THIRD
DIVISION
|
MUSTAPHA M. GANDAROSA, Petitioner, - versus - EVARISTO FLORES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 167910 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ.* Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -x
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,[2]
dated 24 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77163, dismissing
petitioner Mustapha M. Gandarosa’s Petition for
Review of the Order[3] dated 24
July 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Iloilo City, Branch 31, which
denied the motion of the prosecution to amend the Information by excluding
petitioner from the charge in Criminal Case No. 00-52992 for Libel, and its
Resolution,[4] dated 12
April 2005 denying reconsideration thereon.
On
On
Pending the resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration of the
INFORMATION
The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses [petitioner] MUSTAPHA “MUSS” GANDAROSA, EMMANUEL “MANNY” REGALADO ALCALDE, REY P. ALCALDE AND BERNIE G. MIAQUE, whose maternal surnames, dates and places of birth cannot be ascertained, of the crime of LIBEL under Art. 353 in relation to Art. 355, all of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 23, 2000, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, Emmanuel “Manny” Regalado Alcalde, as the author, Rey P. Alcalde as Managing Editor of the Daily Informer, Bernie G. Miaque as the Publisher of the Daily Informer, a daily newspaper published in the City of Iloilo and of general circulation in Western Visayas, and Mustapha “Muss” Gandarosa, Assistant Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Revenue Region 11, as the source, conspiring and confederating with each other, working together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally and with the intention of attacking the honesty, virtue and reputation of Sonia Flores, Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Revenue Region 11, write, compose and publish and permit and cause to be written, composed and published in the June 23, 2000 issue of the Daily Informer the following defamatory and libelous statements, as follows:
“The latest one is dubbed as “back-door-pay” where high (sic) BIR officials like RD Flores and Revenue District Officer (RDO) Willy Narnola enter the office through the backdoor where hands with envelopes exchange and the persons concerned get their share from illegitimate transactions in the Bureau.
x x x x
x x x the envelope given to
Which statements are included in the following article:
“BACK-DOOR-PAY ANOMALY EXPOSED”
by: Manny Regalado Alcalde
A scheme on how money changes hands right inside the BIR Regional Office compound was revealed to the media yesterday by no less than Assistant Regional [D]irecto Mustapha Gandarosa, while a source who requested not to be identified told the INFORMER that “Muss” Gandarosa is blinded by his ulterior motives, the reason why he’s coming out with the exposé against his very own office.
According to the INFORMER source[,] Gandarosa was hurt when he was not appointed Regional Director and instead it was Mrs. Sonia Flores who was appointed to the position by the BIR Commissioner Beethoven Rualo.
The source alleged Gandarosa has since then been waiting for an opportunity to put down Regional Director Sonia Flores.
However, this was denied by Gandarosa himself in an interview with the INFORMERS (sic).
According to Gandarosa, the issues thrown against RD Sonia Flores are legitimate and the series of exposes were intended to stop the irregularities that exist in the BIR Revenue Region No. 11.
Yesterday, another anomaly was revealed to a select group of media practitioners by ARD Gandarosa.
The latest one is dubbed as “Back-door-pay” where high BIR (sic) officials like RD Flores and Revenue [D]istrict Officer (RDO) Willy Narnaloa enters (sic) the office through the backdoor where hands with envelopes exchange and the persons concerned get their share from illegitimate transactions in the Bureau.
Gandarosa
admitted he had been subjected to such temptations but upon learning that the
money given him came from a taxpayer, he refused to accept his supposed share
and let go of the officer. According to
the Muslim Assistant Regional Director the envelope given to
Recently a source told the INFORMERS (sic) that from January to May this year, a high[-]ranking official may have pocketed some P50 million from various taxpayers after their tax assessments were adjusted in exchange for payolas that at times reach millions.
The source further said that another
official gets an average of P50,000 to P100,000 per week.”
Which defamatory and libelous statements are false and malicious and exposed of Sonia Flores and her husband, Evaristo Flores, to public hatred, contempt, ridicule and dishonor.[8]
The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 00-52992.
