SECOND DIVISION
CRAYONS
PROCESSING, INC., G.R.
No. 167727
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus
- Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
FELIPE
OF APPEALS (Fifth Division),
Respondents. Promulgated:
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
The
key facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Crayons Processing, Inc.
(Crayons) employed respondent Felipe Pula (
suffered a heart attack and was
rushed to the hospital, where he was confined for around a week.
Upon his discharge from the hospital,
Following the angiogram procedure,
respondent was certified as “fit to work” by Dr. Recto. On
P12,000 as financial assistance.[3]
It appears that Crayons and the other
named respondents in the complaint, except one, failed to appear during the
preliminary conferences and the hearings. Only Nixon Lee appeared before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but only to manifest that he should be
excluded from the complaint as he had no hand in the management of the
employees and that there was an intra-corporate squabble between him and his
co-respondents Peter Su and Paul Lee, who had denied him access to the company
premises. Despite their previous non-appearance, the other respondents
belatedly filed a Position Paper alleging that
In
a Decision[6]
dated
The
Labor Arbiter took Crayons and its co-respondents to task for failing to
participate in the proceedings despite notice, and for belatedly filing their
Position Paper which contained “bare denials and unsubstantiated allegations.”[7]
She described their claim of non-dismissal as “a deleterious scheme” and a
“last-ditch effort…in order for [the Labor Arbiter] to treat the case as water
under the bridge.”[8] Instead,
the Labor Arbiter concluded as evident from the facts that
On
appeal, the NLRC ruled, in a Decision dated 18 March 2003,[11] that there was indeed valid cause to terminate
Pula’s employment considering that he had a heart attack that kept him out of
work for more than six (6) months. According to the NLRC, the fact that
In
favoring
The Court of Appeals did observe that
Crayons, in its Comment[13]
before the appellate court, attached a report[14]
prepared by Ellen Caluag, Crayons’ HRD Head. The report narrated that during
the time Pula was purportedly dismissed, Crayons had told him that it was
willing to allow him to return to work, provided that he undergo a medical
examination by a certain Dr. Ting, who was to prepare a certification as to his
fitness to return to work. Allegedly, after
Before this Court, Crayons argues
that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Caluag Report, saying that
the refusal to entertain the same was prejudicial to its substantial rights.[16]
Crayons also claims that “[it] was merely exercising prudence in not giving
[Pula] work on June 13, 2000;”[17]
that the medical certification attesting to his fitness to return to work then
“did not guarantee [Pula’s] fitness to work,”[18]
and; that the situation dictated that it exercise prudence and exert every
effort “to ascertain the health condition of [Pula], thus prompting [Crayon’s]
referral to its company doctor, Dr. Ting.”[19]
Assuming arguendo that
We
begin first by upholding the Court of Appeals when it refused to give credence
to the Caluag report. It appears that this report emerged at first instance
only in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. No reference was made to it
before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The report, as attached to Crayons’
Comment before the Court of Appeals, is undated and unverified. It is addressed
to no one in particular, certainly not to any court or tribunal, and is not
accompanied by any motion or pleading seeking its admission as evidence. It is, as the Court of Appeals ruled, hearsay
in character. It could have easily been
introduced in evidence before the Labor Arbiter. Caluag herself could have
likewise easily appeared before the Labor Arbiter herself to give testimony or
otherwise verify under oath the contents of such report, especially since she
herself was named as a respondent in the complaint. Yet Crayons and Caluag did
neither, limiting their participation before the Labor Arbiter to a three (3)-page,
seven (7)-paragraph Position Paper[22] that stands out as a classic example of a pro forma pleading, and which was, to
boot, filed five (5) months late.
Before
this Court, Crayons is all too willing to stress the neglect in the handling of
the case by the former counsel of [Crayons] who represented it before the Labor
Arbiter. Yet the general rule is that the client is bound by the mistakes of
his counsel, save when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[23] Espinosa
v. Court of Appeals[24]
explicates the requisite character of counsel’s negligence that would be
sufficient to excuse the client from the consequences thereof.
Citing the cases of Legarda v. Court of Appeals and Alabanzas
v. IAC[,] Espinosa invokes the exception to the general rule that a client
need not be bound by the actions of counsel who is grossly and palpably
negligent. These very cases cited demonstrate why Atty. Castillon's acts hardly
constitute gross or palpable negligence. Legarda provides a textbook
example of gross negligence on the part of the counsel. The Court therein noted
the following negligent acts of lawyer Antonio Coronel:
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law
school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of
service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have
abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in
the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did
nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to
file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner
was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the
evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment, was
rendered by the trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no
steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment
became final and executory.
