THIRD DIVISION
|
RUSSEL
ESTEVA Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x ALFREDO S. CAPISIN, HERMELO O. LATOJA, JAMES D. CATALAN,
ANECITO TAN, JR., ARNEL CALVO, RICARDO PEPITO, and EVELYN ROSALES, Complainants, - versus – JUDGE EDDIE
R. ROJAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2047
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1786-RTJ)
A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2048 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1798-RTJ)
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
These administrative cases against
respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
The
complainants prevailed before the HLURB,[2] which later issued a Writ of Execution[3] against E.B. Villarosa. Consequently, Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa and
Ramon A. Castillo, Clerk of Court VI and Sheriff IV, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
E.B.
Villarosa later filed a Complaint[5] for injunction with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Clerk of Court and the Sheriff of
the RTC of General Santos City. It
averred that the monthly water bills owed by the homeowners of Gensanville
Subdivision do not wholly accrue to the benefit of E.B. Villarosa, but part
thereof also belongs to the employees of the latter, the suppliers of
electricity necessary to operate the water system, the unpaid sellers of
machineries, materials, and supplies for the operations, and to the government
in the form of taxes. Allegedly, if the
payments were garnished, E.B. Villarosa would be deprived of important
resources to operate the water system in the subdivision that would eventually lead to cessation of operations. E.B. Villarosa would then lose its
contractual right to operate the water system and supply the homeowners the
water they need.
In
an Order[6] dated
Civil
Case No. 7234 was eventually raffled to Judge Rojas, who, on
These
acts of Judge Rojas spawned these two administrative cases.
In
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2047, the complainant,
Vice-President of the Gensanville Homeowners Association, claims that the
association was denied its right to due process by Judge Rojas when it was not
impleaded as party defendant in Civil Case No. 7234.[9]
In
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2048, the complainants are members of the same
association. They aver that the TRO
issued by Judge Rojas interfered with the previous Order of Vice-Executive Judge
Lubao and question the authority of the former in issuing the assailed
order. They, likewise, question their
not being impleaded as defendants in
the injunction case.[10]
In
his Comment[11] on the two complaints, Judge Rojas contends that the TRO and the writ of preliminary
injunction were regularly issued after a judicious examination of the
complaint. He claims that what was
restrained was neither the writ of execution nor the notice of garnishment
themselves but merely the manner by which the HLURB decisions were being
executed. Agreeing with the arguments
raised by E.B. Villarosa, Judge Rojas believes that, without the injunction, E.B.
Villarosa will suffer irreparable injury before the claims of the parties can
be thoroughly investigated and adjudicated, and thus, he did not
interfere with the Order of Vice-Executive Judge Lubao.
He further says that granting injunctive relief to E.B. Villarosa
neither shows his bias nor his abuse of authority in favor of the latter,
absent any proof of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose. Lastly, he alleges that the remedy of the complainants is not an administrative
complaint but other judicial remedies.
On
The
OCA held that the HLURB retained its jurisdiction over the case, and
if irregularities attended the manner in which the writ of
execution was implemented, they should be referred to the same agency. It said that Judge Rojas gravely abused his
authority when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7234 and issued the TRO and
the injunctive writ,
especially because HLURB
exercises quasi-judicial functions and is co-equal with the RTC.
Further,
the complainants, being the prevailing party before the HLURB, should have been
given their day in court before the TRO and the injunction were issued. The OCA noted that Judge Rojas even advised
the counsel of E.B. Villarosa during the hearing of
Thus,
the OCA recommended that Judge Rojas be fined P10,000.00, with a stern warning of a more
severe penalty should he
commit a similar offense
in the future.
We agree with the findings of the OCA with respect
to Judge Rojas’ administrative liability, but hold
that the recommended fine is too light a penalty in light of his previous
infraction as a member of the Judiciary.
In
this case, Judge
Rojas knew very well that the complainants, being the real
parties-in-interest who prevailed in the HLURB decision subject of execution,
should have been impleaded as party-defendants
in the injunction case before him. This is clear from a
reading of Sections 2
and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.[13]
In fact, he pointed this out in the hearing
for the TRO on
COURT: You did not
implead the prevailing party?
ATTY.
ALCONERA: We only assail the
very account of the Sheriff.
COURT: But you should
implead the prevailing party. The court
is inclined to give 72 hours TRO but you should implead the prevailing party
because usually court personnel acted as ministerial duty only.
ATTY.
LASTIMOSA: Your Honor, there
was an Order for an application for 72 hours TRO?
COURT: Because Judge
Lubao did not take action because according to him, the decision that should
not be subject for a TRO. Perhaps not
for the court to stop the implementation but only the garnishment must be done
belonging to the losing party but only mentioned as borne out and alleged in
the complaint that the fund is not solely owned by the Villarosa.
ATTY.
LASTIMOSA: But these are
credits which might belong to the developer and this can be subjected to the
garnishment.
COURT: But according
to the plaintiff, some of the payment of the employees and payment for the
electricity.
ATTY.
ALCONERA: In fact, the claims
of the workers are superior to those of the judgment creditors. The listing of the unpaid sellers, the
workers below, they are the judgment creditors.
COURT: I will issue a
72-hours (sic) TRO then I will require the defendants to show cause why the 72
hours will not be extended and perhaps, to enlighten the court by submitting to
a simultaneous memorandum.
