THIRD
DIVISION
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FIRST CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus
- FORMER SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BRANCH 218 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,** EDUARDO M. SACRIS, and CESAR A.
ABILLAR, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 171989 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: July 4, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul, on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Herein
petitioner First Corporation is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and engaged primarily in trade.
Herein private respondent Eduardo M. Sacris (Sacris) is the alleged
creditor of the petitioner corporation, while private respondent Cesar A.
Abillar (Abillar) had served as the President and Chairman of the Board of the
petitioner corporation from 1993 until
The
controversy of the present case arose from the following generative facts:
In
1991, the corporate officers of the petitioner corporation namely: Vicente C. Esmeralda,
Edgardo C. Cerbo, Nicolas E. Esposado, Rafael P. La Rosa and herein private
respondent Abillar, convinced private respondent Sacris to invest in their
business as the petitioner corporation needed a fresh equity infusion,
particularly in its Rema Tip Top Division, to make viable its continuous
operation. The petitioner corporation
made a promise of turning such equity into shareholding in the petitioner
corporation. While the conversion of
such investment into shareholding was still pending, private respondent Sacris
and the petitioner corporation agreed to consider the same as a loan which
shall earn an interest of one percent per month. Accordingly, from the year 1991 up to 1994, private
respondent Sacris had already extended a P1.2 million loan to the Rema
Tip Top Division of the petitioner corporation.
In 1997, private respondent Sacris
extended another P1 million loan to the petitioner corporation. Thus, from 1991 up to 1997, the total loan
extended by private respondent Sacris to the petitioner
corporation reached a total amount of P2.2 million. All loans were given by private respondent
Sacris to herein private respondent Abillar, as the
latter was then the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
petitioner corporation. The receipts for
the said loans were issued by the petitioner corporation in the name of private
respondent Abillar. Petitioner corporation failed to convert private respondent Sacris’s investment/loan into equity or shareholding in the
petitioner corporation. In its place,
petitioner corporation agreed to pay a monthly interest of 2.5% on the amount
of the loan extended to it by private respondent Sacris. Petitioner corporation likewise made partial
payments of P400,000.00 on the principal
obligation and interest payment in the amounts of P33,750.27 and P23,250.00,
thus, leaving an outstanding balance of P1.8 million.
In the meantime or on
On P1.8 million. As consideration for the execution of the
aforesaid Deed of Assignment, private respondent Abillar shall pay private
respondent Sacris the outstanding balance of P1.8 million due from the
petitioner corporation on or before
On P1.8 million on or before P1.8 million
but the latter refused to do so.
Hence, before pre-trial of the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 66757, private respondent Sacris filed a Motion for
Intervention attaching thereto his Complaint in Intervention. At first, the RTC of Pasig City denied the
said Motion for Intervention. Subsequently,
however, the trial court admitted the Complaint in Intervention filed by
private respondent Sacris and dismissed the Complaint originally filed by private
respondent Abillar against the petitioner corporation. The admission of the
Complaint in Intervention prompted petitioner corporation
to file a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54322
entitled, First Corporation v. Hon. Jose
R. Hernandez, Presiding Judge of Branch 158 of the
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the [P]etition,
the Court issues the writ of certiorari and sets aside the Orders dated
Based on the aforesaid Decision of
the Court of Appeals, private respondent Sacris filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money with Damages before the RTC of Quezon City against the petitioner corporation,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q01-44599, to recover his alleged collectible amount
of P1.8 million due from the petitioner corporation. Petitioner corporation filed its Answer denying
the material allegations stated in the Complaint. Petitioner corporation
denied having liability to private respondent Sacris,
as it had no knowledge of or consent to the purported transactions or dealings
that private respondent Sacris may have had with private respondent Abillar. Subsequently, petitioner
corporation filed a Third-Party Complaint against private respondent
Abillar alleging that the investment/loan transactions of private respondent Sacris, the basis of his cause of action against the
petitioner corporation, were all entered into by private respondent Abillar
without the knowledge, consent, authority and/or approval of the petitioner
corporation or of the latter’s Board of Directors. The aforesaid transactions were not even
ratified by the petitioner corporation or by its Board of Directors. Private respondent Abillar filed his Answer
to the said Third-Party Complaint raising therein the same allegations found in
the Complaint filed by private respondent Sacris. Pre-trial ensued followed by the trial on the
merits.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court renders judgment in favor of [herein private respondents] EDUARDO M. SACRIS and CESAR A. ABILLAR but against [herein petitioner] FIRST CORPORATION, as follows:
1. Ordering [petitioner] corporation to
pay the balance of P1,800,000.00 plus an interest of twenty-four percent
(24%) per annum computed from the time this action was filed until fully paid;
2. Ordering [petitioner] corporation to
pay [private respondent Abillar] P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s
fees;
3.
