SECOND
DIVISION
|
ANGEL CELINO, SR., Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF
APPEALS, CEBU CITY, HON. DELANO F. VILLARUZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 16,
Regional Trial Court, Capiz, Roxas City, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 170562 Present: QUISUMBING,*
J., Chairperson, CARPIO,** CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: June
29, 2007 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
April 18, 2005[1] affirming the trial
court’s denial of petitioner Angel Celino, Sr.’s Motion to Quash; and
Resolution dated September 26, 2005[2]
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision.
The following facts are not disputed:
Two separate informations were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with violation of
Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban),[3]
and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294[4] (illegal
possession of firearm), as follows:
Criminal Case No. C-137-04
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber during the election period – December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 – without first having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila, Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [5]
Criminal Case No. C-138-04
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber without first having obtained the proper license or necessary permit to possess the said firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the gun ban violation charge.[7]
Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash[8] contending that he “cannot
be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also charged of having committed another crime
of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.”[9]
By Order of July 29, 2004,[10] the
trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this Court’s[11] affirmation
in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses[12]
of therein respondent judge’s denial of a similar motion to quash on the ground
that “the other offense charged x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.” [13] Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied by
By Decision dated
The petition fails.
Petitioner’s remedy to challenge the appellate court’s decision and
resolution was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for
lost appeal. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion, could not have been raised on appeal, no
reason therefor has been advanced.[21]
While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a
petition for certiorari as having
been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary
period under said Rule, it finds nothing in the present case to warrant a
liberal application of the Rules, no justification having been proffered, as
just stated, why the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period,[22]
especially considering that it is substantially just a replication of the
petition earlier filed before the appellate court.
Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same.
The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful
Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. — x x x.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
x x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored
proviso. Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo,[23]
People v. Ladjaalam,[24] and other similar cases,[25]
contends that the mere filing of an information for gun
ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession
of firearm. The Solicitor General
contends otherwise on the basis of Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses [26]
and People v.
In Agote,[28] this Court affirmed the accused’s conviction
for gun ban violation but exonerated him of the illegal possession of firearm
charge because it “cannot but set aside petitioner’s conviction in Criminal
Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed
at the same time, i.e., violation
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.”[29] Agote is based on Ladjaalam[30] where
this Court held:
x
x x A simple reading [of RA
8294] shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms. Hence, if the “other crime”
is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an
aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer
be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning
of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified,
for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor
the accused. Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. x x x
x x x x
x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple
illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by
the person arrested.” If the intention
of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder,
it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does
not distinguish, neither should we.[31]
The law is indeed clear. The
accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other
crime was committed by the person arrested. The word “committed” taken in its ordinary
sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence,[32]
necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction
resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.[33]
Petitioner’s reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan,
Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore,
misplaced. In each one of these cases, the
accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their
commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.[34] In the present case, however, petitioner has
only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there
is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.[35] Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.
More applicable is Margarejo[36] where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to
quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that “the
other offense charged [i.e., violation
of gun ban] x x x is not
one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x
x x.”[37] in
consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez[38] that
“all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to
be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act
No. 8294 are involved x x x.”[39]
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under
R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed
because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with
such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder
or homicide,[40]
or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.[41] Conversely, when the other offense involved
is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for
illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of
his motion to quash is for him to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.[42] Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case
there is a grave abuse of discretion,[43] the
appellate court correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not
attendant in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson.
[1] CA rollo at 99-103.
[2]
[3] Rules and Regulations on: (A) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting Firearms or Other Deadly Weapons; (B) Security Personnel or Bodyguards; (C) Bearing Arms By Any Member of Security or Police Organization of Government Agencies and Other Similar Organization; (D) Organization or Maintenance of Reaction Forces During the Election Period in Connection with the May 10, 2004, Synchronized National and Local Elections.
[4] An Act Amending the Provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended, entitled “Codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture,
dealing in, acquisition or distribution of firearms, ammunitions, or explosives
or instruments used in the manufacture of firearms, ammunitions or explosives
and imposing stiffer penalties for certain violations thereof and for relevant
purposes.” (Took effect July 6,
1997)
[5] CA rollo at 24. No copy found in RTC records.
[6] Records, p. 1.
[7] Rollo, p. 8.
[8] Records, pp. 25-31.
[9]
[10]
[11] En Banc.
[12] 417 Phil. 506 (2001).
[13]
[14] Records, p. 91.
[15] CA rollo,
pp. 2-60.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, p. 128.
[21] Heirs
of Griño v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 165073, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 329, 341 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).
[22] Id.
at 342, citing The President, Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151280, June
10, 2004, 431 SCRA 682, 688.
[23] G.R. No. 142675,
[24] 395 Phil. 1
(2000).
[25] Evangelista v. Sistoza,
414 Phil. 874 (2001); People v. Garcia,
424 Phil. 158 (2002); People v. Bernal,
437 Phil. 11 (2002); People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198 (2003); and People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637 (2003).
[26] Supra note 12.
[27] 364
Phil. 259 (1999).
[28] Supra note 23.
[29]
[30] Supra note 24.
[31]
[32] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14, par. (2).
[33] Vide
People v. Concepcion, 55 Phil. 485, 491 (1930),
where this Court held that “inasmuch as every defendant is presumed innocent
until convicted by a competent court after due process of law of the crime with
which he is charged, [the accused] is still innocent in the eyes of the law,
notwithstanding the filing of the information against him for the aforesaid
crime.”
[34] Maintenance of drug den and direct assault
with attempted homicide in Ladjaalam; robbery
in Evangelista; kidnapping for ransom
with serious illegal detention in Garcia and
in Pangilinan; murder and gun ban violation in Bernal; illegal possession of drugs in Almeida; and gun ban violation in Agote.
[35] On the contrary, petitioner even
claimed, through his “not guilty” plea in Criminal Case No. C-137-04
that he did not commit a violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban. (Rollo,
p. 8)
[36] Supra note 12.
[37] Supra
note 13.
[38] Supra note 27.
[39]
[40] R.A. No. 8294, Sec. 1.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Soriano v. Casanova, G.R. No. 163400,
[43] Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil.
151, 176 (1996).