FIRST DIVISION
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MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES RICHARD
HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 172122 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: June 22, 2007 |
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PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83981, dated February 16, 2006 and
March 30, 2006, respectively which affirmed with modification the Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, dated September 29,
2004. The trial court found petitioners
jointly and severally liable to pay respondents damages for the injuries
sustained by respondent Stephen Huang, son of respondent spouses Richard and
Carmen Huang.
First, the facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is
the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate number
PRE 641 (truck). It has in its employ
petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver.
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of
respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with
plate number PTT 775 (car).
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on
December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was
driving the car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del Rosario was driving
the truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were
traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of
Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was
on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right,
when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right
side of the car. The collision hurled
the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the
opposite lane. The truck also hit a
lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front
of Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario
only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR).
His driver’s license had been confiscated because he had been previously
apprehended for reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total
wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent
Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for
committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and
petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident was respondent Stephen Huang’s
recklessness. According to petitioner
Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the
truck’s front right tire. The truck then
swerved to the left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island,
and stopped on the other side of the highway.
The car likewise crossed over the center island and landed on the same
portion of C-5. Further, petitioner
Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of all its employees.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29,
2004, found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally
liable to pay respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding defendants Mercury Drug Corporation, Inc. and Rolando del Rosario, jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffs Spouses Richard Y. Huang and Carmen G. Huang, and Stephen Huang the following amounts:
1.
Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy
Three Thousand Pesos (P2,973,000.00) actual
damages;
2. As compensatory damages:
a.
Twenty Three Million Four Hundred
Sixty One Thousand, and Sixty-Two Pesos (P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;
b.
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen;
3.
Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as moral damages;
4.
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
5.
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expense.[4]
On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to P1,000,000.00. The appellate court also denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners cite the following grounds for their
appeal:
1. That the subject Decision which dismissed the
appeal of petitioners herein but AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, in that the award of moral
damages was reduced to P1,000,000.00 and its Resolution dated March 30,
2006, which dismissed outright the Motion for Reconsideration must be set aside
because the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error:
A. IN DENYING OUTRIGHTLY THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON ALLEGEDLY BEING FILED OUT OF TIME FOR ONE DAY;
B. IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE PETITIONERS HEREIN;
C.
IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY ALL
EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS HEREIN AND PROCEEDED TO RENDER ITS
DECISION BASED ON PRESUMPTIONS AND PERSONAL OPINIONS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT
WITNESSES TO THE ACCIDENT;
D.
IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS HEREIN;
E.
IN FINDING THAT MERCURY DRUG
CORPORATION FAILED TO EXERCISE THE DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN SUPERVISING ITS
EMPLOYEES DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER COMPANY;
F.
IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO
DEL ROSARIO WAS NEGLIGENT IN DRIVING THE TRUCK AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT AND
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
G.
IN PRESENTING ONLY IN THE DECISION
TESTIMONIES FAVORABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE
EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH CONTRADICTED SUCH
TESTIMONIES NOT ONLY THROUGH ORAL TESTIMONIES BUT AS WELL AS DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCES.[5]
We affirm the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that petitioner Del Rosario was negligent. The evidence does not support petitioners’
claim that at the time of the accident, the truck was at the left inner lane
and that it was respondent Stephen Huang’s car, at its right, which bumped the
right front side of the truck. Firstly,
petitioner Del Rosario could not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit
by the car,[6]
despite the fact that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the
car. Petitioner Del Rosario could not
also explain why the car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 which was on its
left side. He said that “the car did not
pass in front of him after it hit him or under him or over him or behind him.”[7] If the truck were really at the left lane and
the car were at its right, and the car hit the truck at its front right side,
the car would not have landed on the opposite side, but would have been thrown
to the right side of the C-5 Highway.
Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza,
an expert in the field of physics. He
conducted a study based on the following assumptions provided by respondents:
1. Two vehicles collided;
2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the other;
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.
Dr.
Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter vehicle
hits the right front portion of the heavier vehicle, the general direction of
the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy
vehicle, not the other way around. The
truck, he opined, is more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which
would move to the right of, and away from the truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the
car will move towards the opposite side, i.e.,
to the left of the truck.
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the
same assumptions except that the car is on the left side of the truck, in
accordance with the testimony of respondent Stephen Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that the general direction
of the car after impact would be to the left of the truck. In this situation, the middle island against
which the car was pinned would slow down the car, and enable the truck to catch
up and hit the car again, before running over it.[8]
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the
damages that the truck sustained at its front right side. The attempt does not impress. The photographs presented were taken a month
after the accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the truck
and authenticated the photographs, admitted that there were damages also on the
left side of the truck.[9]
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted
that after the impact, he lost control of the truck and failed to apply his
brakes. Considering that the car was
smaller and lighter than the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly caused by
the car when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to cause
petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the brakes. He testified, as follows:
ATTY. DIAZ:
May I proceed, Your Honor. You were able to apply the brakes, were you sir?
WITNESS:
No more, sir, because I went over the island.
ATTY. DIAZ:
Because as you said you lost control, correct sir?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DIAZ:
In other words, sir from the time your truck was hit according to you up to the time you rested on the shoulder, you traveled fifty meters?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, about that distance.
ATTY. DIAZ:
And this was despite the fact that you were only traveling at the speed of seventy five kilometers per hour, jumped over the island, hit the lamppost, and traveled the three lanes of the opposite lane of C-5 highway, is that what you want to impress upon this court?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.[10]
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence as the direct
and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to do what a
reasonable and prudent man would have done under the circumstances.