On
In the meantime, or on
Meanwhile, on
The grounds advanced by the [petitioner] to suspend proceedings, namely, that there is a pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by [petitioner] with the City Prosecutor and that probable cause against him does not exist are not legal grounds to suspend proceedings especially when the Court has acquired valid jurisdiction over the accused. Under Sec. 11(c), Rule 117 (sic), Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: x x x (c) a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice of the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. In this case the Motion for Reconsideration should have been filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas which is the reviewing office and not with the City Prosecutor. Consequently, there is no petition for review pending at the offices mentioned in Sec. 11(c), Rule 117 (sic), aforesaid.[13]
Subsequently, on
Pending the resolution of his Omnibus
Motion before the RTC, or on 31 May 2001, petitioner, aggrieved by the earlier
denial by the Office of the City Prosecutor of his Motion for Reconsideration,[17]
filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), praying that
the earlier Resolution of the Office of the Prosecutor, dated 20 February 2001,
be reconsidered and set aside; that a new one be rendered finding no probable
cause against him and ordering the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City to withdraw
the Information.[18]
On
Petitioner sought reconsideration
thereon. In his Motion, petitioner
prayed for the last resetting of the arraignment to
The RTC found the Motion to be
well-taken. Hence, on
Several months following his arraignment, the
DOJ issued a Resolution[26]
on
On
The RTC rendered an Order,[30]
dated
It
must be remembered that said [petitioner] was already arraigned on
Nonetheless, this instant Motion [to Amend Information] [was] filed after the said [petitioner] has already been arraigned. Under Section 4, Rule 117, which allows the amendment of complaint or information, the same shall be done before the accused entered his plea, hence, the desirability of amendment, since the Court will not entertain any Motion to Quash, after the arraignment pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117. This is so because with accused’[s] arraignment, the issue has been joined.
Thus, this Court having already acquired jurisdiction, does not lose it despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. It has the option to grant or deny the Motion to Dismiss filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 657).
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion is hereby Denied for lack of merit.[31]
Petitioner sought reconsideration of
the RTC’s denial to amend the Information by filing
an Omnibus Motion,[32]
dated
Firstly, the Motion to Amend Information was filed by the City Prosecutor’s Office without clearance from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. It shall be noted that the Information herein was approved by the Ombudsman-Visayas.
Secondly, this Motion comes after the accused Mustapha Gandarosa had already been arraigned, hence, already moot and academic.
Thirdly, the authority to proceed with this case, the Court exercising its sound discretion, was first iterated in Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, reiterated in Ledesma v. CA 278 SCRA 657 and Jalandoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107.[33]
Consequently, petitioner sought
relief from the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Certiorari, attributing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC for failing to exclude petitioner from the Information for Libel
in Criminal Case No. 00-52992.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
and dismissed the petition. It held that
not only had the Information against the petitioner already been filed in
court, but that the latter had already been arraigned when the amendment of the
Information was sought by the prosecutor; hence, the matter was no longer in
the hands of the prosecutor’s office but, rather, with the RTC. The Court of Appeals relied on Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[34]
reiterating that when the complaint or information had already been filed in
court, the matter should be left entirely for the determination of the court.[35]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals
defended the silence on the part of the RTC on not making its own determination
of the existence of probable cause, hence:
So too, in assailing the subject order, petitioner faults the public respondent in not making his own determination of the existence of probable cause. In other words, petitioner would like to impress before this Court that since the subject order is silent as to the conduct of such evaluation, then the public respondent did not make his own findings of such probable cause.
We do not subscribe to this thesis of petitioner. It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the prosecutor, they must evaluate the report and the supporting documents, viz, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic note (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination of probable cause. Thus, if the public respondent in this case was silent in his order as to such evaluation of probable cause, then it only goes to show that it was adopting the prosecutor’s earlier findings that probable cause exists against herein petitioner, accused in Crim. Case No. 00-52992, for Libel.[36]
Petitioner sought reconsideration
thereon, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that petitioner had already been arraigned in the aforesaid criminal case, thus, any amendment to the information must be done with leave of court. While this was what the public prosecutor properly did, it does not automatically follow that the court must grant the same. It is still within the discretion of the court, which must still make its own independent findings, assessment and evaluation of the evidence presented based upon the testimonies and affidavits of the parties and/or their witnesses, and other attachments, if any. To be sure, this was what the public respondent did in denying the motion for amendment filed by the public prosecutor.[37]
Petitioner now seeks redress before
this Court through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
A. THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT SANCTIONED WITH APROVAL THE RTC
1. THE RTC ILOILO’S ACT OF DENYING THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AND WITHOUT MAKING AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE ESCAPED THE JUDICIOUS SCRUTINY OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.
