EN BANC
|
PEOPLE OF
THE Appellee, |
G.R. No.
171272 (Formerly G.R. Nos. 150047-48) |
|
- versus - |
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., and NACHURA, JJ. |
|
LEOSON DELA CRUZ y ECHECHE, Appellant. |
Promulgated: June 7, 2007 |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated
The amended informations charging appellant
with murder and frustrated murder, respectively, read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK
(For Murder)
x x x
x
That on or about the 20th day of
November 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a kitchen
knife, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength and using disguise, fraud and craft to
enter the dwelling of one JULIANA RICALDE y RODRIGUEZ, and once inside, did
then and there, with insult to or in disregard of the respect due the latter on
account of rank, age and sex, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab said JULIANA RICALDE y RODRIGUEZ, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which directly caused her death. (Underscoring omitted.)
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK
(For
Frustrated Murder)
x x
x x
That on or about the 20th
day of November 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with
a kitchen knife, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, and using disguise, fraud and craft to enter the dwelling of
PELAGIO RICALDE y TAN, and once inside, did then and there, with insult to and
in disregard of the respect due the latter on account of rank, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said PELAGIO RICALDE y TAN,
thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which ordinarily would have
caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause independent of his will, that is, due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Pelagio Ricalde y Tan which
prevented his death. (Underscoring omitted.)
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
The facts below as found by the RTC
and confirmed by the Court of Appeals were gleaned from the testimonies of (1) Atty.
Pelagio T. Ricalde, survivor and husband of the
victim Juliana; (2) Rebecca R. Ricalde, their 19-year-old daughter; (3) Sgt. Robert D. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3 of the Cinco Hermanos
Subdivision; (4) Godofredo E. Meriel,
the responding subdivision guard; (5) SPO4 Conrado J.
Cruz and (6) SPO4 Jaime E. Gamueda,[5] crime
investigators from the Marikina Police; (7) SPO4 Celso
J. Cruz, evidence custodian of the Marikina Police; (8) Drs. Bu C. Castro and (9)
Noel B. Minay, medico-legal officer of St. Luke’s Medical
Center and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), respectively; and (10)
Aida V. Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI.
It appears that around
Upon reaching the house of Pelagio,
dela Cruz told Rebecca, Pelagio’s daughter who met
him at the gate, that her father had told him to go
there. He stepped in the small gate in
the garage that was already opened, and Rebecca walked ahead of him to fetch her
father. As the father and daughter returned, dela Cruz was already in the
kitchen. According to Rebecca, she first heard the two converse
quietly as dela Cruz asked her father for a job recommendation. It was then
that she noticed dela Cruz’s blue backpack. Suddenly, she heard her father
scream, “Becca, tulungan
mo ako.”[7] She screamed, “Daddy, Daddy,”[8] as she ran towards
him, and noticed dela Cruz holding a knife. She screamed for help and saw her
mother, Juliana, rushing in. Her father was covered with blood and she sought
help to rush him to the hospital.
According
to Pelagio, dela Cruz was a messenger in his law firm who got fired based on
his secretary’s recommendation that dela Cruz had been absent without leave at
least three times.[9] This information was corroborated by Priscila M. Dimaano, Pelagio’s
secretary.[10] When his daughter informed him that dela Cruz
wanted to talk to him, he met with dela Cruz who was by then in their kitchen
already. He told him he did not have his stationery with letterhead and had to
still check with the companies he knew which had vacancies. He said that he
would write dela Cruz a recommendation letter which the latter could pick up
from the office. As he escorted dela Cruz out towards the garage gate, the
latter suddenly stabbed him at the back and kept on stabbing him until he lost
his balance. When he managed to turn and face dela Cruz, the latter kept on
stabbing him frontally. He tried to put his arms around dela Cruz but his
attacker shook him off. As he ran towards the kitchen, dela Cruz chased and
kept on stabbing him at the back of his left shoulder. At this point, Juliana appeared and rushed to
him begging, “Leo, tama na,
tama na, tama na.”[11]
Dela Cruz dropped the knife and ran
towards the garage.[12]
As Juliana was attending to her
husband, dela Cruz suddenly reappeared and stabbed her at the back with a
letter opener. As she jerked backward, she received another stab below the left
shoulder. She tried to ward off the letter opener with her left hand, but again
was stabbed at the back of her left arm. Pelagio shouted, “Huwag
Leo, si Julie yan.”[13] When the letter
opener broke, dela Cruz dropped the instrument and rushed outside where he was
apprehended by Meriel, the guard-on-duty in Gate 1.
