THIRD
DIVISION
|
EMILIO E. DIOKNO, VICENTE R. ALCANTARA, ANTONIO Z.
VERGARA, JR., DANTE M. TONG, JAIME C. MENDOZA, ROMEO M. MACAPULAY, ROBERTO M.
MASIGLAT, LEANDRO C. ATIENZA, ROMULO AQUINO, JESUS SAMIA, GAUDENCIO CAMIT,
DANTE PARAO, ALBERTO MABUGAT, EDGARDO VILLANUEVA, JR., FRANCISCO ESCOTO,
EDGARDO SEVILLA, FELICITO MACASAET, and JOSE Z. TULLO, Petitioners, - versus - HON. HANS LEO J. CACDAC, in his capacity as
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE, MANILA, MED-ARBITER TRANQUILINO
C. REYES, EDGARDO DAYA, PABLO LUCAS,
LEANDRO M. TABILOG, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, JOSE VITO, ANTONIO DE LUNA, ARMANDO
YALUNG, EDWIN LAYUG, NARDS PABILONA, REYNALDO REYES, EVANGELINE ESCALL,
ALBERTO ALCANTARA, ROGELIO CERVITILLO, MARCELINO MORELOS, FAUSTINO ERMINO,
JIMMY S. ONG, ALFREDO ESCALL, NARDITO C. ALVAREZ, JAIME T. VALERIANO, JOHNSON
S. REYES, GAUDENCIO JIMENEZ, JR., GAVINO R. VIDANES, ARNALDO G. TAYAO,
BONIFACIO F. CIRUJANO, EDGARDO G.
CADVONA, MAXIMO A. CAOC, JOSE O. MACLIT, JR., LUZMINDO D. ACORDA, JR., LEMUEL
R. RAGASA, and GIL G. DE VERA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 168475 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the nullification of the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83061, dated
The Facts
The First Line Association of Meralco
Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the
supervisory union of Meralco. Petitioners
and private respondents are members of FLAMES.
On
On
On
On
On
On
NAME POSITION
Emilio E. Diokno President
Vicente P. Alcantara Executive Vice President – External
Antonio Z. Vergara, Jr. Executive Vice President – Internal
Alberto L. Mabugat Vice-President – Organizing
Roberto D. Masiglat, Jr. Vice-President – Education
Leandro C. Atienza Vice-President – Chief Steward
Felito C. Macasaet Secretary
Edgardo R. Villanueva Asst. Secretary
Romulo C. Aquino Treasurer
Jesus D. Samia Asst. Treasurer
Gaudencio C. Camit Auditor
Rodante B. [Parao] Asst. Auditor
Jose Z. Tullo Central Coordinator
Bernardo C. Sevilla North Coordinator
Francis B. Escoto South Coordinator
On
On
Meanwhile, the records show that a
subsequent election was held on
The Decision of the Med-Arbiter
On
The Med-Arbiter noted in his decision
that during a conference which was held on 15 May 2003, the parties agreed that
the issue anent the qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and
academic.[17]
The Med-Arbiter reversed the disqualification
imposed by the COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al. He said that the COMELEC accepted all the allegations of
petitioners against private respondents Daya, et al., sans evidence to substantiate the same. Moreover, he found that the COMELEC erred in
relying on Article IV, Section 4(a) (6) of the CBL as basis for their
disqualification. The Med-Arbiter read
the aforesaid provision to refer to the dismissal and/or expulsion of a member
from FLAMES, but not to the disqualification of a member as a candidate in a
union election. He rationalized that the
COMELEC cannot disqualify a candidate on the same grounds for expulsion of
members, which power is vested by the CBL on the Executive Board. The Med-Arbiter also held that there was a
denial of due process because the COMELEC failed to receive private respondents
Daya, et al.’s motion for reconsideration
of the order of their disqualification.
The COMELEC was also found to have refused to receive their written protest
in violation of the union’s CBL.[18]
Lastly, the Med-Arbiter defended his
jurisdiction over the case. He concluded
that even as the election of union officers is an internal affair of the union,
his office has the right to inquire into the merits and conduct of the election
when its jurisdiction is sought.[19]
The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiter’s
Decision states, viz:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the [P]etition to Nullify the Order of Disqualification;
Nullify Election proceedings and counting of Votes; and Declare a Failure of
Elections is hereby granted. The
disqualification of [private respondent] Ed[gardo] Daya, et al., is hereby considered as null and void. Perforce, the election of union officers of
FLAMES on
The [P]etition to conduct an accounting of union funds and to stop the release of funds to [petitioner] Diokno, et al., is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
And the Petition to Declare [private respondents] Jimmy Ong, Alfredo [E]scall, Nardito Alvarez, and Jaime Valeriano as members of FLAMES is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
The [P]etition to Nullify the election filed by [private respondents] Gaudencio Jimenez, et al., is likewise ordered dismissed.[20]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an
appeal before the Director of the BLR.
