THIRD
DIVISION
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MARIA
SHEILA ALMIRA T. VIESCA, Petitioner, - versus
- DAVID GILINSKY,* Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 171698 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on
The
facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner
and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met sometime in January 1999 at the Makati
Shangri-La Hotel where the former worked as a hotel manager. After a few months, a relationship blossomed
between the two. On
Unfortunately,
the relationship between petitioner and respondent soured and they parted ways
during the early part of 2003.
On
6 February 2004, respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the
company of Louis Maxwell at any time of any given day; he be entitled to enjoy
the company of Louis Maxwell during weekends and on such occasions the child
shall be allowed to spend the night with his father; and he be entitled to
enjoy a yearly three-week vacation in any destination with his child.[5] The
case was raffled off to public respondent’s sala and was docketed as SP Proc.
Case No. No 5785.
During
the pendency of respondent’s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise
agreement. This compromise agreement was
submitted before the trial court and became the basis of the Compromise
Judgment issued on
COMPROMISE
JUDGMENT
Acting on the joint motion to render judgment based on
Compromise Agreement and finding the allegations therein to be of merit, same
is hereby given due course.
Judgment
is therefore rendered based on the compromise agreement which is quoted
hereunder.
“COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This
Agreement entered this 22nd day of April 2004 by and between:
DAVID GILINSKY, of legal age, single and residing at
-and-
SHEILA T. VIESCA, of legal age, single and a resident
of
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties are the biological parents of
minor LOUIS MAXWELL (the “CHILD”) born on
WHEREAS, as a result of disputes and differences, the
parties are now living separately and apart;
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for a complete
settlement of the issues pertaining to the custody, visitorial rights, support
and maintenance of the child;
WHEREAS, each party acknowledges his or her personal
obligations as parent of the child and, by these presents, each hereby
undertakes to render the performance of these obligations to the child and
comply with his or her duties as a parent;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
promises and dispositions made in this agreement, the parties hereto have
agreed as follows:
I.
CUSTODY OF THE
CHILD
The mother shall continue to have custody over LOUIS
MAXWELL while the father shall exercise visitorial rights as hereunder stated.
Both parties, by these presents, undertake to take
every measure necessary, desirable and proper, to consider the best interest of
the child at all times, whether with them or away from them. Any act, word or manipulative scheme that may
cause the alienation of feelings or loss of respect or that either one or both
of them, from either one of the parties, shall never be tolerated.
II.
VISITATION RIGHTS
As the child will continue to be in the custody of the
mother, the father, as the non-custodial parent shall be entitled to the
following supervised visitation rights, to wit:
a. He
shall be entitled to the company of the child every Saturday and/or Sunday
afternoon;
b.
The child shall
be allowed to spend the night with the father once a week;
c. Nothing
herein shall prevent the father from visiting the child during reasonable hour
in the afternoon of any day of the week at the mother’s residence in the
presence of the mother or her duly designated representative, and with prior
notice to the mother.
One year after the signing of this agreement, the
parties shall meet to discuss and resolve the matter pertaining to the
entitlement of the father to enjoy a yearly, three-week vacation in any destination
with the child.
In the exercise and/or enjoyment of the above rights,
the mother shall have the right to designate any person of suitable age to
accompany the child.
III.
SUPPORT
a.
The father shall
give monthly financial support of US Dollars Five Hundred (US$500.00) or its
Peso equivalent within the first five days of the month effective upon the
signing of this agreement. The amount
shall be subject to such yearly adjustment of such rate equal to the inflation
rate determined by the appropriate government agency.
b.
On top of the
said monthly financial support, the Father shall provide:
i.
full medical and
dental expenses and/or insurance coverage for the child;
ii.
full education
for the child at Colegio San Agustin,
iii.
college Education
Insurance for the child;
iv.
monthly car
amortization of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or One Fourth (1/4) of
the current amortization whichever is lower;
v.
Monthly
amortization due as of the date of this Agreement for the Rockwell-Manansala
Condominium unit until its full payment and transfer of title, including its
association dues and charges. The mother
here affirms/confirms she is holding title to the condominium in trust for the
child.
The mother shall ensure that all arrears and/or
outstanding obligations prior to the execution of this agreement shall have
been settled and paid. As soon as the
above have been fully complied with, the father shall pay the ensuing monthly
amortization.
