EN BANC
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PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - RAUL CENAHONON, Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 169962 (Formerly G.R. No. 157022) Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: July
12, 2007 |
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NACHURA, J.:
Before
us is the Decision[1] dated
June 3, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Decision[2]
dated October 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City,
Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 99-248, both finding accused Raul Cenahonon
(Cenahonon) and Ranilo Erdaje (Erdaje) guilty of kidnapping for ransom and
imposing upon them the death penalty.
The
case arose from the Information[3]
dated
That on or about November 25, 1999 in Parañaque City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by force and intimidation, and with the use of a gun, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive KENNETH MEDINA of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting money as in fact a demand for money was made as a condition for his release.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon
arraignment, both accused pled "not guilty." Thereafter, Erdaje escaped from detention and,
thus, was tried in absentia.
The facts, as
established by the prosecution evidence, are as follows:
On
The maid of
the Medinas, who saw the incident, immediately reported to Fortunato, then
descending from the house, what happened.
Fortunato tried to intercept the CRV at the village gate, but failed. He returned home and called Daisy at their
office in Alabang,
Meanwhile, inside
the CRV, both accused informed Magaway that they would call the P5 million ransom. Upon reaching Las Piñas City, the former
ordered Magaway to alight.[6]
Magaway proceeded to
Around P5,000,000.00 for
Kenneth's release. A PAOCTF member
instructed Fortunato to negotiate. The
caller made several calls that same afternoon to negotiate for the ransom.
At about P100,000.00. He
instructed Fortunato to put the money in a black plastic bag and give it to
Magaway who would then turn it over at
Sr. Inspector
Edgar Allan Okubo (Okubo) of the PAOCTF and his team placed the boodle money
inside a black plastic bag and gave it to Magaway. Magaway proceeded to the appointed place
aboard a Tamaraw FX vehicle (Tamaraw FX) of the Medinas, driven by a PAOCTF
operative. Two teams were dispatched to
follow the Tamaraw FX. Okubo led one
team while Sr. Inspector Loreto Delelis (Delelis) led the other.[10] Both teams parked their unmarked vehicles in
front of the McDonald's restaurant beside
At around
The PAOCTF
operatives pursued the Gemini to a house in Barangay
Molino, Bacoor,
Okubo informed
Alamag that they were searching for kidnap victim Kenneth Medina who probably
was the same child Erdaje was looking for.
Okubo asked Alamag to cooperate and tell them what she knew.[15] Alamag acceded and narrated that that
morning, Erdaje requested her to allow the boy to stay for some time because
his friend Cenahonon, allegedly the child's father, and the latter's wife were
fighting over the boy's custody. She
refused but advised Erdaje to bring the boy to her mother's house in Trece
Martires. When Erdaje asked her to
accompany him, she obliged. On their way
to
Alamag
volunteered to accompany the PAOCTF team to her mother's house.[17] When they arrived there, Delelis' team had
already surrounded the area.[18] The Gemini was parked alongside the carnapped
CRV nearby. The operatives then raided
the house, safely rescued Kenneth, and arrested Erdaje and Cenahonon. The team took them to their office in
The next day,
As sole
witness for the defense, Cenahonon testified that, around
In its
Decision[22]
dated
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding Raul Cenahonon and Ranilo Erdaje GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 particularly the penultimate paragraph thereof, with reference to Kidnapping committed for the purpose of extorting money from the victim or any other person, both accused are hereby sentenced to the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law specifically Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Clerk of Court is directed to
prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of Raul Cenahonon to the New
Bilibid Prisons,
SO ORDERED.[23]
This case was
elevated for automatic review to this Court and originally docketed as G.R. No.
157022. The Public Attorney's Office
(PAO) filed an appellants' brief for both Cenahonon and Erdaje.[24] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the People of the
In
a Resolution[27] dated
October 12, 2004, this Court transferred the records of the case to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition pursuant to People of the Philippines v.
Efren Mateo[28]
which modified
Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule
125, all of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, and allowed intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals.