In court, Meriel,[14]
SPO4 Conrado J. Cruz[15]
and SPO4 Gamueda[16]
all identified that dela Cruz was the person who was arrested in connection
with the incident in the Ricalde residence. SPO4 Gamueda,
who recovered the weapons used in the stabbing, identified the same in court. SPO4 Celso J. Cruz,
the evidence custodian of the Marikina Police, identified the kitchen knife and
the letter opener, one bloodied yellow and blue backpack, one striped blue and
white t-shirt with the word MAUI printed on it with the initials “J.G.,” and
one khaki pants marked Geraldo Jelleni with initials
“J.G.”[17]
Dr. Castro, medico-legal officer of
the St. Luke’s
Dr. Minay,
medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the post-mortem on Juliana. He
described eight stab wounds inflicted on Juliana, and said the first wound
caused her internal bleeding that proved fatal. All the wounds were inflicted
by a pointed instrument with one-sided blade.
Three of them were inflicted on her back.[19]
Forensic chemist Magsipoc
testified that the DNA profile of the bloodstain on the backpack and on the
khaki pants, which were presented in evidence, matched the DNA profile of
Pelagio although the stains in the t-shirt did not.
Dela Cruz
denied the accusations against him. He admitted that he went to the Ricalde
residence to ask for a job recommendation from Pelagio upon Pelagio’s
instruction. Pelagio denied he gave this instruction.[20]
Dela Cruz said he traveled one and a
half hours and took three rides to get there. He presented his I.D. card to the
guard-on-duty and saw the guard make an entry in the logbook. He said he was
frisked and his bag was inspected. He claimed that he was frequently at the
Ricalde residence and had at times, when the owners were abroad, slept there
and watched the place for them. According to him, when Rebecca led him in and
when Pelagio saw him, Pelagio was red-eyed and was furious when he reminded
Pelagio that it was the latter who had told him to be there. At this juncture, Pelagio shouted at him, “Shit,
bullshit, putang ina,”[21]
then shoved him towards the garage gate. Still furious, Pelagio continued
shouting, “Tang-ina mo, wala akong
kakilalang Leo.”[22] Dela Cruz recalled that as he was leaving,
Pelagio was blocking the gate so he just stared back. Then, Pelagio grabbed a
kitchen knife in the nearby sink, three steps away from the gate. Pelagio was about to stab him so he grabbed
the knife and stood up. As Pelagio was still blocking his exit, he saw Juliana
hand a knife to Pelagio. It appeared to him that Pelagio was in a daze and did
not recognize anyone. Pelagio tried to stab him but started hitting Juliana
instead. According to dela Cruz, Pelagio stopped only when Juliana dropped to
her knees. He saw Pelagio embrace Juliana. Then, dela Cruz added, he rushed
outside where he was apprehended and brought to the Marikina Police Station.[23]
He said he did not know how Pelagio got
his wounds and how the knife was bent as he was busy grappling for the knife.[24]
During rebuttal, Rebecca testified
that there was no sink in the garage, disputing dela Cruz’s story that Pelagio
got the knife from there. She said that the sink was located in the
generator/engine room that could be accessed through a door with an iron
shutter that was always locked.[25] This information
was corroborated by SPO4 Gamueda.[26]
Dr. Rocco B. Paragas, resident surgeon
at the
On
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused
LEOSON DELA CRUZ y ECHECHE is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK and of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH by
lethal injection and the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, respectively, the crime
having been qualified with treachery and attended with the generic aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. The accused is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Atty. Juliana Ricalde y Rodriguez the
amount of P50,000.00 for the latter’s death, the
amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages for both cases. The
court, however, cannot award actual damages for the death of the victim Atty.
Juliana Ricalde y Rodriguez and for the damages sustained by Atty. Pelagio
Ricalde in view of the failure of the prosecution to substantiate such damages
with official receipts and other documents to support the same.
