Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
RAFAEL DIMACULANGAN, G.R. NO. 156689
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
GONDALINA
CASALLA, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Sought
to be annulled by a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court are the November 4, 2002 Decision[1]
and January 10, 2003 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP-No. 47271.
The
material facts are of record.
A
63-square meter lot known as
On
However,
it appears that rights to the subject lot and structure were previously held by Sabina Casalla but the
latter transferred the same to Gondalina Casalla (Casalla) by virtue
of an Affidavit of Transfer[4] dated
Pinagtitibay
ng kasunduang ito na sina
Ginoong SEBASTIAN DELA CRUZ, Ginoong
RAFAEL DIMACULANGAN, at Gng. LETICIA FERRER, na nangungupahan sa bahay na
pag-aari ni Gng. GONDALINA R. CASALLA, ay pumapayag
na umupa sa nasabing istructura
sa taning na isang taon
(12 months) mula ika-1 Pebrero
1988 hanggang ika-1 ng Pebrero 1989.
Pagkalipas
ng nasabing palugit, kami ay nakahandang lumisan sa nasabing
bahay, at nasa sa may-ari na
ang huling kapasyahan kung kami ay kanya pang bibigyan ng panibagong palugit.[5]
(Emphasis added)
Meanwhile,
the NHA issued a master list dated
The
one-year grace period under the
Around
the time the compromise agreement was executed, Dimaculangan,
Ferrer and Dela Cruz also
filed with the NHA a letter asking that they be given preferential rights to
the subject lot on the basis of their status as “renters.” Their request was
denied by NHA-District
IV - NCR Manager Ma. Teresa P. Oblipias who, in a
letter[8]
dated
Dimaculangan, Ferrer and Dela Cruz questioned Resolution No. 031 before the NHA
General Manager; although Dela Cruz later abandoned
his claim by executing a waiver on
In
a letter-decision dated
The
District’s AAC recommended the award to you of the 63 sq. m. lot which was
protested by DIMACULANGAN, who alleged, among others, that you purchased the
structure from your mother-in-law only in October 1987 while he was already censused as a renter in February 1987.
This confirms your status as
absentee structure owner (ASO) as listed in our census masterlist.
You are therefore disqualified to the lot award.
Renter SEBASTIAN DE LA CRUZ has
voluntarily waived his rights and interests over the
contested lot in an instrument dated
IN VIEW HEREOF, the NHA resolved to
award to renters RAFAEL DIMACULANGAN and RENATO FERRER pro-indiviso the 63 sq. m.
You are directed to sell your
structure to renters DIMACULANGAN and FERRER at terms mutually acceptable to
you within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, if no sale is
effected after 60 days, you are deemed to have waived your rights and interests
over said structure and the renters are given the option to dismantle the same
to enable them to put up their own structures.
This resolution on your case is
FINAL and should you opt to appeal, you have thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice to perfect your appeal to the Office of the President pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.[9]
Casalla[10]
appealed to the Office of the President (OP) which issued a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the letter-decision dated
SO ORDERED.[11]
Dimaculangan filed a motion for reconsideration
which the OP denied in an Order[12]
dated
The CA rendered the
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is
SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby ENTERED declaring both petitioner and
respondent legally DISQUALIFIED from being awarded the lot in question.
Let
SO ORDERED.[14]
Casalla and Dimaculangan
filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration which the CA denied in its
Dimaculangan (petitioner) now challenges before us the aforequoted Decision and Resolution on the ground that the
CA committed grievous error in disqualifying him from being awarded
preferential rights to the subject lot.
Before we delve into that, a few
preliminary matters will have to be emphasized.
First, the possession of the
structure on the subject lot is the subject matter of the ejectment
case before the MTC. As borne by the records, the parties in that case entered
into a compromise agreement which the MTC approved but petitioner, Ferrer and Dela Cruz later defied
its terms. Hence, the MTC issued on
Second,
the status of Ferrer and Dela
Cruz and their rights to a portion of the subject lot are not involved in
the present Petition, for said parties did not join the appeal before the OP
and CA.
Finally,
the portion of the CA Decision and Resolution disqualifying Casalla is
not an issue in the present Petition. Casalla filed a
separate petition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156752, but the same
was denied in our Resolution of
Therefore,
the only matter for resolution here is that portion of the CA
Decision and Resolution declaring petitioner not entitled to
preferential rights to a portion of the subject lot.
In
its
In reversing the NHA and declaring petitioner
disqualified to own a portion of the subject lot, the OP cited the
following grounds:
As
disclosed by the records of the case, respondent-appellee
filed the protest with the NHA after the lapse of six (6) years from the time
the lot was awarded to petitioner-appellant Gondalina
Casalla. To our mind, respondent-appellee’s
protest with the NHA was an afterthought aimed at circumventing the terms and
conditions of the “Kasunduan” whereby
respondent-appellant Dimaculangan has explicitly
recognized the right of complainant-appellant Casalla
over the property in dispute. His refusal to vacate the structure despite
the lapse of the stipulated period has made him a deforciant
with no recognizable rights under the law. Thus, complainant-appellant
was compelled to institute an ejectment
proceedings with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque
to fully impress upon him (Dimaculangan) her superior
right over the property. Again, the court in recognition of her (Casalla’s) right readily approved the compromise agreement
wherein respondent Dimaculangan agreed to vacate the
premises in December 1993.
