NARCISO
AMOROSO, G.R. No. 142766
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
-
versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
JUAN
ALEGRE, JR., VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 31 May 1999 and Resolution[3] dated 8 March 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42100 which involved an appeal from the Decision[4] dated 26 March 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. V-5111.
This case involves two parcels of
land, Cadastral Lots No. 3961 and 3962, which are subdivided lots of Cadastral
Lot No. 729 of the Capiz Cadastre, situated at Barrio Cadimahan,
On
On
Petitioner,
in turn, filed on
On
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that
he is the owner of the properties in question, as he allegedly bought Lot No.
729 from the brothers Roque and Matias Severino, the registered owners of the
property under OCT No. 4570, per Deed of Absolute Sale[12]
dated 31 May 1946. From that time
onwards, he occupied the property and constructed his house thereon, declared
the land for taxation purposes in his name, and has been religiously paying all
the taxes due thereon. He alleged that
OCT Nos. RO-1020 and RO-1021 in Alegre, Sr.’s name had already been cancelled
by virtue of the CFI Decision dated
Petitioner also filed before the RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution, this time of OCT No. 4570 which allegedly covered both Lots No. 3961 and 3962, docketed as Case No. R-1777 and raffled to Branch 16.[15] Civil Case No. V-5111 and Case No. R-1777 were jointly tried.
On
Both parties appealed the
As to Case No. R-1777, the CA affirmed
the dismissal of petitioner’s petition for reconstitution since it found that the
allegations in the petition failed to show any basis for his claim of title to
the properties in question. The CA also made
reference to the Decision dated
The records of Civil Case No. V-5111
were remanded to the RTC. On
The RTC added that the 3 October 1957 Decision which ordered the cancellation of the reconstituted titles in Alegre, Sr.’s name and which was relied upon by petitioner had already been superseded by the 17 January 1983 Decision[24] in Special Civil Case No. 2776 of the CFI of Capiz, Branch IV, which ordered the expunction of the word “cancelled” on the faces of OCT Nos. RO-1020 and RO-1021.
Petitioner appealed the
The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Decision[25]
dated 31 March 1999 reiterated the opinion in the CA Decision dated 23 April
1992 that the Order of the CFI of Capiz dated 20 May 1955 had already become
final, rendering the 3 October 1957 Decision of no force and effect.[26] Since the
Petitioner now challenges the decision of the CA, raising the following questions: (a) whether or not the court a quo acted correctly in affirming the trial court’s judgment and in holding that res judicata is unavailing and in not considering the issue of laches as ground for dismissal of the complaint; and (b) whether or not the courts a quo acted correctly in concluding, based on undisputed facts, that respondent is the actual and real possessor and lawful owner of the subject lots.[27]
Petitioner
reiterates his argument that res judicata and laches bar this suit. He asserts that the then CFI of Capiz had
already rendered a final and executory Decision[28]
dated 3 October 1957 cancelling the certificates of title issued to
respondent’s late father, Alegre, Sr., and declaring that petitioner had
sufficiently proven his possession of the properties with sufficient title. He argues that the
Petitioner
also argues that the suit is barred by laches.
He had been in actual physical possession of the properties since 1946
while respondent filed the civil case for recovery of possession and ownership
only in 1985. It would be unjust and
inequitable to permit respondent to enforce his right after so many years and
after petitioner had invested time, money and effort to buy and improve the
property and to pay taxes thereon, petitioner adds.
In
his Comment,[31]
respondent reiterates the finding of the CFI and the CA that the Decision of
There is likewise no reason for laches to apply, respondent maintains, since he and his father never slept on their rights as lawful and true owners of the properties in question. Respondent had even testified that his father had filed an ejectment case against petitioner.
Respondent
concludes by averring that the issue as to who was in possession of the lots in
question had already been ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA,
and is a question of fact which cannot properly be raised in a petition for
review.
The petition must be denied.
It must be pointed out that the case for resolution before us concerns the complaint for accion reivindicatoria filed by respondent. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership.[32] The basic question in such an action is whether the plaintiff, respondent herein, has presented sufficient evidence to prove his ownership of the properties in question.
As in all civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of evidence. “Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[33] If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.[34]
The
RTC and the CA are one in saying that respondent had sufficiently proven his
claim of ownership over the subject properties.