SO
ORDERED.[29]
Following People v. Mateo,[30] the cases
were transferred to the Court of Appeals for review.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED
for lack of merit. The joint
Decision dated
In Criminal
Case No. 99-3101-MK, appellant LEOSON DELA CRUZ Y ECHECHE is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by
treachery with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
dwelling and is hereby SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The
appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Atty. Juliana
Ricalde the amounts of: (a) Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php25,000.00
as exemplary damages; (d) Php25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (e) Php2,441,423.00 for the
victim’s loss of earning capacity.
In Criminal
Case No. 99-3102-MK, the appellant LEOSON [DELA] CRUZ Y ECHECHE is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER qualified
by treachery with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
dwelling and is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) [y]ears
of prision mayor as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The
appellant is further ordered to pay the victim Atty. Pelagio Ricalde the
amounts of: (a) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (b)
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[31]
Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) opted not to submit their respective supplemental briefs.[32] However, on record we find their briefs filed
before the appellate court on the following issues brought before it, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.[33]
III.
…EVIDENT PREMEDITATION [WAS] SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.
IV.
…DWELLING WAS ALSO PRESENT.[34]
In sum, the issues for our review
are: (1) Did the prosecution prove appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt? (2) Did treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling
attend the commission of the crimes?
First, appellant contends that in
criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and
unless there is overwhelming evidence of the guilt of the accused, the
constitutional presumption of innocence applies.[35] He claims that this burden had not been
satisfied by the prosecution. Second,
appellant contends that treachery was not present in this case. He avers that the informations
did not allege treachery with specificity, hence, it was only a generic
aggravating circumstance and he should only be charged with homicide and
frustrated homicide.[36] He points out that his wounds would clearly
show that Pelagio resisted his attack.
He also insists that the alleged attack on Juliana was an afterthought
of Pelagio since Juliana saw the danger to her life.
On the other hand, the OSG submits
that appellant’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG insists that there was treachery
since Pelagio was totally caught off-guard by appellant’s sudden attack. Further, as appellant’s attack on Juliana was
so sudden, it was impossible for her to defend herself.[37]
Likewise, according to the OSG,
evident premeditation was present since appellant planned the death of the
victims as reflected in the following circumstances: (1) he traveled one and a
half hours to reach the Ricalde residence; (2) he presented a fake I.D. upon
entering the subdivision; and (3) he was armed with a knife and a letter opener
when he went there. Thus, the OSG claims
that despite sufficient time for reflection, appellant went on with his
criminal plan.[38]
Further, the OSG contends that the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling is also present because the crimes were
committed in the house of the victims who had not provoked appellant.[39]
Lastly, the OSG contends that the
two informations against appellant specifically
alleged the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling to
have attended the commission of the crimes.
The OSG cites People v. Aquino,[40] where we clarified that the words “aggravating/qualifying,”
“qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or “aggravated by,” need not be
expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are
specified in the information.[41]
With the prosecution’s overwhelming
evidence, we see no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and of
the appellate court as appellant’s guilt on the crimes charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We find Pelagio’s
testimony to the minutest detail and his categorical identification of
appellant as the assailant credible, unwavering and consistent. Both the trial
and appellate courts agree on the facts surrounding the attack on the victims.
Positive identification made with moral certainty suffices to convict the
accused.[42] Further, the testimony concerning the death
of Juliana and the near death of Pelagio acquires greater weight since it is
amply supported by the testimonies and medical findings of Dr. Castro[43]
and Dr. Minay,[44]
who examined the victims.[45]
On the other hand, appellant’s
defense suggesting that Pelagio, for no motive or reason at all, would suddenly
harm and violently kill his wife is highly improbable. Appellant insinuates that Pelagio was dazed,
red-eyed and beside himself. However,
Pelagio’s testimony was corroborated by his daughter when she heard her
father’s cry for help and she saw dela Cruz with a knife. Appellant’s testimony that Pelagio got a
knife from a nearby sink had been more than contradicted by Rebecca that the
sink was nowhere in the garage but in the generator/engine room. Rebecca’s testimony on this point was
corroborated by a police officer who had no reason to lie. Testimonial evidence, to be credible, should
come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be
credible in itself, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.[46]
As to the
presence of treachery, we agree with both the trial and appellate courts that
the suddenness of appellant’s attack on the victims ensured the commission of
the crimes, giving no opportunity for Pelagio and Juliana to defend themselves. At the
time of the attack, Pelagio was talking with appellant on the way out. At that
time, Pelagio did not have the slightest idea he was going to be stabbed and
had no chance to defend himself.
