Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., G.R. No. 169501
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
ROSARIO T.
ALZUL,
Respondent. June 8, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 questions the February 18, 2005 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341, which granted respondent
Alzul the right to pay the balance of the purchase price within five (5) days
from receipt of the CA Decision despite the lapse of the original period given
to said party through the final Resolution of this Court in an earlier
case. The CA ruling reversed the
September 18, 2003 Resolution[3]
and December 2, 2003 Order[4]
of the Office of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 01-1-097, which
upheld the dismissal of respondent Alzul’s complaint for consignation and
specific performance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
in HLURB Case No. REM-A-99097-0167.
Likewise challenged is the
The Facts
The
facts culled by the CA are as follows:
On
[Respondent]
took immediate possession of the subject property, setting up a perimeter fence
and constructing a house thereon.
On
On
On
The trial court
ruled in [respondent’s] favor in the rescission case. The decision was even affirmed by this [appellate]
Court. Yu brought his cause before the
Supreme Court in a Petition for Review, but this was likewise denied.
On
On
“WHEREFORE, the
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint therein
is ordered dismissed. Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. N-1922, N-1923, N-1924, and N-1925, all of the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, Malabon Branch, in the names
of plaintiffs-appellees Carlos N. Ventura and Sandra L. Ventura are hereby
declared null and void, and the titles of ownership reinstated in the name of
B.E. San Diego, Inc. with the corresponding notices of lis pendens therein
annotated in favor of defendant-appellant until such time that ownership of the
subject parcels of land is transferred to herein defendant-appellant Rosario
Alzul. Costs against plaintiff-appellees.
SO ORDERED.”
Upon
filing of an appeal to the Supreme Court docketed as GR No. 109078, the above
decision was affirmed on
On
“We,
however, agree with the observation made by movants that no time limit was set
by the respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision for the private
respondent herein, Rosario Alzul, to pay B.E. San Diego, Inc. the original
owner of the properties in litigation. To rectify such oversight, private
respondent Rosario T. Alzul is hereby given a non-extendible period of thirty
(30) days from entry of judgment, within which to make full payment for the
properties in question. xxx”
(Emphasis supplied.)
On
On
November 11, 1996, [respondent] filed a Manifestation in GR No. 109078
informing the Supreme Court that [petitioner], on three (3) occasions, refused
to accept [her] payment of the balance in the amount of ₧187,380.00. On
On
On
1.
We have long legally rescinded the sale in her
favor in view of her failure to pay the monthly amortization as per contract.
2.
She sold her rights to Mr. Wilson Yu who failed
to pay his monthly amortizations, too.
3.
We are not and have never been a part of the
case you are alluding to hence we cannot be bound by the same.
4.
The property in question is now under process to
be reconveyed to us as ordered by the court by virtue of a compromised (sic)
agreement entered into in Civil Case No. 2655 MN of the Malabon RTC Branch
entitled Spouses Carlos Ventura and Sandra Ventura vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc. xxx
Thinking
that an action for consignation alone would not be sufficient to allow for the
execution of a final judgment in her favor, [respondent] decided to file an
action for consignation and specific performance against [petitioner] before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board on
On
“The
purported “consignation” in this case is thus of no moment, inasmuch as the
amount allegedly due was not even deposited or placed at the disposal of this
Office by the complainant.
In any event, we agree with [petitioner]
that even if the complainant had actually made the consignation of the amount,
such consignation is still ineffective and void for having been done long after
the expiration of the non-extendible period set forth in the 17 June 1996
Supreme Court Resolution that expired on 20 September 1996.
WHEREFORE,
Premises Considered, a judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint. Cost against complainant.
IT (sic) SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved
by the above decision, [respondent] filed a Petition for Review before the
HLURB’s First Division. On
[Respondent]
then filed an appeal to the Office of the President. This was, however, dismissed on
“From the
foregoing, it is evident that there was no valid consignation of the balance of
the purchase price. The 30-day non-extendible
period set forth in the
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. x x x”
[Respondent]
filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of] the above Resolution, but this was
denied with finality on
The Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
Respondent
Alzul brought before the CA a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 67637, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the OP in dismissing her
appeal in O.P. Case No. 01-1-097 and affirming the March 17, 2000 Decision[7]
and July 31, 2001 Resolution[8] of
the HLURB First Division in HLURB Case No. REM-A-990907-0167.
