FIRST DIVISION
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MANUEL
S. ISIP, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE
OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 170298 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip
and Marietta M. Isip” to the extent that it affirmed with modifications
petitioner Manuel S. Isip’s conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended
Decision[2]
dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under
the following information:
That on or about March 7, 1984, in
the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose
one (1) seven carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the
purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984,
but the herein accused once in possession of the above-described articles, with
intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands
made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the
proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of P200,000.00,
Philippine Currency.[3]
Petitioner’s
wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of the information in
Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:
That
on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
knowing fully well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific
Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the amount of P562,000.00, in
payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which
check upon presentation with the drawee bank for payment was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A.
Jose for the redemption of the said check, accused refused and still refuses to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated
amount of P562,000.00, Philippine Currency.[4]
The six other Informations are
similarly worded except for the date when the offense was committed, the number
and amount of the check. The pertinent
data in the other informations are as follows:
|
Crim. Case No. 147-84 148-84 149-84 155-84 156-84 157-84 |
Date of Commission |
No. of Check 518644 518645 030086[5] 518674 518646 518669 |
Amount of Check
|
The spouses Isip were likewise
charged before the same court with five (5) counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.
The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as
follows:
That
on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, received
from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set
dome shape ring and earrings valued at P120,000.00, with the obligation
of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein
accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by means of false pretenses,
with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them
to their own personal use and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646
and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount
of P90,000 and P25,000, respectively, which upon presentation
with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check,
failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount of P120,000.00,
Philippine Currency.[6]
Except for the description and value
of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and agreed date of return,
and the number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof, the
four other informations are similarly worded.
The specifics thereof are as follows:
|
Crim. Case No. 257-84 260-84 261-84 378-84 |
Value of Jewelry
|
Date of Receipt |
Agreed Date of Return - |
Check No./Date 030086/03-12-84 518647/03-25-84 518672/03-27-84 518644/03-17-84 518645/03-30-84 |
Amount
|
When arraigned on the charges,
petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There being only one complainant in all the
cases, joint trial of the cases followed.
The versions of the prosecution and
the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the parties’ respective
briefs, are the following:
i)
Prosecution Version. –
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses
Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose. The introduction was made by
complainant’s father, Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in
the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués
(pp. 8-16, tsn,
Needing a bigger capital to finance
the growing operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be their capitalist,
a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).
Thus, the operation went smoothly –
that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).
On February 3, 1984, at
complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses received
from complainant a 6 carat men’s ring valued at P200,000.00
with the condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission
basis for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they
have to return the ring if sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October
15, 1993).
On P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged
by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular men’s ring is the
subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 and
518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30, respectively, are the
subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
In the morning of P150,000.00. The
condition was that the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before P150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as
payment (p. 34, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case
No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day,
Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition
that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before
On P120,000.00. As with
their previous agreement, the item was to be returned or the proceeds of the
sale be delivered on P90,000.00
and P25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring (p.
53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case
No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84
and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
At noontime on the same day, the
Isip couple went back to the residence of complainant and got from him one (1)
collar heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00
(p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon,
Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn,
The subject pieces of jewelry are
the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the Isip couple and
Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of P562,000.00.
Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise
that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered on P562,000.00
as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22,
1993).
This is the subject matter of Criminal
Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84
against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the
above transactions were deposited on
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to
these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence at Room 411, 4th
Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila,
but claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite,
was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr.,
6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand,
appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta
hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta.
Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business undertakings in
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9;
Tr., 10/2/95, 13) – appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business;
while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as
in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single
(Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In
1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry
from losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for
financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant Leonardo
Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14).
After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred
appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza
Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem,
17-19). Beginning early 1983, at
complainant’s residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant
Marietta, accompanied by her husband who participated only as a witness, started
having transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February, March
and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta
pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be
sold on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry
to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In
the course of the transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several checks to
complainant as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry which have
either been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant
and had conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, some personal
properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga, Bataan and
Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be registered in the
names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2,
2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of
appellants to complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23;
Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8).
Also, all the checks that appellant
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84,
148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each
case; and of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00
for the value of the articles misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she
is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she
is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P562,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is
acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is
hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the
costs.[8]
In
ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these
cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose’s ancestral house in
The
trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces
of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned
in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84. As to petitioner, the trial
court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 finding him to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts
involved in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for
misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the
complainant.
Aggrieved,
petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following
as errors:
- I -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT,
ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND
Before
the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.
