THIRD DIVISION
|
LEAH
M. NAZARENO, CARLO M. CUAL, ROGELIO B. CLAMONTE, FLORECITA M. LLOSA, ROGELIO
S. VILLARUBIA, RICARDO M. GONZALES, JR., ROSSEL MARIE G. GUTIERREZ, NICANOR
F. VILLAROSA, JR., MARIE SUE G. CUAL, MIRAMICHI MAJELLA B. MARIOT, ALMA F.
RAMIREZ, ANTOLIN D. ZAMAR, JR., MARIO S. ALILING, TEODULO SALVORO, JR.,
PHILIP JANSON ALTAMARINO, ANONIETTA PADURA, ADOLFO R. CORNELIA, IAN RYAN
PATULA, WILLIAM TANOY, VICTOR ARBAS, JEANITH CUAL, BRAULIO SAYSON, DAWN M.
VILLAROSA, AGUSTIN A. RENDOQUE, ENRIQUETA TUMONGHA, LIONEL P. BANOGON,
ROSALITO VERGANTINOS, MARIO T. CUAL, JR., ELAINE MAY TUMONGHA, NORMAN F.
VILLAROSA, RICARDO C. PATULA, RACHEL BANAGUA, RODOLFO CALUGCUGAN, PERGENTINO
CUAL, BERNARD J. OZOA, ROGER JOHN AROMIN, CHERYL E. NOCETE, MARIVIC SANCHEZ,
CRISPIN DURAN, REBECO LINCGONG, ANA LEE ESTRABELLA, MELCHOR B. MAQUILING,
RAUL MOLAS, OSCAR KINIKITO, DARWIN B. CONEJOS, ROMEL CUAL, ROQUETA D. AMOR,
DIOSDADO B. LAJATO, PAUL E. PINO, LITO C. PIÑERO, RODULFO ZOSA, JR., and
JORGE ARBOLADO, Petitioners, - versus - CITY OF DUMAGUETE,
represented by Hon. Mayor AGUSTIN R. PERDICES, DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR.,
ERLINDA TUMONGHA, JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES, and ARACELI CAMPOS, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x REGINALD MANOLO CORDOVA
and OMAR SERION, Intervenors. |
G.R. No. 168484
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The facts
of the case are as follows:
Then incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo) and
Agustin R. Perdices (Perdices) were among the candidates for mayor in
After the elections but before
Perdices’ assumption, Remollo made fifteen (15) promotional appointments and
seventy-four (74) original appointments for various positions in the city
government. Said appointments were
reflected in the June 2001 Report of Personnel Actions (ROPA) of the city, that
was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSCFO)-Dumaguete.[4]
Soon after Perdices assumed office,
or on
Petitioners averred that the
appointments made by Remollo were valid, as they were issued pursuant to CSC
Resolution No. 992411 of the CSC Accreditation Program, which granted the City
of
In a letter[8]
dated August 1, 2001, Director Fabio R. Abucejo (Director Abucejo), of the
CSCFO, invalidated and revoked the questioned appointments as they were issued
in violation of the guidelines set forth by the CSC.[9]
On
On
However, it appears that petitioners
timely appealed Director Abucejo’s action to the CSC Regional Office No. VII,
In September 2001, Reginaldo Manolo
Cordova and Omar P. Serion separately filed complaints-in-intervention against
respondents predicated on causes of action similar to those of petitioners.[17]
On
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the
case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
Petitioners now come before this
Court in this petition for review on certiorari
raising the sole error:
Error
of Law: The January 30, 2004 decision of the Court of
Appeals (formerly 7th Division) and its May 6, 2005 Resolution,
grievously erred in effectively supporting the September 26, 2001 order of the
Regional Trial Court Branch No. 41 in Civil Case No. 13013 declaring as final and executory the ruling of the
then CSC Field Office Director Abucejo invalidating Petitioners’ and
Intervenors’ appointments, which supposed final
and executory ruling served as the trial court’s basis in permanently
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction and rendering the main case for
injunction in Civil Case No. 13013 moot
and academic. This is contrary to
law and justice, to evidence and facts.[26]
Petitioners insist that they have the
legal standing to appeal to the CSC themselves since they are the ones who
would suffer or benefit from the invalidation or validation of their appointments. To further support their claim, petitioners
cite CSC Resolution No. 011812 entitled In
the Matter of the Invalidation of the Appointment of Liza Quirog, and CSC
Resolution No. 00-2205 concerning the invalidation of the appointments of Ulysses
T. Jonggoy, et al., where the CSC allowed the appointees themselves to take
relief from the disapproval of their appointments as an exception to the rule
that only the appointing authority has the discretion to file appeals or
motions for reconsiderations.[27] In view of the foregoing and considering that
the CSC allowed the appeal made by the petitioners themselves, the injunctive
writ issued by the RTC should have remained, pending the determination of the
validity of their appointment.[28]