IV.
COURT APPROVAL OF
AGREEMENT
This agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
The parties agree to submit this written agreement for
the court’s approval.
V.
JUDICIAL RELIEF
Should either one of the parties fail to comply with
the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the aggrieved party may seek
judicial relief against the erring party and apply with the proper court for a
writ of execution against said erring party to enforce his or her obligations
imposed in this Agreement. The offending
party shall pay for the cost of litigation, attorney’s fees, other expenses,
and interest incurred in such application for a writ of execution.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our
respective signatures on the date and place hereinabove mentioned.
(SGD) DAVID
GILINSKY (SGD)
SHEILA T. VIESCA[7]
Father
Mother
On
Respondent’s
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was scheduled to be heard on
Despite
petitioner’s Manifestation, the trial court still proceeded to hear
respondent’s urgent motion on
On
As
expected, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[13]
insisting that said writ was issued with “indecent haste” violative of her
right to due process, and that the writ varied the terms of the Compromise
Agreement since it failed to take into consideration the parties’ understanding
that in the enjoyment of respondent’s visitorial rights, petitioner “shall have
the right to designate any person of suitable age to accompany the child.”[14]
On
The Court heard the
arguments raised by the counsel for the [herein petitioner] and the reply/comment
thereto made by the counsel for the [herein respondent]. The [herein petitioner] thru counsel imposed
certain conditions if ever the visitorial rights of the [herein respondent] would
be granted. Though [herein petitioners]
wished that those conditions be contained in an affidavit, which to the mind of
the court would only delay the
resolution of the motion, the court thereupon ordered that the statement
of the petitioner be made orally but under oath, thus, [herein respondent] was
placed in the witness stand.
Thereafter, the court ruled to deny the motion to quash
the writ of execution filed by [herein petitioner] thru counsel for lack of
merit and grant the prayer of the [herein respondent] that he be allowed to
exercise his visitorial rights over the minor LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA today under
the conditions imposed by the [herein petitioner], some of which are contained
in the compromise agreement to which [herein respondent] promised under oath to
obey the same (sic).
WHEREFORE, let the [herein respondent] DAVID GILINSKY
exercise his visitorial rights over the minor LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA on the
following conditions, to wit:
1. [Herein
respondent] shall surrender to the court his passport everytime he is with his
child; and
2. [Herein
respondent] shall not secure/apply another passport (sic) for his son LUIS
MAXWELL; and
3. [Herein
petitioner] shall exercise her right to designate any person of suitable age to
accompany the child whenever [herein respondent] would exercise his visitorial
right.
[Herein Petitioner] is commanded to bring the minor child
LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA to court not later than 3:00 o’clock this afternoon, to be
pick-up (sic) by the [herein private respondent], upon the service of his order
to the [herein petitioner] by the sheriff of this court.
Failure of the [herein petitioner] to comply with this
order shall be a ground for contempt of this court AND SHALL BE DEALTH WITH
SEVERELY.[15]
In addition, petitioner alleges that in the course of
argument between the parties during this hearing, Judge Rebecca Mariano was not
able to contain her bias against petitioner when she reproved the latter’s
“stubborn refusal”[16]
to comply with the Compromise Judgment.
Believing that Judge Mariano had shown her partiality in favor of
respondent, petitioner’s counsel moved in open court for her inhibition.[17] To this, Judge Mariano remarked:
COURT
ALRIGHT, before I inhibit
myself, the MOTION TO QUASH is DENIED and my position granting visitorial
rights of the child is GRANTED.[18]
Subsequently, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion
to Withdraw Motion for Temporary Relief of Support dated
According to respondent –
3. At
4. At or
about
5. Undersigned
counsel immediately conferred with Atty. E. Perez, [herein petitioner’s]
counsel, to arrange the implementation of the above-quoted Order. Atty. Perez informed undersigned of his
client’s inability to comply with the
6. Despite
the clear and unequivocal tenor of This Court’s Order, Atty. Perez informed the
undersigned counsel that since [herein petitioner] was still at work, his
client could only bring the child at the lobby of Shangri-la hotel,
Undersigned counsel immediately rejected the proposed
arrangement for the same does not only run counter to the express mandate of
This Court’s Order but more importantly would deprive [respondent] of spending
quality time with his son – the raisaon d’etre of the stipulation
in the Compromise Agreement providing an overnight stay. Undersigned counsel, moreover, explained that
The adverse counsel, however, remained insistent that
the child could only be brought by the [herein petitioner] at
The undersigned counsel finally relented to the
was (sic) unaffected by [herein respondent’s]
earnest desire to spend quality time with his son.
