SECOND DIVISION
|
Petitioner, - versus - EUNG WON CHOI,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 165496 Present: QUISUMBING, J.*, Chairperson, CARPIO,** CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This resolves petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated
For the first time, petitioner raises
the matter of inadvertence with respect to the improper verification of his
petition. This Court notes that petitioner
has softened his previously adamant stance[1] as
he now claims to have simply overlooked the failure to include the words “or
based on authentic records” in verifying the petition.
This Court takes cognizance of
petitioner’s humble submission and finds his invocation of honest mistake to be
well-taken in explaining the lapse in the verification.
The relaxation of the rule on verification
notwithstanding, petitioner’s motion must nonetheless fail.
In asserting that he was
not required to attach the MeTC Orders, petitioner
tries to impress upon this Court that he was not questioning the Orders of the MeTC. Such attempt does
not persuade.
Rule 42 explicitly mandates
that a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of both
lower courts’ judgments or final orders must be attached to the petition,
except where, as in the case of Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[2]
the MeTC Order was rendered in favor of the petitioner
in which case only a true or plain copy thereof is required to be
attached.
In this case, the
February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was not submitted to the
appellate court when, in fact, such Order dismissing the entire case was
undoubtedly adverse to petitioner. If
petitioner deemed the MeTC Order favorable as he now
claims, he should not have appealed to the RTC in the first place. Clearly, petitioner’s failure to attach the MeTC Order runs counter to the rules.
In insisting on the
application of Rule 33 to buttress his claim that respondent waived his right
to present evidence, petitioner underscores the silence of Section
23 of Rule 119 in cases where the demurrer to
evidence
was granted by the MeTC but reversed on appeal by the RTC. Suffice it to state that the granting of a
demurrer in criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and may not be
reversed on appeal without violating the proscription against double
jeopardy. Succinctly stated, there is no
waiver to speak of in such case since an accused’s acquittal on demurrer may not
be reversed on appeal.
It must be noted that the
RTC decided the appeal only insofar as the MeTC
dismissed sub silentio the civil aspect
of the case without finding that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
Since the parties do not even dispute the existence of the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise, there was absolutely no
reason for the dismissal of the civil aspect of the case.
A finding of sufficiency
of evidence as to the civil aspect, where a demurrer to evidence is filed with
leave of court, does not authorize the trial court to terminate the proceedings
and immediately render a decision. As
this Court ruled, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is
insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence.
It was thus incorrect for
the MeTC to dismiss the civil aspect of the case
without any basis. And it was thus
premature for the RTC, in its initial decision, to adjudicate the merits of the
civil aspect of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson.
[1] Previously,
petitioner firmly asserted that he chose to employ only “personal knowledge” in
his verification since the term “or” as used in Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court bears a plainly disjunctive connotation.
In fact, petitioner even stated that “[i]f he
says it is based upon his personal knowledge, then so be it. If it turned out later on that he had no
personal knowledge thereof then that is his lookout.” See Reply dated
[2] 341 Phil. 157 (1997).