EN
BANC
|
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES
UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS,
INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK
OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC.,
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY
ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B.
GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M.
MALTU AND REMEGIO S. MERCADO,
Petitioners, - versus
- THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 167324 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES, AZCUNA,
TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
JR., and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: July 17, 2007 |
x - - - - - - -
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- - - x
D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,[1] promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a
petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA)
Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No.
102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada on 24 May 1999.
Prior hereto, petitioners originally
filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Supreme Court on
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a
reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a series of
workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers
and technical staff possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the
health sector. It provided for five
general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health programs; (3) promote
the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
(4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the
coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).[2]
Petitioners questioned the first
reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,
particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate
restructuring of government hospitals.
The said provision under the HSRA reads:
Provide fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals. Government hospitals must be allowed to
collect socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence on direct
subsidies from the government. Their
critical capacities like diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and
medical staff capability must be upgraded to effectively exercise fiscal
autonomy. Such investment must be
cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks. Moreover such capacities will allow
government hospitals to supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement must be
introduced such as allowing them autonomy towards converting them into
government corporations without compromising their social
responsibilities. As a result,
government hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to
health needs.
Petitioners
also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH,
dated 5 January 2001, entitled “Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation
of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by
January 2001;”[3] and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH,
entitled “Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and
Paramedical Professionals in Government Health Facilities,”[4] dated 9 January 2001, for
imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for
medicine and medical services.[5]
Petitioners alleged that the implementation
of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free
medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for
being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:[6]
ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law.
ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved
quality of life for all.
ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.
ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being x x x.
ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:
x x x x
(2) the right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.
x x x x
ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their
maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance
their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation.
ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority
for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102
On
Sec. 4. Preparation of a
Rationalization and Streamlining Plan.
In view of the functional and operational redirection in the DOH, and to
effect efficiency and effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall
prepare a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis
of the intended changes. The RSP shall
contain the following:
a)
the
specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and
activities/strategies;
b)
the
structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions and
activities by organizational unit and the relationship of each units;
c)
the
staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and unfilled
positions; and
d)
the resource
allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline set-up on the agency
budgetary allocation and indicating where possible, savings have been
generated.
The RSP shall [be] submitted to the
Department of Budget and Management for approval before the corresponding
shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH Secretary.
Sec. 5. Redeployment of
Personnel. The redeployment of
officials and other personnel on the basis of the approved RSP shall not result
in diminution in rank and compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into account all pertinent
Civil Service laws and rules.
Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement
the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall be taken from funds available
in the DOH, provided that the total requirements for the implementation of the
revised staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds for Personnel
Services.
Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from
the service as a consequence of the implementation of this Executive Order
shall be entitled to the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who are not covered by
existing laws, they shall be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one
month basic salary for every year of service or proportionate share thereof in
addition to the terminal fee benefits to which he/she is entitled under
existing laws.
Executive
Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
(Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local
government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related
functions and responsibilities.[7]
Petitioners
contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative function. They argued that Executive
Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the President’s
authority.[8]
Moreover,
petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization and
Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented even before
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the
President should have issued an administrative order to carry out the
streamlining, but that it failed to do so.[9]
Furthermore,
petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio
B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuñata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive
Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that
some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer
distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to
relocate to far-flung areas.[10]
Petitioners
also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP. Certain
employees allegedly suffered diminution of compensation,[11] while others were supposedly assigned to positions
for which they were neither qualified nor suited.[12] In
addition, new employees were purportedly hired by the DOH and appointed to
positions for which they were not qualified, despite the fact that the
objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs.[13] It was also averred that DOH employees were
deployed or transferred even during the three-month period before the national
and local elections in May 2001,[14] in violation of Section 2
of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as “Magna Carta
for Public Health Workers.”[15] Petitioners, however, failed to identify the
DOH employees referred to above, much less include them as parties to the
petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the
petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or
authority to sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the verification;
2) Petitioners failed to show any
particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal
injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition,
brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed out of time, or
beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization methods were implemented in
2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus will not lie where the
President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was not acting as a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
In resolving the substantial issues of
the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for
violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article
III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV,
all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty
of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for
legislation.