Treachery also accompanied the
death of Juliana. Juliana was by her
fallen husband when appellant reappeared with a letter opener. The attack on her was instantaneous and
Juliana was not ready to fight back thinking appellant had left. In People
v. Vallespin, we ruled that even if the victim is
warned of the danger to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long
as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
herself or to retaliate.[47]
Appellant further contends that the
informations[48]
filed against him failed to allege treachery with specificity in order to
qualify the killing to murder.
Appellant’s contention is disingenuous, to say the least. The informations
sufficiently apprised appellant of the nature of the charges against him, i.e., that treachery, evident
premeditation and dwelling attended the killing of Juliana, and the attack on
Pelagio. It is not the use of the words
“qualifying” or “qualified by” that raises a crime to a higher category, but
the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential
element raising the crime to a higher category.[49]
When treachery
is present, an allegation of abuse of superior strength can no longer be
appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance.[50] The same holds true with the circumstance of
disregard of the respect on account of rank, age or sex, which in this case
could not be aggravating.[51] In like manner, we do not find that disguise,
fraud or craft attended the commission of the crimes. Also, we find no
intellectual trickery nor cunning resorted to by appellant to lure his victims
into a trap and conceal his identity.[52]
As to the presence of evident
premeditation, we find that only the attack on Pelagio was evidently
premeditated. The same cannot be said on
the assault on Juliana.
To prove evident premeditation, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to such determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the
offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act.[53]
As testified to by Rebecca, she had
never before the incident seen the knife used by appellant in their home. Pelagio and his secretary also testified that
the letter opener had been missing from the law firm after appellant was
dismissed from employment. These uncontroverted testimonies constitute direct evidence of
appellant’s pre-conceived plan against Pelagio.
Further, as the Court of Appeals noted, despite the one and a half hours
travel time for reflection, appellant still clung to his criminal plan against
Pelagio.
On the other hand, Juliana’s
arrival to help her husband was unexpected.
When Juliana rushed to her wounded husband and begged appellant to stop,
appellant left, but suddenly reappeared with a letter opener and stabbed
Juliana at the back. Appellant’s
momentarily leaving the scene did not give him enough opportunity to fully
contemplate on his resolution to kill Juliana. We stress the importance of the
requirement in evident premeditation of sufficiency of time between the
criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent,[54]
affording such opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the
meaning and the consequences of what appellant had planned to do, an interval
long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire
and scheme. In the stabbing of Juliana, this element was wanting.[55]
Finally, we agree that dwelling
aggravated the commission of the crimes.
Appellant’s greater perversity was revealed when he deliberately entered
the victims’ domicile,[56]
at the pretext of soliciting help from its owners. The garage, where the incidents took place,
is undoubtedly an integral part of the victims’ residence.
Clearly, the presence of the
attending circumstances in this case qualified the killing of Juliana to murder
under Article 248[57]
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
As to the attack on Pelagio, the
crime committed was frustrated[58]
murder as appellant performed all
acts of execution which could have claimed the life of Pelagio but because of
prompt medical intervention, a cause independent of appellant’s will, Pelagio
survived.[59]
On the whole, we are fully
convinced that there is no ground to reverse appellant’s conviction. He is guilty of murder and frustrated murder
beyond any reasonable doubt.
Conformably, in Criminal Case No.
99-3101-MK the proper imposable penalty is death. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines,” signed into law on
As to Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK,
applying Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Articles 50,[61]
61, paragraph 2[62]
and 64, paragraphs 3 and 6,[63]
we affirm the appellate court’s sentence of an indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
As to the proper monetary awards
imposable in each of the two criminal cases, modifications are in order.
In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK,
for the murder of Juliana Ricalde, the award of civil
indemnity is mandatory and must be granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime. However, we modify the civil indemnity
imposed by the Court of Appeals, from P50,000
to P75,000 to conform with current jurisprudence.[64]
Because the prosecution failed to
present receipts or other evidence to substantiate actual damages, we could not
award such damages. Nonetheless, in
lieu of actual damages, the heirs of Juliana Ricalde may be awarded
temperate damages of P25,000, in accordance
with current jurisprudence, as it has been shown that the family of the victim
incurred burial and funeral expenses, although the amount thereof cannot be
proved with certainty.[65]
An award of moral damages is also
proper in view of the violent death of Juliana and the resultant grief to her
family. We affirm the reduction made by
the Court of Appeals from P200,000 to P50,000
to conform with current jurisprudence,[66]
as moral damages are imposed to compensate the heirs of the victim for the
injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.