The Ruling of the BLR Director
On
Public
respondent Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac ruled, inter alia, that the COMELEC’s reliance on Article IV, Section 4(a)
(6) of the CBL, as a ground for disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., was premature. He echoed the interpretation of the
Med-Arbiter that the COMELEC erroneously resorted to the aforecited provision which
refers to the expulsion of a member from the union on valid grounds and with
due process, along with the requisite 2/3 vote of the Executive Board. Hence,
the COMELEC cut short the expulsion proceedings in disqualifying private
respondents Daya, et al.[22] The BLR Director further held that the case
involves a question of disqualification on account of the alleged commission by
private respondents Daya, et al., of
illegal campaign acts, which acts were not specifically mentioned in the
guidelines for the conduct of election as issued by the COMELEC. Likewise, on the alleged refusal of private
respondents Daya, et al., to submit
to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by failing to file a petition to nullify its
order of disqualification, the BLR Director deemed the same as an exception to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus:
By themselves, such acts could not be taken as repugnant of COMELEC’s authority. Sensing that they were prejudiced by the disqualification order, it was only incumbent upon [private respondents Daya, et al.] to seek remedy before a body, which they thought has a more objective perspective over the situation. In short, they opted to bypass the administrative remedies within the union. Such a move could not be taken against [private respondents Daya, et al.] considering that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is justified in instances where it would practically amount to a denial of justice, or would be illusory or vain, as in the present controversy.[23]
The
BLR Director disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE,
the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision of Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, DOLE-NCR, dated
Let the records of this case be returned to the DOLE-NCR for the immediate conduct of election of officers of the First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) under the supervision of DOLE-NCR personnel.[24]
Subsequently,
petitioners sought a reversal of the
Petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
a Petition for Certiorari.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The
Court of Appeals found petitioners’ appeal to be bereft of merit.
The
appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC concerns the
dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is vested in the
FLAMES’ Executive Board, and not the COMELEC.
It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in
disqualifying private respondents Daya, et
al., committed a procedural shortcut.
It held:
Without the requisite two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board dismissing and/or expelling private respondents for acts contemplated thereunder, the COMELEC was clearly violating the union’s constitution and bylaws (sic) by utilizing the aforequoted provision in its said May 6, 2003 decision and, in the process, arrogating unto itself a power it did not possess. As the document embodying the covenant between a union and its members and the fundamental law governing the members’ rights and obligations, it goes without saying that the constitution and bylaws (sic) should be upheld for as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.[26]
On the matter of the failure of
private respondents Daya, et al. to
come up with 30 percent (30%) members’ support in filing the Petition to Nullify
the COMELEC’s Decision before the Med-Arbiter, the Court of Appeals said that
the petition did not involve the entire membership of FLAMES, so there was no
need to comply with the aforesaid requirement.
Furthermore, the appellate court applied the exception to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies on the ground, inter
alia, that resort to such a remedy would have been futile, illusory or
vain.[27] Indeed, the Court of Appeals emphasized that
private respondents Daya, et al., were
directed by the COMELEC to file their Answer to the petition for their
disqualification only on
Petitioners sought a reconsideration
of the
Hence, the instant Petition.
At the outset, petitioners contend
that the instant Petition falls under the exceptions to the rule that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
They implore this Court to make factual determination anent the conduct
of the
Petitioners similarly assert that the
For their part, private respondents
Daya, et al., maintain that the
Petition they filed before the DOLE-NCR Med-Arbiter questioning the disqualification
order of the COMELEC and seeking the nullification of the
Issues
Petitioners
attribute to the Court of Appeals several errors to substantiate their
Petition.[32] They all boil down, though, to the question
of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
affirmed the jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of the case and then
upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELEC’s
order of disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
We affirm the finding of the Court of
Appeals upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR.
Article 226 of the Labor Code is hereunder reproduced, to wit:
ART.
226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. – The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall
have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon
request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The
Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it,
subject to extension by agreement of the parties.
The amendment to Article 226, as
couched in Republic Act No. 6715,[33]
which is relied upon by petitioners in arguing that the BLR had been divested of
its jurisdiction, simply reads, thus:
Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the same Code is likewise hereby amended to read as follows:
"The Bureau shall have fifteen (15)
calendar days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by
agreement of the parties."
This Court
in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[34]
interpreting Article 226 of the Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the
BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts. We said that
since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have
original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict would
refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union
controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions.[35]
More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I
of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) “Intra-Union Dispute” refers to any
conflict between and among union members, and includes all disputes or
grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of
the constitution and by-laws of a union, including cases arising from
chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the
rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.