Ordering [petitioner] corporation to pay [private respondent Sacris] P50,000.00
as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
4. Ordering [petitioner] corporation to pay the cost of suit.[10]
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner
corporation appealed the above-quoted Decision of the court a quo to the appellate court where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84660. On
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner corporation comes before
this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Quezon City in rendering its Decision
dated 28 June 2004 in Civil Case No. Q01-44599, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision and Resolution dated
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT AND/OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT [SACRIS’S] CLAIMS OF A PURPORTED LOAN ARE SUPPORTED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BENEFITED FROM THE PURPORTED LOAN FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT [SACRIS].
III. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT AND/OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT ABILLAR WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY PETITIONER TO BORROW MONEY FROM PRIVATE REPSONDENT SACRIS.
IV. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND WITHOUT AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONER AND IN DISMISSING THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER AGAINST [PRIVATE RESPONDENT] CESAR ABILLAR.
In the Memorandum[11] filed
by the petitioner corporation, it avers that the RTC of Quezon City and the
appellate court erred in holding that private respondents’ claim of the
existence of the purported loans was supported by a preponderance of evidence, despite
the fact that the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the private
respondents were tainted with irregularities. Thus, the RTC and the appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of their jurisdiction in giving
credence to these pieces of documentary evidence presented by the private
respondents. The aforesaid pieces of documentary
evidence are the following: (1) the certifications and official receipts to
prove petitioner corporation’s indebtedness to private respondent Sacris; (2) Exhibits
“G”-“FF,” inclusive, consisting of check vouchers which allegedly proved
petitioner corporation’s loans from private respondent Sacris which was subject
to 2.5% interest; (3) deposit slips and official receipts, supposedly evidence
of deposit payments made by private respondent Abillar to the petitioner
corporation; (4) Exhibit “GG,” to show that the amount of P150,000.00
given in the form of a loan was used by the petitioner corporation in paying
its employees’ 13th month pay; and (5) Exhibit “RR,” which consists
of a handwritten note to prove petitioner corporation’s offer to settle
amicably its account with private respondent Sacris.
Petitioner corporation further argues
that the conclusion made by the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court that
it benefited from the loans obtained from private respondent Sacris had no
basis in fact and in law. More so, it
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC of Quezon City and the
Court of Appeals to conclude that the alleged loans were reflected in its
financial statements. Petitioner
corporation points out that its financial statements covering the period
1992-1997 revealed that only its financial statements for the years 1992 and
1993 reflected entries of “loans payable.”
The other financial statements following the year 1993 no longer had any
entries of outstanding loan due from the petitioner corporation. Thus, the RTC of Quezon City and the
appellate court had no basis for claiming that the alleged loans from private
respondent Sacris were reflected in its financial statements.