In their Comment,[29]
respondents contend that petitioners’ act of seeking relief from the regular
court and the CSC is a clear indication of forum shopping which is abhorred by
this Court.[30] A perusal of the pleadings filed by
petitioners before this Court on the one hand, and the CA, on the other, showed
that though they question different orders/decisions of different tribunals,
petitioners were just playing with words but their real intention was to get a
favorable decision on the same issue to suit their designs.[31] Respondents further assert that petitioners
are not entitled to damages in view of the illegality of their
appointment. Considering the earlier
ruling of the CSC invalidating their appointment, the courts cannot order them
to return to work for to do so would mean creating new employment which is
beyond its power to perform.
On the basis of the petitioners’
arguments and the respondents’ counter-arguments, the issues for resolution are
as follows: 1) whether or not the
petitioners have the legal personality to appeal the invalidation of their
appointment; and 2) whether or not petitioners are entitled to the writ of
injunction pending the final determination of the validity of their
appointment.
The
right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a mere
statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.[32] It is necessary that the same be instituted
by the party who is given such authority.
At this point, the concepts of “legal standing” and “real party-in-interest”
become relevant.
The
difference between “real party-in-interest” and “legal standing” has been
thoroughly explained by this Court in the cases of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission[33]
and Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,[34] in this wise:
Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are brought not by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence, the question in
standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
x
x x x
On
the other hand, the question as to “real party-in-interest” is whether he is
“the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment,” or the “party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
If legal standing is granted to
challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so
should petitioners be allowed to contest the nullification of their
appointment. Thus, petitioners have the
legal standing to challenge the act of the CSC.
Real party-in-interest, on the other
hand, is a concept in civil procedure and is expressly defined in the Rules of
Court[35]
as the one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled
to the avails of the suit. “Interest”
within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real
or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or
from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[36]
The question on who the real party-in-interest
is to challenge the invalidation of one’s appointment has been settled in the
case of Abella,[37]
where the Court held that both the “appointing authority” and the appointee may
question the disapproval of an appointment.
The appointing authority stands to be
adversely affected when the CSC disapproves an appointment. The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a
challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s discretion. He must, therefore, have the right to contest
the disapproval. Thus, Section 2,[38]
Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, Series of 1998, or the Omnibus Rules on
Appointment and Other Personnel Actions, is justified insofar as it allows the
appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal. [39]
Petitioners
in the instant case, would like this Court to settle who the “appointing
authority” is – is it the former mayor, who made the questioned appointments,
or the incumbent mayor, who at the time of the invalidation of the appointment
was the one holding the position? The
appointing power of the mayor or the local chief executive is set forth in
Republic Act (RA) 7160 or the Local Government Code.[40] The power to appoint is vested in the office
of the chief executive and not in the person occupying the position. The local chief executive exercises such
power in his official capacity. Applying
it in the present case, the appointing authority who had the right to assail
the invalidation of the appointment is the mayor occupying the position at the
time of the institution of the appeal and not the former mayor who made the
assailed appointment.