Upon
review, the CA rendered its Decision[29]
dated
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[30]
Upon
elevation of this case back to this Court, now docketed as G.R. No. 169962, the
parties were directed to file their respective supplemental briefs within thirty
(30) days from notice, if they so desired.[31] The People, thru the OSG, moved that its
brief already filed be adopted as its supplemental brief.[32]
However, only Cenahonon, thru the PAO, prayed that appellants' brief filed
earlier be adopted as his supplemental brief.[33]
It
must be remembered that Erdaje escaped from jail after his arraignment. The trial court tried him in absentia,
found him guilty of the crime charged together with Cenahonon, and likewise
sentenced him to death. While it appears
that Cenahonon is the lone appellant in this case, this Court, in line with its
ruling in People v. Esparas[34]
and in subsequent similar cases,[35]
is mandated by law to automatically review the conviction and the death
sentence imposed on both Cenahonon and Erdaje, and promulgate the appropriate
judgment. As the brief drafted by the
PAO was initially filed for both accused, the Court will also consider the same
with respect to Erdaje. Further, as the
entire case is thrown open for scrutiny, it is the duty of this Court to
correct any error, if any, that may be found in the judgment under review,
whether or not an appeal brief is filed, and if there is, whether or not such
error is assigned.
Thus, for review is the following assignment
of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
Cenahonon assails the credibility of prosecution witnesses Jometh Magaway and Elizabeth Alamag. He points to certain inconsistencies which, according to him, discredit their testimony.
Firstly, Cenahonon claims that Magaway, on direct examination pointed to him as the person who approached him, poked a gun at him, demanded that he transfer to the front passenger seat, and drove the CRV away from the Medina residence; but, on cross-examination, testified that it was Erdaje, the person who collected the money from him, who poked the gun at him, demanded his transfer, and drove the vehicle with the boy.
Secondly,
Cenahonon points out that Alamag testified that she voluntarily accompanied him
and the boy to her mother's house and was not threatened by her uncle, Erdaje,
but she also affirmed the contents of her affidavit wherein she stated that her
uncle threatened her.
The argument
does not persuade.
As correctly
observed by the OSG and as found by the CA, the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimony of Magaway are more apparent than real. Indeed, Magaway committed a mistake in
identifying the person who poked the gun at him and drove the CRV away with the
child. Noteworthy is that, on re-direct
examination, he was able to explain the apparent inconsistency, and correct the
mistake in this wise:
Q: Mr. witness, in your answer in this
transcript of stenographic notes dated
A: Because Fiscal Macapagal mentioned the name, sir. I only knew them by their faces kaya nalilito po ako.
Q: And you said also that the one who is not present here in court was the one who poked a gun at you and the one who drove the car. Now, while that person was driving the car, did you come to know where he placed the gun that was poked on you?
A: He handed it to his other companion, sir.
Q: And that companion or that person is not present in court, is he present in this office?
ATTY. OCTAVA:
Your Honor please, matters that have to be taken by during re-direct examination are matters that have been taken up during the cross-examination. And these matters were not taken up during the cross-examination, your Honor.
STATE PROS. MACAPAGAL:
It is material, your Honor, because there was a mistake committed by the witness on identifying who poked the gun and drove the car because I mentioned, this representation happened to mention the name of the accused which he did not know. Now, I'm clarifying the matter by making the witness point to that person who was then the companion of the one who is not present in court, for the clarification of the Honorable Court.
ATTY. OCTAVA:
By the way, your Honor, I have vividly asked the witness a while ago that if that statement he made before was not true and he affirmed, your Honor. He affirmed that he was lying.
STATE PROS. MACAPAGAL:
No. There was no affirmation that he was lying. It is just that he committed a mistake because this representation mentioned the name which he did not know.
COURT:
May answer.
A: Yes, ma'am. He is here.
STATE PROS. MACAPAGAL:
Q: Will you please point to him?
A: Siya po. (Witness pointed to a person who, when asked his name, answered Raul Cenahonon).
Q: And what did that person whom you pointed do to the gun?
A: He poked the gun at the left portion of my waist, sir.
Q: So the one who poked the gun on you while you were already on board the car and that the one who is not present was driving the car away is the person whom you just identified here in court?
