PEOPLE OF
THE
Appellee,
Present:
-
versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
and
Nachura, JJ.
MANUEL “BOY” HERMOCILLA,
Appellant. Promulgated:
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Court of Appeals’ Decision[1]
in CA-G.R. CR No. 01294, which affirmed with modifications the judgment[2]
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La
On
That on or about the year 1999, in the Municipality of x x x,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse
with his stepdaughter M, an eight (8) year old minor, against her will, to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The
second Information reads:
That on or about the year 2002, in the Municipality of x x x,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse
with his stepdaughter M, a[n] eleven (11) year old minor, against her will, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
The records show that M
was born out of wedlock on
Thereafter, appellant
would insert his finger into M’s vagina whenever her mother is out of the
house. Such abuse temporarily ceased
when M lived with her father S in
Sometime in December 2004,
appellant furiously hit M on the head and chased her out of the house with a
bolo because she resisted his advances. M
fled but appellant caught up with her and forced her to come back to the house.
When M went to school the next day, her
cousin saw her crying. M eventually
broke down and revealed her ordeal.[10]
M was subsequently
examined by Dr. Donna C. Villanueva, a Medical Officer at the Ilocos Training
and
PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION:
x x x
x
Genitoperineal
Area: triangular pubic hair distribution; hymen circular with healed laceration
at 3, 6 &
Speculum
Examination: cervix-smooth, (-) erosions, (-) lesions, (-) bleeding.
Internal
Examination: Introitus admits 2 fingers with ease; Cervix-firm, closed.
Uterus-small, no palpable adnexal mass/tenderness.
LABORATORY
RESULTS:
x x x
x
Gram
stain: No spermatozoa seen. x x x.[11]
Appellant denied the charges
against him and testified that sometime in 2004 he was summoned by their barangay
captain to answer questions regarding a complaint lodged against him by M. When he denied M’s accusations, appellant claimed
that he was mauled by several persons and was forcibly taken to the Police
Station at Rosario, La Union where he was incarcerated.[12]
Appellant claimed that he treated M like
his own daughter. He bought her clothes
and shoes and attended to her other needs.[13]
On
After his motion for
reconsideration was denied, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court by reducing the penalty
of death to reclusion perpetua and
ordering appellant to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, for each count of rape.
In this appeal, appellant assails M’s credibility claiming that her
failure to confide the alleged rape to her mother, father and grandmother
despite several opportunities to do so renders such accusations doubtful. We find this contention untenable.
Time and again, we have held that when a woman, more so if a minor,
states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed. For no
woman, least of all a child, would weave a tale of sexual assaults to her
person, open herself to examination of her private parts and later be subjected
to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.[14]
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily
on the sound judgment of the trial court because the trial judge enjoys the peculiar
advantage of observing directly and at first hand the witnesses’ deportment and
manner of testifying. He is, therefore,
in a better position to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis
thereof.[15]
The trial court found M’s testimony to be credible:
The accused’s defense was denial. He said that the charges
were made up because M’s relatives did not like him. He was once suspected of
selling the fertilizers which he did not own. He could not have done those
charges against him because he loved his stepdaughter, M.
Who should be believed?
The Court believes the private complainant. She could not
have made these stories up. x x x
When she was testifying she cried several times. The Judge of
this Court observed that her cries were expressions of outrage, reminding her,
when being questioned by the lawyer, of those incidents that her stepfather did
to her. While she could not pinpoint the exact dates, she could vividly
remember the things done to her.
It is the finding of the Court that accused Manuel “Boy”
Hermocilla raped his stepdaughter. x x x[16]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial
court, to wit:
The aforequoted testimony of the complainant reveals that the
same was marked by spontaneity, honesty and sincerity. It is a cardinal rule that when the testimony
of the victim is simple and straightforward, the same must be given full faith
and credit. We reiterate the rule that
the accused could be convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s testimony if
credible. Here, We see no reason to
deviate from the trial court’s determination as to the credibility of
complainant’s testimony.[17]
Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[18] No such facts or circumstances exist in the
instant case.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
appellant guilty of two counts of rape. In
the rape incident committed in 1999, the prosecution proved that appellant had
carnal knowledge of M by inserting his penis into her vagina through force and
intimidation. Under Art. 266-B, in
relation to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge of a woman
through force or intimidation shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Family Case No. A-435.
