THIRD
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- RAMON QUIAOIT, JR., Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 175222 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review
is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 12 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00803
entitled, “People of the Philippines v.
Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y De Castro,” affirming the Decision[2]
dated 1 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in
Criminal Case No. 13229, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
“The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
The
information against appellant reads as follows:
That at around 3:45 o’clock in the morning of April 13,
2004, at Tarlac City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally sell, dispense and deliver 0.851 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, to poseur buyer PO1 Mark
Anthony Baquiran for P500.00, without being authorized by law.[3]
Appellant pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on
During the trial, the prosecution presented
the following witnesses: P/Sr. Insp. Ma. Luisa G. David, a Forensic Chemical
Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory assigned at
the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory; PO2 Ronnie Dueña, a member of the
buy-bust operation team and the one who arrested appellant; and PO1 Mark
Anthony Baquiran, a member of the PNP and the designated poseur-buyer.
The
prosecution’s version of the case is as follows:
At around
Shortly
thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the
movements of appellant who was with the confidential informant at that time. Later, the informant introduced PO1 Baquiran
to appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu. According to PO1
Baquiran’s testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance in front of The Golden Miles’ comfort room which was
located at the back of said establishment.[6] In return, he gave appellant a marked P500.00 bill. As
soon as the exchange between appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter
gave his companions the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. PO2 Dueñas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to
arrest appellant. The plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance was later marked RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas.
On their way back to
All seven
pieces of the plastic sachets were then forwarded to the Provincial Crime
Laboratory for examination. The test was
conducted by P/Sr. Insp. David, and her report[7]
contained the following pertinent information:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with
markings “RID-1” through “RID-7” and marked as specimen “A” through “G,”
respectively, each containing white crystalline substance having a total weight
of 0.851 gram. x x x.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY
EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of dangerous drugs xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated
specimen gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimen “A” through “G” contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug. x x x.[8]
Expectedly, appellant presented a
disparate narration of the incident:
Appellant claimed that at around P500.00 worth of shabu from Medrano. He was also allegedly ordered by PO1 Baquiran
to bring Medrano with him to Golden Miles.
He initially declined to follow PO1 Baquiran’s instructions since he no
longer worked with the police. PO1
Baquiran, however, represented that he was the one who would buy shabu from Medrano and not
appellant. Despite this, appellant
alleged that he was “forced”[9]
to buy shabu himself after PO1
Baquiran told him that “(they) need August Medrano.”[10]
And so, from Golden Miles, appellant
proceeded to Medrano’s house. He
informed Medrano that someone was interested in buying shabu but the prospective buyer wanted to talk to him in
person. Medrano refused appellant’s
invitation claiming that he had to go somewhere else; instead, he gave the
plastic sachet containing shabu to
appellant and the latter gave him the P500.00 earlier given by PO1 Baquiran. After this, appellant went back to Golden
Miles to inform PO1 Baquiran of what had just transpired between him and
Medrano including the latter’s refusal to go with him. He also handed over to said police officer the
plastic sachet containing shabu which
he bought from Medrano. All of a sudden, PO1 Baquiran placed his hand over
appellant’s shoulder and the latter was then taken to
At the camp, PO2 Dueñas called for a
certain PO4 Donato for whom appellant used to act as a police asset. PO4 Donato allegedly asked appellant if it
was possible for him to buy some more shabu
from Medrano. Appellant purportedly
replied in the negative claiming that the personnel at Golden Miles already
knew about his arrest. To this, PO4
Donato reportedly retorted, “How could we release you when this August Medrano
is not yet arrested.”[11] Appellant claimed that he was surprised by
PO4 Donato’s statement since he was only doing the police force a favor.
Appellant also denied having possessed
the other six plastic sachets of shabu,
insisting that he bought only one heat-sealed plastic sachet from Medrano which
he turned over to PO1 Baquiran.
After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the
trial court’s Decision reads:
Wherefore,
the prosecution having established the guilt of the [appellant] beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the
accused RAMON QUIAOIT JR. y DE CASTRO is sentenced to undergo a prison term of
life imprisonment, to pay a fine of Php500,000.00 and to pay the cost.[12]
On
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is
DENIED. The December 1, 2004 Decision of
the
Aggrieved, appellant is now before us
assailing the above-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals. In our Resolution of
In his brief, appellant impugns the
trial court’s decision on the following grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ABSOLUTORY CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSTIGATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO
IDENTIFY THE CORPUS DELICTI.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE
II, OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165, WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[17]
In essence, appellant contends that the trial court erred in
not finding that the buy-bust team instigated him into buying shabu from Medrano and that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt by its failure to properly identify the
sachet of shabu allegedly bought from
him by PO1 Baquiran.