On
WHEREFORE, in
the higher interest of justice, the assailed Decision, Resolution and Order
dated March 17, 2000, September 18, 2003 and December 2, 2003, respectively,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [respondent Alzul] is hereby
ordered to pay [petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc.] the balance due for the sale
of the subject four parcels of land within five (5) days from receipt of this
decision. [Petitioner B.E. San Diego,
Inc.], on the other hand, is ordered to accept such payment from [respondent
Alzul], after which, the corresponding Deed of Sale must be issued.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The CA
agreed with the HLURB that no valid consignation was made by respondent but found
that justice would be better served by allowing respondent Alzul to effect the
consignation, albeit belatedly. It cited
the respondent’s right over the disputed lots as confirmed by this Court in
G.R. No. 109078, which, if taken away on account of the delay in completing the
payment, would amount to a grave injustice.
Moreover,
the CA pointed out that respondent’s counsel concededly lacked the vigilance
and competence in defending his client’s right when he failed to consign the
balance on time; nonetheless, such may be disregarded in the interest of
justice. It considered the failure of respondent’s counsel to avail of the
remedy of consignation as a procedural lapse, citing the principle that where a
rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice, technicalities can be ignored.
A copy
of the
On
Through
its assailed August 31, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, and finding that respondent duly exerted efforts to comply
with its Decision and a valid consignation was made by respondent, it granted
the requested 10-day extension of time to comply with the February 18, 2005
Decision and her motion for consignation.
The fallo of said Resolution
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion
for extension to comply with the Decision is hereby GRANTED, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED and the motion for consignation is GRANTED. [Petitioner] B.E.
San Diego, Inc. is hereby ordered to receive the payment of [respondent]
Rosario T. Alzul and to issue, in her favor, the corresponding Deed of Sale.[12]
The
Issues
Hence, before
us is the instant petition with the following issues:
1.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in issuing the assailed 18 February
2005 Decision and 31 August 2005 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341, has
decided questions of law in a way not in accord with law and with the
applicable decisions of the Honorable Court;
2.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed patent grave abuse of
discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in granting
respondent Alzul’s subsequent motion for extension of time to comply with the
18 February 2005 decision and motion for consignation; and
3.
Whether or not the
The
Court’s Ruling
On the procedural
issue, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. assails the sufficiency of respondent
Alzul’s CA petition as the latter, in violation of the rules, allegedly lacked
the essential and relevant pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP.
Section 6 of Rule 43, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure pertinently provides:
SEC. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall x x x (c)
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and
other supporting papers; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The above proviso explicitly requires
the following to be appended to a petition: 1) clearly legible duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or
resolution appealed from; 2) certified true copies of such material portions of
the record referred to in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.
Obviously, the main reason for the prescribed
attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by
making readily available to the CA all the orders, resolutions, decisions,
pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and
relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case
records of the lower court. The rule is
the reviewing court can determine the merits of the petition solely on the
basis of the submissions by the parties[14]
without the use of the records of the court a
quo. It is a fact that it takes
several months before the records are elevated to the higher court, thus the
resulting delay in the review of the petition.
The attachment of all essential and necessary papers and documents is
mandatory; otherwise, the petition can be rejected outright under Sec. 7 of
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Effect of failure to comply with
requirements.—The
failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
To
prevent premature dismissals, the requirements under Sec. 6 on the contents of
the petition have to be elucidated.
First,
there can be no question that only the award, judgment, or final order or
resolution issued by the lower court or agency and appealed from has to be
certified as true.
The
second set of attachments refers to the “certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein.”
Material
is defined as “important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect;
going to the merits; having to do with matter, as distinguished from form.”[15] Thus, material portions of the records are
those parts of the records that are relevant and directly bear on the issues
and arguments raised and discussed in the petition. They may include any of the pleadings that
are subject of any issue, documentary evidence, transcripts of testimonial
evidence, and parts of the records pertinent and relevant to the grounds
supporting the petition. The attachment
of the material portions is subject to the qualification that these are
referred to or cited in the petition.
Thus, only the material parts specified in the petition have to be
appended and that would be sufficient compliance with the rule as to form.
It
would be prudent however for the petitioner to attach all parts of the records
which are relevant, necessary, or important in whatever way to be able to reach
the resolution of the issues of the petition.
