Republic of the
Supreme Court
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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G.R. No. 169869 |
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Appellee, |
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Present: |
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PUNO,
C.J. |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO-MORALES, |
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AZCUNA, |
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TINGA,
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
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GARCIA, VELASCO,
JR., and NACHURA,
JJ. |
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PEDRO DELIMA, JR., |
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Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
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July
12, 2007 |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 16, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00464, affirming the conviction of accused Pedro Delima,
Jr. (appellant) of the crime of Parricide, imposing upon him the penalty of
death, and ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P15,000.00 as
temperate damages.
The Information filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81,
The
undersigned accuses PEDRO DELIMA, JR. of the crime of PARRICIDE, committed as
follows:
That
on or about the 13th day of September, 2000 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one LOURDES MERINO, his wife, by then and
there stabbing her with a bladed weapon hitting her on the body, thereby
inflicting upon her serious and grave wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said LOURDES MERINO, herein represented by ISABEL L. MAKABENTA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial ensued.
The bodies of evidence for the prosecution and the defense are aptly summarized in the Decision of the CA as follows:
The accused-appellant Pedro Delima, Jr. and
the victim Lourdes Merino were married in 1999 in the
Six-year
old Melissa Makabenta testified that after her mother
(Isabel) left their house to sell sampaguita in the early
morning of
Another
prosecution witness Isabel Makabenta – Melissa's
mother and sister of the victim – claimed that she left the house at 5:30 in
the morning of September 13, 2000 to sell sampaguita
at Don Antonio Heights, leaving her two children behind with her sister Lourdes
and her husband [herein accused-appellant].
When she returned before
Isabel
thereafter saw her daughter Melissa give a statement
at the police station. She (Melissa)
later informed her that the accused-appellant killed her aunt.
Police
Senior Inspector Michael Maunahan, a medico-legal
officer of the Central Police District Crime Laboratory of Camp Crame, conducted a post-mortem examination on the
victim. He testified that the stab wound
on the left chest pierced the left lung and the heart of the victim. The necropsy examination report states:
“POST-MORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly
developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor mortis with post-mortem lividity on posterior portion of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Nailbeds and lips
are cyanotic.
HEAD AND NECK:
1. Stab wound, right zygomatic
region, measuring 1 x 0.2 cm, 8.2 cm anterior midline, 2 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards, medialwards,
piercing the underlying soft tissues and nicking the zygomatic
bone
2. Incised wound, right mental region, measuring 5 x 0.5
cm., 1.5 cm
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death: Hemorrhagic shock secondary
to a stab wound on the trunk.”
The
accused-appellant raised the defenses of alibi and denial. He testified that he and his wife
On direct examination, he admitted that he killed his wife. He claimed on cross-examination, however, that the police threatened him into admitting the crime. He further stated that Melissa, his wife's niece, had no grudge against him and that she had no reason to falsely testify against him.[3]
The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Parricide penalized under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua
and ordered him to pay P25,000.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court but per
Resolution dated
On
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 convicting Pedro Delima, Jr. of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to the
penalty and the awarded damages. The
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to
pay the amount of P50,000.00 as CIVIL
INDEMNITY, MORAL DAMAGES in the amount of P50,000.00 and P15,000.00
as TEMPERATE DAMAGES.[5]
The
CA ruled that (1) the element of relationship between the appellant and
the victim had been admitted by appellant and set forth in the stipulation of
facts in the Pre-Trial Order[6] dated September 4, 2001; (2)
six-year old Melissa, who categorically and positively identified appellant as
the killer, is a credible witness; and (3) treachery attended this case and the
same should be considered as an aggravating circumstance, calling for the
imposition of the graver penalty of death.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
On
Appellant assigned the following as errors of the trial
court:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF PARRICIDE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE ACCCUSED-APPELLANT TO PAY ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P25,000.00 IN SPITE OF THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE.[7]
Mainly, appellant argues that there are inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which undermine their credibility, i.e., (1) Melissa categorically stated that her uncle left when her aunt woke up after the hands of the latter were injured; then, she later stated that her uncle stabbed her aunt many times which resulted in the latter's death;[8] (2) Melissa could not remember issuing a statement to the authorities but her mother, Isabel, testified that she saw Melissa affix her thumbmark on the sworn statement given to authorities;[9] (3) Isabel was already suspicious of appellant before the incident happened because “tahimik siya at pailalim ang tingin,” but she also testified that before she left at 5:30 in the morning on the day the victim was killed, appellant was merely lying in bed;[10] and (4) Isabel first said that the only information given to her by her neighbors was that the body of her sister was brought to Camp Karingal, but later, she added that the neighbors also said it was appellant who killed her sister.[11] Appellant also pointed out that Melissa admitted that her mother, Isabel, had been talking to her about the case and what she would say in court.[12]
The other argument raised by appellant is that he should not be made to pay actual damages, as prosecution witness Isabel admitted that she did not spend for the victim's burial as they were given financial aid.