We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury
Drug as employer of Del Rosario.
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
x x x
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is
not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.
It is also joint and solidary with the employee.[11]
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug
should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both
in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of
his duties. Thus, in the selection of
its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.[12] With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these
requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.[13]
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug
presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie
Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical and actual
driving tests, and psychological examination.
In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he
applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the
position of
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug
does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any
alternate. Mrs. Caamic
testified that she does not know of any company policy requiring back-up
drivers for long trips.[14]
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded.[15] No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
We now consider the damages which respondents should recover from the petitioners.
The trial court awarded the following amounts:
1.
Two Million Nine Hundred
Seventy-Three Thousand Pesos (P2,973,000.00) actual
damages;
2. As compensatory damages:
a.
Twenty-Three Million Four Hundred
Sixty One Thousand, and Sixty-Two Pesos (P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;
b.
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen;
3.
Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as moral damages;
4.
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
5.
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees and litigation expense.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to P1,000,000.00.
With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil
Code provides that “[E]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved x x x.” In the
instant case, we uphold the finding that the actual damages claimed by
respondents were supported by receipts.
The amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost of hospital
expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies, and nursing care services
provided respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the accident,
until December 1998.
Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.[16] The doctors who attended to respondent
Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances of walking again and
performing basic body functions are nil.
For the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and
therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum
infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and
fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care
and support of his family. We thus
affirm the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent
Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial
computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live; and the
conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court,
for the loss or impairment of his earning capacity,[17]
considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his
mental and physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen years old, nearly six
feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was
in fourth year high school, and a member of the school varsity basketball
team. He was also class president and
editor-in-chief of the school annual. He
had shown very good leadership qualities.
He was looking forward to his college life, having just passed the
entrance examinations of the University of the Philippines, De La Salle
University, and the University of Asia and the Pacific. The University of Sto. Tomas even offered him
a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but the accident prevented him from
attending the basketball try-outs.
Without doubt, he was an exceptional student. He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular
undertakings. He is intelligent and
motivated, a go-getter, as testified by Francisco Lopez, respondent Stephen
Huang’s godfather and a bank executive.[18] Had the accident not happened, he had a rosy
future ahead of him. He wanted to embark
on a banking career, get married and raise children. Taking into account his outstanding
abilities, he would have enjoyed a successful professional career in
banking. But, as Mr. Lopez stated, it is
highly unlikely for someone like respondent to ever secure a job in a
bank. To his knowledge, no bank has ever
hired a person suffering with
the kind of disability as Stephen Huang’s.[19]
We likewise uphold the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
“The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante.”[20] Moral damages are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation,
they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[21] The amount of the award bears no relation
whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.
In the instant case, respondent Stephen Huang and respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering they continue to experience as a result of the accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night when he relives the accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels frustration and embarrassment in needing to be helped with almost everything and in his inability to do simple things he used to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest of the family undergo their own private suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huang’s condition. They know that the chance of full recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen Huang’s paralysis has made him prone to many other illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to make themselves available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They have patterned their daily life around taking care of him, ministering to his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed.
Respondent Carmen Huang’s brother testified on the insensitivity of petitioner Mercury Drug towards the plight of respondent. Stephen, viz.:
Maybe words cannot describe the anger that we feel towards the
defendants. All the time that we were
going through the crisis, there was none (sic)
a single sign of nor offer of help, any consolation or anything
whatsoever. It is funny because, you
know, I have many colleagues, business associates, people even as far as United
States, Japan, that I probably met only once, when they found out, they make a
call, they sent card, they write small notes, but from the defendant, absolute
silence. They didn’t care, and worst,
you know, this is a company that have (sic)
all the resources to help us. They were (sic) on our part, it was doubly painful
because we have no choice but to go back to them and buy the medicines that we
need for Stephen. So, I don’t know how
someone will really have no sense of decency at all to at least find out what
happened to my son, what is his condition, or if there is anything that they
can do to help us.[22]
On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that in cases of
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence. The records show that
at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a
license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also shows that he failed to
step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the
injuries which respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly reduced.
Wanton acts such as that committed by petitioner Del Rosario need be
suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should be more
circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees. The award of
exemplary damages in favor of the respondents is therefore justified.
With the award of exemplary damages,
we also affirm the grant of attorney’s fees to respondents.[23] In addition, attorney’s fees may be granted
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest
by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.[24]
Cost against petitioners.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83981, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-72.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11] Art.
2194, Civil Code.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
[12] Estacion v.
Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 222; Campo v.
Camarote, 100 Phil. 459, 463 (1956).
[13] Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Andres Malecdan, G.R. No. 154278, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA
520.
[14] TSN,
January 2002, pp. 39-42.
[15] TSN,
April 2000, pp. 11-16; TSN,
[16] Art.
2202, Civil Code.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant
shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences
of the act or omission complained of. It
is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant.
[17] Art.
2205, Civil Code.
Damages may be recovered:
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury;
x x x
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN,
[20] Cesar
Sangco, Torts and Damages 986 (Rev. ed., 1994), cited in Roque
v. Torres, G.R. 157632,
[21] Philippine National Railways
v. Brunty, G.R.
No. 169891,
[22] TSN,
[23] Art.
2208 (1), Civil Code.
[24] Art.
2208 (2), Civil Code.