In support of the first error, appellant argues that the
facts obtaining in this case reveal that he was a victim of instigation
perpetrated by PO1 Baquiran. He
emphasizes that despite his initial resistance to participate in the police
operation that night, PO1 Baquiran, nevertheless, insisted that he purchase shabu from Medrano with the specific
instruction to bring the latter to Golden Miles. Appellant, likewise, points out that the
money he used in acquiring shabu was
supplied by PO1 Baquiran himself, thus, proving that it was said police officer
who initiated the events which led to his eventual arrest.
Appellant
further assails the existence of a valid buy-bust operation on the ground that
the buy-bust team was composed of untrained and incompetent police
officers. He claims that it was
“inconceivable”[18] for
such a team to be made up of police officers who had insufficient knowledge of
how to properly conduct a buy-bust operation as shown by their failure to frisk
appellant at the scene of the crime.
The
demarcation line distinguishing “instigation” from “entrapment” is clearly
drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana,[19]
we explained the distinction between the two, to wit –
There is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation, for while in the latter case the instigator practically induces
the will be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan.
Instigation
and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule is that instigation and
inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of filing criminal charges, is to
be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means and
ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is sanctioned
and permissible. And the reason is
obvious. Under the first instance, no
crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes of the
instigator a co-criminal. Under the last
instance, the crime has already been committed and all that is done is to
entrap and capture the law breaker.[20]
In the case at bar, we find appellant’s claim of instigation
to be baseless. To recall appellant’s
version of the story, PO1 Baquiran approached him that night inquiring about
Medrano, the alleged object of the buy-bust operation. PO1 Baquiran then gave him a P500.00
bill to be used for purchasing shabu
from Medrano; but PO1 Baquiran had an additional instruction for appellant
which was to bring along Medrano to Golden Miles. While appellant was able to talk with Medrano,
he was unable to convince the latter to accompany him back to Golden
Miles. Such being the case, we fail to
see anymore reason for him to still buy shabu
considering that he knew fully well that he would be unable to fully abide by
PO1 Baquiran’s instructions.
Furthermore, we scrutinized the records of this case and failed to
discern any “force” that was exerted upon him by PO1 Baquiran. In fact, nowhere in appellant’s testimony did
he aver that PO1 Baquiran insisted that he buy shabu from Medrano. We note that after appellant had initially
refused to take part in the buy-bust operation that night, PO1 Baquiran merely told
him that “(they) needed August Medrano” and nothing more.
THE COURT:
Q: What will you buy?
A: Shabu worth 5 hundred pesos, sir.
Q: Did he give you the money?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. ABELLERA:
Q: What again PO1 Baquiran says to buy and what else?
A: “Take him along with you”.
Q: Where?
A: At GMA Golden Miles, sir.
Q: And how much money did he hand to you?
A: Five hundred, sir.
Q: And how many items will you buy?
A: One sachet, sir.
Q: And how much is one sachet?
A: Five Hundred, sir.
Q: Now, you said that he asked you to buy from this Medrano, did
you comply?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, what did you tell PO1 Baquiran concerning the
task that he is asking you to
do?
A: I told him I was already
passed on that matter, I am now working.
Then he told me that he will be the one to buy but I was forced to buy,
sir.
Q: How did he force you, Mr.
Witness?
A: He told me, “We need that
August Medrano.”
Q: And how did you find this August Medrano?
A: I went to his house in Suizo, sir.
Q: Who told you that he lives in Suizo at that time?
A: My friend, sir.
Q: What is the name of your friend?
A: Noel Mallari, sir.
Q: What did you use in going there?
A: Single motorcycle, sir.
Q: And were you able [to] purchase a sachet of shabu from
Medrano?
A: Yes, sir.[21]
To our mind, such innocuous statement on the part of PO1
Baquiran is inadequate to lead to the conclusion that appellant was “forced” by
the police to procure shabu. Moreover, appellant himself admitted that he
was all alone when he went to see Medrano at the latter’s house, far from the
prying eyes and the perceived influence of PO1 Baquiran. Clearly, at that point, he could have easily
desisted from buying shabu from
Medrano and chosen instead to go back to Golden Miles empty handed for he already
knew before he bought the illegal drug that Medrano could not accompany him
back to the said videoke bar. The fact
that he persisted in buying shabu
despite the absence of PO1 Baquiran betrays his contention that said police
officer “forced” him to purchase shabu.