After a judicious review of the record, the Court agrees with the CA that the prosecution evidence has established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A thorough examination of the transcripts of stenographic notes reveals that there are no real inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Melissa's testimony is not necessarily contradictory. The prosecutor only had to question her further to ferret out and clarify some of the details of the horrifying event. This is completely understandable, considering that she was merely six years old at the time that she was put on the witness stand. She testified thus:
Q - Now you said that your Tita Lourdes was sleeping when she was stabbed by your Tito
Pedro, after your Tita woke-up, what did Tito Pedro
do?
A - She was injured at the hands.
Q - Who was injured in the hand?
A - The hands of my Tita
Lourdes was injured by my Tito Pedro.
Q: What
did your Tita do after she woke-up after (sic)
and after she was stabbed by Pedro?
A: When
my Tita Lourdes woke up, my Tito Pedro left.
Q: Where
did your Tito Pedro go?
A: He
left but he did not tell us.
Q: How
many times did your Tito Pedro stab your Tita Lourdes?
A: Many
times, sir.
Q: And
what happened to your Tita Lourdes after she was
stabbed many times by Tito Pedro?
A: When
Pedro left, he told me to close the door and do not leave the house.
COURT: Ang tanong ng Fiscal ang sagutin
mo.
A: She
died.
Q: So,
after your Tito [sic]
A: He
left the house, sir.
x
x x x[13]
(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It is a hornbook doctrine that the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not by truncated portions or isolated passages thereof.[14] Evidently, the totality of Melissa's testimony positively and convincingly shows that there is no real inconsistency.
Moreover, in People v. Lorenzo,[15] the Court held that it is quite understandable for a very young witness to make errors or make inconsistent statements when they are testifying. The Court explained thus:
Apparently, Lea erred when on redirect examination,
she failed to mention that the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. However, such circumstance
should not discredit her and her testimony.
It must be stressed that Lea was barely four years old when she was
raped and when she testified. She could
not be expected to understand every question asked of her in the course of
examination. Ample margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to Lea who, much more than adults, would be
gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience of testifying before
a court.
Error-free
testimony cannot be expected, most especially when a witness is recounting
vivid details of a harrowing experience, one which even an adult would like to
bury in oblivion. x x x Also, the Court cannot impose the burden of
exactness in the victim's recollection of her harrowing experience, more so in
this case where the victim was barely four years old.[16]
In the present case, six-year old Melissa also had a very harrowing and shocking experience when she witnessed the violent act of her uncle stabbing her aunt. Thus, the same leniency and consideration given to the young witness in People v. Lorenzo should also be granted to Melissa. Her seemingly inconsistent statements should be calibrated in their entirety so as to extract the facts established by the testimony of such child witness. The lower court committed no error in relying on the testimony of Melissa.
As to the fact that Melissa could not remember issuing a statement to the authorities but that her mother, Isabel, testified that she saw Melissa affix her thumbmark to the sworn statement given to authorities, Melissa's failure to recall can again be easily attributable to her tender age. Thus, there is a great possibility that she was not able to fully comprehend the question when she was asked whether “she gave a statement to the police,” and if she was “invited by the policeman.”[17] Human experience would tell us that such a young child, who has never experienced dealing with police matters, would have great difficulty understanding just exactly what “giving a statement or a salaysay,” or being “invited by policemen” means. The Court finds no inconsistency between Isabel's statement that when she left her house early in the morning, appellant was still lying in bed; and her observation that at that time, appellant was “tahimik” and “pailalim tumingin.”[18] As correctly observed by the CA, “[s]ince the accused-appellant was already awake at the time, it was not impossible for Isabel to have observed his behavior before she left the house to sell sampaguita.”[19]
There is likewise no reason to uphold
appellant's asseveration that Isabel's statement had discrepancies. Isabel supposedly said that the only
information given to her by her neighbors was that the body of the victim, her
sister, was brought to
If at all, Isabel's testimony refers only to collateral matters. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters – not to the central fact of the crime – do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of a witness as long as it is coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.[21]
With regard to the issue that Melissa admitted that her mother talked to her regarding the case and on what she would say in court, the CA is right when it held that “communication between mother and child are not unusual, nor is the communication between witness and counsel prior to trial. In our view, these communications, even if they did transpire, cannot amount to objectionable ‘coaching’ in the absence of details of what had been communicated.”[22] On cross-examination, the defense only asked the following questions regarding the alleged “coaching”:
Q: Now,
before you sat there, who was your companion in coming to this Court?
