LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, G.R. No. 141309
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
and
Nachura, JJ.
FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondent.
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29,
1997 Order[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No.
97-341-MK, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent sought to
recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights arising
from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals.[3]
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged
in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” cigarettes.
On P5.00)
per pack.”[6]
On P9,598,334.00 (computed on the
basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.[8] On
On
Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss[12]
contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that
she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the
one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for
lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against
forum shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that
it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the
motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss
filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds
aforecited. The defendant is ordered to
file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. However, same was dismissed on the
ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public
officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the
instant case. Consequently, malice or
bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that
the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission
of the corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to
execute the same.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book
I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach
only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. She further averred that the
Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for
violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public
officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law
on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in
the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the
same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against
forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to
dismiss the complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the
public officers’ “acts” from which civil liability may arise, is a general law;
while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers’ violation
of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether
the complaint states a cause of action or not.
Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,[14]
respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is
not required that said public officer should have acted with malice or in bad
faith. Hence, it concluded that even
granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad
faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public
officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as
between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint
states a cause of action?
(3) Should the
complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification
against forum shopping?
(4) May
petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not
liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance
of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.[15] An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent.[16] However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.[17]
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on
the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence.
Thus –
Sec. 38. Liability
of
x x x x
Section 39.
Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or
employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the
performance of his duties. However, he
shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to
law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or
instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[18]
that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad
faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be
validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted
with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated
a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent
stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32
of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and
does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally
understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or
to a particular portion or section of the state only.[19]
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if
possible, with a view to giving effect to both.
The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the
same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a
general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular
and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary
so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.[20]
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the
general act does not change the principle.
Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to,
or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later,
the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms,
unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.[21]
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,[22]
the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces,
cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of
defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision
and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of
Manila, in determining the liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be
held for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to
enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence
while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and,
we think, correctly. It is true that,
insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a
special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for “damages
or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of” city officers “to
enforce the provisions of” said Act “or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence” of the city “Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.” Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by, any person by reason” — specifically — “of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.” In other
words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
“defective streets,” in particular. Since
the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.[23]
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,[24]
the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the
City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which
requires their publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax
Code, a general law, which deals in particular with “ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges,” and which demands publication only
after approval. In holding that it is the
Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
x x x x
(6) The right
against deprivation of property without due process of law;
x x x x
(8) The right to
the equal protection of the laws;
x x x x
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code
Commission, as follows:
“DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights,
Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a
public official liable for violation of another person’s constitutional rights
only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion
for these reasons:
“The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil
or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main
purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance
of their duties. Precisely, the object
of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In
the
“Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental
articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public
official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that
it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that
official is liable. As a matter of fact,
we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely
abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a
plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one’s duty. And so, if we
should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the
object of the article. Precisely, the
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by
a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing
individual rights.”[25]
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not
only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation
of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under
this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would
defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual
rights. It suffices that there is a
violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.[26]
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law.[27] A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property, or reputation.[28] There are cases in which it has been stated
that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental
state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of
the defendant has been rendered immaterial.
The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful.[29] Presence of good motive, or rather, the
absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an
invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded
by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.[30]
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct
cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.[31] This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil
Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of
legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended
to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.
In Aberca v. Ver,[32]
it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability
of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a
larger dimension. No longer may a
superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected
rights and liberties of the citizen. Part
of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to
expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect
of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code,
laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public
officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public
officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements
that will make them liable for damages. Note
that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government
officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., “acts” done
in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or
omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and
unequivocal terms a particular specie of an “act” that may give rise to an
action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment
of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article
32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of
constitutional rights by public officers.
All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38
and 39 of the Administrative Code. While
the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of
wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative
Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which
must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for
violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the
Civil Code. Considering that bad faith
and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil
Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to
state a cause of action. The courts
below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a
violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping,
the subsequent submission of the secretary’s certificate authorizing the
counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the
defect of respondent’s complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case
justify the liberal application of the rules.[33]
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina,
Branch 272, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 62-71. Penned by Associate Justice Hector L.
Hofileña and concurred in by Associate Justices Omar U. Amin and Teodoro P.
Regino.
[2]
[3]
329 Phil. 987 (1996).
[4] Prior
to its amendment by RA 7654, Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, (as amended by R.A. No. 6956), provides:
“On locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five percent (55%) Provided, That
this rate shall apply regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to
the foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to the local
manufacturer. Whenever it has to be
determined whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of brands
manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World Tobacco
Directory shall govern.”
[5]
Pertinent portion thereof, states:
SEC.
142. Cigars and Cigarettes. –
x x x x
(c) Cigarettes packed by machine. - There
shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax
at the rates prescribed below based on the constructive manufacturer’s
wholesale price or the actual manufacturer’s wholesale price, whichever is
higher:
(1) On
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the exportation
of which is not authorized by contract or otherwise, fifty-five (55%) provided
that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
(2) On
other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five percent (45%) provided
that the minimum tax shall not be less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.
[6] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, supra note 3 at
1001-1003; Separate Opinion of Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, id. at 1014-1015.
[7]
[8] Rollo, pp. 542-543.
[9]
[10] Supra note 3. The motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
Decision was denied with finality on October 7, 1996.
[11] Rollo, pp. 533-552.
[12]
[13]
[14]
No. L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299.
[15] Orocio
v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992, 213 SCRA 109, 126,
cited in Agpalo, Philippine Administrative Law, 2004 edition, p. 473.
[16] Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 86147, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 721, 728.
[17] Meneses
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82220, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 162, 174.
[18]
G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602, 604.
[19] Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, second edition (1990), p. 197.
[20]
[21]
[22]
G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 267.
[23]
[24]
G.R. No. L-41613, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306, 311-312. (Emphasis added)
[25] Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Congress
on the Amendments to the New Civil Code, XVI The Lawyers’ Journal, No. 5, May
31, 1951, 258. Cited in Lim v. Ponce
de Leon, supra note 14 at
309. Article 32 of the Civil Code was
also applied in the following cases: Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No.
L-69866, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 590; MHP
Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86720, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 227; Cojuangco,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18; Obra v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 120852, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 594; Lui v. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA 449; Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta, G.R. No. 163087, February
20, 2006, 482 SCRA 660.
[26] Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta, supra.
[27]
Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the Amendments to the
New Civil Code, XVI The Lawyers’ Journal, No. 5, May 31, 1951, p. 259.
[28]
74 Am Jur 2d, Torts, §1, 620.
[29]
[30]
[31]
In the report on the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the Amendments
to the New Civil Code, Dean Bocobo expressed that while the defendant may not
be exonerated on the basis solely of good faith, the inherent justifiability of
his/her act, which is up to the courts to decide under the peculiar
circumstance of each case, may be the basis of absolution. Thus:
CONGRESSMAN
DE
DEAN
BOCOBO. It would not be good faith but it would be inherent justifiability of
the act, which is up to our courts to decide under the peculiar circumstance of
each case, because we had back in our minds the old saying that “Hell is paved
with good intentions.” (Lawyers’ Journal,
No. 5, May 31, 1951, p. 259.)
[32] Supra note 25.
[33] LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No.
159653, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 137, 144-145.