THIRD DIVISION
Eugenio Juan
R. Gonzalez, Complainant, - versus - Judge
Lizabeth G. Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Respondent. |
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A.M. No.
MTJ-06-1653 (Formerly OCA IPI No.
03-1498-MTJ) Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
C.J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an
Administrative Complaint[1] filed by Eugenio
Juan R. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) against Judge Lizabeth G. Torres (Judge Torres),
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong
City, for the Violations of Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution and
Rules 3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to
Criminal Case No. 71984 entitled, “People
of the Philippines v. Revelina R. Limson” pending before said court.
It stemmed
from an earlier complaint for perjury filed by Gonzalez against Revelina R.
Limson (Limson) with the Mandaluyong Prosecutor’s Office. After the submission of the necessary
pleadings by the respective parties, the Mandaluyong Prosecutor’s Office
recommended the filing of an information for perjury against Limson. Accordingly, the appropriate information was
filed with the MeTC of Mandaluyong City and was raffled to Branch 60, where it
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 71984.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
After Gonzalez rested his case, the
defendant Limson, instead of presenting evidence, filed a Manifestation/Motion
to Admit Attached Demurrer to Evidence, which was granted by the court in an
Order dated
In his complaint dated
Through an Indorsement dated
On
Subsequently, the OCA received a
letter dated
However, on
Judge Torres finally submitted her
Comment dated
Judge
Torres added that the pleadings in Criminal Case No. 71984 were being filed
inconsistently. Some were filed directly
at Branch 60, while others were filed at the Office of the Clerk of Court
without record of when the same were purportedly forwarded to her branch. She could not review the records of Criminal
Case No. 71984 as fast as she wanted to because said records were merely
fastened, and the pleadings were not filed chronologically.
She further
countered that since
She expressed offense that the acts alleged by
Gonzalez in his administrative complaint made her appear remiss in her duties. Respondent
reasoned that she was acting on inherited cases as inventoried by the court
staff and the records were disorganized.
In fact, she claimed that she had already personally gone to the OCA
Legal Staff to explain her predicament.
While
admitting that she was not able to quickly comment on the present administrative
case, she invoked her case load and added duties as Executive Judge of
On
Respectfully submitted
for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that the
instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and respondent
Judge Torres be FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and WARNED that
further infraction of the Rules of Court shall be dealt with more severely.
On
Resultantly, the case is submitted for decision based on
the pleadings filed, after a review of which, we find ourselves agreeing in the
recommendation of the OCA.
As a
general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to
the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.[8]
The office
of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution
and the law in the discharge of official duties.[9] Section 15(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must
be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges
to “dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.” Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct
in order to preserve the integrity, competence and independence of the
judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient.[10] Time and again, we have stressed the need to
strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not
totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long
plagued our courts. Finally, Canons 6
and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics exhort judges to be prompt and punctual
in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their
courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.[11]
Also relevant
herein is Administrative Circular No. 1, dated
In the case at bar, Limson’s Demurrer
to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984
was submitted for resolution on
Respondent
Judge Torres presented several excuses for her delay in resolving the Demurrer
to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 and in filing her comment to the present
administrative case, among which were her heavy case load, additional duties as
Executive Judge of the MeTC of Mandaluyong City, the vacancies in her branch,
and the disorganized record-keeping.
These will not exonerate her.
Prompt
disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. If they do
not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable, to
the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to
promptly administer justice.[12]
The
administrative responsibility for the prompt and speedy disposition of cases
rests on the judge’s shoulders. The Code
of Judicial Conduct requires judges to organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require
at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
The same Code charges him with the duty of diligently discharging
administrative responsibilities, maintaining professional competence in court
management, and facilitating the performance of the administrative functions of
other judges and court personnel.[13]
The absence
of an efficient record system in her court may not be used by Judge Torres in
failing to resolve the Demurrer to
Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984. It is incumbent upon her to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness
can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. A judge cannot take
refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since
proper and efficient court management is her responsibility. Court personnel
are not the guardians of a judge’s responsibilities. The efficient
administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame
from one court personnel to another. A judge should be the master of his own
domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.[14] He is the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions.
Judges cannot escape administrative liability by pointing to lapses,
absences or negligence of court personnel under them.[15]
It must be
stressed that the primordial and most important duty of every member of the
bench is decision-making. Furthermore,
as administrators of their respective courts, judges have the primary
responsibility of maintaining the professional competences of their staff. Prompt disposition of the court’s business is
attained through proper and efficient court management, and a judge is remiss
in his duty and responsibility as court manager if he fails to adopt a system
of record management.[16]
As
frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with
efficiency and with probity. They are
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence must be their guiding principle.
This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence
which the public reposed in them and the institution they represent.[17]
Her failure
to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. As we ruled in Española v. Panay,[18] if the case load of the
judge prevents the disposition of cases within the reglementary period, again,
he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the
cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that something
sinister or corrupt is going on. The Court, cognizant of the heavy case load
of some judges and mindful of the difficulties encountered by them in the
disposition thereof, is almost always disposed to grant such requests on
meritorious grounds.[19]
If it was
indeed true that Judge Torres was prevented from the timely disposition of her
pending cases, including Criminal Case No. 71984, by her case load, additional assignments or designations, lack of personnel,
and any other reason, all she had to do was to simply ask this Court for a
reasonable extension of time to dispose of her cases. The records of this administrative matter do
not show that Judge Torres made any attempt to report and request extension of
time to resolve the cases pending before her court. Instead, she preferred
to remain silent, kept the cases pending, and thus clothed the same with
suspicion. Obviously, she forgot the character of her office as a public trust,
imposing upon her the highest degree of responsibility, efficiency, as well as
transparency.