In particular, both courts relied on the certification dated
The
foregoing, however, does not write finis to the case at bar. There remains the matter of the validity of
the
It
is apparent that a petition for reconstitution of title and a case for recovery
of possession of property have no identity of causes of action. In a reconstitution case, the judgment merely
orders the re-issuance of a lost certificate of title in its original form and
condition. It does not determine or
resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original
certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate
covered thereby.[37] An accion reivindicatoria, on the
other hand, is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element
of ownership. It is an action whereby the
plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession. The judgment in such a
case determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the
property to the lawful owner.
There are two aspects to the doctrine of res judicata. The first concept of res judicata, known as "bar by prior judgment," is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. This concept is clearly inapplicable to the case at bar since the two cases, although involving the same parties and the same subject matter, have different causes of action. In the second concept, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Conclusiveness of judgment operates as a bar even if there is no identity as between the first and second causes of action. Under the doctrine, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[38] This second concept is likewise inapplicable to the present case.
Petitioner
claims in his petition that the 3 October 1957 Decision resolved the issue of
ownership of the lots and declared in the body of the decision that he had
“sufficiently proven uncontroverted facts that he had been in possession of the
land in question since 1946 x x x [and] has been in possession of the property
with sufficient title.”[39] However, such findings made by the CFI in the
said decision are mere obiter, since the ownership of the properties, titles to
which were sought to be reconstituted, was never the issue in the
reconstitution case. Ownership is not
the issue in a petition for reconstitution of title. A reconstitution of title
does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
title.[40]
It
may perhaps be argued that ownership of the properties was put in issue when petitioner
opposed the petition for reconstitution by claiming to be the owner of the
properties. However, any ruling that the
trial court may make on the matter is irrelevant considering the court’s
limited authority in petitions for reconstitution. In a petition for reconstitution of title,
the only relief sought is the issuance of a reconstituted title because the
reconstituting officer’s power is limited to granting or denying a
reconstituted title. As stated earlier, the reconstitution of title does
not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title,
and any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a
separate suit.[41]
It
should be noted, too, that the dispositive portion of the
Besides,
the validity of the
The equitable doctrine of laches is also inapplicable to the case at bar. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[43] The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.[44]
Petitioner
had been in possession of Lot No. 729 since 1952. Petitioner first possessed the property
sometime in 1950 but that same year, respondent’s father filed an ejectment
suit against him. The case was settled upon the intervention of the town mayor,
with petitioner explicitly agreeing to vacate the property. In 1951, when respondent’s father went to
It
appears that during the pendency of the reconstitution case, petitioner
remained in possession of the property. This is understandable since the last
ejectment case filed by respondent’s father against petitioner was dismissed by
the trial court and respondent’s father was required to produce the title to
the property. However, even after the
issuance of the 1955 Order granting reconstitution of the titles in the name of
respondent’s father, the latter did not
re-file or revive the ejectment case.
The reason for this failure was the filing by petitioner of the criminal
case for perjury against Alegre, Sr. for which he was convicted.[46] Alegre, Sr. left for
Thus, respondent’s and his father’s right to the property remains intact. Their ownership was affirmed by the lower courts, while laches could not have set in owing to respondent’s and his father’s persistent moves to reclaim possession of the property and the circumstances which prevented Alegre, Sr. from re-filing the ejectment case against petitioner. Indeed, neither respondent nor his father abandoned their right to the property.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Official Leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[5]Records, pp. 298-300. Docketed as Cadastral Case No. 4, GLRO Cad. Record No. 336; order penned by Judge Jose D. Evangelista.
[7]
[13]In Criminal Case No. 12985 where Alegre, Sr. was tried and convicted for perjury. See id. at 737.
[15]Petitioner alleged that he bought the properties, Lots No. 3961 and 3962, from the brothers Matias and Roque Severino, and that the properties were titled under OCT No. 4570. He stated that he actually saw the title which was already tattered and brittle. He did not realize the importance of the title so he did not get it from the Severinos. When he attempted to get the title from the Severinos, it could no longer be found; hence he filed the petition for reconstitution. See id. at 647-648.
Petitioner
had earlier filed on
[18]
[24]
Memorandum of Encumbrances
x
x x x
Entry
No. 7055 – Court Decision – canceling this certificate of title by virtue of
the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, filed in this office,
dated
LEALTAD A. MORENTE
Register of Deeds
These
entries were unsigned and cross marked in ink.
Also presented was a certified photocopy of the day book in the office
of the Register of Deeds of Capiz showing that the entry on
[25]Rollo,
pp. 20-28. Decision penned by Justice
Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero
and Teodoro P. Regino, of the Twelfth Division.