In
a decision promulgated
WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision of the
1. In
Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence
imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was
ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal rate from
filing of the information until fully paid;
2. In
Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged; and
3.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose,
jointly and severally, the sums of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00,
P562,000.00 and P200,000.00 representing the amounts involved in
said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid.[10]
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court’s finding that the venue was properly laid and that the checks were
delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired at
complainant’s ancestral home in
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court of Appeals
ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces
of jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the defense’s claim of
redemption/dacion en pago – that real
and personal properties were conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of
desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases – to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that
though novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise
of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court. In these five
cases, it ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted the checks
issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said
cases. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals acquitted
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84
for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling of conviction. It found
petitioner’s claims that he did not receive the jewelry worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt he
issued for said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon him to
sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to
preserve his friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive.
On
On
WHEREFORE, the decision dated
“3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases DISMISSED.”[13]
Petitioner
is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He raises the following issues:
First
– WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO
PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;
Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT
HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.
On
the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and
conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that
any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84
took place in
The concept of venue of actions in
criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was committed determines
not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot
take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[16]
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was properly laid in the
RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took
place in his ancestral home in
In the
instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent
evidence that the transaction happened in
It is axiomatic that when it comes to
credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence.
The reason is obvious. Having the
full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[19] It is to be pointed out that the findings of
fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court.[20] In the case at bar, we find no compelling
reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and to apply the exception. We
so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction
took place in
On the second issue, petitioner contends
that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No.
136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt
evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but
merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that there
is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no competent
evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received
by, or delivered to, him.
We find his contentions
untenable. The finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
is supported by the evidence on record. The
acknowledgment receipt[21]
executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring in
question. Petitioner’s claim that he did
not receive any ring and merely executed said receipt in order to preserve his
friendship with the complainant deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as
he is, knows the significance, import and obligation of what he executed and
signed. The following disputable
presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been fair and
regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed [22]
Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully well
the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however, find that he
failed to do so. Aside from his
self-serving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship
with complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said
presumptions. It is clear from the
evidence that petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt when he received the
ring from complainant in
Petitioner’s argument that he did not
receive the subject ring[23]
is further belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter testified that
said ring was borrowed by him on
Anent the third issue, petitioner
argues that, assuming gratia argumenti
that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring
subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was
effectively extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations
incurred as shown by the fact that complainant executed Affidavits of
Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did
not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No.
136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim
that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of
prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied
the application of the rule of novation on said case because the rejected
initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt
to preserve their good relations) was but an alternative defense and its
rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the novation rule in said
case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that novation[25] cannot
be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84.
The claim of petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed
to complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered
to complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of
all, not some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late
wife. This, complainant did not do for
the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him were not enough to cover
all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he
received were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.[26] In particular, he said that petitioner and
his spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they
delivered properties as payment.[27] It follows then that the obligations incurred
by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal cases herein
tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of
Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because
it rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is
untenable. The main reason why the Court
of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of
novation are present. For novation to
take place, four essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous
valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract;
(3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new
obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84,
only the first element is extant. What
distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there
were checks issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces
of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case
No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any
check as payment for the subject ring that could have extinguished his old
obligation and brought to life a new obligation.
From the allegations of the
information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of estafa
with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the
money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or
denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended
party demands that the offender return the money or property.[28] All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat
diamond (men’s ring), valued at P200,000.00,
for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the
proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said
ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from complainant,
petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof
causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount of P200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.
WHEREFORE, the
decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275
dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 174-194.
[2]
[3] Records, Vol. 11, p. 1.
[4]
[5] All checks were drawn against Pacific Banking Corporation, except for Check No. 030086 which was drawn against Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation.
[6] Records, Vol. 7, p. 1.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 245-251.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Petitioner was already acquitted by the RTC in said five cases.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 264-276.
[13]
[14] People v. Amadore, G.R. Nos. 140669-75
& 140691,
[15] Macasaet v. People, G.R. No.
156747,
[16] Uy v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 329, 337 (1997).
[17] Exhs. S & S-1; Records, Vol. 2, pp. 148-149.
[18] Samson
v. Daway, G.R. Nos.
160054-55,
[19] People
v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649,
[20] People
v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051,
[21] Exh. I; Records, Vol. 2, p. 134.
[22] Section 3(c), (d), (p) and (q), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[23] TSN,
[24] TSN,
[25] Novation has been defined as the
extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation
by a subsequent one which terminates the first, either by changing the object
or principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the debtor, or
subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal). Novation has two functions: one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place. For novation to take place, four essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. (California Bus Lines, Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., 463 Phil. 689, 702 [2003].)
[26] TSN,
[27] TSN,
[28] Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150443,