The availability of such documents to the ponente and members of a Division can easily provide the substance
and support to the merits of the grounds put forward by the petitioner. Moreover,
the processing time for the review and resolution of the petition is greatly abbreviated,
thereby obviating intolerable delays.
Lastly,
it has to be explained whether the material portions of the records have to be
certified as true by the clerk of court or his/her duly authorized
representative as provided in Sec. 6 of Rule 43. If strictly required, the rule to require
attachment of certified true copies of the material portions will surely make
the preparation of the petition more tedious, cumbersome, and expensive. It should therefore be construed that merely
clear and legible copies of the material portions will suffice. The rules on the different modes of appeal
from the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies to the CA reveal that it is
only Rule 43 that specifically states that the material portions to be appended
to the petition should be certified true copies. Rule 41 of course does not require attachment
of the pertinent records since the entire records are elevated to the CA. Rule 42 on petition for review from the trial
court in aid of its appellate jurisdiction to the CA speaks of plain copies of
the material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition.[16] Even Rule 45 on appeal by certiorari from the
CA to this Court simply speaks of material portions of the records without
indicating that these should be certified true copies. Rule 46 on original cases to this Court only
requires plain copies of the material portions of the records. Finally, Rule 65 on special civil actions
requires only copies of relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents.
From
the foregoing premises, the inescapable conclusion is that only plain and clear
copies of the material portions of the records are required under Sec. 3 of
Rule 43. This finding is buttressed by
our ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where
it was held that only judgments or final orders of the lower courts are needed
to be certified true copies or duplicate originals.[17] There is no plausible reason why a different
treatment or stricter requirement should be applied to petitions under Rule 43.
The
last requirement is the attachment of “other supporting papers.” Again, it is only in Rule 43 that we
encounter the requirement of annexing “supporting papers” to the petition. This can be interpreted to mean other
documents, pictures, and pieces of evidence not forming parts of the records of the lower court or agency that
can bolster and shore up the petition.
While not so specified in Sec. 3 of Rule 43, it is inarguable that said
papers must also be relevant and material to the petition; otherwise, the
attachments would be mere surplusages and devoid of use and value.
Petitioner
claims respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 failed to attach material
documents of the records of the HLURB and the OP. They cry foul that none of the pleadings filed
with the HLURB and the OP found their way into the CA petition. It prays that the CA petition should have
been dismissed under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 due to the lack of needed attachments.
Petitioner’s
postulation must fail.
Sec.
7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition if it is not
accompanied by the required documents but simply gives the discretion to the CA
to determine whether such breach constitutes a “sufficient ground” for
dismissal. Apparently, petitioner was
not able to convince the CA that the alleged missing attachments deprived said
court of the full opportunity and facility in examining and resolving the
petition. It has not been satisfactorily
shown that the pleadings filed by petitioner with the quasi-judicial agencies
have material bearing or importance to the CA petition. Such pleadings could have been attached to
the comment of respondent and hence, no prejudice would be suffered. Thus, the CA did not exercise its discretion
in an arbitrary or oppressive manner by giving due course to the petition.
In
addition, it was noted in Cusi-Hernandez
v. Diaz that the CA Revised Internal Rules provide certain flexibility in
the submission of additional documents:
When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of copies, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to complete the annexes or file the necessary number of copies of the petition before docketing the case. Pleadings improperly filed in court shall be returned to the sender by the Chief of the Judicial Records Division.[18]
In Rosa Yap Paras, et al. v. Judge Ismael O. Baldado, et al., the
Court preferred the determination of cases on the merits over technicality or
procedural imperfections so that the ends of justice would be served better,
thus:
At the same time, the Rules of Court
encourage a reading of the procedural requirements in a manner that will help
secure and not defeat justice. Thus:
Section 6.
Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding.
As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, “(w)hat should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. x x x (T)he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.”[19]
Now
we will address the main issue—whether respondent Alzul is still entitled to
consignation despite the lapse of the period provided by the Court in G.R. No.
109078 entitled Yu v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner
stresses the fact that respondent Alzul did not comply with this Court’s
After three (3) unsuccessful tenders
of payment, respondent Alzul made no consignation of the amount to the court of
origin. It was only on
Moreover,
petitioner argues that respondent’s delay of a year and a half to pursue full
payment must be regarded as a waiver on her part to claim whatever residual
remedies she might still have for the enforcement of the June 17, 1996
Resolution in G.R. No. 109078.
