|
ILDEFONSO P. JACINTO, Complainant, -versus- BERNABE M. CASTRO, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela,
Respondent. |
A.M. No. P-04-1907 [formerly
OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1872-P] Present: QUISUMBING,* J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO,** CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
x -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
- - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Echague, Isabela found
the accused in Criminal Case No. JR-2387, “People of the P73,266
and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000, and in case of insolvency,
Artemio Salvador (Salvador), the owner of the
passenger jeepney involved in the case, would be subsidiarily liable.
The trial court subsequently issued a
writ of execution of the civil aspect of the case,[2]
which was not, however, satisfied as, by the report of herein respondent Sheriff
Bernabe M. Castro, “the accused has neither personal
nor real property to be levied upon.”[3] A “Subsidiary Writ of Execution against Artemio Salvador” was later issued.[4]
Herein complainant Jacinto thereupon charged
respondent Sheriff for Refusal to Perform Official Duty and Acts Favoring
Judgment Debtors in connection with the implementation of the writ of execution
issued by the trial court.
In his complaint, Jacinto alleges that
in the implementation of the writ of execution for which he gave the amount of P5,000
to respondent, the latter seized a motorized tricycle from the accused but that
he (respondent) released it after the accused promised that he would pay P50,000,
which promise was not, however, kept;[5]
that respondent also seized Salvador’s passenger jeepney
which respondent similarly released;[6] that in respondent’s Sheriff’s Return of
January 15, 2003, the latter reported that the accused has no more leviable properties;[7] and that his counsel called the attention of
respondent for his failure to implement the writ, but he failed to respond.[8]
Justifying the release of the tricycle,
respondent, in his Answer[9] of
April 14, 2004, explains that the accused was no longer the owner thereof, he (the
accused) having sold it to one Julius Raspado who showed
him a copy of a deed of sale[10]
for the purpose.
Respecting his Sheriff’s Return of
As for the passenger jeepney which he seized from its owner Salvador, but which
he later released, respondent explains that a certain Catalino
Tabiolo showed him a copy of a deed of sale executed in
his favor by Salvador, hence, his release thereof is in good faith.[12]
As to his failure to reply to the
letter of counsel for complainant, respondent explains that since complainant
and his representative were present when he seized the tricycle and passenger jeepney which he later released, he posits that they should
have relayed the same to complainant’s counsel. Respondent nonetheless apologizes for his failure
to reply.[13]
As to the expenses incurred in the implementation
of the writ, respondent explains that since complainant did not make any
deposit with the Clerk of Court for the purpose and he had to go as far as Arubub, Jones, Isabela, complainant
gave him P100 for transportation expenses.[14]
The case was referred for
investigation, report and recommendation of the Executive Judge of the RTC, Echague, Isabela who reported that
the parties submitted their case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.
The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), noting that respondent released the vehicles despite the absence of
affidavits supporting third-party claims and the prior approval of the court, found
that respondent failed to adhere to the rules regarding third-party
claims. It found too that respondent
failed to observe the rules on acceptance of fees representing expenses for the
implementation of writs.
Finally, the OCA found that respondent
failed to observe Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (R.A. 6713) on public
officials and employees’ obligation to respond to letters, telegrams or other
means of communications sent by the public.
The OCA thus recommended the
suspension of respondent for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay, with a
stern warning that a repetition of a similar conduct shall be dealt with more
severely.
When a person other than the judgment
obligor or his agent claims title or right to the possession over a property
levied on in execution, Section 16 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court directs:
SEC.
16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. – If the
property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or
his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to
the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves
the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of
the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court
issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping
of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is
filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the
bond.
The
officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property,
to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained
shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to
the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee
from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
x x x x
Evidently, respondent failed to
observe the foregoing rule.
That sheriffs play an important role
in the administration of justice, they being called upon to, among other
things, serve and execute orders and processes with due care and utmost
diligence,[15] can
never be overemphasized. If they fail to
execute final judgments of the courts, such judgments become empty victories
for the prevailing party.[16]
By receiving money from complainant
to enforce the writ of execution, respondent lost sight of the requirements in Section
10(l)(2) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court which, among other things, provides
the rules on payment of sheriff’s expenses in executing writs pursuant to court
orders or decisions, which section reads:
x x x x
With regard to sheriff’s expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards’ fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. THE LIQUIDATION SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE COURT. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted to the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff’s expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent likewise lost sight of Section
5(a) of R.A. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, which provides that “[a]ll
public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from
receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications
sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.”
Respondent is thus guilty of simple
neglect of duty[17] which
is, under Section 52 (B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, considered a less grave offense punishable by suspension from
office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense,
and dismissal for the second offense.
Instead, however, of suspending respondent,
this Court, consistent with this Court’s pronouncements in Aquino
v. Lavadia[18]
and Morta v. Bagagñan,[19]
deems it appropriate, so as not to hamper his work and other duties of his
office, to impose on respondent a fine equivalent to his two- month salary,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
strictly dealt with.
WHEREFORE,
respondent BERNABE M. CASTRO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela, is guilty of
simple neglect of duty and violation of Section 10(l)(2) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 and is hereby ordered
to pay a FINE equivalent to his TWO-MONTH SALARY with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson.
[1] Rollo, p. 1.
[2] Id.at 7.
[3]
[4]
[5] Id.at 3.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Id.at 18-21.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Bautista v. Orque,
Jr., A.M. No. P-05-2099,
[16] Santuyo
v. Benito, A.M. No. P-05-1997, August 3, 2006, 497 SCRA 461, 468; Escobar Vda. de Lopez v. Luna, A.M.
No. P-04-1786,
[17] Escobar
Vda. de Lopez v. Luna, supra note
16.
[18] 417 Phil. 770 (2001).
[19] 461 Phil. 312 (2003).