THIRD
DIVISION
|
BRIGIDO B. PAREDES, Petitioner, - versus - THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and BERNARDINO TELOREN, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 169534 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,*
JJ. Promulgated: |
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For resolution is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Brigido B. Paredes, seeking the reversal
of the Decision[1] dated 15
October 2004 and Resolution[2]
dated 20 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71928, which
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner and denied reconsideration thereon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Orders
dated
Culled
from the records are the following salient facts:
Petitioner
is the Municipal Treasurer of Ubay,
On
Check No. Date of Issue Amount
1) Check No.
046000 P23,280.00
2) Check No.
020601 P23,280.00
3) Check No.
020617 P22,067.50
4) Check No.
081406 P24,317.90
5) Check No.
081408 P19,589.15
6) Check No. 081407 P24,317.90
7) Check No.
081409 P 9,726.51
TOTAL
P 146,578.96[5]
The checks appeared to have been
encashed by private respondent as borne by his signatures appearing at the back
thereof. However, private respondent
refuted the genuineness of his signatures, disclaimed his encashment of the
checks, and alleged that the
Hence, on
In
his Answer,[7] petitioner
denied the allegations, and by way of an affirmative defense, alleged that the
subject checks were already in the hands of private respondent as shown by the
disbursement vouchers which covered the issuances of the checks. According to petitioner, such documents bear
private respondent’s signatures evincing his acknowledgment and acceptance of
the payments corresponding to each of the subject checks.
In
a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause to indict the respondent for seven (7) counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, penalized under Articles 315 and 172 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, let the corresponding informations be filed with the proper court. [8]
Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) through Graft Investigation Officer I Alvin Butch
E. Cañares filed seven separate informations[9] for
Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document (under Article 315[10]
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 171[11]
of the same Code) against petitioner with the RTC, where they were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531.
Meanwhile,
on
Unconvinced,
petitioner sought reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Resolution of
Hence, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Review, under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, to
assail the Ombudsman’s ruling in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0536. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59124.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition for review is herby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Ombudsman, dated
The Court of Appeals found that substantial
evidence was wanting to establish petitioner’s participation in the alleged
fraudulent encashment of the subject checks.
A contrario, it held that petitioner
adequately explained why his signatures were affixed on the subject checks. It hypothesized:
[P]etitioner had
sufficiently explained the appearance of his signatures on the subject seven
(7) checks, as representatives of the respondent would come to him, after he
had issued the payment[s] [in the form of] checks, and [had] ask[ed] that he
rediscount the said checks. He would
then deposit [the] amounts in the municipality’s [account] [with] the
Development Bank of the
In fine, the Court of Appeals opined that the evidence demonstrates
that the private respondent had received the subject checks.[18] They were already in his hands and control
when the alleged unlawful acts of the petitioner occurred.[19]
The
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon,
but the appellate court did not depart from its assailed ruling.[20] It filed before this Court a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 151066, but
the same was dismissed for non-compliance with the rule on the reglementary
period to file the petition.[21]
Subsequently,
on
On
The Ombudsman Prosecutor, invoking the Supreme Court rulings in Tan v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 353 and in Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 641, argued that the investigation then being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on the criminal case for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Documents, on the one hand, and its administrative adjudication [of] the administrative charge for Dishonesty were entirely independent proceedings; the results in one could not conclude the other and therefore the dismissal of the administrative case does not necessarily foreclose the matter of possible liability, if warranted, of the accused in the criminal case.
In Ceferino Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court ruled:
“That one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability (underlined for emphasis).”[23]
The RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding the Ombudsman Prosecutor’s argument, supported as it is by the aforecited Supreme Court rulings to be tenable and noting further the manifestation from the private prosecutor that in this criminal case the prosecution will adduce evidence that it had failed to adduce in the administrative case, this Court resolves to deny the [petitioner]’s motion to dismiss, notwithstanding the information given the Court by the [petitioner] in its supplement to the motion to dismiss that the Supreme Court had denied [respondent’s] motion for extension to file before the Supreme Court his petition for review on certiorari (of the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals).[24]
Unfazed, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the
Petitioner thereafter sought recourse
before the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71928, to annul the 10 April 2002
and the 11 June 2002 Orders of the RTC in Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531.