A: My
mama (mother).
Q: Have
you been talking with your mother about this case?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Regarding
this case?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Have
your mother been telling you what to say in this court?
A: Yes, sir.[23]
Unfortunately, counsel failed to ask further questions to find out what Melissa’s mother told her to say in court. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the child's entire testimony is merely a product of what her mother told her to say in court.
Moreover, a reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that Melissa testified in a spontaneous, straightforward, unwavering manner even during cross-examination, which gives the Court no reason to overturn the trial court's finding as to her credibility.
Appellant's weak defense of alibi cannot stand a chance against the declaration of Melissa identifying him as the killer and describing the manner in which he perpetrated the crime. Appellant himself admitted that Melissa, his niece, bore no grudge against him, nor had he offended her.[24] As held in People v. Mangitngit,[25] to wit:
x x x The settled jurisprudence is that categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying thereon, prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, as in the case at bar, constitute self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[26]
Appellant's uncorroborated claim that
he was in
The crime of parricide is punishable
by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. To determine the proper penalty to
be imposed, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when in the commission of
the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
Undoubtedly, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. In Andrada
v. People,[27]
the Court held that there is treachery where the attack is so sudden and unexpected
that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend
himself. Verily, nothing can be more
sudden and unexpected as when a husband starts stabbing his wife while she is
asleep, and then repeatedly stabbing her when she has awakened, as what
happened in this case. Therefore, in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the CA, when it rendered its
Decision on
However, on
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is
hereby prohibited. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred
Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty-Nine (R.A.No. 7659) otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following
shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
x
x x x
SECTION 3.
Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Accordingly, the penalty of death imposed on appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
As to the damages awarded, the Court finds that the CA correctly deleted the trial court's award of actual damages but erred in awarding temperate damages. It should be noted that Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate or moderate damages may be awarded when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. In this case, Isabel testified thus:
FISCAL AGCAOILI: (To Witness)
Q: Now, did you incur expenses in
connection with the wake and funeral of your sister
A: Yes sir.
Q: How much did you spend?
A: P25,000.00,
sir.
Q: Do you have receipt to prove that indeed
you incurred that expenses for the wake and
funeral of your sister
A: I do not have my receipts sir because somebody
helped me in shouldering the expenses for the intern (sic) of my sister.
x x
x x
CROSS EXAMINATION
OF
WIT. ISABEL MAKABENTA
ATTY. AMDENGAN: (To Witness)
x x
x x
Q: About this P25,000.00
you mentioned, you said this amount has no receipt, is that correct?
A: None sir.
Q: In other words when you said that
somebody helped you in the burial of your sister, is that correct?
A: Yes sir.
x x
x x
Q: You mentioned about the P25,000.00 for the funeral services but you did not give any
amount of that P25,000.00, is that correct?
A: I did not give any amount, sir. [29] (Emphasis supplied)
With Isabel's own admission that she did not give any amount, it is quite clear that no expenses were incurred by the victim's family for the burial and wake. Thus, there is no basis for the award of temperate damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
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ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Associate
Justice |
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ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C.
GARCIA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
[1] Penned by former Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion (now Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment) and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (now
retired) and Eliezer R. de Los Santos (now
deceased); rollo,
pp. 3-22.
[2] Records, p. 1.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 104-107.
[4] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[5] Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[6] Records, p. 33.
[7] Brief for the Accused-Appellant, CA rollo, p. 39.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14] People v. Mahinay, 462 Phil. 53, 69 (2003); People v. Gusmo, 467 Phil. 199, 212 (2004).
[15] 460 Phil. 37 (2003).
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] CA Decision, rollo, p. 14.
[20] TSN,
[21] People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos.
153573-76,
[22] Supra note 19.
[23] TSN,
[24] TSN,
[25] G.R. No. 171270,
[26]
[27] G.R. No. 135222,
[28] People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No.
171271,
[29] TSN,