Although
the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is the real
party-in-interest to institute an appeal or motion to reconsider the
invalidation of an appointment, there is nothing to preclude the appointee from
taking the same course of action.[41] Aggrieved parties, including the Civil
Service Commission, should be given the right to file motions for
reconsideration or to appeal. The
appointee is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from
assuming the office in a permanent capacity.
Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is
obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him all the rights and
privileges of a permanent appointee.[42]
Clearly,
petitioners timely appealed the action of Director Abucejo to the CSC Regional
Office, to the CSC Proper and ultimately to the CA. In fact, the CSC, in Resolution 040932 (on
the appeal made by petitioners herein) recognized the right of the appointees
to assail the nullification of their appointment. The CSC pronounced[43]
that the appointees themselves may appeal the disapproval of their appointments
as when, at the time of the disapproval of their appointments, there is already
a new appointing authority.[44]
Therefore, at the time of the issuance of the RTC Order dismissing the petition
for injunction, Director Abucejo’s action had not yet become final and
executory in view of the timely appeal made by petitioners. It is thus error for the CA to affirm the
finding of the trial court that petitioners’ appeal did not prevent the earlier
decision from attaining finality because of lack of legal personality on the
part of the petitioners to institute the same.
This
notwithstanding, we affirm the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
earlier issued, and consequently, denying the issuance of a permanent writ of
injunction, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the RTC and the
CA.
The
Court notes that the petition for injunction filed by petitioners before the
RTC was premature. Petitioners initiated
the instant case prior to the “invalidation” of their appointment by the CSC. Records show that it was the act of then
incumbent Mayor Perdices when he announced that he would not recognize the
questioned appointments, that prompted the petitioners to file the petition
below. At that time, there was yet no
action taken by the CSC. It was only
after the filing of the petition that Director Abucejo invalidated the
appointments. After the invalidation,
still, petitioners could appeal, and in fact so appealed, to the CSC Regional
Office and to the CSC Proper. Clearly
then, petitioners had ample administrative remedies under the law to protect
their rights. Perforce, it was premature
for them to commence an action for injunction before the regular courts.
Moreover, in their petition before
the CA Cebu City, assailing CSC Resolution Nos. 040932 and 050472, petitioners
specifically prayed that the implementation of said resolutions be stayed
pending appeal in the interest of justice and equity.[45] In that case, petitioners sought to enjoin
the execution of the CSC decision invalidating their appointment, which is the same
subject matter in the instant case. In
effect, we have a situation where a party is seeking the same relief from two
different fora. This is proscribed by
the Rules.
An
injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established:
1. The invasion of the right is material and
substantial;
2. The right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable;
3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.[46]
It must be stressed that injunction
is not designed to protect contingent or future rights, and as such, the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no
ground for an injunction. A clear and
positive right especially calling for judicial
protection must be established.[47]
It is beyond this Court’s authority
to rule on the validity of petitioners’ appointment as it is now the subject of
a petition for review before the CA,
Lastly, the Court would like to
emphasize the pronouncement made in the cases of Almeida v. Court of Appeals[49]
and Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos:[50]
[T]here is no power the exercise of which is
more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an
injunction. It is the strong arm of
equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction
is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be
granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is
fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.[51] [Emphasis supplied.]
As
earlier discussed, petitioners are given by law and related rules adequate
remedies to protect their rights and interests.
They have in fact made use of such remedies and there is thus no need to
pursue the separate case of injunction.
The law does not permit it and no emergency demands it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The January 30, 2004 Decision and
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Noel G. Tijam,
concurring; rollo, pp. 48-54.
[2] Rollo, p. 71.
[3] Penned by Judge Araceli S.
Alafriz, CA rollo, pp. 270-271, 294-295.
