Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, G.R. No. 161758
DIVISION OF ALBAY
represented by its SCHOOLS Present:
Division Superintendent,
Petitioner, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
CELSO OŅATE,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
A little neglect may lead to great
prejudice.
The Case
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the January 14, 2004 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659, which affirmed the
November 3, 1997 Decision[3]
of the Legaspi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I, declaring as null and
void the December 21, 1998 Deed of Donation[4]
executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner, and directing
the latter to return to respondent Celso
Oņate the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the
Daraga North Central Elementary School.
The Facts
Spouses
Claro Oņate and Gregoria Los Baņos owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot) with an
area of around 27,907 square meters registered under the Torrens System of land
registration under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2563. Claro Oņate had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all surnamed
Oņate. Respondent Celso Oņate is the
grandson of Claro Oņate, being the son of Francisco Oņate.
In
1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on a portion of the
disputed lot. The school was eventually
renamed
Sometime
in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT No. 2563 which was
granted by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch V after due notice, publication, and
hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-18971[5]
was issued in the name of spouses Claro Oņate and Gregoria Los Baņos.
On
Meanwhile,
the issue of whether respondents father, Francisco Oņate, truly acquired the
disputed lot through a prior partition among Claro Oņates three (3) children
had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages
filed by the heirs of Rafael Oņate before the Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX.[6] In said case, respondent Celso Oņate, the
defendant, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the trial court.
Thereafter,
respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five (5) lots, all under
his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of Mariano M. Lim. On
On
December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to petitioner
apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the elementary school
and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters. Respondent
proposed to petitioner DECS that it purchase Lot No. 6849-A at the Fair Market
Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per square meter and also requested for reasonable
rentals from 1960.[12] The records show that then DECS Director IV
Jovencio Revil subsequently referred the matter to the DECS Division
Superintendent Rizalina D. Saquido for investigation.[13]
On
Consequently,
on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint[16]
for Annulment of Donation and/or
Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 6849 located at
Barrio Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay
before the Legaspi City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against
petitioner DECS, Division of Albay, represented by the Division Superintendent
of Schools, Mrs. Rizalina D. Saquido; and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay,
represented by the Municipal Mayor, Honorable Cicero Triunfante.
In
its April 28, 1993 Answer,[17]
the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, through Mayor Cicero Triunfante, denied respondents
ownership of the disputed lot as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality
bought said lot from Claro Oņate, respondents grandfather, and since then it
had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an
owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner
DECS; thus asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse
possession. Moreover, it claimed that the
disputed lot had been declared in the name of defendant municipality in the
Municipal Assessors Office under Tax Declaration No. 31954 from 1940 until
1988 for purposes of exemption from real estate taxes. Further,
Similarly,
petitioners April 29, 1993 Answer[18]
reiterated in essence the defenses raised by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay
and further contended that respondent had no cause of action because it
acquired ownership over the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation
executed on December 21, 1988 in its favor; and that respondents claim was
vague as it was derived from a void Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
and Cession disposing of the disputed lot which was already sold to the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940.
Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a reconstituted OCT over
During the ensuing trial where both parties
presented documentary and testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he
came to know of the disputed lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took
possession of the said lot in the same year; that he came to know that the
elementary school occupied a portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it
was only in 1992 that he came to know of the Deed of Donation executed by the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay.[19] Also, Felicito Armenta, a tenant cultivating
a portion of disputed
However,
after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss[21]
on the ground that respondents suit was against the State which was prohibited
without the latters consent. Respondent
countered with his Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss.[22] Subsequently, the trial court denied the
Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by
entering into a contract.[23]
Aside
from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented the TCTs covering
the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax Declaration No.
04-006-00681[24]
issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992 Certification[25]
from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay attesting
to respondents payment of realty taxes for Lot 6849 from 1980 to 1990.
After
respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their documentary
exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of the late Claro
Oņate, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration 31954,[26]
which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of Municipality of
Daraga with the annotation of Ex-Officio Deputy Assessor Natalio Grageda
attesting to the purchase by the Municipality under Municipal Voucher No. 69,
August 1940 accounts and the issuance of TCT No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality;
Tax Declaration No. 8926[27]
in the name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 31954; and
the subsequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184,[28]
332,[29]
and 04-006-00068.[30]
The
defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adra,[31]
the Principal of Daraga North Central Elementary School, who testified on the Municipalitys
donation of disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the improvements on said lot
amounting to more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs. Toribia Milleza,[32]
a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay since
1955, who testified on the Municipalitys continuous and adverse possession of
the disputed lot since 1940.