Moreover,
the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners’ assertion that Executive Order
No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue.
The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or
disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political
department.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102, in
accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It also
declared that the DOH did not implement Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or
with grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by the petitioners, as the DOH
issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which created the
different committees tasked with the implementation of the RSP, only after both
the DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective
Governance (PCEG) approved the RSP on 8 July 2000 and 17 July 2000,
respectively.
Petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on
Hence, the present petition, where the
following issues are raised:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR
IN RULING THAT ANY QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR
REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE NOT JUDICIALLY
ENFORCEABLE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST
ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS
DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST
ERROR IN UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER AND ABOVE THE ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE PETITION BELOW. [16]
The Court
finds the present petition to be without merit.
Petitioners allege that the HSRA should
be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the
Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution.[17] They claim that the HSRA’s
policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III;
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the
1987 Constitution. Such policies
allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical
services. This contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions of
the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future
legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress.[18] However, some provisions have already been
categorically declared by this Court as non
self-executing.
In Tanada v. Angara,[19]
the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles
need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article
II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” x x x. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by
the legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[20]
this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of
Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not
self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[21]
the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. These provisions,
which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other
constitutional provisions as non self-executing and,
therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.[22]
Some of the constitutional provisions
invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically,
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically
ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case
of Tañada v. Angara.[23]
Moreover,
the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated
the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of
Article III of the Constitution. There
were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached,
petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to
the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections
11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and
healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of
children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and
nutrition. Like the provisions that
were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation[24] and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[25]
they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed
to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will
not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be
manifested in their votes.
The rationale for this is given by
Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the
case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission[26]:
x x
x However, to declare that the constitutional
provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied
therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be
impractical, if not unrealistic. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated. x x
x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define
the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent
legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own
conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely
on petitioners’ bare allegations that it violates the general principles
expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of
action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic
considerations of due process and the limitations of judicial power.[27]
Petitioners also claim that Executive
Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in
excess of his authority. They maintain
that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of
legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order
No. 102.[28] This line of argument is without basis.
This Court has already ruled in a
number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order,
direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department.[29] This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter
10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987
reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing
Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1)
Restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2)
Transfer any
function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies; and
(3)
Transfer any
agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments
or agencies.
In Domingo v. Zamora,[30] this
Court explained the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority under
the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. The law grants
the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her
office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” To remain effective and efficient, it must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that
the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and
the agencies under it.[31] The
agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter
8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the
President.—The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those
offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those
under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those
attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 2(4) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term “agency of the
government” as follows:
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau,
office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a
local government or a distinct unit therein.
Furthermore, the DOH is among the
cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the Administrative Code,
mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President.[32] Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is
under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the
Office of the President. Consequently,
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the
President the continued authority to reorganize the Office of the President, extends
to the DOH.
The power of the President to
reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general
appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No.
7645, the “General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993,” already contained
a provision stating that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down
and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive Branch.—The heads of
departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify
their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of
public services and which may be scaled down, phased out, or abolished, subject
to civil service rules and regulations. x x
x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or
abolition of activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders
issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)
Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed
by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key
positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by this Act.
Again, in the year when Executive Order
No. 102 was issued, “The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999”
(Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President the power to make any changes
in any of the key positions and organizational units in the executive
department thus:
Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed
by the President of the
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is
well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative
prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102.
It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control
over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by
this Court.
Petitioners also pointed out several
flaws in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102, particularly the
RSP. However, these contentions are
without merit and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.
The
RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The facts show otherwise. It was only after the DBM approved the Notice
of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000,[33] and after the
Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 62,[34] approving the RSP, that
then DOH Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28
July 2000 Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000,[35] creating the different
committees to implement the RSP.
