SECOND
DIVISION
VICENTE P. LADLAD,
G.R. Nos. 172070-72
NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO,
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and
REY CLARO
C. CASAMBRE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO,
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
JOSELITA C. MENDOZA,
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ,
STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN
A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR
MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity
as members of the Department of Justice
panel of prosecutors investigating
I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and
2006-234,
JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ,
DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity
as Chief, Philippine National Police,
P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR.,
and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G. TANIGUE,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -x
LIZA L.
MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR,
G.R. Nos. 172074-76
SATURNINO
C. OCAMPO,
TEODORO A.
CASIÑO, CRISPIN B.
BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V. MARIANO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice,
JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in his capacity as
Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors composed of
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA
C. MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S.
GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and
MERBA A. WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B.
Director, Directorate for Investigation
and
Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA
G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting
Executive Officer of DIDM, the
DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP),
Respondents.
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -x
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN,
G.R. No. 175013
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
PEOPLE OF THE
SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
in his capacity as the Secretary of
Justice
and overall superior of the Public
Prosecutors,
HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G.
MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of
Branch 146, and HONORABLE ELMO M.
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati Promulgated:
City, Branch 150,
Respondents. June 1, 2007
x--
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These
are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin
petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
The Facts
Petitioner
in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R. Nos.
172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G. Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo
(Ocampo), Teodoro A. Casiño (Casiño), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),[1]
are members of the House of Representatives representing various party-list
groups.[2] Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private
individuals. Petitioners all face charges
for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.
G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)
Following
the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 on
The
authorities brought back Beltran to
On
Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a
judicial determination of probable cause against him.[8] Before the motion could be resolved, Judge
Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under
Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).
In
its Order dated
Hence,
the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006 and
29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran’s prosecution.
In
his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s
inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found
probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and
Ladlad Petitions)
Based
on Tanigue and
During the preliminary investigation
on
Petitioners
moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of
impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which
petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the
Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case,[11]
and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on
Petitioners
now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of
Acting
on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court issued
a status quo order on
In
his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that
the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities.
The Solicitor General also claims that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944
has mooted the Maza petition.
The Issues
The
petitions raise the following issues:
1.
In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for
Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran
for Rebellion; and
2.
In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined
from continuing with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.[13]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petitions meritorious.
On the Beltran Petition
The
Inquest Proceeding against
Beltran
for Rebellion is Void.
Inquest proceedings are proper only
when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.[14] Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be
effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just
been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x
x x x
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting
officers[15] states
that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,[16]
for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor
could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition
and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran
to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering
the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran
commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion,
sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their
affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech
on
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61,
dated
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where
the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the
City or Provincial Prosecutor but the
evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation,
the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said
detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the
subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies
of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the
complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
For
the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7,
Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare
Beltran’s inquest void.[19]
Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not
asked the trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which
effectively took the place of such proceeding.
There
is No Probable Cause to Indict
Beltran
for Rebellion.
Probable cause is the “existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.”[20] To accord respect to the discretion granted to
the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with
petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations.[21] However,
in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring
a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying
the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not
hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn
the prosecutor’s findings.[22] This exception holds true here.
Rebellion
under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –
[B]y rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or
other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly
or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the
offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.[23]
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a
crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of
a political end.[24]
The evidence before the panel of
prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the
affidavits and other documents[25]
attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit
in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause
to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some
of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military
and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel
Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,[26]
and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated
The allegations in these affidavits
are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed
public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is
that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on
In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated
that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as “Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU).”
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the
CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not
constitute rebellion.[29] As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s military
equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit merely
contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such
funding. Cachuela merely alleged that “ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa
mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA – pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN
BELTRAN, x x x.”[30] Such a general conclusion does not establish
probable cause.
In
his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’
affidavit, dated
The claim is untenable. Fuentes’
affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on
Respondent prosecutors later tried to
remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio
submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes’ affidavit as part of their Comment
to Beltran’s motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Such belated
submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during
the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s case. Assuming them to be true,
what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to
Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion
under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to
bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts
constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged
this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran and
The minutes[32]
of the
To
repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining,
or heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such
allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran
for taking part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right
since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter
of the Rebellion.[33] However, the Information in fact merely
charges Beltran for “conspiring and confederating” with others in forming a “tactical
alliance” to commit rebellion. As
worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.[34]
On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions
The
Preliminary Investigation was Tainted
With
Irregularities.
As
in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly loath to enjoin
the prosecution of offenses, a practice rooted on public interest as the speedy
closure of criminal investigations fosters public safety.[35] However,
such relief in equity may be granted if, among others, the same is necessary
(a) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner[36] or
(b) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.[37] The
case of the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under
these exceptions.
The
procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four
years, two months and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Procedure.—The
preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as
other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such
number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official
file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot
be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the
ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint
based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer
may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or
a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating
officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the
investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there
is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had
mandated in an earlier ruling, “so that the constitutional right to liberty of
a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,”[38] respondent
prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it.
Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which
provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number
as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public. Respondent
prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the
CIDG, PNP as complaints[39] and
accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were
notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified
government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further,
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the
complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the
investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall
“issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent
prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear
at the DOJ office on
These
uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’ statement in the Order of
A preliminary investigation is the
crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual the
difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus,
we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not “a mere
formal or technical right” but a “substantive” one, forming part of due process
in criminal justice.[41]
This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be
non-bailable for those accused as principals.
Contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General, respondent prosecutors’ filing of the Information against
petitioners on
On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of
Impartiality
We find merit in petitioners’ doubt
on respondent prosecutors’ impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises
supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on
13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, “We [the DOJ] will just declare
probable cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x.”[42] Petitioners raised this issue in their
petition,[43] but respondents
never disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment,
a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause.