As
mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages was instituted by the heirs
of Rafael Oņate in Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX against Spouses Celso Oņate and
Allem Vellez, involving the same disputed lot.
Petitioner and
The Ruling of the RTC
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants:
1.
Declaring the Deed of
Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of the
defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports through the Albay Schools
Division as null and void;
2.
Declaring the
plaintiff as the owner in fee simple of Lots Nos. 6849-A, 6849-C, 6849-D and
6849-E which are registered in his name;
3.
Commanding the
defendants to return the possession of the portion of the land occupied by the
school site to the herein plaintiff Celso Oņate;
4.
Ordering the plaintiff
for reason of equity, to pay the defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay the
amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Article 479 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines;
5.
The defendant Department
of Education Culture and Sports being a builder in good faith, the provisions
of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines shall be observed by
the parties; and
6.
Ordering the defendants
to pay the costs of the suit. No
attorneys fees is hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiffs counsel.
SO ORDERED.[33]
The
trial court ratiocinated that it was clear that subject
While
the
The
trial court concluded that given these factual and evidentiary proofs,
petitioner had no right to occupy
The Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved,
petitioner DECS and
Moreover,
the appellate court held that there was no jurisdictional defect in the
reconstitution proceeding being one in
rem, and in the issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 based on the destroyed or lost
OCT No. 2563, even if no notice was sent to petitioner. Thus, the CA ruled that respondents claim of
ownership over
The CA
emphasized that petitioners failure to present TCT No. 4812allegedly issued
in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940 in lieu of OCT No.
2563 and the Deed of Conveyance executed by the original owner, Claro Oņate, in
favor of the Municipalitywas fatal to the defense. It reasoned that all the more had their
claim of ownership become doubtful when defendants-appellants [sic] failed to
explain from their pleadings and the evidence submitted before Us their failure
to present the two documents.[40] The appellate court concluded that given these
facts, no title in the name of the Municipality ever existed and thus it could
not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner.
Anent the
issue of the applicability of Amigable v. Cuenca,[41]
the CA affirmed the doctrine enunciated in said case that to uphold the
States immunity from suit would subvert the ends of justice. In fine, the appellate court pointed
out the inconvenience and impossibility of restoring possession of Lot 6849-A
to respondent considering the substantial improvements built on said lot by the
government which amounted to almost PhP 12 million; and that the only relief
available was for the government to pay just compensation in favor of
respondent computed on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the
governments taking of the land.
Through its
assailed Decision,[42]
the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial
courts decision in toto. It reasoned that laches does not apply, its
application rests on the sound discretion of the court, and where the court
believes that its application would result in manifest wrong or injustice, it
is constrained not to be guided strictly by said doctrine. Besides, it opined that laches could not defeat
the rights of a registered owner.
The Issues
Hence, we
have the instant petition where petitioner raises the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT YET BARRED BY LACHES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ACCORDING GREAT WEIGHT ON RESPONDENTS RECONSTITUTED ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 2563 COVERING SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED IN VIOLATION OF THE STATES IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
IV
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE
Petitioner
basically raises two issuesthe application of laches and the non-suability of
the State.
The
threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715
without its consent. A supplementary
issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of
the
We rule
that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its
being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the
The
auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the
The
Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil
Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its
approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract between a
government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need
not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is
assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into such
contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued
in its name.
Main
Issue: Equitable Remedy of Laches
Petitioner
strongly asserts that the
When
petitioner received the lot as donation from the Municipality on
Petitioner
strongly avers that Claro Oņate, the original owner of subject lot, sold it to
the Municipality. At the very least it
asserts that said Claro Oņate allowed the Municipality to enter, possess, and
enjoy the lot without protest. In fact,
Claro Oņate neither protested nor questioned the cancellation of his Tax
Declaration No. 30235 covering the disputed lot and its substitution by Tax
Declaration No. 31954 in the name of the Municipality on account of his sale of
the lot to the latter. In the same vein,
when Claro Oņate and his spouse died, their children Antonio, Rafael, and
Francisco who succeeded them also did not take any steps to question the
ownership and possession by the Municipality of the disputed lot until they
died on
Petitioner
maintains that significantly, respondent and his siblings succeeding their
father Francisco as the alleged owners, from his death on
Laches and
its elements
Indeed, it
is settled that rights and actions can be lost by delay and by the effect of
delay as the equitable defense of laches does not concern itself with the
character of the defendants title, but only with plaintiffs long inaction or
inexcusable neglect to bar the latters action as it would be inequitable and
unjust to the defendant.