In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust
operation, appellant casts questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of
the police officers. Unfortunately for
appellant, jurisprudence instructs us that in cases involving the sale of
illegal drugs, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.[22] Where there is nothing to indicate that the
witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption
is that they were not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to
full faith and credit.[23] In this case, the records are bereft of any
indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the police
officers. The following observation of
the Court of Appeals is indeed appropriate, thus:
In this case, the policemen
categorically identified Quiaoit as the one subject of the “buy-bust” operation
who agreed to sell to PO1 Baquiran a sachet of “shabu” in front of the restroom
of Golden Miles Beerhouse after he was being introduced by the informant. As police officers, PO1 Baquiran and PO2
Dueñas had in their favor the presumption of regularity of performance of duty. Furthermore, the defense failed to present
any evidence to show that the police officers were improperly motivated to bear
false witness against Quiaoit. While
Quiaoit claimed that he was a former asset of the police and he knew the police
officers who arrested him, yet, he did not impute any ill-motive as to why the
police officers would implicate him to drug pushing. This fact bolsters the police officers’ claim
that Quiaoit was, indeed, arrested in a buy-bust operation.
Quiaoit’s claim that he was just being framed-up by the
arresting officers does not inspire belief.
Appellant failed to show any motive why the policemen would implicate
him in a crime for illegal possession of prohibited drugs. It is the settled rule that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, his/her
positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand made under solemn
oath, should be given full faith and credence.
(People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104).
Moreover, there is nothing in the record that the police
officers were trying to extort money from Quiaoit during his apprehension up to
the time he was brought to the police station.
If Quiaoit was really a victim of frame-up, then he should have filed an
administrative or criminal case against these policemen. But he did not. Hence, his defense of frame-up must fail.
Finally, Quiaoit’s defense of denial is a weak
defense. Unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, it is self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law
(see People v. Hampton, 395 SCRA 156).
It cannot prevail over the positive identification by PO1 Baquiran that
it was Quiaoit who sold to him a sachet of “shabu” in the early morning of
Neither can we give credence to appellant’s contention that
the existence of a valid buy-bust operation was betrayed by the inadequate training
of the members of the team for, it must be stated here, there is no textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations.
The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection
of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.[25]
Anent the second issue, appellant maintains that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by its
failure to properly identify the sachet of shabu
which he sold to PO1 Baquiran. Again, we
disagree with appellant’s proposition.
In order to successfully prove the existence of the illegal
sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must be able to establish
the following elements of the crime: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[26]
In the case of People
v. Mala,[27]
we held that what is material is the proof that the transaction actually took
place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. It bears emphasizing that neither the law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust
operation, for the only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof
that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the illicit drug as evidence.[28] In the present case, appellant insists that
the prosecution failed to properly identify the sachet of shabu sold by appellant to PO1 Baquiran because of the buy-bust
team’s failure to segregate the said sachet from those confiscated from him at
The pertinent portions of the testimony of PO1 Baquiran belies
appellant’s claim:
ATTY. ABELLERA:
Q Mr.
Witness did Dueñas mark these RID before Quiaoit was frisked?
FISCAL
No
basis.
ATTY. ABELLERA
Q Mr.
Witness, you said that this RID 1, these RID 2 and series where they mark these
(sic)?
A RID
2 and series were marked in
Q Did
he marked (sic) them simultaneously or one at a time?
A One
at a time sir.
Q He
was already marking after you handed this to him?
A The
RID 1 was marked before Quiaoit was frisked.[29]
It is clear from PO1 Baquiran’s declaration that, contrary to
appellant’s assertion, the packet of shabu
sold to PO1 Baquiran by appellant during the buy-bust operation was properly
identified and marked as RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas even before the police frisked
appellant for more illegal drugs. With
PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, there can no longer be any basis for vacillation with
respect to the identity of the object which he, acting as poseur buyer, obtained from appellant. And, as the laboratory examination would
later confirm, the contents of the sachet bearing the mark RID 1 was positive
for shabu.
All told, as the illegal sale of drugs had been established
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained to uphold appellant’s
conviction.
We shall now determine the proper imposable penalty.
The sale of shabu
is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. It reads:
SEC. 5. P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Under the law, the sale of any
dangerous drug, regardless of its
quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine
of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. The statute, in prescribing the range of
penalties imposable, does not concern itself with the amount of dangerous drug
sold by an accused. With the
effectivity, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00803 dated 12 July 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision of the
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Elvi
John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Arturo G. Tayag,
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-8.
[2] Records, pp. 22-27.
[3]
[4]
[5] Sometimes referred to in the records as “GM Golden Miles.”
[6] TSN,
[7] Exhibit “C” for the prosecution.
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11]
[12] Records, p. 27.
[13]
[14] Rollo,
p. 8.
[15]
[16]
[17] CA rollo, p. 29.
[18]
[19] G.R. No. 83888,
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22] People
v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 114 (2002).
[23] People
v. Pacis, 434 Phil. 148, 159 (2002).
[24] CA rollo, p. 78.
[25] People
v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234,
[26] Suson
v. People of the
[27] 458 Phil. 180, 190 (2003).
[28] People
v. Astudillo, 440 Phil. 203, 224 (2002).
[29] TSN,