7. Albeit the
representation [herein petitioner’s] counsel that his client committed to bring
the child at
x x x x
10. Furthermore,
[herein petitioner] arrived at past 9 o’clock p.m. despite her undertaking that
she will bring the child to [herein
respondent] at 8 o’clock p.m.; [herein petitioner] also imposed on two
guardians: herself and her mother, instead of only one guardian, as provided in
the Compromise Judgment; The child was not allowed by [herein petitioner] to
sleep in [herein respondent’s] room and was made to sleep in her separate room
with her mother; finally, on the argument that overnight stay simply means
sleeping over, [herein petitioner] left with Louis and her mother at 6 o’clock
in the morning of 16 April 2005.[21]
On the other hand, petitioner countered –
“4. It is clear therefore that there was nothing in the oral
argument nor in the Order given in open court that the child was supposed to be
brought to Court at 3:00 p.m. that same day to accommodate [herein
respondent’s] request for visitorial rights.
Neither is there mention of the specific time in the Compromise
Judgment. It appears that it was [herein
respondent] who had prior notice or advanced information as to the contents of
the Order from his Manifestation that –
“3. At
“5. Undersigned
counsel received a copy of the Order dated
6.
[Herein petitioner] maintains that –
a. She arrived late at little past
b. [Herein respondent] conveniently failed to mention that when [herein petitioner] arrived with the child Louis Maxwell at the hotel lobby, they were met by [herein respondent] together with three (3) Manulife insurance agents and a physician. [Herein respondent] and the insurance men tried almost to coercion to convince [herein petitioner] to agree that the child be subjected to medical examination that night so that [herein respondent] could secure a multimillion insurance policy for the child with David Gilinsky as the sole beneficiary. [Herein petitioner] naturally did not agree. [Herein petitioner] does not want to speculate but the circumstances, time and manner of taking the policy appears to be dubious. The fact remains that whatever desire of [herein respondent] to spend quality time with the child was clouded when he allowed these insurance men to get in the way when they should not be there in the first place.[22]
On
26 April 2005, petitioner filed an “Ex-Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit”
claiming that Judge Mariano could no longer handle the case “with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge”[23]
because of her statement pertaining to petitioner’s failure to abide by the
Compromise Judgment. Respondent filed his opposition thereto, arguing that Judge
Mariano’s remark was merely based on her observation of petitioner’s behavior
and attitude during the proceedings of this case.[24]
On
a.
To command [herein petitioner] to bring the child to either This Court
or to the [herein respondent’s] residence not later than
b.
To direct the [herein petitioner] pay (sic) the amount of P295,000.00,
as and by way of attorney’s fees.
Other relief just and equitable under
the circumstances are likewise prayed
for.[26]
In
her Comment,[27] petitioner
asserted that Judge Mariano should no longer rule on respondent’s motion, since
there was a pending motion for her to inhibit.
She likewise took the opportunity to refute respondent’s allegations
with regard to her purported failure to observe the terms of the Compromise
Judgment. Petitioner claimed that on
Meanwhile,
Judge Mariano issued an Order dated
In
respondent’s Comment to the present Petition, it is claimed that the following
terms were agreed upon by the parties during the in-chamber conference held on
a.
The respective counsels of each party will meet on
b.
Pending the conclusion of the agreement, the child will be fetched from
the Petitioner’s residence at
c.
Private Respondent is to surrender his passport during these visits.
d.
Petitioner’s mother will act as the designated guardian; and
e.
The withdrawal of the parties’ respective motions, i.e., Petitioner’s
Reiterative Motion to Inhibit and Motion to Withdraw Support.[30]
The 20-21 May 2005 sleepover
proceeded as scheduled.[31] However, discord between the parties
resurfaced when respondent was unable to spend time with Louis Maxwell on 27-28
May 2005. It appears that petitioner’s
mother, who was the designated accompanying guardian, got sick and because of
this, respondent did not enjoy the company of his son. Once more, respondent sought the trial
court’s intervention through his Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy
Visitorial Rights dated
a) To allow (him) to have the company of
his son on
b) To designate the hours of
c) To designate the Court Sheriff and/or
any other court officer to act as the accompanying guardian of Louis Maxwell
Viesca Gilinsky during the implementation of the prayed for relief under
paragraph (a) hereof and of the sleep-over provision mentioned in Clause II of
the Compromise Judgment.
d) To command [herein petitioner] to pay
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), as and by way of cost of litigation,
attorney’s fees and other expenses pursuant to Clause V of the Compromise
Judgment.
