DAKILA C. MANALABE, A.M. No. P-05-1984
Complainant, [Formerly OCA-I.P.I.
No. 05-2125-P]
Present:
QUISUMBING,*
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,**
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
EVELYN D. CABIE, Stenographer VELASCO, JR., JJ.
III; MARITA G. MONTEMAYOR,
Stenographer III; TYKE J. SARCENO,
Clerk
III; and DANILO GARCIA, Promulgated:
Process
Server, all of Regional Trial
Court,
Branch 31,
Respondents.
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Tinga, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Dakila C. Manalabe against EVELYN
D. CABIE, Stenographer III; MARITA G. MONTEMAYOR, Stenographer III; TYKE J. SARCENO,
Clerk III; and DANILO GARCIA, Process
Server, all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 31.
In
a Letter-Complaint[1]
dated
Among
the attachments of the Letter-Complaint were the affidavits of complainant’s
wife, Dorothy Manalabe, and Corazon Malindog of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Manila.[4] Malindog stated that she is tasked with the delivery of the
correspondences to all the RTC Branches located in the
In
her letter-comment[6]
dated
Respondent
Cabie asserted that Malindog
had admitted to the former’s co-workers that the envelope of the subject letter
was already opened and stapled when she delivered the same to RTC Branch 31. Respondent
Cabie also stated that a few days after the incident,
Malindog came to their office bragging about having
signed an affidavit prepared by complainant and threatened her by saying, “Hala, lagot ka!” Respondent Cabie
posited that complainant had threatened Malindog with
a lawsuit if she does not sign the affidavit.[8]
Respondent
Cabie contended that complainant filed the instant
complaint to get even with her for having testified against him in an administrative
case. Knowing complainant’s character, respondent Cabie
added, no one in the office would dare open his
letters.[9]
Respondent
Cabie appended to her letter-comment the affidavits
of her co-workers Marita G. Montemayor,
Tyke J. Sarceno, and Danilo
P. Garcia who all corroborated her allegations.[10]
In
his Reply[11]
dated
Complainant
next maintained that Malindog is the one assigned to
deliver letters to RTC Branch 31. Thus, he claimed that the comment of a
certain Liwayway Santiago that the subject letter had
already been opened and stapled when delivered, which respondent Garcia
included in his sworn statement dated 20 October 2003, is irrelevant and mere
hearsay.[13]
Further,
complainant impugned the character and credibility of the three (3) affiants
who supported respondent Cabie’s allegations.[14]
Regarding
respondent Montemayor, complainant claimed that it is
not her duty to sort the letters delivered to the court. Complainant alleged that Montemayor
questionably opted to be a stenographer rather than work as a Legal Researcher
for the Municipal Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 considering that she is a law
graduate and the latter position merited a higher compensation.[15]
Moreover,
records show that respondent Montemayor previously
defied an order of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to report back
to her original post on the pretext that she was then already reporting as
stenographer to RTC Branch 31. In truth, she was still awaiting her appointment
to said item.[16]
As
for respondent Sarceno, complainant asserted that his
character is tainted. First, items of evidence of the court disappeared while
in his custody. He added that Sarceno will definitely
support respondent Montemayor’s allegations as she
stood as one of the sponsors at his wedding.[17]
As
for respondent Garcia, complainant claimed that he is an expert liar who
falsely testified in the administrative case against him.[18]
Pursuant
to the recommendations of the OCA in its Report[19] dated
In
his Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated
The
Investigating Judge summarized the issue in the present case as follows:
Whether respondents are guilty of opening the envelope addressed to
complainant. Judge Ros considered the charge as gross
misconduct because if proven true, the charge would involve a violation of a
constitutionally guaranteed right, that of the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.
Judge
Ros, however, found two pieces of evidence that militate
against complainant’s claim that respondents opened the subject letter in their
desire to find out whether it was the Court’s Resolution in the administrative
case against him.
First,
the testimony of respondent Montemayor as well as her
handwritten affidavit stated that:
ATTY. REYES:
Q Would you tell this Honorable Court if you have any interest
in that letter?