The
controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question that this is one which
involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. At issue is the propriety of the
disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES
COMELEC in the
After having settled the jurisdiction
of the BLR, we proceed to determine if petitioners correctly raised the
argument that private respondents Daya, et
al., prematurely sought the BLR’s jurisdiction on the ground that they
failed to exhaust administrative remedies within the union. On this matter, we affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals which upheld the application by the BLR Director of the
exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In this regard, this Court is emphatic
that “before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction when such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s judicial
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.”[36]
Verily,
there are exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine.[37] Among the established exceptions are: 1) when
the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is
urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9)
when the subject of the proceeding is private land; 10) in quo warranto proceedings;[38]
and 11) where the facts show that there was a violation of due process.[39] As aptly determined by the BLR Director,
private respondents Daya, et al., were
prejudiced by the disqualification order of the COMELEC. They endeavored to seek reconsideration, but
the COMELEC failed to act thereon.[40] The COMELEC was also found to have refused to
receive their written protest.[41] The foregoing facts sustain the finding that
private respondents Daya, et al.,
were deprived of due process. Hence, it
becomes incumbent upon private respondents Daya, et al., to seek the aid of the BLR.
To insist on the contrary is to render their exhaustion of remedies
within the union as illusory and vain.[42] These antecedent circumstances convince this
Court that there was proper application by the Med-Arbiter of the exception to
the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as affirmed by the BLR
Director, and upheld by the Court of Appeals.
We cannot accept, and the Court of
Appeals rightfully rejected, the contention of petitioners that the private
respondents Daya, et al.’s complaint filed
before the Med-Arbiter failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement
because it was not supported by at least thirty percent (30%) of the members of
the union. Section 1 of Rule XIV of the
Implementing Rules of Book V mandates the thirty percent (30%) requirement only in cases where the issue involves the
entire membership of the union, which is clearly not the case before us. The issue is obviously limited to the
disqualification from participation in the elections by particular union
members.
Having resolved the jurisdictional
cobwebs in the instant case, it is now apt for this Court to address the issue
anent the disqualification of private respondents and the conduct of the
On this matter, petitioners want this
Court to consider the instant case as an exception to the rule that the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts; hence, importuning that we make findings of fact
anew. It bears stressing that in a
petition for review on certiorari, the
scope of this Court’s judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is
generally confined only to errors of law,[43] and questions of fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to this rule,
and we said:
Thus,
only questions of law may be brought by the parties and passed upon by this
Court in the exercise of its power to review.
Also, judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of
the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based
its determination.[44]
It is aphoristic that a re-examination
of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews
only questions of law.[45] The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.[46] This is already outside the province of the
instant Petition for Certiorari. While there may be exceptions to this rule,
petitioners miserably failed to show why the exceptions should be applied
here. With greater force must this rule
be applied in the instant case where the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter
were affirmed by the BLR Director, and then, finally, by the Court of Appeals. The findings below had sufficient bases both
in fact and in law. The uniform
conclusion was that private respondents Daya, et al., were wrongfully disqualified by the COMELEC; consequently,
the FLAMES election should be annulled.
On the issue of disqualification,
there was a blatant misapplication by the COMELEC of the FLAMES’ CBL. As has been established ad nauseam, the provision[47]
relied upon by the COMELEC in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., applies to a case of expulsion of members from the
union.
In full, Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the
FLAMES’ CBL, provides, to wit:
Section 4(a). Any member may be DISMISSED and/or
EXPELLED from the
x x x x
(6) Acting in a manner harmful to the interest
and welfare of the
We highlight five points, thus:
First,
Article IV, Section
4(a)(6) of the FLAMES’ CBL, embraces exclusively the case of dismissal and/or expulsion of members from the union. Even a cursory reading of the provision does
not tell us that the same is to be automatically or directly applied in the disqualification
of a candidate from union elections, which is the matter at bar. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC
erroneously relied on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) because the same does
not contemplate the situation of
private respondents Daya, et al. The latter are not sought to be expelled or
dismissed by the Executive Board. They
were brought before the COMELEC to be disqualified as candidates in the
Second, the aforecited provision evidently
enunciates with clarity the procedural course that should be taken to dismiss
and expel a member from FLAMES. The CBL
is succinct in stating that the dismissal and expulsion of a member from the
union should be after due process and investigation, the same to be exercised
by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board for any of the causes[49]
mentioned therein. The unmistakable
directive is that in cases of expulsion and dismissal, due process must be
observed as laid down in the CBL.