The Court of Appeals was not
persuaded. It rendered a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly,
the April 10, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch
52 as well as its June 11, 2002 Order, are AFFIRMED.[28]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration
of the Decision, but it was denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in
a Resolution dated
Hence, the present Petition where
petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals in issuing the questioned Decision of
Petitioner rehashes before this Court
the argument that he buttressed before the court a quo and the appellate court.
The kernel of his contention is that the
continuation of the criminal proceedings against him in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531 is an exercise in futility;
hence, these cases must be dismissed. He
argues that as his liability in the administrative case against him was not
established by substantial evidence, so will his criminal case necessarily
fall, demanding as it does, a heavier quantum of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly,
the instant Petition must fail.
It is indeed a fundamental principle
of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal
actions for the same act or omission.[29] Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is
not a bar to an administrative prosecution,
or vice versa.[30] One thing is administrative liability;[31] quite another thing is the criminal liability
for the same act.[32]
Verily, the fact that the required
quantum of proof[33] was not
adduced to hold petitioner administratively liable for falsification, forgery,
malversation, grave dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a public officer in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0536 does not ipso facto mean that Criminal Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531 filed
against petitioner for Estafa
through Falsification of a Commercial Document before the RTC should be dismissed. The failure to adduce substantial evidence
against petitioner in the former is not a ground for the dismissal of the
latter. These two cases are separate and
distinct; hence, independent from each other.
First, the
quantum of evidence required in an administrative case is less than that
required in a criminal case.[34] Criminal and administrative proceedings may
involve similar operative facts; but each requires a different quantum of
evidence. Administrative cases require
only substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[35] In contrast, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-525 to 99-531, respondents are required to
proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure petitioner’s conviction. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Sec.
2. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
Thus, considering the difference in
the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.[36] Notably, the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in
the criminal cases. The prosecution is
certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence to discharge the
burden of proof required in the criminal cases.
Significantly, the prosecution had manifested that it would present testimonial
evidence which was not presented in the administrative case.
Second, it is
well settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and
related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as
well as administrative liability.[37] As such, they may be prosecuted
simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the accused
in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.[38]
In the instant case, we find once again
an occasion to apply the foregoing rule, and with more reason, as petitioner
does not herein place at issue the question of double jeopardy. The independent character of OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0536 from Criminal Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531
cannot be more obvious. The facts are
telling. The former is an administrative
charge of dishonesty constituting grave misconduct against petitioner. This sprung from his alleged fraudulent
encashment of the subject checks. On the
other hand, the latter involved seven separate criminal charges against
petitioner for the crimes of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial
Document as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 171[39] of the
same Code. In these cases, the
prosecution seeks to establish the gravamen
of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document and to show that the
petitioner committed the aforesaid crimes by taking advantage of his official
position. Hence, the seven separate
Informations filed against petitioner, corresponding to the seven checks, criminally
charges petitioner in the following tenor, thus:
That
on or about the 17th day of January, 1996, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Ubay, Province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [petitioner],
a public officer, being the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Ubay,
Bohol, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
taking advantage of his official position, with deliberate intent, with intent
to defraud and falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a Commercial Document, consisting of a Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) Checks bearing No. xxx, Tagbilaran Branch, in the amount
of xxx, payable to [private respondent], by affixing a signature at the back of
the said check, thus making it appear therein that the said check was signed
and endorsed by [private respondent] or his representative, thereby
counterfeiting or feigning the signature of [private respondent] and causing it
to appear that persons participated in an act, when they did not in fact so
participate, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well know that [private
respondent] did not affix his signature on said check, nor endorsed the same
nor did he give authority to any representative to sign and endorse said check,
and that such was only a scheme for herein accused to be able to get hold of
the amount of xxx as once the said check was falsified, herein [petitioner]
encashed the same and once in possession of the amount of xxx, with deliberate
intent, with intent [to] gain, did, then, and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and convert
to his own personal use and benefit said amount of xxx, Philippine Currency,
despite demands made upon him to account for said amount, he has failed to do
so, to the damage and prejudice of [private respondent].[40]
As it is, the dismissal of the
administrative case against petitioner cannot be implored as basis for the
dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against him.
In Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division,[41] we pronounced:
As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the
subject of the administrative complaint.
Petitioner’s
assertion that private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is
unacceptable. The investigation then
being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the
inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are
entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude
the other. Thus an absolution from a
criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the
Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1) or vice versa. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conversely, we have also ruled that the
dismissal of the criminal case is not per
se a bar to administrative sanctions[42]
when called for by the malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance of a public
officer.[43] To paraphrase, dismissal of the criminal case
does not foreclose administrative action involving the same facts.[44]
Finally, we agree with the People
that the ground raised by petitioner, which is the dismissal of his administrative
case, does not per se exonerate the
criminal action. As aptly cited, Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides the manner in which criminal
liability is totally extinguished, does not contemplate the case of the
petitioner, thus:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
Evidently, the right of the
prosecution to present evidence as it finds necessary and relevant to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531 must be respected. The aforesaid cases must be allowed to
proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of the administrative case filed against
the petitioner in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0536.
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 52 of
Talibon,
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
No Part
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* No
part. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura was Solicitor General when
respondent People of the
[1] Penned by former Associate Justice
Elvi John S.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon
M. Bato, Jr. with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Vicente L. Yap,
concurring; id. at 226.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Irma
Zita V. Masamayor; id. at 143-144.
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, pp. 2-3.
[7]
[8] Rollo, pp. 62-65; penned by Graft Investigation Officer I Alvin Butch E. Cañares with the recommending approval of Graft Investigation Officer III Virginia Palanca-Santiago and Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo C. Mojica.
[9]
[10] Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code punishes the act of swindling or estafa.
[11] Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who
shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
[12] Rollo,
pp. 66-69.
[13] The dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE,
finding the respondent guilty of grave misconduct, the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM SERVICE AND FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS is entirely imposed. (
[14]
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo
V. Cosico with Associate Justices Eubolo G. Verzola and Eliezer R. delos
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] People
v. Judge Toledano, 387 Phil. 957, 964 (2000).
[30] Tan
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112093,
[31] Paredes,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709, 730 (1996).
[32]
[33] In Barillo v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155088,
Administrative cases are, as a
rule, independent from criminal proceedings.
The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an
administrative case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative
proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because unlike in criminal cases
which require proof beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of proof required in
administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
[34] Carlos
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 105293,
[35] Lumiqued
v. Exevea, 346 Phil. 807, 829 (1997); Office
of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 338 Phil. 28, 38 (1997); Mariano v. Roxas, 434 Phil. 742, 749
(2002).
[36] De
la Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera
Administrative Region, 464 Phil. 1033, 1050 (2004), citing Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 114683, 18 January 2000, 322 SCRA 17, 22.
[37] Paredes,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note
31.
[38]
[39] Falsification by public officer, employee, notary or ecclesiastic minister.
[40] Rollo,
pp. 79-99.
[41] Supra note 31.
[42] In Barillo v. Gervacio, supra note 33 at 573, the Court cited an exception to this rule, which, however, finds no application to the case at bar for salient differences in factual and legal circumstances; hence:
In Larin v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 112745, 16 October 1997, 280
SCRA 713, 728], we held that where the very basis of the administrative case
against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on
set aside by this Court upon a clear and categorical finding that the acts for which
he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the
acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the
dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case,
there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative
suit.
[43] Hipolito
v. Mergas, A.M. No. P-90-412,
[44] De
la Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera
Administrative Region, Supra note
36 at 1049.