Republic of
the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
MIGUEL E. COLORADO, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658
Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ]
Present:
- versus
- YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
JUDGE
RICARDO M. AGAPITO, NACHURA, JJ.
Municipal
Circuit Trial Court,
Laur, Nueva Ecija, Promulgated:
Respondent. July 3, 2007
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R E S O L U T I O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a sworn letter-complaint[1] dated January 31, 2001 of Miguel E. Colorado (complainant) charging Judge Ricardo M. Agapito (respondent), Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Laur, Nueva Ecija, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G, entitled “People v. Miguel Colorado,” with Grave Slander and Grave Threats.
Complainant alleges: He is the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases. The cases were directly filed with the court without first passing the Office of the Barangay Chairman, although he and private complainants are permanent residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. Respondent ignored the glaring deficiency in private complainants’ filing of the cases without attaching the requisite certifications to file action from the barangay. On the date the two cases were filed, respondent immediately issued two warrants for his arrest. He was arrested on a Friday and languished in the municipal jail for two days and two nights. He posted bail and filed a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the case, but the same was not acted upon. He received an envelope from the court with nothing inside and found out later that the same was supposed to be a notice of hearing; thus, he was ordered arrested in view of his non-appearance in court.
On
In a 1st
Indorsement dated
Acting on
the complaint, the Court, in its Resolution of P1,000.00 and deemed
respondent to have waived the filing of a comment on the complaint.
In the
Agenda Report[2]
dated P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
On P1,000.00 imposed on him in the
Resolution of
In his
Comment[3] dated
In the
Resolution of
In a letter[4] dated P20,000.00 pending resolution of
the present complaint.
In the
Resolution[5] of P20,000.00
to answer for whatever liability respondent may incur in the present
administrative case.
In the
Agenda Report dated
The
charges against respondent judge are summarized as follows:
1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand
or dismiss the case in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file
action issued by the Barangay as a mandatory
requirement of the Katarungan Pambarangay
Law and the Local Government Code.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainant’s
incarceration for two days.
3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the
hearing of the cases and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent
complainant’s appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed
notice of hearing but with nothing inside.
x x x
x
Respondent judge argued that under
Administrative Circular No. 14-93 dated August 3, 1993 issued by this Court as
Guidelines for the Implementation of the Barangay
Conciliation Procedure, based on the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160,
which took effect on January 1, 1992, one of the exceptions to the coverage of
the circular is “Offense[s] for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).” Considering that the offenses for which
accused was charged have corresponding penalties of more than one year there is
no
need for a certification to file action from the Barangay.
There was likewise no grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of warrant of arrest. The subject criminal cases were within the
original jurisdiction of the MTC and after finding probable cause against the
accused, respondent issued the questioned warrant of arrest. Respondent pointed out that there is no law
or circular issued by the Honorable Court prohibiting the issuance of a warrant
of arrest on Friday.
With regard to the charge of grave abuse
of discretion relative to the motion for inhibition, respondent submitted that
there should be a hearing on the motion before it could be acted upon. But in spite of the several settings of said
motion the complainant as accused failed to appear.
Respondent contended that if it were
true that complainant received an envelope from the MCTC of Laur,
Nueva Ecija, without any
contents, he should have immediately informed the court about it so that the
proper action could have been done.
Lastly, respondent invited the Court’s
attention to the fact that complainant was also accused of Grave Slander by Darlito Urbano and Violeta Urbano which case were
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3648-G and 3649-G, MCTC Laur-Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija. It is argued that this shows the character of
Miguel Colorado.
After careful evaluation of the record
of the case, the undersigned finds merit in the neglect of respondent judge to
resolve the pending issue of the motion for inhibition which was not acted upon
up to the time of his compulsory retirement from the service.
It should be noted that respondent never gave
any valid justification for the delay in the filing of his comment. It seems that he believed that the mere
payment of the fine obliterated the charge of contumacious refusal to obey the
order of this Court. Respondent's
conduct cannot be left unnoticed by the Court.