[4] Rollo, p. 74.
[5]
[6] CA rollo, pp. 20-32.
[7] The authority of the Mayor to
issue said appointments was embodied in a letter dated
[8] CA rollo, pp. 214-215.
[9] Specifically, the action of
Director Abucejo was based on the following findings of facts:
1.
There were a total 15 promotional appointments and 74
original appointments issued as reflected in the submitted ROPA for the month
of June 2001,
2.
There was only one (1) en banc meeting of the City
Personnel Selection Board (PSB) held on
3.
There were no minutes available on the deliberation of
the PSB of the 89 appointments listed in the ROPA as certified by the City
HRMO.
4.
There were no PSB statements certifying that there was
actual screening and evaluation done on all candidates for each position.
5.
The appointing officer of the 89 appointments was an
outgoing local official who lost during the
6.
The 89 appointments were all issued after the elections
and when the
[10] The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, pending the hearing of the main case, and
pursuant to Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue ordering and commanding respondent City of
Dumaguete, represented by Hon. Mayor Agustin R. Perdices from doing any acts or
issuing any orders dismissing/terminating/demoting herein petitioners either
actually or constructively, pending the final adjudication of this case.
Plaintiffs are each required to put up a bond
equivalent to their one month salary basic pay under their new appointments.
SO ORDERED. (CA
rollo, pp. 194-195).
[11] CA rollo, p. 194.
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo,
pp. 118-119.
[15] The CSC upheld the right of
petitioners, as appointees, to appeal the disapproval of their appointments if
their appointing authority is no longer in a position to appeal the same. The CSC nevertheless affirmed the invalidation
of the questioned appointments on the ground that they were “mass appointments”
which is prohibited by CSC Resolution No. 01-0988. The dispositive portion of the resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Leah
Medina-Nazareno, et al. is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. VII Decision dated February 14, 2002, affirming
the action of the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Dumaguete in
invalidating the appointments reflected in the June 2001 Report of Personnel
Action of Dumaguete City, which include those of Medina-Nazareno, et al., is AFFIRMED. However, those
appointees involved in a chain of promotions shall be automatically restored to
their former positions.
The Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. VII is directed to monitor the
implementation of this Resolution. (
[16] The case is docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 00665; id. at 134-149.
[17] Rollo,
p. 51.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 270-271.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the orders dated
SO ORDERED. (Rollo,
pp. 53-54.)
[23] Section 2. Request for reconsideration of, or appeal
from, the disapproval of an appointment may be made by the appointing authority
and submitted to the Commission within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt
of the disapproved appointment.
[24] Rollo,
p. 53.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Philippine
National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289, 293 (2002), citing University of the Philippines v. Civil
Service Commission, 228 SCRA 207 (1993).
[33] G.R. No. 152574,
[34] 460 Phil. 830, 895 (2003).
[35] Specifically Section 2, Rule 3 thereof; Miranda v. Carreon, 449 Phil. 285, 293 (2003).
[36] Dagadag
v. Tongnawa, G.R. Nos. 161166-67, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 437, 443-444; Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,
supra note 33, at 521; Mathay, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 378 Phil 466, 482 (1999).
[37] Abella,
Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at 521-522.
[38] See
note 23.
[39] Abella,
Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at 518.
[40] Specifically Section 444 (v) which
provides:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation.
x
x x x
(v) Appoint all officials and
employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal
funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as
well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint;
[41] Hon.
Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, 456 Phil. 273, 291-292 (2003).
[42] Abella,
Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 33, at 521-522.
[43] Rollo, pp. 127-128.
[44] Citing CSC Resolution No. 01-1812
dated
[45] Rollo,
p. 147.
[46] Almeida
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159124,
[47]
[48] Civil
Service Commission v. Tinaya, G.R. No. 154898,
[49] Supra note 46, at 695-696.
[50] 353 Phil 740, 774 (1998).
[51] Citations omitted.