AAA,* G.R. No. 171465
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
and
Nachura, JJ.
HON. ANTONIO
A. CARBONELL,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
ENGR. JAIME
O. ARZADON,
Respondents.
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari[1]
assails the December 16, 2005[2]
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed against private
respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3,
2006[3]
Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner worked as a secretary at
the Arzadon Automotive and
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near him and upon reaching
his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted
his penis into her vagina. She wept and
cried out for help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the
premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill
her and her family. But when she discovered
that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident
to her parents. On
On
On
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and
requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and
after the clarificatory questioning, the panel issued on
An Information[8]
for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding
probable cause before the Department of Justice. On
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of
Justice Raul Gonzales reversed the
Consequently, Arzadon filed an “Urgent
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing
a Warrant of Arrest.”[13] In an Order dated
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established
the existence of probable cause. Pending
resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition[14]
with this Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter
No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue of Criminal Case No.
6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27,
In a Resolution[15] dated
Meanwhile, on
Petitioner raises the following issues:[16]
I
RESPONDENT
JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
II
RESPONDENT
JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE COMPLAINANT AND
WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
III
RESPONDENT
JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE REFUSED TO INHIBIT FROM
FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE WHISPERS OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY
IV
RESPONDENT
JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ORDER OF
Petitioner contends that the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses in
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell should
have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence
of probable cause.
Arzadon claims that the petition
should be dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal, it appearing
that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an action for certiorari
under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment[17]
that the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is not
binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner and
her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.
The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed
for being the wrong mode of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell
acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for
lack of probable cause.
The petition has merit.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in that the former brings up for review
errors of judgment while the latter concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 may be considered a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondents abused their discretion in
their questioned actions, as in the instant case.[18] While petitioner claims to have brought the
instant action under Rule 45, the grounds raised herein involve an alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall treat the same as
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in
directly filing the instant petition before this Court instead of the Court of
Appeals, thereby violating the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[19] In this case, however, the gravity of the
offense charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of the complaint
for rape, compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid
further delay.[20]
We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause.
We rule in the affirmative.
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply
with his orders to take the witness stand. Thus –
In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case
record and considering that the Private Prosecutor, despite several admonitions
contumaciously nay contemptuously refused to comply/obey this Court’s Orders of
March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other similar Orders issued in
open Court that directed the complainant/witnesses to take the witness stand to
be asked probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited jurisprudential
rulings of the Supreme Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion and
sound judgment finds and so holds that NO probable cause was established to
warrant the issuance of an arrest order and the further prosecution of the
instant case.
Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the
scheduled hearings of the case, the accused had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant
failed to appear during the last four (4) consecutive settings despite due
notice without giving any explanation, which to the mind of the Court may
indicate an apparent lack of interest in the further prosecution of this
case. That failure may even be construed
as a confirmation of the Defense’s contention reflected in the case record,
that the only party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor, prodded
by the accused’s alleged hostile siblings to continue with the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable
cause, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.[21]
He claims
that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.”
However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,[22]
the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus:
The addition of the
word “personally” after the word “determined” and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to “other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law,” has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is
not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates
this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.[23]
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,[24]
where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.[25]
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for
purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper –
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.[26]
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be
emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in
the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when
there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
cause.[27] Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the
documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part
of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v.
Gutierrez,[28]
we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of
the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his
witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor
upon the filing of the Information.[29] If the report, taken together with the
supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it
is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses be conducted.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983
without taking into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003
Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department
of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence
in support thereof. Respondent judge’s
finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and
her witnesses’ absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for
the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay[30]
dated
After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The
gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.[33] Petitioner has categorically stated that
Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary
investigations. Taken with the other
evidence presented before the investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for
purposes of establishing probable cause.
It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require that the evidence would
justify conviction. [34]
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on
the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and
sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it was
unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and
her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in
holding that petitioner’s absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of
a lack of interest in prosecuting the case.
In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the
truth.[35] As it were, the incidents of this case have been
pending for almost five years without having even passed the preliminary
investigation stage. Suffice to say that
the credibility of petitioner may be tested during the trial where the
respective allegations and defenses of the complainant and the accused are properly
ventilated. It is only then that the
truth as to Arzadon’s innocence or guilt can be determined.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Information
in the said case is hereby REINSTATED.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* Pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 (AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the latter’s consent shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this
provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of
not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Section 63, Rule XI of the RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262 also provides: During the investigation, prosecution and trial of an offense under the Act, law enforcement officials, prosecution, judges, court personnel and medical practitioners, as well as parties to the case, shall recognize the right to privacy of the victim-survivor of violence. Law enforcement officers and prosecutors shall conduct closed-door investigations and shall not allow the media to have access to any information regarding the victim-survivor. The adult victim, however, may choose to go public or speak with the media, preferably with the assistance of her counsel.
The barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel shall not disclose the names and personal circumstances of the victim-survivors or complainants or any other information tending to establish their identities to the media or to the public or compromise her identity.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television or radio, director and editor of a film in case of the movie industry, or any person utilizing try-media or information technology to cause publicity of the name of identity of the victim-survivor or complainant without her consent. Identities of children shall not in any way be disclosed to the public without the conformity of the DSWS officer of the city or province.
Any person who violates this
provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of
not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-18.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
Records, Vol. 2, pp. 69-78.
[15] Rollo, p. 98.
[16]
[17]
[18]
People v. Court of Appeals,
438 Phil. 215, 231 (2002); GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Principe, G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005,
474 SCRA 555, 561-562.
[19] Yared
v. Ilarde, 391 Phil. 722, 733 (2000).
[20]
See Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corporation, 434 Phil. 28, 35 (2002).
[21] Rollo, p. 22.
[22]
G.R. Nos. L-82585, L-82827, and L-83979,
[23]
[24]
317 Phil. 758 (1995).
[25]
[26] People
v. Inting, G.R. No.
88919,
[27] Webb v. De
[28]
G.R. No. 150185,
[29]
[30]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 13-16.
[31]
[32]
[33] People
v. Sabardan, G.R.
No. 132135,
[34] Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.
[35] Abugotal
v. Tiro, 160 Phil. 884, 890
(1975).