EN BANC
|
OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, |
G.R.
No. 168079 |
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
-
versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated:
MA.
MELLY JAUD MAGBANUA,
Respondents.
July 17, 2007
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D E C I
S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before
the Court is a petition for certiorari[1]
assailing the
The Antecedent Facts
Respondent
was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office in P265,450. Upon demand,
respondent failed to produce the missing amount.
Respondent
alleged that the shortage was due to the machinations and dishonest acts of
Cash Clerk I Monina Baja (Baja). Respondent alleged that Baja, acting as
Paymaster, received payroll funds for distribution to specific offices. In her liquidation report, Baja reflected
twice the missing amount of P265,450
representing cash advances for
P. Villamor, et al. P 5,100
L. Oyanib, et al. 21,900
R. Makila, et al.
74,950
M. Abada, et al. 163,500
P 265,450
Baja
was impleaded in the case before the Ombudsman Visayas. Baja denied
that respondent designated her as Paymaster.
She also denied that she received the payroll funds. Baja alleged that her assigned task was only
to take charge of the listing of payrolls and vouchers to be included in the
respective cash advances of the disbursing officers.
Respondent
and Baja failed to appear during the preliminary conference conducted on
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
In
a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent MA. MELLY
JAUD MAGBANUA be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY
for NEGLECT OF DUTY. For having been
found guilty of DISHONESTY, respondent MONIN[]A
BAJA is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS AND DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD
PUBLIC OFFICE.[4]
Petitioner
reviewed the Decision of the Ombudsman Visayas. In a Memorandum dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and upon finding that respondent MA. MELLY JAUD MAGBANUA GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and for VIOLATIONS OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS and respondent MONINA BAJA GUILTY OF DISHONESTY, they are both meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from service pursuant to the provisions of Section 22(b) and (a), respectively, of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. The penalty prescribed under Section 22(c), a lesser offense, is deemed absorbed in a much graver offense.
Accordingly, the herein
reviewed Decision dated
Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration. In
an Order dated 28 May 2002,[7]
petitioner denied the motion.
Respondent
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The
Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not commit any reversible error in
finding respondent guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent
was an accountable officer. On the other hand, Baja
was not officially designated as Disbursing Officer or Paymaster but was merely
assigned to “take charge of the listing of payrolls and vouchers to be included
in the respective cash advances of disbursing officers.” The Court of Appeals sustained petitioner in
finding that respondent was grossly remiss in her obligations as an accountable officer when she allowed Baja to release payroll
funds which formed part of her own cash advance. In addition, respondent allowed Baja to
prepare the necessary disbursement and liquidation reports which respondent
should have prepared herself. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent
did not even review or examine the reports prepared by Baja.
However,
the Court of Appeals ruled that while petitioner’s findings were correct,
petitioner has no power to impose directly sanctions against government
officials and employees who are subject of its investigation. Citing Tapiador
v. Office of the Ombudsman,[8]
the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner’s power is limited and it may only
recommend, not impose, the appropriate sanctions.
Petitioner
challenges before this Court the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
The Issue
The
sole issue in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or employees.
The
Ruling of this Court
The
petition has merit.
The
powers of the Ombudsman are found in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
states in part that the Ombudsman shall “exercise such other powers or performs
such functions or duties as may be provided by law.” Sections 15, 21, and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770),
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provide:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. ― The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions ad duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) x x x x
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
x x x x
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. ― The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
x x x x
SEC. 25. Penalties. ― (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the
penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,
illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman,
taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the
liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In
ruling that the power of petitioner is only recommendatory, the Court of
Appeals relied on the following statement of the Court in Tapiador:
Besides, assuming arguendo, that
petitioner [was] administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from government
service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the
removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public
official concerned.[9]
The
Court has already settled this issue. In
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[10]
the Court observed that the main issue in Tapiador
was the failure of the complainant to present substantial evidence to prove the
charges in the administrative case. The
Court ruled that the reference in Tapiador to
the power of the Ombudsman is at best merely an obiter dictum. The Court ruled that the statement on the
Ombudsman’s power was not supported by sufficient explanation and was
susceptible to varying interpretations.
The Court categorically stated that the statement in Tapiador
cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Court. The Court recognized the authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman under Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770,
thus:
It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer x x x.
It is thus clear that
the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more
effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences
and vested with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to [the]
Congress to empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did
when RA 6770 was enacted. x x x.[11]
More
at point is the Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[12] In that case, the Office of the Ombudsman
found respondents guilty of simple misconduct and meted on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman that respondents
were guilty of simple misconduct but ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. The Court of
Appeals also cited Tapiador in ruling that the
power of the Office of the Ombudsman is limited only to the recommendation of
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of
a public officer or employee found to be at fault.
The
Court in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals found the petition
of the Office of the Ombudsman meritorious, ruling that in Ledesma,
the Court already rejected the argument that the power of the Ombudsman is only
advisory or recommendatory in nature.[13] The Court ruled:
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
x x x x
[The] provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and necessarily, impose the said penalty.
x x x x
The legislative history
of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the
Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The lawmakers envisioned the
Office of the Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.
x x x.[14]
In
Estarija v. Ranada,[15]
petitioner assailed as unconstitutional his dismissal from the service by
the Ombudsman. Petitioner in Estarija alleged that the Ombudsman did not
have direct and immediate power to remove government officials, whether
elective or appointive, who are not removable by
impeachment. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Sections 15, 21, and 25 of RA 6770, thus affirming that the
powers of the Office of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Court ruled in Estarija
that under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
The
Court reiterated the Ledesma and Estarija rulings in Barillo
v. Gervasio[16]
and in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[17]
While
Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to “recommend
x x x removal, suspension,
demotion x x x” of
government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the
Ombudsman in the alternative may “enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21” of RA 6770.
The word “or” in Section
15(3) before the phrase “enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21” grants the Ombudsman this alternative power.
Section 21 of RA 6770
vests in the Ombudsman “disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of
the Government,” except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the
Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings the “penalty ranging from suspension
without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the
discretion of the Ombudsman x x x.”
Clearly,
under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative
penalty on public officials or employees.
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner has no power
to impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or employees.
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.
[3] Erroneously
stated as
[4] Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[5] Approved by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio, Jr. on
[6]
[7] Approved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
on
[8] 429 Phil. 47 (2002).
[9]
[10] G.R. No. 161629,
[11]
[12] G.R. No. 160675,
[13] See Office of the Ombudsman v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167844,
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 159314,
[16] G.R. No. 155088,
[17] Supra note 13.