Exemplary damages of P25,000 have been properly imposed by the Court of Appeals to
serve as an example and deterrent to future similar transgressions. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances,[67]
as in this case.
It is also proper to award
compensation to the heirs of the victims for loss of earning capacity, pursuant
to Article 2206 (1)[68]
of the Civil Code. The testimonial evidence for the prosecution, as
corroborated by documents[69]
presented, were sufficient bases for the award.
At the time of her death, Juliana was 46 years old,[70]
and was receiving pay in the amount of P215,388
per annum as an Associate Professor I with a salary grade of 22 at the
University of the P2,441,064.[73]
In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK,
for the frustrated murder of Pelagio Ricalde, we
grant an award of P30,000 as civil indemnity
without proof other than the commission of the crime and the culprit’s
liability therefor.[74] In addition, an award of moral damages of P50,000 is proper for the suffering endured by the victim from
appellant’s criminal acts.[75]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK,
appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and with the
attendant aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Rep.
Act. No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without possibility of parole.
Appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Juliana Ricalde, the
amounts of: (a) P75,000 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000 as moral
damages; (c) P25,000 as exemplary damages; and (d) P2,441,064 for
the victim’s loss of earning capacity, all with interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum from this date until fully paid.[76]
In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER qualified by treachery with the attendant
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and dwelling and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Appellant is further ORDERED to pay the victim
Pelagio Ricalde the amounts of: (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b) P25,000 as exemplary
damages; and (c) P30,000 as civil indemnity, all with interest at the legal
rate of 6% from this date until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
(On leave) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
(On leave) RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-91. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 22-113. Penned by Judge Reuben P. De La Cruz.
[3] Records, p. 55.
[4]
[5] “SPO2” and “SPO3” Jaime E. Gamueda in some parts of the records.
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11] Supra note 9, at 23.
[12]
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] TSN,
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27] TSN,
[28]
[29] CA rollo, pp. 112-113.
[30] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[31] Rollo, pp. 86-87.
[32]
[33] CA rollo, p. 141.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] G.R. Nos. 144340-42,
[41] CA rollo, pp. 258-259.
[42] People v. Maguing, G.R. No. 144090,
[43] Rollo, pp. 9-13.
[44]
[45] See People v. Mejares, G.R. No.140204,
[46] People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 145993,
[47]
[48] Records, pp. 55 and 65.
[49] People v. Garin, G.R. No. 139069,
[50] People v. Simon, G.R. No. 130531,
[51] See People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
[52] See People v. Quiñanola, G.R. No. 126148,
[53] People
v. Demate, G.R. Nos. 132310 & 143968-69,
[54] People v. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 369 (1929).
[55] See People v.
[56] See People
v. Lapan, G.R. No. 88300,
[57] ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.
With treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength….
x x x x
5.
With evident
premeditation.
x x x x
[58] Revised Penal Code, Art. 6.
x x x x
A felony is… frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
x x x x
[59] See People v. Pinuela, G.R. Nos. 140727-28,
[60] People
v. Tubongbanua, supra at 743.
[61] ART. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
[62] ART. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. –…
x x x x
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
x x x x
[63] ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.-…
x x x x
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
x x x x
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
x x x x
[64] People v. Tubongbanua, supra at 742.
[65] See People v. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87,
[66] People v. Tubongbanua,
supra at 743.
[67]
[68] Art. 2206.…
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
x x x x
[69] Exhibits “O” and “P,” folder of exhibits, pp. 9-10.
[70] Exhibits “J,” and “L”, id. at 5, 7.
[71] Exhibit “P”, id. at 10.
[72] In the absence of contrary evidence, reasonable and necessary living expenses is pegged at 50
percent of the earnings. People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32,
[74] People
v. Pacaña, G.R. Nos. 97472-73,
[75] People
v. Singh, G.R. No. 129782,
June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 404, 418; See also People v. Rafael, G.R. Nos. 146235-36,
[76] See People v. Tubongbanua, supra at 743.