The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant
inserted his fingers into M’s vagina likewise constituted rape through sexual assault.
In People v. Palma,[19]
we held that the insertion of the appellant’s finger into the victim’s vagina
constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No.
8353 or “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997” which in part provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how
committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By
a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through
force, threat or intimidation;
b) When
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By
any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphasis supplied)
Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed with any aggravating or qualifying
circumstances.[20] The Information in Family Case No. A-436
mentioned the victim as appellant’s stepdaughter and an 11-year old minor. A stepdaughter is a daughter of one’s spouse
by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of one’s mother by
virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the
offspring. In the instant case,
appellant and M’s mother were never married.
Hence, appellant is not M’s stepfather; vice-versa, M is not appellant’s
stepdaughter. Appellant is the common
law spouse of M’s mother. However, since
this relationship was not specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be
considered in the imposition of the proper penalty.
On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of minority
was specifically pleaded in the information and proved during trial. Conformably with the ruling in People v. Esperanza,[21]
when either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is
omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the
evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, M’s minority may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. However, it
may not serve to raise the penalty in Family Case No. A-435 because in simple
rape by sexual intercourse, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and indivisible. In Family Case No. A-436, however, the
penalty for rape by sexual assault with any aggravating circumstance is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty should be within the range of prision
mayor or 10 years and 1 day to 12 years as minimum, and 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
As to the amount of
damages, complainant is entitled in Family Case No. A-435 to P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for rape through sexual
intercourse. In Family Case No. A-436, M
is entitled to P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages for rape through sexual assault.[22]
Civil indemnity is separate and distinct
from the award of moral damages which is automatically granted in rape cases.
Moral damages are additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of the
basis thereof. This is because it is
recognized that the victim’s injury is concomitant with and necessarily
resulting from the odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the amount
of moral damages.[23] In addition, we held in People v. Catubig,[24]
that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, such as M’s minority,
entitles her to an award of exemplary damages.
The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
rape is appropriate under the circumstances.[25]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that in
Family Case No. A-435, appellant Manuel Hermocilla is found guilty of rape through
sexual intercourse and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay M the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Family Case No. A-436, appellant is found
guilty of rape through sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, up to 20
years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to pay M the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00
as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-13. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon
and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and Rosalinda
Asuncion-Vicente.
[2] CA
rollo, pp.
52-65. Penned by Judge Clifton U.
Ganay.
[3]
Pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and Section 63, Rule XI of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9262, the real name of the
child-victim is withheld to protect his/her privacy. Fictitious initials are
used instead to represent him/her. Likewise, the personal circumstances or any
other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as
those of his/her immediate family or household members shall not be disclosed.
[4]
Records, Vol. 2, page unnumbered.
[5] Records,
Vol. 1, page unnumbered.
[6]
Father’s name is withheld to protect him and the victim’s privacy.
[7]
Mother’s name is withheld to protect her and the victim’s privacy.
[8]
TSN,
[9]
[10]
[11]
Records, p. 5.
[12]
TSN,
[13]
[14] People
v. Balleno, G.R. No. 149075,
[15] People
v. Maguikay, G.R.
Nos. 103226-28,
[16] CA
rollo, pp. 16-17.
[17] Rollo,
p. 10.
[18] People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474,
[19]
G.R. Nos. 148869-74,
[20]
See Art. 266-B (12).
[21]
453 Phil. 54, 75-76 (2003).
[22]
See People v. Palma, supra note 19 at
378.
[23] Supra
at 28; p. 522.
[24]
416 Phil. 102,120 (2001).
[25]
See People v. Nebria, 440 Phil. 572,
588 (2002).