Laches
is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have
been done earlier.[46] Verily, laches serves to deprive a party
guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its
elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom
the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having
had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the
defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[47]
In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty
Corporation, we held that [t]hough laches applies even to
imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which
could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved
in a motion to dismiss (emphases supplied).[48] In the same vein, we explained in Santiago v. Court of Appeals that there
is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each
case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[49]
Issue of
laches not barred by adverse judgment
against Daraga,
Albay
It
is unfortunate that
As an off-shoot, with respect to the
Municipality of Daraga, the Deed of Donation in favor of petitioner DECS was
annulledrespondent Oņate was declared owner in fee simple of the disputed lots
and entitled to possession but was required to pay PhP 50,000 to the Daraga Municipal
Government and the costs of suit. By
reason of the finality of the Decision against the Municipality of Daraga, Tax
Declaration Nos. 04-006-00068, 332, 22184, 31954, and 8926 are all cancelled
and annulled (if not yet cancelled).
What
are the effects of the final judgment against
Generally,
it has no impact on the appeal of DECS unless the decision affects its
defenses. In this petition, DECS no longer questions the declaration of nullity
of the Deed of Donation over the disputed lot and hence can be considered as a
final resolution of the issue. Likewise,
it does not challenge the ownership of Oņate of the disputed lots, but merely
relied on the defense of laches. The
final directive for
The only remaining issue left is
whether laches can inure to the benefit of petitioner DECS considering the fact
that Lot No. 6849-A was devoted to public education when the elementary school
was built in 1940 under the supervision and control of DECS up to 1993 when
Civil Case No. 8715 was filed by respondent Oņate.
We
rule in the affirmative.
Laches has set in
A brief scrutiny of the records does
show tell-tale signs of laches. The
first element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed
Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. 6849-A containing 13,072
square meters under TCT No. T-83946.
Moreover, Mrs. Toribia Milleza,[50]
a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955
pertinently testified, thus:
Q: How long have you been residing in this
place, Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay?
A: Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the
present.[51]
x x x x
Q: Now, can you further recall the kind of
building that was constructed
in this property?
A: Seva type, building.
Q: At present how many buildings were constructed
in this property?
A: Plenty of school buildings.
Q: Now, how many buildings were first
constructed in [sic] this property?
A: In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there
was constructed five (5) Marcos
Type buildings during the Marcos time.[52]
The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to
education started in 1940 and continued up to December 21, 1988 when said lot
was donated to the DECS. From then on,
DECS built various buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot No. 6849-A was continuously used for
public education until March 18, 1993 when respondent Oņate filed Civil Case
No. 8715 and thereafter up to the present.
Thus, for a total period of more than
fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A was exclusively and completely utilized by
DECS for public education. This fact was not successfully challenged nor
refuted by respondent.
The second element of laches was
likewise proven. No evidence was
presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took any
action, administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or protested
the Municipalitys adverse occupation of a portion of
Respondent testified that he came to
know of
Nonetheless, even granting that
respondent indeed only came to know of such encroachment or occupation in 1991,
his rights cannot be better than that of his predecessors-in-interest, that is,
Claro Oņate and his uncles, Antonio and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991,
respectively. Since respondents right
over the lot originated from his predecessors-in-interest, then he cannot have
better rights over
In the third element, the records
clearly bear out the fact that petitioner DECS did not know nor anticipate that
their possession and occupancy of a portion of
Finally, the last element is likewise
proven by the antecedent facts that clearly show grave prejudice to the
government, in general, and to petitioner, in particular, if the instant action is not barred without even
considering the cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities
and the deleterious effect on the school children and affected school teachers
and personnel if Lot No. 6849-A would be returned to respondent.
Verily, the application of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled
by equitable considerations. In the
instant case, with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from giving
approbation to the trial and appellate courts ruling that the application of
the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the
affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-in-interest
had slept on their rights for 52 years.