Petitioner further contends that even
if the action before the HLURB was made on time, that is, within the 30-day
period, still it is fatally defective as respondent did not deposit any amount
with the HLURB which violated the rules for consignment which require actual
deposit of the amount allegedly due with the proper judicial authority.
Premised
upon these considerations, petitioner faults the appellate court for its grant
of respondent’s petition for review which nullified the denial by the HLURB
Arbiter, HLURB First Division, and the OP of respondent’s action.
On
the other hand, respondent contends that the June 17, 1996 Resolution of this
Court should not be construed against her inability to effect payment due to
the obstinate and unjust refusal by petitioner—a supervening circumstance
beyond her control. Respondent
underscores that within the 30-day period, she repeatedly attempted to effect
the payment to no avail. Moreover, the
much delayed response of petitioner embodied in its
Moreover,
she argues that the December 26, 1995 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078 granting
her proprietary rights over the subject lots has long become final and
executory.
Anent
the issue of laches and estoppel, respondent strongly contends that such do not
apply in the instant case as incontrovertible circumstances show that she has
relentlessly pursued the protection and enforcement of her rights over the
disputed lots for over a quarter of a century.
After
a careful study of the factual milieu, applicable laws, and jurisprudence, we find
the petition meritorious.
Respondent Alzul was accorded legal rights over
subject properties
In
G.R. No. 109078, finding no reversible error on the part of the CA, we denied
Wilson P. Yu’s petition and affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that as
between Wilson P. Yu, the
It
is thus clear that we accorded
respondent Alzul expectant rights over the disputed lots, but such is conditioned
on the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Having been conceded such rights, respondent
had the obligation to pay the remaining balance to vest absolute title and
rights of ownership in his name over the subject properties.
In
our June 17, 1996 Resolution, we clearly specified thirty (30) days from entry
of judgment for respondent to promptly effect the full payment of the balance
of the purchase price for the subject properties, thus:
We however agree with the observation made by movants that no time limit was set by the respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision for the private respondent herein, Rosario Alzul, to pay B.E. San Diego, Inc., the original owner of the properties in litigation. To rectify such oversight, private respondent Rosario T. Alzul is hereby given a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment, within which to make full payment for the properties in question.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)
The non-compliance with our June 17, 1996 Resolution
is fatal to respondent Alzul’s action for consignation and specific performance
Unfortunately,
respondent failed to effect such full payment of the balance of the purchase
price for the subject properties.
No consignation within the 30-day period or at a
reasonable time thereafter
It
is clear as day that respondent did not attempt nor pursue consignation within
the 30-day period given to her in accordance with the prescribed legal
procedure. She received a copy of the
entry of judgment on
It
must be borne in mind however that a mere tender of payment is not enough to
extinguish an obligation. In Meat Packing Corporation of the
Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. It should be distinguished from tender of payment. Tender is the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived the immediate consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation, where validly made, produces the effect of payment and extinguishes the obligation.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
There
is no dispute that a valid tender of payment had been made by respondent. Absent
however a valid consignation, mere tender will not suffice to extinguish her
obligation and consummate the acquisition of the subject properties.
In
First of all, the decision of the then
Court of Appeals which was promulgated on October 21, 1981, is quite clear when
it ordered the payment of the balance of the purchase price for the disputed
lot within 60 days “from receipt hereof”
meaning from the receipt of the decision by the respondents. It is an admitted fact that the respondents
received a copy of the decision on
The
records also reveal that respondent failed to effect consignation within a
reasonable time after the 30-day period which expired on
Considering the manifestation, dated November 11, 1996, filed by counsel for private respondent Rosario T. Alzul, stating that private respondent tendered to B.E. San Diego, Inc. the payment of the sum of P187,380.00 representing the balance of the purchase price of the properties which are the subject of this litigation, but B.E. San Diego, Inc., refused to accept the same, the Court resolved to REFER the case to the court of origin, for appropriate action.[27]
Respondent
still failed to take the cue by her inaction to consign the amount with the
court of origin. Undoubtedly, pursuing
the action for consignation on
No valid consignation made
We
agree with petitioner’s assertion that even granting arguendo that the instant case for consignation was instituted
within the 30-day period or within a reasonable time thereafter, it would still
not accord respondent relief as no valid consignation was made. Certainly, the records show that there was no
valid consignation made by respondent before the HLURB as she did not deposit
the amount with the quasi-judicial body as required by law and the rules.