A None at all[,]
Your Honor. Because in administrative cases we don’t have to open his letter
because the court is copy furnished [sic] of whatever is the result of the administrative
case we have. So it is baloney to open his letter. In fact we are (not)
interested with it.[22]
AFFIDAVIT dated
His accusations that we
are interested in the RESOLUTION of his case is bereft of truth. Firstly, the
Honorable Judge Leonardo P. Reyes is also copy furnished [sic] of the same
letter, we need not open said letter addressed to him. Our Honorable Judge will
surely let us know of the Resolution;[23]
Second, the logbook of
the mailing section of the Office of the Clerk of Court contained the following
entries: 2787 Judge
Judge Ros
found no basis for the instant administrative complaint against respondents. He
held that there is no evidence showing that the subject letter had been opened
by any or all of respondents. In addition, Judge Ros noted
that complainant, in his defense, spitefully gave a narrative of what
respondents had done to him in the past. This together with the fact that some
of respondents had testified in the administrative case against complainant led
Judge Ros to conclude that the present case was
instituted to wage a personal vendetta.[25]
The Court adopts the recommendation.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further,
the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The
basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant
relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations,
as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of
merit.[26]
Complainant
failed to substantiate the charges and allegations he leveled against
respondents with evidence. Other than his and his wife’s allegations and Malindog’s statement, there is nothing in the records that
would indicate that respondents opened the subject letter. Malindog’s
claim that subject letter was sealed at the time of its delivery was disputed
by respondents Cabie and Montemayor.
This, complainant never addressed.
In
contrast, respondent Cabie’s claim that the subject
letter had already been opened when she received it was amply supported by
respondent Montemayor’s affidavit and testimony.[27]
Respondent Sarceno, on the other hand, categorically
attested that the staff of RTC Branch 31 did not open the subject letter.
Respondent Garcia, for his part, testified that he had heard Malindog say that the letter was already opened when she
delivered it.[28]
Complainant failed to rebut respondents’ evidence. In the absence of contrary
evidence, the presumption that respondents regularly performed their duties
will prevail.[29]
Moreover,
there is basis to hold that this administrative complaint was filed by
complainant in retaliation for respondents’ having
testified against him in another administrative case.[30] Further,
instead of refuting respondents’ arguments, complainant in his pleading
detailed respondents’ allegedly discreditable acts to malign their character.
Taken together, the inevitable conclusion is that the instant case was filed to
exact vengeance.
Finally,
the Court agrees with Judge Ros that respondents had
no motive in opening the subject letter. The logbook of the Office of the Clerk
of Court shows that the Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 31 was likewise furnished
a copy of the Court’s missive to complainant. Respondents, as staff of RTC Branch
31 and as interested parties to the administrative case, would necessarily be
informed of the progress of the case.
Accordingly,
for being baseless and unsubstantiated, the instant administrative complaint
must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Finally,
the Court restates that it has always been punctilious about any conduct, act
or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish
the people’s faith in the judiciary. However, when an administrative charge
against a court personnel holds no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this
Court will not hesitate to protect the innocent court employees against any
groundless accusation that trifles with judicial process. This Court will not
shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees of the
judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits
that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.[31]
WHEREFORE,
the administrative complaint against EVELYN D. CABIE, Stenographer III, MARITA
G. MONTEMAYOR, Stenographer III; TYKE J. SARCENO, Clerk III; and DANILO GARCIA,
Process Server, all of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 31, is
DISMISSED with a WARNING to complainant to be more circumspect in filing administrative
cases against innocent people.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On
Official Leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
[3]Ong v. Manalabe,
A.M. No. P-05-1931 (Formerly-OCA IPI No. 02-1470-P); In a Per Curiam Decision promulgated on 13 January 2005, Dakila Manalabe, Legal Researcher
of RTC Branch 31 was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from
service; 448 SCRA 106.
[26]Navarro v. Cerezo, A.M. No. P-05-1962,