2. THE RTC
B. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT RTC
Petitioner is unequivocal that it
does not contest the RTC’s jurisdiction and its discretion to decide whether he should be
excluded from the Information for Libel in Criminal Case No. 00-52992. What petitioner maintains as erroneous is the
fact that the RTC neither examined the evidence presented nor reviewed the
Resolutions of the DOJ, but instead, merely denied the motion to amend the
Information on the basis simply that it had already acquired jurisdiction over
the case.
Moreover, petitioner disputes the
existence of probable cause against him on the ground that private respondent Evaristo Flores failed to present clear, convincing and
credible evidence that he was the source of the alleged libelous publication
identifying private respondent’s wife, Sonia Flores, as being involved in
corrupt practices in the BIR. According
to petitioner, private respondent merely relied on newspaper reports. Even then, petitioner argues that he never
named Sonia Flores as the official involved in the anomalies, nor did he
identify any particular official. He
further asserts that malice does not exist where the accused shows good
intention or justifiable motive for an alleged defamatory imputation. He repeats his invocation that not only did
he not mention the name of Sonia Flores, but he was motivated by his moral,
social and legal duty to expose what he perceived were anomalies in the BIR.
Finally, petitioner imputes grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC’s silence as to the evaluation of probable cause should
be taken to mean that it was adopting the prosecutor’s earlier findings of the
existence of probable cause. Petitioner
submits that such a silence was not a tacit affirmation of the public
prosecutor’s earlier findings on the existence of probable cause but rather, it
showed a failure on the part of the RTC to exercise its discretion in the
manner that was expected of it.
For their part, respondent People of
the
According to the OSG, while the trial
court was silent on whether it conducted an independent evaluation of the
evidence to determine the existence of probable cause, this fact does not
necessarily prove that no such evaluation was made.[41] The OSG further asseverates that the
Resolution of the DOJ directing the amendment of the Information was rendered
despite the fact that petitioner had already been arraigned. The OSG posits that the same is violative of
Section 4,[42] Part IV
of the Manual for Prosecutors of the DOJ,
which prescribes that notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion, no petition shall be entertained when the accused has
already been arraigned. The same section
mandates that once the accused is arraigned, the petition shall be dismissed motu proprio by
the Secretary of Justice.[43]
We deny the Petition.
First, the
preliminaries.
There is no
question that once an Information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of
the court. Indeed, in Crespo v. Mogul,[44] it was emphasized that when a criminal
action is initiated via the filing of
a complaint or information in court, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.[45] The court remains the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it notwithstanding the power of the prosecutor
to retain the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases. In Crespo, this
Court was explicit that the determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence.[46] Hence, “[a] motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same.”[47]
Jurisprudence, however, is also explicit
that once a motion to dismiss is filed, the trial judge may grant or deny it,
not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise
of judicial prerogative.[48] Hence, in the determination thereof, trial judges
are required to make their own independent assessment. Citing
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency.
It is imperative on the part of the
trial judges to state their assessment and reasons in resolving the motion
before them.
We now resolve the question: Is the petitioner correct in claiming that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Amend the
Information to exclude petitioner from the charge for the reason that it relied
solely on the ground that it had acquired jurisdiction over the case?
Under the herein factual milieu, we
answer in the negative.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention,
a cursory reading of the assailed Order would reveal that the RTC did not deny
the Motion on the lone basis that it had already acquired jurisdiction over the
criminal action. It denied the Motion on
more formidable legal grounds.
The reason for the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s Motion bears reiterating, viz:
Nonetheless, the instant Motion is filed after the said accused has already been arraigned. Under Section 4, Rule 117, which allows the amendment of complaint or information, the same shall be done before the accused entered his plea, hence, the desirability of amendment, since the Court will not entertain any Motion to Quash, after the arraignment pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117. This is so because with accused’[s] arraignment the issue has been joined.[51]
The crucial fact is, on
Nothing in the records discloses that
petitioner’s arraignment was with restriction, condition, or reservation. Jurisprudence is clear that with the
arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the
appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or
abandoned the same.[55] In the case at bar, following petitioner’s
arraignment, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his petition for review
earlier filed with the DOJ Secretary.