Pertinently,
the first paragraph of Article 1258 of the Civil Code provides that “[c]onsignation
shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial
authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper
case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases (emphasis supplied).”
It
is true enough that respondent tendered payment to petitioner three (3) times
through a Solidbank Manager’s Check No. 1146 in the amount of PhP 187,380[28] on
August 29 and 30, 1996 and
Petitioner
is of the view that there was no jurisdiction acquired over its person and
hence, it is not bound by the final judgment and
Considering the tenor of our
As cited earlier, consignation is the act of depositing the
thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot
accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of
payment.[29] It is of no moment if the refusal to accept
payment be reasonable or not. Indeed,
consignation is the remedy for an unjust refusal to accept payment. The first paragraph of Art. 1256 of the Civil
Code precisely provides that “[i]f the creditor to whom tender
of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from
responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due (emphasis supplied).”
The proper
and valid consignation of the amount due with the court of origin, which shall
judicially pronounce the validity of the consignation and declare the debtor to
be released from his/her responsibility, shall extinguish the corresponding
obligation.
Moreover, in order that consignation may
be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the
creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because s/he
was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled
to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation had been lost;
(3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the
person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was
placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation
had been made, the person interested was notified of the action.[30]
Respondent
did not comply with the provisions of law particularly with the fourth and
fifth requirements specified above for a valid consignation. In her complaint for consignation and
specific performance, respondent only prayed that she be allowed to make the
consignation without placing or depositing the amount due at the disposal of
the court of origin. Verily, respondent
made no valid consignation.
The
rights of petitioner and respondent over the 1,275 square meter lot subject of
this petition will be determined by the significance and effects of the
December 26, 1995 Resolution rendered in G.R. No. 109078 entitled Yu v. Court of Appeals.[31]
The
subject matter of G.R. No. 109078 is the November 27, 1992 Decision rendered in
CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 entitled Carlos N.
Ventura and Sandra L. Ventura v. Rosario T. Alzul, et al., the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the complaint therein is ordered
dismissed. Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. N-1922, N-1923, N-1924, and N-1925, all of the Register of Deeds of
Metro Manila, District III, Malabon Branch, in the names of plaintiffs-appellees
Carlos N. Ventura and Sandra L. Ventura are hereby declared null and void, and
the titles of ownership reinstated in the name of B.E. San Diego, Inc., with
the corresponding notices of lis pendens therein annotated in favor of
defendant-appellant until such time that ownership of the subject parcels of
land is transferred to herein defendant-appellant Rosario Alzul. Costs against plaintiff-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On
However,
on
The
question is—can the Court, the CA, or the Malabon City RTC order petitioner B.E.
San Diego, Inc. to accept the tender of payment made by respondent Alzul?
Definitely,
they cannot. The reason is that petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the
Malabon City RTC civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 33619, nor in G.R. No. 109078 and
hence is not under the jurisdiction of said courts. What were determined and decided in the CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 were the annulment of the titles of spouses
Carlos and Sandra Ventura, the reinstatement of said titles to the name of
petitioner, and the declaration that the ownership of the lots subject of said
titles will be transferred to respondent.
There is no directive to respondent granting her the right to pay the
balance of the price to petitioner and, more importantly, there is no order for
petitioner to accept the payment. The
dispositive or fallo of the decision
is what actually constitutes the judgment or resolution of the court that can
be the subject of execution. Where there
is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and its body, the
dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the
decision.[34] Such being the case, petitioner is not duty
bound to accept any tender of payment from respondent precisely because such
diktat is absent in the fallo of the
CA Decision which was affirmed by this Court in its December 26, 1995
Resolution in G.R. No. 109078.
The
lacuna in the CA Decision was sought to be corrected in its
The
answer is no. The reason is obvious as
jurisdiction was never acquired over the person of petitioner. The action for quieting of title is
characterized as quasi in rem. In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, it was held that:
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)[35]
Not
being impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party, petitioner is not bound
by the dispositions in the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 and the Resolutions
of this Court in G.R. No. 109078.
Moreover, there is no explicit and clear directive for petitioner to
accept the payment of the balance of the price.
