THIRD
DIVISION
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PHILIPPINE COMPUTER SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Pasig City, Br. 158, and WINEFRIDA MANZO, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 168776
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by petitioner Philippine
Computer Solutions, Inc. assailing (1) the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81351 dated 30 September 2004 affirming
the Order[2]
dated 8 December 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
158, in Civil Case No. 68524, denying petitioner’s Motion for the Issuance of a
Commission to Depose its witnesses abroad, and (2) the Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals dated
Petitioner
was incorporated on
The
Complaint alleged that Condol previously withdrew his participation in the
business of petitioner but continued to remain as an incorporator and
shareholder thereof. Petitioner
subsequently discovered that Condol had been engaging or is continuously
engaged in business in its behalf both in the
Of the four defendants named in the SEC
complaint, only Manzo filed an Answer as well as a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint. It appears that the SEC
failed to serve summons on the rest of the defendants since they can no longer be
found in their respective last known addresses.
The SEC heard Manzo’s Motion to Dismiss on
Before petitioner could serve summons by publication,
Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies to the regular courts, took effect. Consequently, the pending dispute was
transferred, initially to the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 11, and later to the RTC
of Pasig City, Branch 158, where it was docketed as SEC Case No. 68524.
In compliance with the trial court’s
Meanwhile, petitioner served written interrogatories upon
Manzo. After initially objecting
thereto, the latter filed her answer and, likewise, moved for the resolution of
her pending Motion to Dismiss.
For their failure to file an Answer notwithstanding valid
service of summons by publication, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare the
non-participating defendants in default.
It also filed a Motion dated 16 September 2003[6]
for the Issuance of a Commission to take the deposition in Australia of a
corporate officer of PeopleSoft Australia regarding the details of the foreign
corporation’s transactions with defendants; as well as that of Bergen, one of
petitioner’s incorporators and stockholders, who was then in the United States.
Manzo filed an Opposition to the motion to which petitioner
countered with a Rejoinder.
In an Order dated
The assailed RTC order reads:
Lastly,
[herein petitioner’s] Motion for Issuance of Commission is DENIED. It is clearly a circumvention of Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
for Intra-Corporate Controversies which provides that “a party can only avail
of any of the modes of discovery not later than fifteen days from the joinder
of issues.” From the very beginning,
[petitioner] has already alleged that defendant [Manzo] usurped its corporate
powers and rights when they transacted business with PeopleSoft
[Petitioner]
cannot properly find solace in the cases of
Fortune Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 108119, January 19, 1994), Republic v. Sandiganbayan (G.R No. 112710,
However,
none of these cases resolved the issue of whether or not deposition may be
accepted by the Court in lieu of direct testimony of the witness, especially so
when the party could have taken such deposition at the earliest possible
opportunity and within the period prescribed by law, but failed to do so. This Court then finds no cogent reason to
allow the [petitioner] to avail of any of the modes of discovery beyond the
period prescribed by the Interim Rules.[7]
Further in its Order[8]
dated 7 March 2003, the trial court clarified that “for purposes, therefore, of
reckoning the limited period to avail of any of the modes of discovery under
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure governing intra-corporate
controversies, there is deemed to have been a joinder of issues as of 3 July
2002 or immediately after the period for the respondents to file their Answer
has lapsed. Petitioner, therefore, had
until
From this Order of the RTC,
petitioner sought recourse before the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals did not issue the restraining order or
injunction prayed for; thus, the trial court continued with the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 68524.[9]
As earlier adverted to, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the Petition and affirmed the Order of the RTC. Rationalizing its decision, the Court of
Appeals stressed that the issues in the case had been joined as early as
Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated
Aggrieved, petitioner comes to this Court by way of Petition
for Review raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD SET BY SECTION 1 RULE 3 OF THE INTERIM
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSIES APPLIES TO DEPOSITION THAT
IS RESORTED TO AS A METHOD OF PRESENTING THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT A DEPOSITION AS A MODE OF DISCOVERY CAN ONLY BE
ADDRESSED TO AN ADVERSE PARTY AND NOT TO A WITNESS; THE DEPOSITION SOUGHT BY
PCSI IS A MODE OF PRESENTING THE TESTIMONIES OF ITS OWN WITNESES, NOT TO ELICIT
FACTS FROM THE ADVERSE PARTIES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD MANDATED UNDER SECTION 1 RULE 3 OF
THE INTERIM RULES INCLUDED A DEPOSITION AS A MODE OF PRESENTING THE TESTIMONY
OF A PARTY’S WITNESS, BECAUSE IT HAS RENDERED NUGATORY THE DUAL FUNCTION OF A
DEPOSITION.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF PCSI’S RIGHT TO PRESENT THE TESTIMONY OF
ITS WITNESSES ON A MATTER WHICH IS VERY MATERIAL AND RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
BEING LITIGATED; THE SAME IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF PCSI’S RIGHT TO BE
HEARD, RESULTING TO GRAVE INJUSTICE.[11]
It is petitioner’s stand that the Court of Appeals
committed a gross misapprehension of the 15-day reglementary period under Rule
3, Section 1 of the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies, which
reads:
RULE 3
MODES OF DISCOVERY
SECTION
1. In
general. – A party can only avail of any of the modes of discovery not
later than fifteen (15) day from the joinder of issues.