Also, the inaction of respondent
Oņate and his predecessors-in-interest for over 50 years has reduced their
right to regain possession of
Laches holds over the actual area possessed and occupied by
petitioner
We, however, make the
clear distinction that laches applies in favor of petitioner only as regards
Lot 6849-A which is actually possessed and occupied by it. Laches does not apply to Lot Nos. 6849-B,
6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E. These
portions were never occupied by the Municipality and petitioner. Agricultural tenant Felicito Armenta
testified that his father, Antonio Armenta, started cultivating portions of
Transfer Certificates of Title on portions of
Petitioner
contends that the reconstitution of OCT No. 2563covering subject lot in 1991
or 52 years after the Municipality owned said lotdoes not in any way affect
the latters preferential and superior right over the disputed lot. In the same vein, it maintains that it is
inconsequential that petitioner and the Municipality failed to present as
evidence the deed of conveyance in favor of the Municipality, as well as TCT
No. 4812 as a registered land owner may lose the right to recover possession of
a registered property by reason of laches.
Petitioner concludes that the long delayed reconstitution of OCT No.
2563 by respondent was a mere afterthought and intended to camouflage his and
his predecessors unreasonably long inaction which indicates an awareness that
they have no valid claim whatsoever over disputed Lot 6849.
We disagree.
It must be
noted that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and is thus binding
to the whole world. While it is true
that laches has set in so far as it pertains to the portion of Lot 6849,
specifically Lot 6849-A where the Municipality and petitioner DECS had
constructed the existing school, such does not hold true for the totality of
Lot 6849 as explained above. Indeed, the
reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, the consequent issuance of
OCT No. RO-18971 in lieu of the lost or destroyed OCT No. 2563 is valid.
Anent the
issue of non-notification, we agree with the observation of the courts a quo
that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified about the
reconstitution proceeding, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as to nullify
and prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a proceeding in
rem.
More so,
while petitioner strongly asserts that the certification in Tax Declaration No.
31954 attesting to the payment of the disputed lot under Municipal Voucher No.
69 and the issuance of TCT No. 4812, which was never disputed nor controverted
by respondent, should have been given evidentiary weight by the trial and appellate
courts as the presumptions of regularity and validity of such official act have
not been overcome, such documents cannot defeat the registered title of
respondent.
Between a
clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title and a certification
in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the former holds as
the latter is only persuasive evidence.
Indeed, tax declarations in land cases per se do not constitute
ownership without other substantial pieces of evidence.
The records
do not show and petitioner has not given any cogent explanation why the Deed of
Conveyance in favor of the
Thus,
notwithstanding valid titles over the portions of
The law[55]
provides that no title to registered land in derogation of
that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens Title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner
may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered
property by reason of laches.[56]
Thus, with
our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the equitable remedy
of laches, the issue of suability of the State has been mooted.
A final
word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of equity, a
modification of the final decision prevailing between respondent Oņate and the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED
and the January
14, 2004 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3,
1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
1) Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS),
Division of Albay to have the rights of possession and usufruct over
2) Declaring Celso Oņate as the true and
legal owner in fee simple of the following lots:
a.
b.
c.
3) Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and
legal owner of
4) Ordering petitioner DECS and all other
persons claiming under said department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C,
6849-D, and 6849-E to respondent Celso Oņate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim;
and
5) Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3,
1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC, which ordered respondent Celso Oņate to
pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000) to defendant Municipality of Daraga,
Albay.
The
November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 13-48.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 6-7.
[5]
Issued on
[6] Records, pp. 164-171. See the August 14, 1995 Decision entitled Heirs of Rafael Oņate, represented by Diego Oņate v. Spouses Celso Oņate and Allem Vellez.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[17]
[18]
[21] Records, pp. 97-100.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
TSN,
[32]
TSN,
[33] Supra note 3, at 81-82.
[34] Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 456 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
[35] Records, pp. 296 & 298.
[40]
[41] G.R.
No. L-26400,
[42] Supra note 2.
[43] Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[44] See
[46] Soliva
v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017, December
8, 2003, 417 SCRA 277, 286; citing Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, Sr., G.R.
No. 140848, April 25, 2002, 381 SCRA 594, 605; and Westmont Bank v. Ong,
G.R. No. 132560, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 212, 222.
[47] Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315; citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405-406.
[50] Supra note 32.
[51]
[52]
[53] Supra note 19.
[54] Supra note 31.
[55] Act. No. 496, Sec. 46 (The Land Registration Act), now P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
[56]
G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518; citing Isabela
Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, G.R. No.
132677, October 20, 2000, 344 SCRA 95, 106-107.