SECOND DIVISION
|
ALEGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner,
- versus - EMILIO ALVAREZ, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 172555 Present: QUISUMBING,*
J., Chairperson, CARPIO,** CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: |
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D
E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Legarda family, owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot 20, Block
RP-39 located in Sampaloc, Manila, assigned its rights and interests over it on
May 9, 2000, by a Deed of Assignment[1]
in favor of Alegar Corporation (petitioner), in whose name Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 250317 was issued on
The Legarda family had verbally leased the property on a monthly basis to
Catalina Bartolome (Catalina). Even
after Catalina’s death, her children Amado, Isabelita, Pacita, Ramon, and
Benjamin continued to occupy the property.
Because of
non-payment of rentals, petitioner, by counsel, sent a letter[2]
dated
Its demands having remained unheeded,
petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) a
complaint[4]
for unlawful detainer against the “Heirs
of Catalina Bartolome, Spouses Amado and ‘Jane Doe,’ Bartolome, Spouses ‘John
Doe’ and Isabelita Anquilo, Spouses ‘Johanne Doe’ and Pacita
Landayan, Spouses Benjamin and ‘Joan Doe’ Bartolome-Alvarez, Ramon
Alvarez, and those persons claiming rights under them.” (Underscoring
supplied). Petitioner prayed that the
defendants be ordered to vacate the property and to pay P1,100 per month beginning May 2002 until they vacate
the property, P25,000 attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
The RETURN OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS
accomplished by Process Server Alfonso D. Valino reads:
This is to certify that the undersigned tried to serve
the Summons and copy of the complaint to the following defendants;
1.
Defendant Catalina Bartolome, Amado Bartolome, and Benjamin
Bartolome-Alvarez, all of 455 Pepin Street, Sampaloc, Manila had been served
with summons on May 20, 2003, but the said
persons were all dead a year ago, as per information given by their tenant,
Mr. Acosta who is residing at the same given address.
2.
With respect to
defendants Sps. John Doe and Isabelita
Anquilo and Sps. Johanne Doe and Pacita
Landayan, all of 455 Pepin Street, Sampaloc, Manila, summons were not served on
May 20, 2003 because said persons were no
longer residing at the given address a year ago, as per informations given
by their tenant, Mr. Acosta who is residing at the same address.
3.
Defendant Ramon Alvarez of
The original of the Summons are hereby respectfully
returned DULY SERVED.[5] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring partly in the original, partly
supplied)
The original of the summons bears the
signature of one Guilberto Acosta who received it for the defendant Ramon
Alvarez on
Herein respondent filed an Answer,[6] alleging
that the defendants Amado, Isabelita, Pacita and their brother Benjamin, who is
his father, had died, hence, they may not be considered as parties-in-interest; that upon his father Benjamin’s death, the latter’s
right to lease was transmitted to him and his siblings who should be considered
real parties-in-interest in the case; that
he and his siblings have no knowledge or information of the Deed of Assignment
in favor of petitioner which was not even registered and they may not be bound
by it; and that the verbal monthly lease
agreement cannot be terminated upon failure to settle rental arrearages, given the
length of time that the lease had been in effect, citing Article 1687 of the
Civil Code.
Respondent in fact questioned the
service of only one set of summons, despite the number of defendants, and even the
service thereof on one Guilberto Acosta who was not authorized to receive the
same.
Petitioner countered that it allowed the
defendants to continue leasing on a monthly basis, but since they have not been
paying rentals, the lease had been terminated;
that Article 1687 cannot be invoked by the defendants since a verbal
contract of lease between the owner and the lessee on a monthly basis is a
lease with a definite period which expires after the last day of any given 30-day
period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate; and that while the demand letter was received
only by respondent, his receipt is considered as receipt by all of them, citing
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
By Decision of April 26, 2004, Branch
25 of the MeTC Manila rendered judgment[7] in
favor of petitioner, it holding that the receipt by respondent of the demand
letter addressed to the Heirs is deemed sufficient compliance with the
jurisdictional requirement of prior demand to pay and vacate; and that the termination of the lease
expressed in petitioner’s May 13, 2002 letter is a ground to eject the
defendants. Additionally, the trial
court held that the lease had expired upon failure of respondent et al. to pay
rentals.