A: Yes, ma'am.[36]
What Magaway made was an honest mistake
that does not destroy his credibility as a witness. Even the most truthful witness can commit
errors, but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect his
credibility. The testimonies of
witnesses must be calibrated in their entirety, not merely by their truncated
portions or isolated passages.[37]
Similarly, the
truthfulness of Alamag's testimony is not affected by the alleged inconsistency
as to whether she was threatened or not by her uncle (Erdaje). The discrepancy is of such a minor nature
that it does not belie the occurrence of the abduction of Kenneth Medina by
Cenahonon and Erdaje. In fact, such
trivial inconsistencies even serve to strengthen the case of the prosecution as
they erase suspicion of a rehearsed or perjured testimony.[38]
In this case,
both Magaway and Alamag proved to be credible witnesses as there was nothing to
show that they were actuated by any ill motive to testify against Cenahonon and
Erdaje. Hence, the presumption that
these witnesses were not moved by improper motive or bias, and thus, entitled
to full faith and credit, holds.[39]
On the
other hand, Cenahonon interposed the
defenses of alibi and denial, stating that he was merely coerced to take care
of Kenneth and that he met Erdaje for the first time at
Magaway and
Kenneth identified both Cenahonon and Erdaje as the kidnappers in a police line-up the day
following the kidnapping.[40] Following the "totality test rule"
laid down in People of the Philippines v. Teehankee,[41]
this out-of-court identification is admissible and reliable. Indeed,
Magaway had sufficient time to familiarize himself with Cenahonon and Erdaje
when he and Kenneth were taken on board the CRV, and more so with Erdaje when
the latter collected the boodle money from him.
There was a short interval of time between the abduction on
During trial, however, only
Cenahonon was positively identified by Magaway, as Erdaje had already escaped
from prison.
An affirmative testimony merits
greater weight than a negative one, especially when the former comes from a
credible witness. Categorical and
positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the witness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial,
which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law
unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[43]
In this case, Cenahonon's version
that he was forced to take care of the kidnap victim is simply unbelievable. For testimony to be believed, it should not
only come from a credible witness but must also be credible in itself.[44]
It would be inconceivable that kidnappers would entrust the performance of an
essential and sensitive phase of their well-planned scheme to people not in
collaboration with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of
their reprehensible plan.[45] Cenahonon’s narrative even strengthens the
prosecution’s case, as it partakes of an admission that he participated in
depriving the child of his liberty.
Cenahonon also points out in the
reply brief that it was incredulous for him and Erdaje to release Magaway after
the latter had seen their faces.
According to him, it is unnatural for criminals to risk their identification.[46]
The contention lacks merit. Following this line, if they were careful not
to risk identification, then they should have worn masks in the first
place. What occurred, and as was proven
during trial, was not improbable or unnatural.
It should also be remembered that
Erdaje escaped from prison after he was duly arraigned. His flight can only be indicative of his
guilt. Flight means the act of evading
the natural course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid
arrest, detention, or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings. In jurisprudence, it has
always been a strong indication of guilt betraying a desire to evade
responsibility.[47] It is hardly consistent with a claim of
innocence.[48]
In
fine, there is no showing that the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would warrant
the reversal of the conviction. Further,
the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is binding
and conclusive on appeal because the trial court had the opportunity to
evaluate conflicting testimonies and observe the demeanor of witnesses while on
the stand.[49]
As
regards the issue of conspiracy, the prosecution has proffered sufficient
evidence that Cenahonon and Erdaje had unity of purpose in the perpetration of
the kidnapping for ransom of Kenneth Medina.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[50] While it is mandatory to prove it by
competent evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy – it may
be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.[51]
Cenahonon
and Erdaje were shown to have clearly acted towards a common goal – to abduct
Kenneth Medina and to extort ransom from his family. It was Erdaje who drove the CRV while
Cenahonon poked a gun at Magaway from the back seat. They took Kenneth to Alamag in Molino,
Bacoor,
The
elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267[52]
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 7659
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, are as follows: (a) intent on
the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual
deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which
is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.[53] Neither actual demand for nor payment of
ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that the deprivation of
liberty was for extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.[54]
Based on the
evidence proven during trial and as above discussed, the elements of the crime
were present. Necessarily, the assailed
decisions should be affirmed. However,
with the advent of R.A. 9346,[55]
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, Cenahonon and Erdaje should be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties
and without eligibility for parole under Act 4103,[56]
as amended.