Also, petitioner corporation alleges
that it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC and the appellate court to
hold that private respondent Abillar was authorized by the petitioner
corporation to borrow money from private respondent Sacris, deliberately ignoring
the provisions of the by-laws of petitioner corporation which only authorized
private respondent Abillar, as President, to act as its signatory of negotiable
instruments and contracts. The by-laws
clearly authorized private respondent Abillar to perform only the ministerial
act of “signing,” and never gave private respondent Abillar a blanket authority
to bind the petitioner corporation in any kind of contract, regardless of its
nature and its legal consequences or effects on the petitioner corporation and
its stockholders.
Lastly, petitioner corporation
contends that the RTC and the Court of Appeals likewise acted with grave abuse
of discretion in not awarding damages in its favor and in dismissing its
Third-Party Complaint against private respondent Abillar.
On the other hand, private
respondents argue that the grounds enumerated by the petitioner corporation for
the allowance of its Petition for Certiorari
before this Court clearly call for the review of the factual findings of the
RTC of Quezon City. Private respondents
further avow that the petitioner corporation is simply using the remedy of certiorari provided for under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as a substitute for an ordinary
appeal. They claim that certiorari under Rule 65 of the
aforesaid Rules cannot be used for the review of the findings of fact and
evidence. Neither is it the proper
remedy to cure errors in proceedings nor to correct erroneous conclusions of
law or fact. Thus, private respondents
maintain that the petitioner corporation is merely using the remedy of certiorari as a delaying tool to prevent
the Decision of the RTC of Quezon City from immediately becoming final and
executory.
Likewise, private respondents aver
that for failure of the petitioner corporation to allege in its appeal before
the Court of Appeals that the RTC of Quezon City committed grave abuse of
discretion, petitioner corporation cannot now make the said allegation in its
Petition before this Court so as to justify its availment of the remedy of certiorari to annul the Decision of the RTC
of Quezon City dated 28 June 2004.
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Petitioner corporation evidently
availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal.
Although petitioner corporation ascribes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of both the RTC of
Quezon City and the appellate court in rendering their respective Decisions, a
closer look on the grounds relied upon by the petitioner corporation in its present
Petition for Certiorari will clearly
reveal that the petitioner corporation seeks a review of the factual findings
and evidence of the instant case.
It is a well-entrenched rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts. [12] This Court will not pass upon the findings of
fact of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by the
appellate court.[13] Unless the case falls under the recognized
exceptions,[14] the
rule should not be disturbed.
In the case at bar, the findings of
the RTC of Quezon City as well as the appellate court are properly supported by
evidence on record. Both courts found that
the alleged loans extended to the petitioner corporation by private respondent Sacris were reflected in the petitioner corporation’s
financial statements, particularly in the years 1992-1993, were contrary to the
claim of petitioner corporation. The said financial statements of the
petitioner corporation were not the sole bases used by the RTC of Quezon City
and by the appellate court in its findings of liability against the petitioner
corporation. The RTC of Quezon City also
took into consideration the pieces of documentary evidence[15] which
likewise became the grounds for its findings that indeed, private respondent
Sacris had extended a loan to petitioner corporation, and that the same was
given to private respondent Abillar, and received by the petitioner corporation. Those pieces of documentary evidence very
well supported the claim of private respondent Sacris that the petitioner corporation
received money from him through its former President, private respondent
Abillar. Thus, petitioner corporation
cannot claim that it never consented to the act of private respondent Abillar
of entering into a loan/investment transaction with private respondent Sacris, for there are documents that would prove that the
money was received by the petitioner corporation, and the latter acknowledged
receipt of said money. The same pieces
of evidence likewise confirm the findings of the RTC of Quezon City that the
petitioner corporation benefited from the said transaction; therefore, it should
be held liable for the same amount of its unpaid obligation to private
respondent Sacris. As the findings of
the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court are supported by evidence, this
Court finds no reason to deviate from the heretofore cited rule.