This is where petitioner’s contention
that the RTC failed to make independent findings based on the evidence before
it does not hold water. The allegation
that the RTC did not make an independent evaluation of the evidence to
determine the existence of probable cause becomes immaterial in light of
petitioner’s unconditional arraignment.
Petitioner’s arraignment constitutes a waiver of her right to
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.[56] Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of
probable cause.[57] Hence, the determination of the existence or
non-existence of probable cause becomes unnecessary. Following petitioner’s arraignment, it was no
longer the RTC’s duty to make an independent finding
of the evidence before it for the determination of probable cause.
We do not herein abandon the ruling
that the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the
merits of the motion when confronted with a motion to withdraw an information
on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary
of justice.[58] Surely,
trial courts are called to validly and properly exercise judicial discretion
and independence. But where the accused
has already been arraigned without reservation, condition or restriction, in
line with our ruling in Adasa v. Abalos,[59] the
unconditional arraignment constitutes a waiver of his right to preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation.
Consequently, there is a waiver or abandonment of his petition for
review before the Department of Justice.
In like manner, therefore, the trial court has no more need to make an
independent assessment of the evidence before it to determine probable
cause. Trial ensues. Conversely, with the arraignment of the
accused, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for
review because the accused has already waived or abandoned the same.
Moreover, when the petitioner brought
forth the denial of the Motion to Amend the Information to exclude his name
from the charge, and to seek the quashal of the Information
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
he was in error in his choice of remedy.
This Court emphasizes the established rule that the writ of certiorari will not lie against the
denial of a motion to quash an information.
The remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
a manner authorized by law.[60] We have, however, sanctioned a writ of certiorari on the basis of a patent,
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion by a trial judge or when an appeal
will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the disputed
orders.[61] No such special circumstances are herein present
that would convince us to treat the instant case as an exception. Thus:
The special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy against interlocutory orders such as those assailed in these proceedings; i.e., an order denying a motion to quash the information, and one declaring the accused to have waived his right to present evidence and considering the case submitted for decision. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (citing Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 [1990], and Acharon v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309; People v. Madaluyo, 1 SCRA 990), the established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. The Court has been cited to no such special circumstances in the cases at bar.[62]
Certainly, this Court has been
steadfast in holding that when such an adverse interlocutory order as the
denial of a motion to quash is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
to certiorari or prohibition. Besides, remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.[63]
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, then Solicitor
General filed the Memorandum for public respondent People of the
[1] Rollo, pp. 16-46.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Vicente L.
[3] Penned by Judge Rene S. Hortillo; records, p. 279.
[4] Rollo, pp. 58-60.
[5] Records, p. 14. The newspaper article was written by Manny Regalado Alcalde.
[6] Rollo, pp. 83-88.
[7] Records, pp. 47-48.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo pp. 96-107.
[11]
[12] Records at 67.
[13] Rollo, p. 115.
[14] Records, pp. 81-104.
[15] Rollo, pp. 127-130.
[16]
[17]
[18] Records, pp. 148-173.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] No resolution on the Motion appears on record.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Rendered by Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez for the Secretary of Justice; id. at 261-264.
[27] The decretal portion of the
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City is REVERSED and he is directed to amend the
information for libel and to drop [petitioner] Mustapha Gandarosa
from the charge and to report to this Office the action taken within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof. (
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Rollo, p. 178.
[32]
[33]
[34] 324 Phil. 568, 601 (1996).
[35] Rollo,
p. 53.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Filed by Solicitor General Alfredo
L. Benipayo; id. at 300-316.
[40] Filed by then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura; id. at 396-412.
[41]
[42] SECTION 4. – Cases not subject to
review; exceptions. – No petition may be allowed from a resolution of the Chief
State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion. Either complainant/offended
party or respondent/accused may file a petition. Notwithstanding the showing of
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion no petition shall be entertained
where the accused had already been arraigned.
Once arraigned, the petition shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
[43]
[44] G.R. No. L-53373,
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48] Roberts,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
[49] G.R. No. 112387,
[50] Roberts,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
[51] Records, p. 279.
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55] Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617,
[56]
[57]
[58] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 217 (1997).
[59] Supra note 55.
[60] Soriano v. Casanova, G.R. No. 163400,
[61] Hon.
Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio, 337 Phil. 513, 519
(1997).
[62] Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917, 940 (2000), citing Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan, 338 Phil. 290, 309
(1997).
[63] Lalican v. Hon. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 497
(1997).