ATTY.
ALCONERA: Since we will still
implead
COURT: This is proper
I think so that we can avoid duplicity of suit, you implead the prevailing
party because it is not a job of the court personnel to be appearing. But in fairness to the plaintiff, I will
issue a TRO of 72 hours and then scheduled (sic) hearing on the show cause why
the 72 hours TRO will not be extended.[14]
Despite this, not only did he grant a
twenty-day TRO,[15] instead of the 72-hour TRO prayed
for, but also denied the motion to dismiss filed by the named defendants and
issued a writ of injunction in favor of E.B. Villarosa.[16]
The
complainants not having been joined as party-defendants,
it was error on the part of Judge Rojas to have denied the motion to
dismiss. Indeed, complainants were
indispensable parties with such interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights so that the court could not proceed without
their presence[17] and all its subsequent actuations
were rendered null and void.[18]
Judge Rojas had forgotten the rule that if the suit is not brought in
the name of or against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action.[19]
Also,
Judge Rojas encroached upon
complainants’ right to
due process of law, as enshrined in the
Constitution, as they were not given an opportunity to be heard.[20]
Denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act
taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.[21]
Finally, Judge Rojas disregarded the fact that the HLURB is a
quasi-judicial agency, co-equal with the RTC. The Order dated
Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344, the HLURB (then National Housing Authority)
has exclusive original jurisdiction on the following: (a) unsound real estate
business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by a
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker, or salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman.[22] The decision of the HLURB is appealable
within 15 days to the Office of the President (OP), and, if after 30 days the
appealed decision is not reversed or amended by the OP, then it is deemed
affirmed.[23] Thereafter, the case may be elevated via a
petition for review to the Court of Appeals, and then to this Court.[24]
Truly, Judge Rojas acted beyond his
judicial authority when he proceeded to enjoin the final and executory decision
of the HLURB. His proffered excuse that
the TRO and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed against the
HLURB’s writ of execution but only against the manner of its execution, is too
shallow and facetious. He cannot feign
ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the enforcement
of the writ of execution, thus frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a
co-equal body.
This
Court also notes that in Re: Inhibition
of Judge Eddie R. Rojas, RTC, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato in Crim.
Case No. 09-5668,[25]
Judge Rojas was already fined P10,000.00 for failure to inhibit himself
for a period of almost one-and-a-half years in a criminal case where he previously
appeared as public prosecutor, contrary to the mandatory norm of
impartiality. He presided in the said
case without the written consent of all parties in interest, in violation of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
In that case, he was also sternly warned that the commission of the same
or a similar breach would merit a higher penalty.
Generally, for a judge to be found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision, or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be
found erroneous but actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other
like motive.[26] However, if the law, rule, or principle is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it already
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without the complainant having to prove
malice or bad faith on the part of the erring judge, as the same can clearly be
inferred from the error committed.[27]
A magistrate like Judge Rojas owes to
the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence.[28] Judges must not only render just, correct,
and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good
judges are men who have a mastery of the principles of law and who discharge
their duties in accordance with law.[29] In this regard, Judge Rojas has twice failed.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law
is classified as a serious charge. The
imposable penalties, as provided by Section 11 of the same Rule, are: (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.[30]
Inasmuch as this case constitutes
Judge Rojas' second infraction, a suspension of three (3) months without salary
and benefits is warranted.
WHEREFORE,
Judge Rojas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General Santos City, for
gross ignorance of the law, is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION without salaries and other
benefits for a period of three (3) months, with a STERN WARNING that the commission in the future of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
[1] Decision dated
[2] Decision dated
[3] Writ of Execution dated
[4] Notice of Garnishment dated
[5] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2047), pp. 29-35.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2047), pp. 2-5.
[10] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2048), pp. 1-6.
[11] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2047), pp. 45-51.
[12]
[13] SEC.
2. Parties-in-interest. – A real
party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest.
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
[14] TSN,
[15] Order dated
[16] Order dated
[17] Aron v. Realon, G.R. No. 159156, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 372, 389 (2005); Quiombing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93010, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 325, 330; Seno v. Mangubat, No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113, 119; see also Kho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53630, September 30, 1992, 214 SCRA 329, 336-337; Lozano v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 49470, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 681, 690.
[18] Aron
v. Realon, id.; Tanhu v. Ramolete,
160 Phil. 1101, 1121 (1975); see also Alabang
Development Corp. v. Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727, 737 (1982); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-45168,
[19] Rules of Court, Rule 16, Section 1(g).
[20] 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 1; Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, 445 Phil. 300, 310 (2003).
[21] Macias v. Macias, 457 Phil. 463, 471
(2003).
[22] P.D.
No. 1344, Section 1.
[23] P.D. No. 1344, Section 2.
[24] Realty Exchange Venture Corporation
v. Sendino, G.R. No. 109703,
[25] A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC,
[26] Sevilla
v. Quintin, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1603,
[27] Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar
of the
[28] Alconera v. Majaducon, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-1313,
[29] Canon 3, Sections 1 & 2, Code of Judicial Conduct, A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC; Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. Demetria, 425 Phil. 1, 18 (2002).
[30] Lumabas
v. Banzon, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1421,