Third, nevertheless, even if we maintain a
lenient stance and consider the applicability of Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) in the disqualification of
private respondents Daya, et al.,
from the elections of
Fourth, the
Court of Appeals, the BLR Director, and the Med-Arbiter uniformly found that
due process was wanting in the disqualification order of the COMELEC. We are in accord with their conclusion. If, indeed, there was a violation by private
respondents Daya, et al., of the
FLAMES’ CBL that could be a ground for their expulsion and/or dismissal from
the union, which in turn could possibly be made a ground for their
disqualification from the elections, the procedural requirements for their
expulsion should have been observed. In
any event, therefore, whether the case involves dismissal and/or expulsion from
the union or disqualification from the elections, the proper procedure must be
observed. The disqualification ruled by
the COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al., must not be allowed to abridge a clear procedural policy
established in the FLAMES’ CBL. If we
uphold the COMELEC, we are countenancing a clear case of denial of due process
which is anathema to the Constitution of the
Fifth, from another angle, the erroneous disqualification
of private respondents Daya, et al.,
constituted a case of disenfranchisement on the part of the member-voters of
FLAMES. By wrongfully excluding them
from the
On a final
note, as it appears that the question of the qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and
academic,[50] we do
not find any reason for this Court to rule on the matter. As borne out by the records, the question had
been laid to rest even when the case was still before the Med-Arbiter.[51]
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices
[2]
[3] According to Section 5, Article V
of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws, the OFFICERS of the
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] DOLE personnel were assigned to the following precincts, to wit:
a) Head Office – Ortigas
b) Manila Sector
c)
d) Balintawak Sector
e) Valenzuela Sector
f) Alabang Sector
g) Plaridel Sector
h) Rizal Sector
i) Sta. Rosa Sector
j) Dasmarinas Sector
k)
San Pablo Sector.
[9]
[10]
[11] Section 4.
(a) Any
member may be DISMISSED and/or EXPELLED from the
x x x x
6. Acting in a manner harmful
to the interest and welfare of the
[12] Rollo, p. 129.
[13]
[14] From the Decision dated
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; id. at 417-435.
[16]
[17]
[18] The Med-Arbiter in his Decision, cited Article IX, Section 1 of the FLAMES CBL, which provides, thus:
Section 1.
x x x x
(c) In the event of any election protest or questions, the COMELEC shall rule [on] such protest or questions regarding the conduct of the election provided that the protest or questions must be submitted in writing within twenty-four (24) hours from the time that the last ballot has been officially opened. The COMELEC has three (3) days to decide the protest or question.
[19]
[20]
[21] Penned by Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac; id. at 209-216.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] The Court of Appeals expounded in this wise, thus:
Although
the rule had, likewise, been long-settled that redress must first be sought
within the union itself, in accordance with its constitution and bylaws (sic),
before a case should be elevated to the jurisdiction of labor agencies, said
requirement had been traditionally held inapplicable under the following
circumstances, to wit: (a) when resort to the remedy would be futile, illusory
or vain; (b) when the remedy applied for was not acted upon for an unreasonable
length of time; (c) when the relief sought was simply for damages; (d) when the
act complained of is contrary to the constitution and bylaws (sic); (e) when the issue is purely a question of law; and (f) when due process
was not observed.
[28]
[29] ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. – The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties.
[30]
[31] Supra note 29.
[32]
[33] Entitled
AN ACT TO EXTEND PROTECTION TO LABOR, STRENGTHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
WORKERS TO SELF-ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PEACEFUL CONCERTED
ACTIVITIES, FOSTER INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND HARMONY, PROMOTE THE PREFERENTIAL USE
OF VOLUNTARY MODES OF SETTLING LABOR DISPUTES, AND REORGANIZE THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF
THE
[34] G.R. 123375,
[35]
[36] Metro
Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Association-Federation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 142666, 26 September 2005,
471 SCRA 45, 58, citing Ambil, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 143398, 25 October 2000, 344 SCRA 372.
[37] Morcal
v. Laviña, G.R. No. 166753,
[38]
[39] Verceles
v. Bureau of Labor Relations-Department of Labor and Employment-national
Capital Region, G.R. No. 153322,
[40]
[41]
[42] Rollo,
p. 216.
[43] Gerlach
v. Reuters Limited, Phils., G.R. No. 148542, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 535,
544-545.
[44]
[45] Umpoc
v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166,
[46]
[47] Article
IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES’ CBL.
[48] Rollo,
p. 82 and its dorsal page.
[49] (1) Non-payment of dues and other monetary obligations for a reasonable period of time, subject to the provisions of Article X;
(2) Joining or forming another
(3) Violation of any provision of the Constitution,
By-laws, rules and regulations of the
(4) Willfull (sic) violation of any provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);
(5) Urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice against the UNION or any of its officers, without first exhausting all internal remedies open to him or available in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the UNION;
(6) Acting in a
manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the
[50] Supra note 17.
[51]