Just and equitable reliefs prayed for
under the circumstances.[33]
Respondent requested that his Very
Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights be heard on 1 June 2005
notwithstanding the three-day notice rule required under the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, as he was about to go on a two-week business trip on 3 June
2005.
Petitioner posed her objection to
respondent’s motion, as it violated the three-day notice rule. She also denied that the
On
O R D E R
Set
for today’s hearing is the Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial
Rights filed by the [herein respondent] and the Comment thereto filed by the [herein
petitioner]. The Court heard the
arguments between the parties accusing each other of violation of the compromise
agreement.
The [herein respondent] wanted to present testimonial
evidence to prove his allegation in the motion but which was denied by the
Court for lack of material time.
The Court likewise reminded the parties the fact that
the [herein respondent] surrenders his passport everytime he exercises his visitorial
right was voluntary on his part and not as part of the compromise agreement.
WHEREFORE, the court ruled that the [herein
respondent] can exercise his visitorial right today at
Considering that the very urgent motion filed by the [herein
respondent] was commented or objected to by the [herein petitioner’s] counsel,
let the [herein respondent], thru counsel file a reply within five (5) days
from receipt of this Order and the [herein petitioner] is given the same period
of time from receipt of the reply within which to file a rejoinder, if she so
desires.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 1st day of June
2005, at
REBECCA R. MARIANO
Judge[35]
On
O R D E R
Before
the Court is the Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights
filed by the [herein respondent] thru counsel, alleging among others, that [herein
petitioner] had once again proven herself to be unfaithful to her promises and
representations, citing the incident which happened on 27 May 2005, the
scheduled meeting of the [herein respondent] and his son. On the said date, [herein petitioner’s] grandmother
(sic) became sick, however, the latter refused the offer of the petitioner to
get medical help. Said alleged illness
became more doubtful when the grandmother insisted on being well enough to push
through with the visitation but at
On the Comment filed by the [herein petitioner], she
stated that the present motion should be denied because it violates the
three-day notice rule and there is no good cause to set the hearing on shorter
notice.
We shall now rule on the motion.
Under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court
and following the pronouncements by the High Court in the cases of Cledera, et
al. vs. Sarmiento, et al 39 SCRA 552;
Estipora vs. Navarro, 69 SCRA 285, the motion under consideration should have
been dismissed ourtright, however, the above-cited provision or the so-called
three-day notice rule is not absolute.
Like any other rule, it admits of exception, i.e. urgent motions
(Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Regalado).
Moreover, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court finds it
imperative and necessary to brush-aside any technicality since the issue
involved herein is basically the natural right of a father to enjoy the company
and presence of his beloved son. To the
mind of the Court, the best and most applicable law in cases of this nature is
the conscience of untroubled and unprejudiced majesty. Finally, the right of custody accorded to
parents’ springs from the exercise of parental authority (Santos Sr. vs. Court
of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407). Hence, the
motion under consideration is hereby given due course.
Accordingly, [herein petitioner] is ordered to perform
the following, to wit:
1.
Allow [herein
respondent] to enjoy the company of Louis Maxwell on 24 June 2005 and on every
Friday of each week starting from 6:00 pm to 9:00 am of the following day,
pursuant to Clause II of the compromise Judgment dated 12 May 2004;
2.
The Deputy
Sheriff of this court is hereby designated to act as the accompanying guardian
of Louis Maxwell Viesca Gilinsky during the implementation of the prayed for
relief under paragraph 1 hereof;
3.
Pay the [herein
respondent] the amount of Thirty-Thousand Pesos (Php 30,000.00), as and by way of cost of litigation,
attorney’s fees and other
expenses pursuant to Clause V of the Compromise Agreement.
As regards the prayer under paragraph (a) of the
motion, the same is denied for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Chambers this
REBECCA R. MARIANO Judge[36]
During the hearing on
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case via Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the 16 June 2005 Order of the trial court as well
as its Orders dated 1 June 2005 and 8 April 2005.[38]
In her petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended
that the assailed Order dated
Petitioner
also insisted that Judge Mariano should desist from further hearing the case
below.
On P30,000.00 that the trial
court awarded to private respondent in its Order of
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the
Order dated
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the
Resolution promulgated on
Hence, the present recourse raising the following issues
for our consideration:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION
OF LAW, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, AND/OR
DECIDING IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT CONSIDERING THAT-
A.
THE TRIAL COURT AMENDED OR ALTERED THE TERMS OF THE COMPROMISE JUDGMENT
WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF BOTH PARTIES THERETO.
B.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ISSUED THE ASSAILED ORDER AMENDING THE COMPROMISE
JUDGMENT IN HASTE AND WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AS IT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT
WAITING FOR THE SCHEDULED HEARING OF THE MOTION FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
DESPITE THE PENDING MOTION TO INHIBIT.[43]
The petition is partly meritorious.
A
compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.[44] A compromise agreement that is intended to
resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a judicial
compromise. Once it is stamped with
judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the
parties. Having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of
the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment.[45] Such agreement has the force of law and is
conclusive between the parties. It
transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties
thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance
with the Rules.[46] Thus, a compromise agreement that has been
made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may
be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the
litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is
decreed.[47]
The
settlement of disputes brought before the courts is encouraged. In fact, in the Civil Code and in the Revised
Rules of Court, courts are directed to persuade the litigants in civil cases to
agree upon some fair compromise.[48]
Unfortunately
in the case before us, the compromise agreement entered into between the
parties fell way short of its objective of finally putting an end to their
dispute. The sheer number of incidents
which cropped up shortly after the trial court’s approval of the compromise
agreement reveals that the compromise judgment failed to bring peace to the parties. Interestingly enough, the only points of
disagreement are Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which pertains to the overnight
visits of Louis Maxwell with respondent
and the last paragraph of the same clause regarding the appointment of the
child’s accompanying guardian.
Clause
II(b) states that “(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the
father once a week.” The sentence seems
simple enough to be understood by a layman.
Petitioner claims that the parties did not specify the day and time of
the week when private respondent could enjoy the overnight company of Louis Maxwell
in order to give the parties “some flexibility” and to give them the
opportunity to arrange the schedule themselves.[49] But the parties have overstretched the
indeterminate language of said provision.
Indeed, the parties have been at odds over the interpretation and
implementation of this plain provision of the Compromise Judgment and this
could have caused much confusion in the mind of the young Louis Maxwell who had
to be brought from one place to another at such unholy hours of the night only
to be awakened from deep slumber in the early hours of the morning to be taken
to another place. And yet, all of these
could have been avoided had the parties opted to be more specific in their
agreement. The question thus
becomes: can the trial court modify, by
motion of one of the parties, a Compromise Judgment? We hold in the negative.
To
reiterate, a compromise judgment has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except
for vices of consent or forgery[50]
which private respondent does not allege in this case.
More
importantly and as correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is settled that
neither the courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a
judgment different from their compromise agreement or against the very terms
and conditions of their agreement[51]
without contravening the universally established principle that a contract is
the law between the parties.[52] The courts can only approve the agreement of
parties. They can not make a contract
for them.[53]
Nevertheless,
we cannot totally blame the trial court for having granted respondent’s Very
Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. Perhaps, in its desire to finally put to rest
the bothersome issue concerning Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and to
prevent future disagreements between the parties, the trial court saw the
wisdom, as this Court does, in providing the specifics in the said indefinite portion
of the Compromise Judgment. As we
previously held in the case of Hernandez
v. Colayco[54] –
This is not the first unfortunate instance that a
compromise judgment of a trial court has given rise to subsequent prolonged
controversy, only because the trial judge failed to exercise the required
degree of care in seeing to it that neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of
details should characterize the agreement, much less the judgment rendered on
the basis thereof. The expressed desire
of the parties to end their judicial travails by submitting to a compromise
deserves the utmost attention from the court, and no effort should be spared in
helping them arrive at a definite and unequivocal termination of their problems
and differences. It is high time that
the matter-of-fact treatment usually accorded by trial courts to motions to
approve compromises were abandoned in favor of the more positive activist
attitude the situation demands. In
acting in such a situation, the judge should bear in mind that the objective is
to end the disagreement between the parties, not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their counsel are
unable to do it, the judge is expected to assist them in attaining precision
and accuracy of language that would more or less make it certain that any
disputes as to the matters being settled would not recur, much less give rise
to a new controversy. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Resultantly, a remand of this case is necessary to allow
the parties themselves to resolve the matter regarding the implementation of
Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment.
In this regard, the rule on immutability for purposes of execution does
not attach to a judgment that is materially equivocal or which suffers from
either patent or latent ambiguity.[55] To obviate further discord between them and
to preclude their recourse to the trial court every time one of them perceives
a violation committed by the other of Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment,
we direct the trial court to be on guard and ensure that the parties would lay
out in concrete, specific details the terms of their agreement as to this
specific matter as well of the appointment of Louis Maxwell’s accompanying
guardian.
Turning now to the question of whether Judge Mariano should
inhibit herself from the case, we rule in favor of respondent.
The pertinent provision of Rule 137, Section 1, of the
Revised Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge
or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in
the exercise of his sound discretion disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis
supplied).
This Court has ruled that to disqualify or not to disqualify
is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the sense of fairness
and justice of the judge concerned.[56] Said discretion is granted to judges, since
they are in the better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition,
as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties in their courtrooms.[57] The test that must be applied in questions
involving the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the
movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.[58] In this case, we hold that petitioner was not
deprived of her day in court, for she was able to file her comments on and/or
objections to the motions filed by private respondent. She, therefore, was able to ventilate her
positions on the issues brought before the trial court.
As regards Judge Mariano’s remark regarding petitioner’s
obstinacy, we agree with private respondent that the same is not a sufficient
ground for public respondent to inhibit herself. Indeed, “(o)pinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and
conduct observed by the judge, even if found later on to be erroneous, do not
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.”[59] Moreover, a single comment uttered by the
public respondent in the course of the proceedings should not be taken to be
generally illustrative of her conduct in hearing and determining the outcome of
the entire case. Such isolated remark should not be taken to mean that public
respondent has crossed the line separating cold impartiality from unbridled
bias.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90285 dated
Judge Mariano is ordered to hold further proceedings to
allow the parties to agree SPECIFICALLY
and DEFINITIVELY on how the
overnight visits of Louis Maxwell with respondent and the appointment of said
child’s accompanying guardian would be implemented within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* In
the Petition for Review as filed before this Court on
SEC.
4. – Contents of petition. – The petition shall be filed
in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the
appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the
material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if
any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set
forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or
arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain
copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the
petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q.
Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-42.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] CA rollo, pp. 36-37.
[6] Rollo, pp. 132-136.
[7]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 60-61.
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo,
pp. 260-261.
[12] Per Sheriff’s Report dated
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] CA rollo, pp. 104-111.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] CA rollo, pp. 108-111.
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 436.
[30]
[31] CA rollo, p. 126.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Rollo, p. 81.
[36]
[37] CA rollo, pp. 313-314.
[38]
[39] Rollo, p. 265 citing Articles 2037 and 2038 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code.
However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other if the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already commenced.
[40] Citing Philippine Bank of Communications
v. Echiverri, G.R. No. L 41795,
[41] Rollo, p. 42.
[42]
[43]
[44] David
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97240,
[45] Armed
Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
370 Phil. 150, 163 (1999).
[46]
[47] Martir v. Verano, G.R. No. 170395, 28
July 2006, 497 SCRA 120, 126-127.
[48] Art. 2029, Civil Code:
The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise.
Rule 18, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 2. Nature and purpose. – xxx.
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
[49] Rollo,
p. 20.
[50] Binamira
v. Ogan-Occena, G.R. No. L-27777,
[51] Philippine
Bank of Communications v. Echiverri, supra note 40 at 527.
[52] Municipal
Board of
[53] De
Guia v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. 51143,
[54] G.R. No. L-39800,
[55]
[56] Flores
v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 992, 1019 (1996).
[57] People
v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130-39,
[58] Soriano
v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 226, 250 (2001).
[59] Rollo,
p. 392 citing Seveses v. Court of Appeals,
375 Phil. 64, 73 (1999).