On respondent’s claim of lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the MeTC held that the filing by
respondent of an Answer is a clear manifestation that he and his co-defendants voluntarily
appeared and submitted themselves to its jurisdiction.
The defendants were accordingly ordered
by the MeTC to vacate the premises, and pay P1,100
as monthly rental starting May 2002 until they vacate, attorney’s fees, and
other costs.
On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC decision, it citing “G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals”[8]
which held that “[a]lthough it may be true that the service of summons was made
on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner, nevertheless,
since it appears that the summons and the complaint were in fact received by
the corporation through its clerk, . . . there was substantial compliance with
the rule on service of summons.”
On elevation of the case to
the Court of Appeals via Petition for Review,[9]
the complaint was, by Decision[10] of
We
find the substituted service of summons was not validly effected on
[respondent] because the return of the process server did not clearly indicate
the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time upon the [respondent]. More importantly, the summons was merely left
behind to a certain Gilbert Acosta, whose relation to the case remained a
mystery to this day. There was no explanation whatsoever in the return as to
indicate any effort exerted if any on the part of the process server in
verifying the whereabouts of the [respondent] from any responsible person of
sufficient age, and there was no indication in the return that personal service
was impossible. The return merely made general statements that [respondent]
could not be found.
x x x x
It was cavalier for the MTC and RTC
to pronounce that EMILIO voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court because of his act of filing his Answer.
In
fact, he pleaded lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons as
an affirmative defense. While lack of jurisdiction is nominally a ground
for a Motion to Dismiss under the Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, its inclusion
as an affirmative defense in the Answer is allowed under Section 6, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. x x x[11] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner is now before this Court raising the sole issue
of whether the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the RTC which
sustained the findings of the MeTC that it acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of respondent and the defendants[12]
named in the complaint.
The
complaint names the defendants as follows:
“Heirs of Catalina Bartolome, Spouses
Amado and ‘Jane Doe,’ Bartolome, Spouses ‘John Doe’ and Isabelita
Anquilo, Spouses ‘Johanne Doe’ and Pacita Landayan, Spouses Benjamin and ‘Joan Doe’
Bartolome-Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez, and those persons claiming rights under
them.” (Underscoring supplied)
Admittedly, the therein named, now deceased, defendant Benjamin
Alvarez is the father of respondent.
Ergo, respondent, who is apparently residing in the questioned premises,
is one who claims rights under him as in fact he proffers so.
Respondent questioned the service of summons on one Guilberto
Acosta who, by his claim, was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of the
defendants.
Assuming
that Guilberto Acosta was not so authorized to
receive summons on behalf of the defendants, the summons, together with a copy
of the complaint, must have reached respondent; otherwise, he could not have filed an Answer
to the Complaint. Respondent in fact participated
in all the proceedings of the case. Thus, the purpose of summons, which is to
give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced
against him, was sufficiently met.[13]
That
the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent does not, however,
extend to the other defendant Ramon Alvarez on whose behalf Acosta allegedly
received the summons with copy of the complaint.
Based on the Return of Service of Summons
submitted by the Process Server, it appears that indeed, only one set of
summons and complaint was served – that which was received by Acosta. The rest of the therein named defendants-children
of Catalina having died or are living elsewhere, it would appear that only the therein
named defendant, Ramon Alvarez, together with those deriving rights under him, was
served with summons thru Acosta. There
is, however, no showing that substituted service of summons on Ramon Alvarez,
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If,
for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof,
was justified.
In fine, only respondent, a person
who claims right from his now deceased father Benjamin, is bound by the trial
court’s decision.
The appellate court’s dismissal of
the complaint, without prejudice, except with respect to respondent, is thus in
order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner’s complaint, without prejudice, against
all the defendants, except with respect to respondent, Emilio Alvarez who
derives rights under the defendant Benjamin Alvarez, is AFFIRMED.
The decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, adverse to respondent is thus REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON
OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson.
[1] Records, p. 7; Vide dorsal side of Annex “B.”
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] G.R. No. L-78299,
[9] Court of Appeals rollo, pp. 6-17.
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[13] Paramount
Insurance Corporation v. Japzon, G.R. No. 68037,