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated October 20, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 99-248 of the RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque City, finding Raul
Cenahonon and Ranilo Erdaje guilty of kidnapping for ransom of Kenneth Medina,
and the Decision dated June 3, 2005 of the CA, affirming in toto the
Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED.
On Cenahonon and Erdaje is imposed, in lieu of the death penalty by
lethal injection, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
appurtenant accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole.
Pursuant to Section 4 of R.A. 9346, in
relation to Article 83 of the RPC, let the records of this case be forwarded to
the President of the
Costs against appellant Cenahonon.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
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CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
(On Leave) ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
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|
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 157022), pp. 15-19.
[3] Records, pp. 1-2.
[4] TSN,
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8] TSN,
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11]
[12] TSN,
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] TSN,
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 157022), pp. 15-19.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 169962), p. 2.
[28] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 169962), pp. 3-19.
[30]
[31] Order dated
[32] OSG's Manifestation and Motion for Leave to Adopt Brief as Supplemental Brief, id. at 21-23.
[33] Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), id. at 25-27.
[34] 329 Phil. 339, 347 (1996) (Resolution); 354 Phil. 342 (1998) (Decision). Citing U.S. v. Laguna, et al. (17 Phil. 533 [1910]), the Court held that the power to review a decision imposing the death penalty remains automatic and mandatory and cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. In this case, the accused has absconded.
[35] Please see People v. Latayada, 467 Phil. 682 (2004); People v. Abes, 465 Phil. 165, 180 (2004); People v. Ferrer, 454 Phil. 431, 451 (2003); People v. Oranza, 434 Phil. 417, 424 (2002); People v. Palabrica, 409 Phil. 618, 627 (2001); People v. Aquino, 385 Phil. 887, 899 (2000); People v. Raquiño, 374 Phil. 283, 292 (1999); and People v. Prades, 355 Phil. 150, 160 (1998).
[36] TSN,
[37] Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 149802, 150320, 150367, 153207 & 153459, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 1, 39; People v. Castillano, Sr., 448 Phil. 482, 506-507 (2003).
[38] People v. Salimbago, 373 Phil. 56, 65 (1999).
[39] People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 87 (2003).
[40] TSN,
[41] 319 Phil. 128, 180 (1995). See also People v. Arellano, 397 Phil. 307, 322 (2000). "In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure."
[42] People v. Bacungay, 428 Phil. 798, 811 (2002).
[43] People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos.
153573-76,
[44] People v. Garin, G.R. No. 139069, June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 394, 407; People v. Giganto, Sr., 391 Phil. 169, 183 (2000).
[45] People v. Bacungay, supra note 42, at 814-815.
[46] Rollo (G.R. No. 157022), pp. 116-117.
[47] People v. Otayde, 462 Phil. 309, 323 (2003); People v. Cueto, 443 Phil. 425, 436 (2003); People v. Prades, supra note 35, at 164-165.
[48] People v. Raquiño, supra note 35, at 298.
[49] People v. Andales, 466 Phil. 873, 887 (2004).
[50] Revised Penal Code, Article 8, 2nd paragraph.
[51] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159556, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 236,
258; People v. Felipe, 463 Phil. 518, 553-554 (2003); People v.
Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198, 238 (2003).
[52] Art. 267. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another or in any manner deprive him of his liberty shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted for more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person detained or kidnapped shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or public officer.
The penalty of death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. x x x
[53] People v. Bisda, 454 Phil. 194, 234 (2003).
[54] People v. Salimbago, supra note 38, at 75.
[55] An Act Prohibiting Death Penalty in
the
[56] Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[57] Sec. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication of at least once a week, for three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommended for communication or pardon: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)