Gross negligence on the part of the counsel in Legarda is clearly
established, characterized by a series of negligent omissions that led to a
final executory judgment against the client, who never once got her side aired
before the court of law before finality of judgment set in. The actions of
Atty. Castillon hardly measure up to this standard of gross negligence
exhibited in the Legarda case.
On the other hand, in Alabanzas counsel failed to file an
appellant's brief, thereby causing the dismissal of the appeal before the Court
of Appeals. Despite such inexcusable and fatal lapse, the Court ruled that it
was not sufficient to establish such gross or palpable negligence that
justified a deviation from the rule that clients should be bound by the acts
and mistakes of their counsel. It strikes as odd that Espinosa should cite Alabanzas
in the first place, considering that the lapse of the counsel therein was
far worse than that imputed to Atty. Castillon, yet the Court anyway still
refused to apply the exception to the general rule.[25]
The
failure of Crayons to submit any evidence worthy of credence to bolster its
factual allegations stands independent of the failures of its former counsel
before the Labor Arbiter. It may have been a different story had the Caluag
report been verified under oath or submitted as an affidavit. Even if questions
on its admissibility past the Labor Arbiter stage of proceedings would linger,
at least it would manifest some good faith or earnest effort on the part of
Crayons to submit credible evidence in support of its bare allegations. Such a
showing may be cause to mitigate the damage wrought by the negligence of its
former counsel. But instead, Crayons submitted a report with utterly no
probative value.
As
such, the factual version presented by
The
termination as upheld by the NLRC was grounded on Article 284 of the Labor
Code, which reads:
An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been
found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of
his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least
one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.
The particular manner by which it is determined that the
employee is suffering from the disease of such character as expressed in
Article 284 is in turn spelled out in Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which provides:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for
dismissal. — Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health
of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such
a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with
proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the
period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the
employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his
former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
(Emphasis supplied)
For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered
valid, two requisites must concur: (a) the employee must be suffering from a
disease which cannot be cured within six months and his continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his
co-employees; and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a
competent public health authority.[26] The burden falls upon the employer to establish these requisites,[27] and in the absence of such
certification, the dismissal
must necessarily be declared
illegal.[28]
As
succinctly stressed in Tan v. NLRC,[29]
“it is only where there is a prior certification
from a competent public authority that the disease afflicting the employee
sought to be dismissed is of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be
cured within six (6) months even with proper medical treatment that the
latter could be validly terminated from his job.”[30]
Without the required certification,
the characterization or even diagnosis of the disease would primarily be shaped
according to the interests of the parties rather than the studied analysis of
the appropriate medical professionals. The requirement of a medical certificate
under Article 284 cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the
unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent
of the employee's illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection
of labor.[31]
The
NLRC’s conclusion that no such certification was required since
work. Assuming that the burden did
fall on
All
told, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the reinstatement of the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter is in order.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[4]In respondent’s Position Paper, it is accounted that Crayons Processing, Inc. was a subsidiary of Clothman Knitting Corp. and both corporations had as common stockholders Nixon Lee, Paul Lee, and Peter Su. Ellen Caluag, on the other hand, was the HR manager of both Crayons Processing, Inc. and Clothman Knitting Corp. See rollo, p. 67. Only Crayons Processing, Inc. is a party to the present petition.
[6]Rollo, pp. 164-170.
[8]Id. Interestingly, while petitioners attached to their petition a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, supra note 6 in relation to rollo, p. 31, page 3 of said copy, which highlighted petitioners’ lapses before the Labor Arbiter, was omitted therefrom (footnote 7).
[9]
[10]
[11]Rollo, pp. 186-191. Decision penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier, concurred in by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo.
[12]
[23]Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 678, 688–689 (2000), citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 81 (1997) and Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 642 (1997).
[27]Phil. Employ Services & Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,, G.R. No. 144786, 15 April 2004, 427 SCRA 732, 748; ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 883, 893 (2001).
[28]See Manly Express v. Payong, supra note 14, at 329; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 775,
783 (2000), citing Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 114333, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 237, 244; General Textile, Inc.
v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 102969, April 4, 1995, 243 SCRA 232, 236; Cebu
Royal Plant v. Hon. Deputy Minister of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 58639,
August 12, 1987, 15 SCRA 38, 43-44.
[31]Sy v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 404, 418 (2003); citing Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608, 618 (1998).