the consideration that any complaint against private respondent for
perjury under the Revised Penal Code would necessarily have to allege the
element of materiality. The pertinent section of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 183. False testimony in
other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.—
The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provision of the next preceding articles, shall
testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires. (Emphasis supplied)
The basis of the crime of perjury is
the willful assertion of a falsehood under oath upon a material matter.
Although the term “material matter” under Article 183 takes on a fairly general
meaning, that is, it refers to the main fact which is the subject of inquiry,[12] in
terms of being an element in the execution of a statement under oath it must be
understood as referring to a fact which has an effect on the outcome of the
proceeding for which the statement is being executed.[13] Thus,
in the case of a certificate of candidacy, a material matter is a fact relevant
to the validity of the certificate and which could serve as basis to grant or
deny due course to the certificate in case it is assailed under Section 78. Of
course, such material matter would then refer only to the qualifications for
elective office required to be stated in the certificate of candidacy.
Perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code carries the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and translates to
imprisonment for four months and one day up to two years and four months. The
duration of this imprisonment is a far cry from that meted by Section 264 of
B.P. 881, which is a minimum of one year up to a maximum of six years. With the
gravity of the punishment provided by B.P. 881 for violation of election
offenses, we glean the intention of the law to limit culpability under Section
262 for violation of Section 74 only to a material misrepresentation. We thus
adhere to the more reasonable construction of the term “pertinent portions”
found in Section 262, in particular reference to Section 74, to mean only those
portions of Section 74 which prescribe qualification requirements of a
candidate.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS
the petition. We AFFIRM the En Banc Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections dated 1 February 2006 and 25 May 2006.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On official leave)
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
** Acting Chief Justice.
[1] Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2] G.R. No. 119976,
[3] 371 Phil. 377 (1999).
[4] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[5] Agpalo, Statutory Construction 185 (1990), citing Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958).
[6]
[7] See Sections 80, 81, 85, 86, 89, 95, 96, 97, and 229 of B.P. 881, among others.
[8] G.R. Nos. 87721-30,
[9]
[10] Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states:
Section 39. Qualifications. —
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
[11] Salcedo, supra note 3 at 385-390.
[12] Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 232.
[13] 60 Am. Jur. 2d Perjury §27, citing Holbrooks v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 85 S.W.3d 563, Ky., 2002, 26 September 2002.