According to the petitioner, the 15-day reglementary period
mandated under Rule 3 of the Interim Rules pertains to a deposition resorted to
as a mode of discovery. It does not
apply when the deposition is resorted to by a party as a means of presenting
the testimony of its witnesses, as in the instant petition.[12] Petitioner submits that since the deposition
sought by it is resorted to as a means of presenting the testimony of its
witness, the 15-day period under Rule 3, Interim Rules, does not apply. Instead, the general rule under the Rules of
Court should be applied.[13]
Petitioner also relies on Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals[14] to
strengthen its claim that the Rules of Court and not the Interim Rules applies. According to petitioner, said case enumerates
two uses of deposition. First, deposition
as a mode of discovery where the Interim Rules on intra-corporate controversies
applies. Second, deposition as a mode of
presenting testimony where the Rules of Court applies. The significant portion of Fortune cited by the petitioner is
hereby reproduced in part:
[U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function
of a method of discovery – with use on trial not necessarily contemplated – and
a method of presenting testimony.
Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been
placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to
circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever
practicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
Essentially, petitioner questions the correctness of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial by the trial court of
petitioner’s motion to take the deposition of its witnesses for having been
filed beyond the period allowed by the Interim Rules governing intra-corporate
controversies.
Specifically, petitioner sought to take (1) the deposition
testimony of Peoplesoft
The testimony of the responsible officers of Peoplesoft
Australia is, as claimed by petitioner, indispensable in proving its claims
against Manzo and her other co-defendants especially as to the income and the
other corporate opportunities they derived from Peoplesoft Australia, which
rightfully belonged to the petitioner, but were transferred to Condol
International.
On the other hand, the testimony of Ralph Bergen, one of
the incorporators and stockholders of the petitioner and who is already based
in the United States, is necessary because he has personal knowledge of the
facts as alleged by the petitioner in its Complaint. Petitioner cites the exorbitant cost and the
impracticability of requiring the personal testimonies of its witnesses before
the trial court here in the
This Court notes that during the pendency of the instant
Petition, specifically on
Petitioner, however, informs this Court that from the
Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 68524, it filed a Notice of
Appeal which the trial court denied in its Order dated 7 February 2007 on the
ground that under A.M. No. 04-9-07 SC,[19]
all decisions in cases falling under the Interim Rules shall be appealable by
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and not by ordinary
appeal. Petitioner alleges that it had
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals which is still pending
before said court at this time.[20]
It
is not disputed that a Decision in the main case, SEC Case No. 68524, has
already been rendered. While the Court
of Appeals has yet to act on petitioner’s Petition for Review, it is this
Court’s view that the issue has become moot and academic. An issue becomes moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical use or value.
In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief which petitioners
would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts of justice generally
decline jurisdiction in said cases and no longer consider questions in which no
actual interests are involved.[21]
It must be emphasized that the underlying reason for the
instant Petition is to allow the petitioner to take the depositions of its
witnesses, Mr. Ralph Bergen and any of the responsible officers of Peoplesoft
The Complaint of the petitioner in the main case before the
RTC prayed that judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Declaring
Null and Void Ab Initio the “Trustees’ Certificate” and the “Affidavit of Loss”
as well as any and all corporate acts done or conducted on the basis thereof;
2. Enjoining
the defendants solidarily, from using the name PCSI in all their business
dealings and from representing themselves as officers thereof;
3. Directing
the defendants solidarily to render and submit an accounting of all business
transactions undertaken by the defendants on behalf or in representation of
PCSI. x x x And thereafter, all of the
Defendants herein shall be directed solidarily to turn over said moneys,
rights, choses-in-action to Plaintiff PCSI;
4. Directing
the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following
amount:
4.1. Actual
damages of not less than TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS or as may be
proved during trial;
4.2. Moral damages of not less than ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS;
4.3. Exemplary
damages of not less than ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS;
4.4. Attorney’s
fees of not less than TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P250,000.00) PESOS or
as may be proved during trial;
4.5. Actual
litigation expenses of not less than ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS or as may be proved during the trial.