Judge Torres even stated that
she was constrained to inhibit herself from acting on Limson’s Demurrer to
Evidence to protect the MeTC of Mandaluyong City from being drawn into the controversy
between the Gonzalezes and their adversaries over the Wack-Wack Apartments. Such an excuse is feeble and unacceptable,
hardly expected from a judge. First and
foremost, it is precisely Judge Torres’ duty to settle controversies between
adversarial parties. Judge Torres cannot
shirk from the responsibility of resolving a case pending before her court
because she is afraid that her court will be dragged into a “controversy.” Second, her fear that her court will be
dragged into an even bigger controversy between Gonzalez and other parties
involving the Wack-Wack Apartments is unfounded considering that the MeTC can
only take cognizance of the issues pending before it and over which it has
jurisdiction. Third, Judge Torres’
course of action is totally baseless and irrational. She cannot keep Criminal Case No. 71984
pending before her court, neither proceeding with it nor dismissing it, for an
undetermined period of time or hopefully, perhaps, until the Wack-Wack
Apartments controversy has blown over.
And fourth, Judge Torres’ actions, instead of protecting her court, has
actually done more damage to it, raising doubts and suspicions as to its
credibility, impartiality, and independence.
We
note that the case left unresolved by Judge Torres is a criminal case. As
we previously stressed, the unjustified delay in the dispensation of justice
cuts both ways. On the part of the accused, since his liberty is at
stake, his suffering is unduly prolonged on account of the judge’s failure to
promptly render the judgment of acquittal. On the part of the offended party,
the excruciating pain of waiting for the sentencing of the accused gives the
offended party the impression of impropriety that could diminish his trust in
the judicial system.[20]
Indeed, we
have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the
expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an
accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial, which, as defined, is one “[c]onducted according to
the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.”
The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by delaying
criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It is likewise intended to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.[21]
Failure to
resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes
a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.[22]
We cannot
overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit
in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering
of its standards.[23] Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.[24]
Finally,
this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed her comment on
the present complaint more than one year from the time the OCA issued a
directive[25] for her to do so. As a judge, Judge Torres ought to know that
all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued
in the exercise of this Court’s administrative supervision of trial courts and
their personnel, hence, said directives should be respected. Directives issued
by the OCA should not be construed as mere requests, and should be complied
with promptly and completely. Failure to comply accordingly betrays not
only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for a lawful order
and directive. Judge Torres’ reasoning
that she needed more time to be able to make a detailed comment is not
sufficient for her to just ignore the deadline set by OCA. It took resolutions issued by this Court for
Judge Torres to finally file her comment. Even then, Judge Torres had asked for several
more extensions (on
On the
matter of Gonzalez’s prayer that Judge Torres be ordered to inhibit herself
from Criminal Case No. 719841 on grounds of bias and partiality, be it noted
that Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (then Court Administrator)
already issued an Order[26] that the motion
for inhibition should be filed with the judge sought to be inhibited. Pertinent portions of said Order read:
Please be advised
that under Administrative Circular No. 1 dated
In the situation at hand, a motion for inhibition should be filed with the judge involved. And, pursuant to the aforecited provisions, should the party who seeks the inhibition of the judge feel aggrieved by the action taken by the judge involved, then he should take the appropriate legal remedies.
All
told, we find Judge Torres guilty of undue delay in resolving Limson’s Demurrer
to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 which, under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under
Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than
three months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
It must be
noted also that Judge Torres was already penalized and was fined P20,000.00
for her inefficiency and Violation of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611 entitled, “Antonio del Mundo v. Judge Lilibeth G.
Torres.” She should have known
better than to simply let the reglementary period pass by again in another
case.
There are
also pending cases against Judge Torres in which she is charged with the
following: (1) Inefficiency, Gross Negligence, Grave Abuse of Discretion and
Violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1464-MTJ, in
which she was ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for failure to file her
comment therein; (2) Violation of Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution,
and Rules 3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Grave
Prejudice, docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1496-MTJ; (3) Culpable violation of the
Constitution, Gross Ignorance of the law and Violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, docketed as OCA-IPI-1806-MTJ; and (4) Unreasonable Delay in
Resolving Criminal Case and Gross Inefficiency, docketed as OCA IPI No.
04-1606-MTJ.
Given
the foregoing premises, we find that the imposition of the maximum amount of
fine, P20,000.00, reasonable.
WHEREFORE, Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, is found guilty of
undue delay in resolving the Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984
and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. She is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to her personal records.
The Court Administrator is directed to furnish all concerned copies of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-6.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 540,
548-549, citing Valdez v. Ocumen, 106
Phil. 929, 933 (1960) and Alvero v. De la
Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434 (1946).
[9]
Re: Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada Re: Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 26, Argao,
[10]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, A.M. No.
RTJ-02-1737,
[11]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Alumbres, A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1965,
[12]
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases in the
Regional Trial
[13]
Bajet v. Baclig, 434 Phil. 564, 574 (2002).
[14]
Re: Cases Left Undecided by Retired Judge Antonio E. Arbis, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 48,
[15] Office of the Court Administrator v. Alumbres, supra note 11 at 388.
[16]
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
[17]
[18]
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1325,
[19]
Judge Gonzales-Decano v. Judge Siapno, 405 Phil. 752, 763 (2001).
[20]
Report on Judicial Audit conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branches 29
and 59, Toledo City, 354 Phil. 8, 21 (1998).
[21]
Guerrero v. Judge Deray, 442 Phil. 85, 91-92 (2002).
[22]
Re: Judicial Audit of the Regional Trial
[23]
Re: Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada, Re:
Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No.
00-4-09-SC, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 125, 133.
[24]
Celino v. Judge Abrogar, 315 Phil. 305, 312 (1995).
[25]
Issued on
[26]