It
is for this reason that respondent cannot ask for a writ of execution from the trial
court where the complaint was originally instituted as said court has no
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
Even if a writ is issued, it should conform to the judgment, and the fallo of the CA Decision does not impose
the duty or obligation on the part of petitioner to accept the payment from
respondent. It is the settled doctrine
that a writ of execution must conform to the judgment and if it is different
from or exceeds the terms of the judgment, then it is a nullity.[36]
In
addition, Sec. 10, Rule 39 provides the procedure for execution of judgments
for specific acts, thus:
Sec. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.—(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title.—If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may by an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
The
rule mentions the directive to a “party.”
It is therefore essential that the person tasked to perform the specific
act is impleaded as a party to the case.
Otherwise, the judgment cannot be executed. In the case at bar, petitioner should have
been impleaded as a party so as to compel it to accept payment and execute the
deed of sale over the disputed lots in favor of respondent. As petitioner was not impleaded as a party,
then the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 as affirmed in G.R. No. 109078
cannot be enforced against it.
The
cause of action available to respondent is to file an action for consignation
against petitioner which she did by registering a complaint for consignation
before the HLURB on
In
First of all, the decision of the then
Court of Appeals which was promulgated on October 21, 1981, is quite clear when
it ordered the payment of the balance of the purchase price for the disputed
lot within 60 days “from receipt hereof,”
meaning from the receipt of the decision by the respondents. It is an admitted fact that the respondents
received a copy of the decision on
Secondly, even if we reckon the 60-day period from the date of the finality of the decision as interpreted by the appellate court, such finality should be counted from March 5, 1982, which was the date the decision became final as indicated in the entry of judgment and not from August 26, 1982 which is the date the entry was made. The date of a finality of a decision is entirely distinct from the date of its entry and the delay in the latter does not affect the effectivity of the former as such is counted from the expiration of the period to appeal.[37] x x x
In the aforecited case, the lot owner
was made a party to the case and the judgment of the court was for the plaintiff
to pay to the lot owner the balance of the purchase price within 60 days from
receipt of the Decision. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner B.E. San Diego,
Inc., though not a party in the complaint for quieting of title, can be
compelled to receive the purchase price, still, the refusal to receive the
money requires respondent Alzul to follow the procedure in St. Dominic Corporation and consign the money with the court of
origin. Having failed in this respect,
respondent’s rights to the property have been forfeited as a result of
non-payment within the prescribed time frame.
The
CA relied on justice and equity in granting an additional period of five (5)
days from receipt of the February 18, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 to
pay the balance due for the sale of the four lots.[38] While we commiserate with the plight of
respondent, the CA ruling will not prevail over the established axiom that
equity is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure.[39] For all its conceded merits, equity is
available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.[40] Equity as an exceptional extenuating
circumstance does not favor, nor may it be used to reward, the indolent. This Court will not allow a party, in guise
of equity, to benefit from respondent’s own negligence.[41]
In
the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that the grant of
respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 and the recognition of the
belated consignation of the amount find no support nor basis in law, rule, or
jurisprudence. The CA’s holding that the
non-consignation of the amount due is merely a procedural lapse on the part of
respondent’s counsel is misplaced and is contrary to settled
jurisprudence. Plainly, respondent’s
rights over the subject property are now lost and forfeited.
Having
resolved the core issue on the validity of the consignation, the Court sees no
further need to discuss the remaining issues raised in the petition.
Petitioner to reimburse payments
However,
respondent had made payments over the subject properties based on her agreement
with petitioner. So as not to enrich
itself at the expense of respondent, petitioner is obliged to reimburse
respondent whatever amount was paid by her in form of monthly
amortizations. On the other hand, if
respondent is in possession of the subject properties, she and all persons
claiming under her should surrender the possession to petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the February 18, 2005 Decision
and
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DANTE O.
TINGA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-37.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Supra note 2, at 45-51.
[7] Rollo, pp. 162-168.
[8]
[9] Supra note 2, at 56.
[10] Rollo, pp. 340-344.
[11]
[13] Rollo, pp. 467-468.
[14] Atillo v. Bombay, G.R. No. 136096, February 7, 2001, 351 SCRA 361, 369; cited in San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392.
[18] G.R.
No. 140436,
[29] Supra note 25.
[30] Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgate Bank v. Diaz, G.R. No. 153134, June 27, 2006,
493 SCRA 248, 263, citing Pabugais v.
Sahijwani, G.R. No. 156846,