This prayer of the petitioner in its Complaint was
substantially heeded by the trial court in its decision in the main case. The dispositive portion of the Decision of
the trial court in SEC Case No. 68524 reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
1. Declaring
both the Trustees Certificate executed by defendants Rizalito Condol, Adorima
Lisama and Winefrida Manzo for plaintiff and the Affidavit of Loss executed by
defendant Winefrida Manzo and all other acts performed on the basis thereof as
null and void;
2. Enjoining
defendants from using plaintiff’s name in their dealings, absent proper
authorization from the plaintiff, and from representing themselves as officers
of plaintiff;
3. Directing
defendants Rizalito Condol and Adorima Lisama to pay plaintiff:
a. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as temperate damages;
b. Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages;
c. One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and
d. Costs
of suit.[22]
From a quick reference to the Decision of the trial court
in SEC Case No. 68524, it is readily apparent that the trial court had already
granted the prayer of petitioner in its Complaint. In other words, petitioner prevailed in the
court a quo. As can be seen from the complaint of the
petitioner and the RTC decision, the underlying prayer of the petitioner in its
Complaint had been granted in the decision of the trial court. In a very real sense, therefore, the RTC has
already granted what the petitioner had asked for in its Complaint.
Even more, during the hearings before the trial court, Mr.
Ralph Bergen had already personally testified, hence, foregoing any need for
taking his deposition.[23]
Considering the trial court’s Decision dated
Furthermore, the Order dated
In Investments, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals[26] -
A “final” judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the
merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata
or prescription. Once rendered, the task
of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court
except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an
appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once
it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final
and executory.”
x x x
x
Conversely,
an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory,” e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time
to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or
things, etc. Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be
taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
Since a Decision has already been rendered by the trial
court in SEC Case No. 68524 on 27 December 2006, then the Order of the same
court dated 8 December 2003 denying petitioner’s motion to take deposition,
being an interlocutory order, should have been included and raised in the
petition for review filed by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals.
In Go v. Court of
Appeals,[27]
the Court adverted to the hazards of interlocutory appeals:
It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be
challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has
been held that “the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment on the merits,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the `sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and
from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an
error in any of its interlocutory rulings.
x x x.
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure,
to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all
such orders may be contested in a single appeal.[28]
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Portia Aliño- Hormachuelos and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman, concurring; rollo, pp. 173-186.
[2] Penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez, pp. 166-169.
[3] Rollo, pp. 212-213.
[4] CA rollo, p. 27.
[5] In its Complaint (CA rollo, p. 33), petitioner also alleged
that defendants also transacted business with PeopleSoft
[6] CA rollo, p. 83.
[7] Rollo, pp. 168-169.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 144-145.
[9] Rollo, p. 282.
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 291-292.
[12]
[13] The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court are hereby quoted:
Rule 23
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. – By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of [13]the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any peson, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
Rule 24
DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR
PENDING APPEAL
SECTION 1. Depositions before action; petition. – A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines, may file a verified petition in the court of the place of the residence of any expected adverse party.
Rule 25
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
SECTION 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof. – Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf.
Rule 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
SECTION 1. Request for admission. – At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
[14] G.R. No. 108119,
[15] CA rollo, pp. 91-92.
[16]
[17] Penned by Presiding Judge Maria
Rowena
[18] Rollo, p. 340.
[19] The RTC Order states:
The
Notice of Appeal filed by the plaintiff on
The
specific provision under A.M. No.
1. All
decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of
Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable
to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. (A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC,
[20] Rollo, p. 286.
[21] Vda.
de Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.116526,
[22] Rollo, p. 374.
[23]
[24] II Herrera, Remedial Law (2000 Ed.), p. 527.
[25] Black’s Law Dictionary (Fifth Ed.), p. 731.
[26] G.R. No. L-60036,
[27] G.R. No. 128954,
[28] II Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW (2000 Ed.), p. 527.