With regards to Casalla’s being earlier
declared an “ABSENTEE AWARDEE,” this supposed status of hers was found
inaccurate and not in conformity with the real circumstances by the Awards and
Arbitration Committee, NHA, through Resolution No. 031 dated
In affirming the disqualification of
petitioner, the CA relied on our ruling in Nidoy
v. Court of Appeals[19]
that Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517 (Urban Land Reform Program) is not
intended for apartment dwellers, least of all deforciants
on the property. The CA held that
petitioner was a mere tenant of one of the apartments on the subject lot, and
that his continued possession of the apartment became illegal when he failed to
vacate the same in accordance with the terms of the Kasunduan.
Petitioner impugns the reasoning of
the CA and argues that Nidoy is not apropos
because the structure his family is occupying is not an apartment unit, but
a mere makeshift shack which he rents for P1,200.00 a month, compared to
regular apartments in Paranaque City which fetch a
minimum monthly rent of P5,000.00. He cites B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[20]
as the applicable ruling, for it is imbued with the liberal spirit of P.D. No.
1517.
We commiserate with petitioner, but
we cannot oblige him.
Section 6 of PD 1517 grants
preferential rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land
within urban land reform areas:
Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas.
Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten
years or more who have built their homes on the land and
residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the
last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the
right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at
reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban
Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this
Decree.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 2016[21]
reinforced P.D. No. 1517 by prohibiting the eviction of qualified tenants/occupants:
Sec. 2. No tenant or occupant family, residing for ten years
or more reckoned from the date of issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1517
otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform Law, in land proclaimed as Areas for
Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zones or is a project for development
under the ZIP in Metro Manila and the SIR Program in the regional cities shall
be evicted from the land or otherwise dispossessed.
The protective mantle of P.D. No.
1517 and P.D. No. 2016, however, extends only to landless urban families who
meet these qualifications: a) they are tenants as defined under Section 3 (f)
of P.D. No. 1517;[22] b) they built a home on the land they are
leasing or occupying;[23]
c) the land they are leasing or occupying is within an Area for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zone;[24]
and d) they have resided on the land continuously for the last ten (10) years
or more.[25]
There is no question that the subject
lot in the present case is found within an urban land reform zone. There is
likewise no question that Casalla owned the structure
the petitioner was renting. The dispute is whether petitioner would qualify as
a legitimate tenant or occupant thereon.
He does not.
As found by the CA, petitioner was initially a
tenant of the structure on the subject lot but later became a deforciant when he
reneged on his commitment under the January 7, 1988 Kasunduan
to vacate the property by February 1, 1989. As of that time, his status was
no longer that of
legitimate tenant, for it was
neither by contract nor tolerance that he remained on the property.
Moreover, in the same Kasunduan, petitioner acknowledged that he
did not build the structure on the subject lot, but merely rented the same from
Casalla. It is in this sense that he was a mere
“apartment dweller.” The term “apartment dweller” is not to be taken literally as referring
exclusively to apartments. Rather, taken in the context of Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1517, the term refers to a structure intended for dwelling or as a home
which was not built by the occupant, but merely rented by him from another. As we said in Arlegui
v. Court of Appeals, apartment dwellers are excluded from the protective
mantle of the Urban Land Reform Law.[26]
Finally, there is nothing in the
records by which to determine the exact period that petitioner had been
occupying the subject lot. Even if we were to base it on his allegation that he
started occupying the property in 1980, the period of his tenancy would still
fall short of the requirement of ten years. To reiterate, petitioner became a deforciant in 1989 when he refused to honor the Kasunduan; hence, from 1980 to 1989, his occupancy
only reached a period of nine (9) years.
All told, the CA did not err in
declaring that petitioner has no preferential rights to the subject
lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola (now deceased) and concurred in by Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera (now retired) and Amelita G. Tolentino; CA rollo, p. 86.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Based on the records, Casalla appealed only that portion of the
[11] CA rollo, p. 12.
[12]
[13] Based on the records, Ferrer and Dela Cruz did not join Dimaculangan in his petition.
[14] CA rollo, p. 92.
[15]
[16]
[17] CA rollo, p. 150.
[18] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[19] G.R. No. 105017,
[20] G.R. No. 80223,
[21] Prohibiting the Eviction of Occupant Families from Land Identified and Proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development (APD) or as Urban Land Reform Zones and Exempting such Land from Payment of Real Property Taxes.
[22] Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Decree, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings and definitions: x x x (f) Tenant refers to the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.
[23] Arlegui
v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 381, 391 (2002).
[24] Frilles
v. Yambao, 433 Phil. 715, 724 (2002).
[25] Dee v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 352, 363 (2000).
[26] Supra note 23 at 391, citing Nidoy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19 at 398.