Judges are the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the
people draw the will and inclination to obey the law (Morońo
v. Lomeda, 316 Phil. 103, July 14, 1995) “How can the
respondent judge expect others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey
orders as simple as the show-cause resolution?” {Longboan v. Hon. Polig
(A.M. No. R-704-RTJ,
In a catena of cases this Court has
unhesitatingly imposed the penalty of dismissal on those who have persistently
failed to comply with orders requiring them either to file comment or to show
cause and comply. Respondent's belated
filing of his comment cannot cure or obliterate[d] his shortcomings with this
Court. The fact remains that he ignored
the lawful directive of the Court and in fact offered no valid justification or
excuse for it. This Court could have
imposed the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all of respondent's
retirement benefit had it not been for this Court’s compassion in allowing him to
retire with the mere retention of P20,000.00. Respondent’s comment should not have been received in the first
place as the same was already considered waived pursuant to the Resolution of
the Honorable Court dated 24 August 2005.
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
undersigned respectfully recommends to the Honorable Court that:
1. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito,
former judge of MCTC, Laur, Nueva
Ecija be found guilty of gross neglect for failure to
act on the motion for inhibition filed by accused-complainant and for his
failure to promptly comply with the lawful order of Court and not offering a
valid excuse therefor and should be FINED in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000); and
2. The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) shall be considered the payment of the fine.[6]
We agree in toto with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No.
03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the
Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints,
which took effect on
Recognizing
the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes
of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which provides:
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six
months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an
alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie
that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended
for dismissal. If such is not the case,
the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a
comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the
Court a report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt
of the comment. The Court shall act on
the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent,
or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without
prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the
Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint
against a retiring judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause
of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.
In
the present case, the first two requisites are present. The sworn letter-complaint was received by
the Office of the Court Administrator on
As
to the third requirement, although
the first and second charges against
respondent are outrightly
without merit as aptly
found by the OCA, the
complaint that respondent failed to act on his motion for inhibition and
intentionally prevented complainant from appearing in
a scheduled hearing was not prima
facie shown to be without merit;
nor was the filing thereof shown to be intended merely to harass the respondent.[7] Thus, the
OCA correctly proceeded with the administrative case against respondent.
Moreover, the fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise
been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint,
pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallo v. Cordero,[8] citing Zarate
v. Judge Romanillos:[9]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent had ceased in office during the pendency
of his case. The Court retains
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has
served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
We
now go to the four charges against respondent.
1. Gross Ignorance of the law
for his failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the absence of the
requisite certificate to file action issued by the barangay
as a mandatory requirement of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.
As we earlier stated, the Court finds that the OCA is
correct in not finding respondent administratively liable therefor.
Complainant is charged with grave slander,
the maximum penalty for which is 2 years and 4 months under Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, respondent is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law in taking
jurisdiction over said criminal case, considering that prior
recourse to barangay conciliation is not required
where the law provides a maximum penalty of imprisonment
exceeding one year.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainant’s incarceration for two days.
Complainant
faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday, causing him to languish
in jail for two days and two nights.
Respondent cannot be held administratively liable for this particular
matter.
Section
6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest
may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.
It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
Granting
that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without recourse, as he could
have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of Supreme Court Circular
No. 95-96[10] dated December 5, 1996,
providing for a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to
3. Grave abuse of authority and
bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for failure to act on the
motion for inhibition.
While there is no evidence in
support of the claim that respondent committed grave abuse of authority and
bias in continuing the hearing of cases, we find respondent liable for failure to act upon complainant’s motion for inhibition.
As borne by
the records, complainant filed his motion for respondent's inhibition sometime
in September 2000 but up to the time of respondent’s compulsory retirement from
the judiciary on
Section
5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,[12] mandates judges to perform
all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Similarly, Supreme Court Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987 directs
judges to observe unscrupulously the periods prescribed by the Constitution in
the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted to their court.
In Visbal v. Buban,[13] the
Court held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.[14] Delay in resolving motions and incidents
pending before a judge within the reglementary period
of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency.[15] Further, such delay constitutes a violation
of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a
judge should dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. As a trial judge,
respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and should at all times act with efficiency and with probity.[16] Undue delay in
the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the
people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature.[17]
4. An intention on the part of
respondent to prevent complainant’s appearance in court by sending an envelope,
with a supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.
Suffice it to be stated that in the absence of evidence to
show that the sending of an empty envelope to complainant was malicious on the
part of respondent, he cannot be held liable therefor.
Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross neglect or undue delay in
rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge which carries any of the
following sanctions: suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of the OCA that
respondent should be imposed a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.[18]
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito
guilty of gross neglect and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00). The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.0) from respondent’s retirement
benefits is considered as payment of the fine.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |