EN
BANC
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RUDY A. PALECPEC, JR.,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. CORAZON C.
DAVIS in her capacity as the Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region, Manila,
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 171048 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES, AZCUNA,
TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
JR. and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: July 31, 2007 |
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D
E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
The
petition before Us is an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the following: (1) the Decision[1]
dated
The following antecedent
facts are undisputed:
Petitioner rose from the ranks in the DENR-NCR starting as Clerk II,
moving onto Statistician I, then as Legal Assistant II, until he was promoted
to Administrative Officer III. He served as Administrative Officer III of the
Interim Internal Audit Division of the DENR-NCR from 1998 until he was dropped
from the rolls of the DENR-NCR plantilla of personnel by virtue of a Memorandum[7]
issued on
Please
be informed that per Memorandum of the Regional Executive Director
dated June 1, 2000, you were advised to report for work within (5) days
upon receipt thereof and file the corresponding leave application for the days
you were absent. Likewise, you were also instructed to submit your Original
Daily Time Record (DTR) Card for the month of April to the Personnel Section.
However, up to this writing, you have not yet complied with said instruction
nor have properly informed this Office of your interest/disinterest to go back
to work.
In this connection, we regret to
inform you that consistent with Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 12 Section 2.1.a, s. 1994 hereunder reproduced, you are Officially dropped
from the rolls of the DENR-NCR Plantilla of Personnel effective
“An
Officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at
least 30 calendar days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the
rolls without prior notice. He shall however be informed of his separation from
the service not later than five (5) days from its effectivity which shall be
sent to the address appearing on his 201 files.”
In petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted
memorandum, he asserted that he had been reporting for work as evidenced by his
“Entry of Time” in the Security Guard’s Logbook of Employees and that he had to
resort to such recording of his official attendance since there was no Daily
Time Record (DTR) form found in the DTR rack. To refute the allegations that he was
continuously AWOL the entire months of May, June, and July 2000, petitioner
presented the security logbook showing that he reported for work on 15, 21, 22, and 27
June 2000; and 12 and 24 July 2000.
Respondent denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
in an Order[8] dated 13
October 2000 citing that in her earlier Memorandum[9] dated
1 June 2000, she already ordered petitioner to return to work but he failed to
comply therewith, and neither did he properly inform respondent’s office of his
interest to go back to work.
Respondent’s Order dated
Petitioner initially appealed his dismissal from service
with the CSC, but his appeal was dismissed without prejudice in an Order[11]
dated
Foregoing
premises considered, Palecpec cannot be found to have been continuously absent
for thirty working days. Hence, DENR’s findings of AWOL and the eventual
dropping of Palecpec from the rolls is without valid cause. Thus, Palecpec
should be reinstated to his former position with the payment of back salaries
from the time he was dropped from the rolls. Nonetheless, the DENR should
initiate the appropriate administrative investigation for failure to make
complete entries in the logbook.
WHEREFORE,
the Appeal of Rudy A. Palecpec is hereby granted.[12]
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing CSC-NCR Order, but it was denied by the
CSC-NCR in a Decision dated
Unsatisfied,
the respondent filed an appeal of the
WHEREFORE,
the appeal of Regional Executive Director Corazon C. Davis of DENR is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Orders of CSC-NCR dated
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the above
Resolution was subsequently denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 050758
dated
WHEREFORE,
the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, CSC Resolution
No. 04-0968 dated
The
CSC-NCR is directed to monitor the implementation of this Resolution.[14]
On
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission affirming the CSC-NCR’s Orders
reinstating Rudy Palecpec to his position as Administrative Officer III with
payment of back salaries are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.[15]
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of its
Hence, petitioner
now comes before us via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the Decision dated 29 September 2005 and Resolution dated 10
January 2006 of the Court of Appeals and, consequently, his reinstatement to
his position as Administrative Officer III with the DENR-NCR, with payment of
back salaries, per CSC Resolutions No. 040968 (dated 1 September 2004) and No. 050758
(dated 07 June 2005).
Petitioner posits the following
arguments in support of his Petition:
I.
THE ASSAILED DECISION IMPOSES A MEANING AFAR OR NOT
INFERRED IN A CIVIL SERVICE RULE CONCERNING THE DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF AN
OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN GOVERNMENT VIS-À-VIS THE PRESCRIBED RECORD OF THE DAILY
ATTENDANCE WHICH HAS SUSTAINED THE ADMISSIBILITY OR RELEVANCE OF EITHER THE
DAILY TIME RECORD (DTR) CARD OR OTHER EQUIVALENT FORMS.
II.
THE ASSAILED DECISION RULING OUT THE AUTHENTICITY
AND/OR VERACITY OF THE ENTRIES IN THE SECURITY LOGBOOK OF EMPLOYEES IN THE
DENR-NCR CONCERNING THE ATTENDANCE OF PETITIONER HEREIN IS FOUNDED PURELY ON
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.
Respondent
countered the present Petition by filing two Comments, one through private counsel[16]
and another through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).[17]
Respondent
asserts that the CSC-NCR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in entertaining and assuming jurisdiction over
petitioner’s Petition for Relief from judgment, since a petition for relief
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Respondent points out that petitioner received her Memorandum dated
Respondent
also refutes petitioner’s statement that he worked as a dedicated public
servant during his stay with the DENR-NCR alleging that his stay was actually
marked by recalcitrant and contemptuous attitude towards his superiors and his official
responsibilities, in addition to habitual absences.
It is
also not true, as petitioner claims, that he only learned of respondent’s
Memorandum dated
Petitioner
replied to both of respondent’s
Comments. He contends that the
perfection of appeal before the CSC is not an issue in the instant petition,
and that the allegation that he did not work as a dedicated public servant is
negated by his Service Record.
Moreover,
the wordings of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1991, simply
prescribe the forms available in recording the daily attendance of an officer
or employee in the government, only for the purpose of ensuring “a uniform
system of monitoring the attendance of all government officials and employees
for purposes of complying with the eight hours for five working days a week.”[21] Petitioner asserts that the act of not
accomplishing his DTR cards may simply be a non-compliance with the policy of
his office or the Civil Service Rules, and cannot be proof of his being AWOL
for the contested period, given that he had presented evidence of his
attendance for the same period.
Petitioner
empathically argues that the signature in the employee security logbook which
reads “Andy P.” refers to one and the same person – the petitioner – as is
known by respondent and other employees of DENR-NCR, since it is the customary
signature he had used not only in his attendance records, but also in receiving
his salary for the past ten years.
Finally,
petitioner asserts that the Memoranda dated
[T]he disputed
Memorandum (sic) by
Petitioner brought his case before us via
an appeal by certiorari from the
adverse Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In a long line of cases, it has been held
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; and under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review to be given due course should
raise only questions of law.[24]
But when is the Court faced with a
question of law? We have differentiated
a question of law from a question of fact, thus, “[t]here is a
question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what law pertains to a
certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the
truth or falsity of alleged facts.”[25]
A question of fact arises when “there is need for a calibration of
the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence
and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.”[26]
Findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are generally conclusive on this Court, but this rule admits of the
following exceptions[27]:
(1)
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory;
(2)
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
(3)
the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is mainly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4)
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation
of facts;
(5)
the appellate court, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(6)
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7)
the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; and
(8) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where
the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or where
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.
A recognized exception to the general
rule that factual issues are not within the province of this Court is the
circumstance in which there are conflicting findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals on one hand and the trial court or government agency concerned on the
other.[28] The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
and the CSC herein are evidently in conflict with each other; hence,
necessitating our review of the evidence on record and coming up with our own
findings of fact.
The factual matters for our
determination are (1) the actual attendance of petitioner during the contested
period and the probative value to be given the security logbook presented as
evidence by petitioner; and (2) receipt by petitioner of a copy of respondent’s
Memorandum dated 1 June 2000 which ordered petitioner to return to work and
another Memorandum dated 1 August 2000 dismissing petitioner from service.
Petitioner’s allegations that he had
been reporting for work on certain days and was not continuously absent for
more than 30 days are dependent chiefly on the probative value to be given the
entries in the employee security logbook. Petitioner asserts that the employee security
logbook must be given probative value because CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21,
Series of 1991, recognizes other means of recording employees’ attendance. According to the said Memorandum Circular:
Use of Bundy Clock and Other
Records of Attendance
1. All
officers and employees shall record their daily attendance on the proper form
or whenever possible, have them registered on the bundy clock. Any
other means of recording attendance may be allowed provided their
respective names and signature as well as the time of their arrival to and
departure from the office are indicated subject to verification.
This Court cannot give credence to
petitioner’s assertion. Although it is
true that attendance of civil service employees may be recorded by means other
than the DTR, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1991, clearly requires
that these records must (1) provide the respective names and signatures of the
employees; (2) indicate their time of arrival and departure; and (3) be subject
to verification. Petitioner failed to
establish herein that the employee security logbook complied with all of these
requirements, particularly, that it also indicated his time of departure and
that the said logbook was subjected to the verification of his supervisors
and/or superiors.
To
better illustrate, the entries in the employee security logbook of one “Andy
P.” only consist of the following:
DATE IN
OUT IN OUT
(AM) (PM)
June 15
June 21
July 12
(time in is unclear)
July 24
Not only are these entries unverified,
but they are also palpably incomplete and insufficient to establish actual
attendance. And even though the employee security logbook may be considered as
evidence on behalf of petitioner, it cannot be given more probative value than
the positive declarations made by petitioner’s immediate supervisor[30]
and respondent, as head of office, that he was not present at the office from
April to July 2000. There appears to be no reason why respondent
and his immediate supervisor would insist that petitioner was absent when, as
he claims, he was actually not. In
keeping track of petitioner’s attendance, petitioner’s immediate supervisor and
respondent may be legally presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, to have acted in the regular performance of their official duties.[31]
Petitioner’s explanation that he
failed to accomplish and submit his DTR because he was not provided with a DTR
form with his name on it on the DTR rack is untenable in light of the
certification by the DENR-NCR Chief of the Personnel Division that petitioner
was provided his DTR forms for the months in issue on the DTR rack. Said explanation is also specious considering
that petitioner could have easily asked for a DTR form from the Personnel
Division, should there be none on the DTR rack.
If petitioner was actually reporting
for work, given that he was already ordered to return to work by respondent in
her Memorandum of 1 June 2000, the more rational course of action for
petitioner would have been to immediately refute that he had been absent, make
sure that respondent and his immediate supervisor see him within office
premises performing his assigned tasks, and diligently submit his DTR
thereafter. It is beyond our
comprehension why petitioner, faced with a serious charge of being AWOL, continued
with the practice which may have gotten him into trouble in the first place –
refusing to submit his monthly DTR and, as alleged by him, signing only the employee
security logbook.
Neither is there enough
proof to show that the signature “Andy P.” refers to petitioner. We cannot accept on face value petitioner’s
allegation that the signature “Andy P.” pertains to him in the absence of other
proof that indeed such is the signature and appendage petitioner has been using
for the last ten years.[32] We
note that petitioner’s name is Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr., and there is utter lack
of rationalization as to why his personal signature would bear a different name
such as “Andy P.” Assuming it were true
that petitioner is known among DENR-NCR employees to be “Andy P.” and that he
actually uses this signature in his office transactions, then he would have had
numerous possible pieces of evidence to present to support such a
contention. Petitioner could have easily
provided additional testimonies or affidavits from his officemates at the
DENR-NCR to prove his contention that “Andy P.” and Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr. are
one and the same person. He could have
also procured copies of official documents from his office, such as his
personal data sheet or statement of assets and liabilities, showing that he
actually signed the same as “Andy P.”
Given the obvious adverse consequence he would have to face by his
failure to establish such a fact, petitioner once again acted contrary to
reason by relying on the security logbook and his self-serving allegation that
the “Andy P.” therein was his signature, instead of presenting readily accessible,
objective and independent evidence in support thereof.
While
petitioner claims respondent did not put the authenticity of the employee
security logbook entries in question, the records of the case reveal otherwise. As respondent argues, “we beg to disagree
that we did not put the authenticity of the logbook entries in question,
because it was even first raised in the Motion for Reconsideration with the
CSC-NCR and subsequently discussed under letter A, Arguments and Discussion of
the Memorandum of Appeal.”[33] Accordingly, respondent actually puts in issue
the authenticity of the aforementioned logbook entries. In her Motion for Reconsideration filed before
the CSC-NCR, respondent avers that “the same has no basis in fact and in truth,
the alleged entries in the logbook can be entered by anybody.”[34]
Lastly, the fact that petitioner was
issued his disbursement voucher for his salary for the period 1-31 May 2000
does not necessarily prove that he had reported for work during the entire
period. It is important to note that
petitioner had an approved leave of absence from 8-10 May 2000. We also take
notice of the fact that reasonable time is needed for the Personnel Division to
coordinate with the Accounting Division of the same office for the withholding
of the salary of an employee for any reason.
This is more so when the non-payment of salary is due to unauthorized
absences because the employee’s salary is released by the end of the month,
just about the same time when the employee is required to submit his DTR for
the said month. It is not uncommon for salary
that is improperly paid to be merely deducted from the employee’s salary for
the following month. Neither can the
said voucher negate petitioner’s continuous unauthorized absence for 30 days in
the succeeding months of June and July 2000, for which reason he was dropped
from the rolls.
The dearth of evidence presented by
petitioner astounds us, considering that if petitioner were truly present at
the office during the contested period, then he could have so easily proven the
same by presenting testimonies of officemates who had seen or interacted with
him during those days or his work output during the period such as work-related
documents which bear his signature and date of signing. Apart from stating that there was no
deliberate malice in his absences, as he had a family problem at the time the
absences were incurred, and in giving a copy of dubious entries in the employee
security logbook, petitioner presented little evidence to refute the AWOL
charge against him. Unfortunately,
petitioner chose to build his case around the questionable entries in the employee
security logbook and mostly self-serving allegations.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds
that except for the period 8-10 May 2000 for which petitioner was granted an
approved leave of absence, petitioner had been absent without authorization
beginning 2 May 2000, the entire months of June and July 2000, and up to 1
August 2000 when respondent issued her second Memorandum. The evidence
presented and legal presumptions applicable herein support the conclusion that petitioner
incurred continuous absences of more than 30 days.
Now we proceed with a discussion of petitioner’s
assertion that he was not properly served a copy of respondent’s Memoranda
dated
Petitioner alleges that he was never
served the first Memorandum dated
It is not true that [petitioner
herein] did not report for work in compliance with the Return to Work Order
dated
Based on
the afore-cited, petitioner may not now deny receipt of the above
Furthermore, we have already
recognized that a government employee who is on AWOL may be dismissed without
prior notice.[36]
The
provisions of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,[37] Series
of 1999, are clear and leave no room for interpretation. A civil service officer or employee who is
continuously AWOL for at least 30 working days shall be separated from the
service or dropped from the rolls without
need of any prior notice. The said
Memorandum Circular only requires that the employee be informed of his
separation from service not later than five (5) days from its effectivity and
sent to the address appearing on his 201 file or to his last known address,
which respondent complied with by her issuance of the second Memorandum dated 1
August 2000.
But
petitioner denies being served the second Memorandum dated
Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s
unauthorized absences are not continuous and are less than 30 days, he may
still be dropped from the rolls by reason thereof, after compliance with the
requirement set forth in section 2b, Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
15, Series of 1999, which reads:
If the number of unauthorized
absences incurred is less than thirty (30) WORKING
days, a written Return-to-Work order shall be served on the official or
employee at his last known address on record. Failure on his part to report for work within
the period stated in the order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the
rolls.
Respondent’s
first Memorandum dated
Now, we proceed to address
petitioner’s argument that he was not properly informed that he was being
dismissed for his continued absences in June and July 2000, for respondent’s 1
August 2000 Memorandum refers only to his absences during the previous months
of April and May 2000. We disagree with
petitioner because a cursory reading of respondent’s 1 August 2000 Memorandum,
particularly the first paragraph thereof, would reveal that respondent noted
petitioner’s absence and refusal to submit his DTRs for the months of April to
July 2000, thus:
Please
be informed that per Memorandum of the Regional Executive Director dated
It is very
clear from the foregoing that petitioner, from April 2000 up to the time of the
Memorandum’s writing on 1 August 2000, had not yet submitted any DTR, reported
back to work, or informed respondent of his interest/disinterest to return to
work. Although petitioner contends that he had submitted his
DTRs for April and May and that the two DTRs are in the possession of the
Personnel Records Division of the DENR-NCR, it behooves this Court to wonder
why there was no attempt by petitioner to provide copies thereof as evidence. Petitioner could have easily provided us a
copy of the aforementioned DTRs he allegedly submitted by securing copies thereof
from the Personnel Records Division. Without supporting evidence, petitioner’s contention that he
had submitted his DTR’s for April and May is, once more, declared self-serving
and deserves scant consideration.
Anent respondent’s allegation that
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission was
filed out of time, petitioner argues that the reglementary period of 15 days
within which to file does not apply inasmuch as there was no sufficient notice
and valid service thereof effected upon petitioner. Petitioner’s assertion is delusive. Under
Section 80 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a
decision of the CSC or Regional Office shall be immediately executory after 15
days from receipt thereof unless a motion for reconsideration[39]
is seasonably filed.
As
has been extensively discussed in the preceding paragraphs, there was proper
service on petitioner of the first and second memoranda. Thus, petitioner’s
argument on this ground must fail. The registry receipt shows that a certain
Rudy Palecpec received the
This
Court has indeed, in several instances, pronounced that the rules on
technicality can be brushed aside in order to serve the ends of substantial
justice.[40]
Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the findings of the Court of Appeals as
to the validity of his removal from service due to AWOL are in accordance with
law and the records of the case.
Our Constitution enshrines the policy that “public office is
a public trust [and all] public officers must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency.”[41] Public office therefore is given utmost regard,
and the highest standards of service are expected from it. We have categorically pronounced that “the
nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the 1987
Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law are not mere rhetorical words,
not to be taken as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and
attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds.”[42]
Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the government, provides measures to ensure compliance with these
working standards and goals. With respect to unauthorized absences, “the Civil
Service Law provides that frequent or habitual unauthorized absences shall be
ground for disciplinary action.”[43]
As this Court has held in the case of Talion v. Ayupan[44]:
[C]ivil service employees who are absent for
at least 30 days without leave are considered absent without leave (AWOL) and
shall be dropped from the service after due notice. The notice contemplated by this rule is not
jurisdictional in nature and failure to give such notice by the appropriate
government office does not prevent the dropping of the employee concerned from
the government service. Staying away
from one’s regular employment in the government or remaining on leave without
proper approval is something that an employee can hardly be unaware of.
Time and again, this Court has made
the pronouncement that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for
public office shall not be countenanced.[45] Absence without leave for a prolonged period
of time constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service
and justifies the dismissal of an employee and the forfeiture of benefits with
prejudice to re-employment in the government[46] since it is an
established fact that frequent unauthorized absences cause inefficiency in the
public service.
Hence,
in this case, the dismissal of petitioner for being AWOL carries with it the
attendant penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in government service.[47]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari and AFFIRM the
Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
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ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
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ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate
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DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
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CANCIO
C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
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PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los
[2] CA
rollo, p. 213.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] This is to remind you that you
have been absent since
Be informed that under Section
63 of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 14, S. 1999, “an employee who has
been continuously absent for at least thirty (30) WORKING DAYS shall be considered
absent without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or
dropped from the rolls without prior notice.”
In view thereof, you are hereby
ORDERED to Return to Work within five (5) days upon receipt hereof and file the corresponding leave application for
the days you were absent. Further, you
are required to submit your original Daily Time Record (DTR) card for the month
of April to the Personnel
Section within the same period of time aforestated.
For strict compliance under pain
of penalty as maybe sanctioned by existing laws, rules and regulations on the matter.
(CA rollo, p. 54.)
[10] CA rollo, pp. 59-61.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Public
Respondent’s Comment (to the Petition for Review on Certiorari) dated
[17] Public
Respondent’s Comment dated
[18] CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999.
Pertinent provisions read:
Section 71.
Complaint or Appeal to the Commission. – Other personnel actions, such
as, but not limited to separation from the service due to unsatisfactory
conduct or want of capacity during probationary period, dropping from the rolls
due to Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL), physically and mentally unfit,
unsatisfactory or poor performance, action on appointments (disapproval,
invalidation, recall and revocation), reassignment, transfer, detail,
secondment, demotion or termination of services, maybe brought to the
Commission, by way of an appeal.
Section 72. When and Where to File. – A decision or
ruling of a department or agency appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil Service
Commission-Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the
same period, a motion for reconsideration maybe filed with the same office
which rendered the decision or ruling within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
[19] Petitioner’s
name is Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr.; petitioner’s father is deceased.
[20] Page
6, Comment dated
[21] CSC
Resolution No. 01-0962, dated
[22] CA rollo, p. 179.
[23] Rollo, p. 46.
[24] Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128305, 28 March 2005, 454 SCRA 17, 29; Towne & City Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135043, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 356, 360; Lanuza v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 147372, 27 May
2004, 429 SCRA 562, 569.
[25] Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321, 31
March 2005, 454 SCRA 593, 606; Traverse
Development Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
150888, 24 September 2004, 439 SCRA 83, 93.
[26] Imperial v. Jaucian, G.R. No. 149004,
[27] Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124814, 21 October 2004, 441 SCRA 96, 101-102; Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao, G.R. No. 144458, 14 July 2004,
434 SCRA 404, 413-414; MEA Builders, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121484, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 155,
165-166; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 226
Phil 496, 511-512 (1986); Samala v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 130826, 17 February 2004, 423 SCRA 142, 146.
[28] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Estate of
Pureza Herrera, G.R. No. 149836, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 107, 123.
[29] CA rollo, p. 37.
[30] In the last paragraph of the
affidavit executed by Manuelita C. Jatulan, incumbent designate Assistant Regional Executive Director
(ARED), Administrative Services of DENR- NCR
and direct supervisor of petitioner, she states:
“That this affidavit is issued
to attest to the truth of the foregoing that Mr. Rudy Palecpec had continuously
been absent for more than thirty (30) working days since June 1-30, 2000 and
July 1-31, 2000 as reflected in his said Daily Time Record (DTR) cards without
submitting any required leave application/s for the said months; neither did he
signify his intention to report for work and perform his assigned
duties/functions as Head of the Internal Audit Division (IAD) or as member or
the RED’s Chief of Staff, although it would appear that he allegedly enter
(sic) isolated entries his attendance in the logbook on June 15, June 21, July
12, and July 24, 2000 during the time he visited the Office, but did not render
actual services thereof.” (
[31] Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3, on disputable presumptions, reads:
The
following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x
x x x
(m)
That official duty has been regularly performed.
[32] As
allegedly signed by petitioner in Annexes V, W, X, Y, Z, AA to the Petition for
Review; rollo, pp. 135-140.
[33] As
cited in Resolution No. 059758 dated
[34] Motion
for Reconsideration dated
[35] Taken
from Annex P (petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration to DENR-NCR dated
[36] Petilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150792,
[37] Section
2A, Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999:
Section
2. Dropping from the Rolls. Officers
and employees who are either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory or poor
performance or have shown to be physically and mentally unfit to perform their
duties may be dropped from the rolls subject to the following procedures.
a.
An officer or
employee who is continuously absent without approved leave (AWOL) for at least thirty
(30) WORKING days shall be separated
from the service or dropped from the rolls without
prior notice. He shall, however, be
informed of his separation from the service not later than five (5) days from
its effectivity which shall be sent to the address appearing on his 201
Files or to his last known address. (Italics
ours.)
[38] The
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3, provide:
Disputable presumptions – The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
x x x x
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail.
[39] Section 80. Execution of Decision
– The decisions of the Commission Proper or its Regional Offices shall be
immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, in which case the execution of
the decision shall be held in abeyance. (Velasco
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160991,
Additionally, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the
Organization of the Civil Service Commission
in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and
Functions and for Other Purposes) states under Section 39 thereof the following:
(a)
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days
from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is
seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. x x x.
(b)
x x x Provided, That only one petition for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
Moreover,
pertinent provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999
provide:
Section
71. Complaint or Appeal to the Commission.
– Other personnel actions, such as, but not limited to separation from the
service due to unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity during probationary
period, dropping from the rolls due to Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL),
physically and mentally unfit, unsatisfactory or poor performance, action on
appointments (disapproval, invalidation, recall and revocation), reassignment,
transfer, detail, secondment, demotion or termination of services, maybe
brought to the Commission, by way of an appeal.
Section
72. When and Where to File. – A
decision or ruling of a department or agency may be appealed within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil
Service-Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the same
period.
A
motion for reconsideration may be filed with the same office which rendered the
decision or ruling within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
[40] Nerves v. Civil Service Commission, 342
Phil. 578, 584-585 (1997); Siguenza v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44050,
[41] Loyao v. Manatad, 387 Phil. 337, 344 (2000).
[42] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124261,
[43] Talion v. Ayupan, 425 Phil. 41, 52
(2002).
[44]
[45] Loyao v. Manatad, supra note 41.
[46]
Caña v. Gebusion, 385 Phil. 773, 786 (2000); Masadao, Jr. v. Glorioso, 345 Phil. 861, 864 (1997).
[47] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, supra note
42; CSC Resolution No. 991936 as per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, series
1999 provides for the following administrative disabilities inherent in certain
penalties:
a. The
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.