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence
is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal.[16] In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof.[17] It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence.[18] Any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error
of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or
its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.[19] It is not for this Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or
substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.[20]
Since the issues raised by the
petitioner corporation in its Petition for Certiorari
are mainly factual, as it would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of
the evidence on which the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court based
their Decisions, the Petition should not be given due course. Thus, the remedy of certiorari will not lie to annul or reverse the Decision of the RTC
of Quezon City dated
Settled is the rule that the proper
remedy from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals is an appeal under Rule
45 and not a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.[21] Hence, petitioner corporation could have
raised the Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 November 2005 and Resolution
dated 14 February 2006, affirming the assailed Decision dated 28 June 2004 of
the RTC of Quezon City, to this Court via
an ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. It should be emphasized that
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
will not lie when there are other remedies available to the petitioner.[22] Therefore, in availing itself of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
the petitioner corporation resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.
While it is true that this Court, in
accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, may treat a Petition for Certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the same
was filed within the reglementary
period for filing a Petition for Review,[23] however,
in the present case, this Court finds no compelling reason to justify a liberal
application of the rules, as this Court did in the case of Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[24] In
the said case, this Court treated the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner therein as having been filed
under Rule 45, because said Petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner’s counsel therein received the
Court of Appeals Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on
In the instant case, petitioner
corporation received on
Finally, even if this case will be
treated as having been filed under Rule 45, still it will be dismissed for
utter lack of merit because this case does not fall under the recognized
exceptions[27] wherein
this Court is authorized to resolve factual issues.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES – SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* No
part.
** What was written in the SC Rollo
was “Regional Trial Court of Manila,” but, it was the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which rendered the Decision dated
[1] Penned by Judge Hilario L. Laqui, rollo, pp. 58-69.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Magdangal M. de Leon, concurring, rollo, pp. 134-149.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 38-39.
[5]
[6] Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino with Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring, rollo, pp. 187-195.
[7] Penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez, rollo, pp. 182-183.
[8] Judge Jose R. Hernandez was the judge who issued the above-mentioned Orders that had been the subject of the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
[9] Rollo, p. 194.
[10]
[11]
[12] Western
Shipyard Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110340, 28 May 2001,
358 SCRA 257, 264.
[13] Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856,
[14] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion [Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322].
[15] Among these documentary evidence are the following:
1)
Certifications
issued by the [petitioner] corporation which acknowledged the amount of P1,200,000.00
received from [private respondent Sacris] and registered as an investment in
the name of [private respondent Abillar].
2)
Receipts issued
by the [petitioner] corporation which showed that the [petitioner] corporation
received from [private respondent Abillar] the amount of P1,000,000.00
as investment.
3)
Several check
vouchers reflecting interest payment of 1% on the investment.
4)
Check voucher
Nos. 4836, 5095, 5024 and 5025 issued by the [petitioner corporation] showing
partial payment of P400,000.00 on the principal obligation and interest
payment of P 33,750.27 plus P23,250.00.
5)
Check voucher No.
497 which was issued by [petitioner corporation] as payment of additional
interest on the P1.2 million loan from [private respondent Sacris].
6)
Official Receipts
Nos. 0031, 0405, 0493, 0543, 0676, 0679, 0678, 523, 548 and 549 which were
issued by the [petitioner] corporation in the name of [private respondent
Abillar] which showed that the [petitioner] corporation received from said
[private respondent Abillar] a total investment of P2,250,00.00.
7) A letter sent by Vicente C. Esmeralda, one of the officers of the [petitioner] corporation, addressed to [private respondent Abillar].
[16] Montebon v. Tanglao-Dacanay, G.R. No.
136062,
[17] Garcia v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 147427,
[18] Comsavings Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission,
327 Phil. 117, 128 (1996).
[19] People v. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106,
[20] Montebon v. Tanglao-Dacanay, supra note 16.
[21] Verde
v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342,
[22] Land Bank of the
[23] Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 163988,
[24] 335 Phil. 1066, 1075 (1997).
[25]
[26] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
[27] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, supra note 13.