Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, G.R.
NO. 155409
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
DITA
MAQUILAN, Promulgated:
Respondent. June
8, 2007
x-
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] dated August 30, 2002 promulgated by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which affirmed the Judgment on
Compromise Agreement dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley, and the RTC Orders dated January
21, 2002 and February 7, 2002 (ORDERS) in Civil Case No. 656.
The facts of the case, as found by
the CA, are as follows:
Herein petitioner and herein private
respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which
were blessed to have a son. However,
their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that
private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which
thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private
respondent and the latter’s paramour.
Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision
correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision
correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent,
through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on
During the pre-trial of the said case,
petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the
following terms, to wit:
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains,
the parties agree to the following:
a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the
name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of
their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit
in the joint account of the parties.
The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at
P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided
equally by the parties;
b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff
shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full
settlement thereof.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega
until the time the owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a
building thereon;
c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the
defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his share
thereon and in full settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to
the litigation of other conjugal properties that have not been mentioned;
x x x x
The said Compromise Agreement was
given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion dated
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order
dated
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied in the
assailed Order dated
The
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed grave error and
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1) in
upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when
it held in its Order dated February 7, 2002 that the Compromise Agreement was
made within the cooling-off period; (3) when it denied petitioner’s Motion to
Repudiate Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on Compromise Agreement;
and (4) when it conducted the proceedings without the appearance and
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial
Prosecutor.[4]
On
Hence,
herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER
CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED
SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND
LEGAL SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER
CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL
PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.[5]
The petitioner argues that the
Compromise Agreement should not have been given judicial imprimatur since it is
against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it was approved is
null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor
General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that
the respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified
from sharing in the conjugal property.
The Petition
must fail.
The
essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of property made
by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the
Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the
guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,
from sharing in the conjugal property.
Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues
that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2)[6]
and 63[7]
of the Family Code.
To
the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse
convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the
Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory.
Moreover,
the petitioner cites Article 2035[8]
of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal
separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
These
arguments are specious. The foregoing
provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case.
Article
43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article[9] shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and
circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage
and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined
in case such fact is disputed.
where a subsequent marriage is terminated
because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to
the effects of a decree of legal separation.
The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage
is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.
Article
2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided
the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and
does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035.
Moreover,
the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention
of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law
and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under
Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the
law. This conclusion holds true even if
the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of
property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership
of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of
the Family Code.
Second. Petitioner’s
claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence
of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary
separation made during the pendency of the case is also
void. The proceedings pertaining to the
Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The
settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their
marriage. Nor did the settlement amount
to a collusion between the parties.
Article
48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e)
of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x
x x x x
(e) Where no defaults
allowed.— If the defending party in action for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails
to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to
see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly,
the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor
General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression
of evidence.[10] While the appearances of the Solicitor
General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to
require their appearance does not per se nullify
the Compromise Agreement. This Court
fully concurs with the findings of the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of
the law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State
prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion
between the parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is
not fabricated. In the instant case,
there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State
prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise
agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of
marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the
parties. At the risk of being repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their
conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
case of declaration of nullity of marriage.[11]
Third. The
conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides
for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil
Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the
right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by
any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code,
the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of
the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension
from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that
of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It
is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that
the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and
to dispose of such property inter vivos.
Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not
intelligently and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the
compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise
Agreement. The argument of the
petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the
legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of
consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the
settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,[12]
this Court held:
[I]t is well-settled that the
negligence of counsel binds the client.
This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in
the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been
recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
"results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a
technicality." x x x x[13]
None
of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement
is VALID without prejudice to the rights
of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of
the conjugal partnership of gains.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios (now deceased) and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[2] The Compromise Agreement is dated
[3] Rollo,
pp. 29-31.
[4] Rollo,
p. 32.
[5] Rollo,
pp. 19-20.
[6] Article
43 reads:
Art.
43. The termination of the
subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
x x x
x
(2) The
absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the
net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse;
x x
x x (emphasis supplied)
[7] Article 63 reads:
Art.
63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
x x x x
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the
net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership,
which shall be forfeited in accordance with
the provisions of Article 43(2);
x x x
x (emphasis supplied)
[8] Article 2035 reads:
Art. 2035. No
compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The
civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future
support;
(5) The
jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future
legitime. (1814a)
(emphasis supplied)
[9] Article 41 reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
[10]
[11] Rollo,
p. 39.
[12] 336 Phil. 514 (1997).
[13]