A Final Word
The
obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of respondent
Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors brings to mind an observation
we made in another equally politically charged case. We reiterate what we
stated then, if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the integrity
of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in
particular, thus:
[W]e cannot
emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid,
giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of observing the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike,
whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may be public’s perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.[44]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013,
we SET ASIDE the Order dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Beltran is also one of the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76.
[2] Beltran and Mariano represent Anakpawis; Virador, Casiño, and Ocampo represent Bayan Muna; and Maza represents Gabriela.
[3] Police Chief Inspector Rino V.
Corpuz, Police Inspector Honesto Gaton, and SPO1
[4] Atty. Ben V. Dela Cruz.
[5] During the inquest and in a motion
filed with the MeTC, Beltran protested his detention, invoking his
parliamentary immunity from arrest under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution since Inciting to Sedition is punishable with a maximum penalty of
less than six years. Finding merit in Beltran’s motion, the MeTC ordered
Beltran’s release in its Order of
[6] Composed of Attys. Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Rosalina P. Aquino, Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez, Irwin A. Maraya, and Maria Cristina P. Rilloraza.
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 84-85; Annex “I.” The Information reads in full:
That
prior to February 24, 2006 and dates subsequent thereto, in Makati City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court (and other parts of the
Philippines) the above named accused 1Lt. LAWRENCE SAN JUAN, being then a
member of the Philippine Army, CRISPIN BELTRAN y BERTIZ, duly elected member of
the House of Representatives, together with several other JOHN/JANE DOES whose
present identities and whereabouts are presently unknown, conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong
Komunista and Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng
Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby
rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government, such
as, but not limited to, conducting bombing activities and liquidation of
military and police personnel, for the purpose of removing allegiance from the
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or armed forces, or depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives and ultimately to overthrow President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and the present duly constituted Government.
[8] Pending resolution of Beltran’s motion, the DOJ sought leave from Branch 137 to file an Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452, impleading additional 46 defendants, including the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76 and 172070-72 and encompassing crimes committed since the 1960s. On petitioners’ motion, Branch 137 expunged the Amended Information for being an entirely new Information.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), p. 59; Annex
“A.” The Order of
[10] Composed of Attys. Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Joselita C. Mendoza, Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez, Irwin A. Maraya, and Merba A. Waga.
[11] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172074-76), pp. 99-102; Annexes “K” and “L.” The President was quoted by a daily, thus: “They [petitioners in the Maza petition] have committed a crime. They are committing a continuing crime. And we have laws to deal with that. x x x.” (The Philippine Star, 12 March 2006, p. 1). Respondent Gonzalez was also reported to have said: “We will just declare probable cause, then it’s up to the Court to decide. x x x.” (The Philippine Star, 14 March 2006, p. 6)
[12] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172070-72), pp. 540-541; Annex “11.”
[13] The Solicitor General claims that
the petitioners in the Maza petition (except Beltran) are guilty of
forum-shopping for having filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 93975) “demanding the
conduct of preliminary investigation.” However, the records show that the
petition in CA G.R. SP No. 93975 sought the nullification of a DOJ Order, dated
[14] Section 7, Rule 112 provides: “When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.— When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing Rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time
he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.” (Emphasis
supplied)
[15] Rollo
(G.R. No. 175013), pp. 540-541; Annex “PP-1.” Beltran’s arrest was later
declared illegal by the MeTC for violating Beltran’s parliamentary immunity from
arrest under Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. It appears the
prosecution did not appeal from this ruling.
[16] Beltran also claims that on the
night of his arrest, his jailors showed him a warrant of arrest, dated
[17] Even under the rulings in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (No. L-61388, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 472 also reported as Parong v. Enrile, 206 Phil. 392) and Umil v. Ramos (G.R. No. 81567, 9 July 1990, 187 SCRA 811) where the Court characterized Rebellion as a “continuing offense” thus allowing the warrantless arrest of its perpetrators, Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion remains void as he was not arrested for committing such felony.
[18] “Section 8. Initial Duty of the Inquest Officer.— The Inquest Officer must first determine if the arrest of the detained person was made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, x x x.”
[19] Larranaga
v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 241 (1997);
Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 101837,
[20] Cruz,
Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436,
[21] Acuña
v. Deputy Ombudsman for
[22] See
Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5
May 1994, 232 SCRA 192; Salonga v.
Cruz-Paño, No. L-59524,
[24] People
v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481 (1995).
[25] Including official receipts, publications, articles, inventories, and photocopies of ID pictures.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 690-693;
Annex “PP-27.”
[27]
[28] The affidavits mainly concern the
organization and recruitment of members of MKP, the aborted participation of
MKP members in a rally on
[29] See Buscayno v. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, 196 Phil. 41
(1981); People v. Hernandez, 120
Phil. 191 (1964).
[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), p. 613.
[31] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172070-72), pp. 59-67;
Annex “D.”
[32] Rollo (G.R. No. 175013), pp. 657-674;
Annex “PP-18.”
[33] Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
“Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.”
[34] Under Article 136 of the Revised Penal
Code, Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion is punishable by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall
not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000).
[35] Hernandez v. Albano, 125 Phil. 513
(1967).
[36] Dimayuga v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304
(1922).
[37] Hernandez v. Albano, supra.
[38] Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758 (1995).
[39] Defined under Section 3, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as “sworn written statement charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated.” (Emphasis supplied)
[40] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 172074-76), pp. 61-62; Annex “A.”
[41] Go
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 172074-76), p. 102.
[43] Id.,
pp. 16-17.
[44] Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-72335-39,