Petitioners
also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an
administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do
so. Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the DOH
Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of the
President. The members of the Cabinet
are subject at all times to the disposition of the President since they are
merely his alter egos.[36] Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President,
presumptively acts of the President.[37] Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary
were clearly authorized by the President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the
aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the implementation of
the RSP.
Petitioners
Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang,
Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope,
Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo
U. Bacuñata, and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive
Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that
some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer
distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to
relocate to far-flung areas.
In several
cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or departments
as valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faith—that is, for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.[38] On the other hand, if the reorganization is
done for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-motivated
political purposes, any abolition of position would be invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable
since none of the petitioners were removed from public service, nor did they
identify any action taken by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their
dismissal. The reorganization that was
pursued in the present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the
efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions of the Local Government Code on the
devolution of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes the inconvenience
suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas, the executive
department’s finding of a need to make health services available to these areas
and to make delivery of health services more efficient and more compelling is
far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is well within
its authority. In all, this Court finds
petitioners’ contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No.
102.
Without
identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including them as parties to
the petition, petitioners went on identifying several errors in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 102.
First, they alleged that unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution
of compensation by virtue of the provision on Salaries and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series
of 2000, issued on
2. Any employee
who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG) shall not suffer a
reduction in salary except where his/her current salary is higher than the
maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case he/she shall be paid
the salary corresponding to the maximum step of the SG of the new
position. RATA shall no longer be
received, if employee was matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.
Incidentally, the petition shows that
none of the petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were entitled to receive
RATA at the time the petition was filed.
Nor was it alleged that they suffered any diminution of
compensation. Secondly, it
was claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with unidentified positions
for which they were supposedly neither qualified nor suited. New
employees, again unnamed and not included as parties, were hired by the DOH and
appointed to unidentified positions for which they were purportedly not
qualified, despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was
to cut back on costs. Lastly,
unspecified DOH employees were deployed or transferred during the three-month
period before the national and local elections in May 2001, in violation of
Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as “Magna Carta for Public Health Workers.”
Petitioners’ allegations are too
general and unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to pass upon. The persons involved are not identified,
details of their appointments and transfers – such as position, salary grade,
and the date they were appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which
attended the alleged violations are not specified.
Even
granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners,
they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent
provisions of Department
Circular No. 312, Series of 2000.
Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly
addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94,
series of 2000;[39] and if
the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order
No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid, although they may be abused or misabused,
and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to
be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case.[40]
In a number
of cases,[41]
the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the
“transcendental importance” of the constitutional question justified the
granting of relief. In spite of these rulings, the Court, in Domingo v. Carague,[42]
dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to show any present
substantial interest. It demonstrated
how even in the cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case
was of transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert
substantial interest. Present substantial interest, which will
enable a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a party
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[43] It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or
future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[44]
In the same
way, the Court, in Telecommunications
& Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,[45]
ruled that a citizen is
allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. This case likewise stressed that the rule on constitutional
questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a
party’s substantive claim is without merit.
Thus, a party’s standing is determined by the substantive merit of his
case or a preliminary estimate thereof.
After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners’ substantive claims, this
Court finds that the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their
claims.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
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ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
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ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
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DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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[1] Penned by Associate Justice Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; rollo, pp. 214-254.
[2]
[3] The rationale for this draft administrative order reads:
In line with the goal of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) of providing equitable quality health services, the hospital reforms were initiated to complement the other HSRA components. The objectives of the Hospital Reform component include among others, the following to promote efficiency in hospital operations and management; to enhance the capabilities through facilities and human resource upgrading; and to attain fiscal autonomy and managerial flexibility while maintain the government’s social responsibility for the indigent patients.
With this framework, the corporate restructuring of DOH Hospitals into government owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) was identified as the most effective means to attain the above objectives.
[4] The rationale for this administrative order reads:
The
Department of Health encourages the employment of physicians and paramedical
personnel who are experts in their field of practice in various government
hospitals and other government health facilities. It is envisioned to attract the best and the
brightest professionals for medical and paramedical positions, in order to 1)
provide adequate quality medical care to patients especially the indigent; 2)
teach, train and interact with the other medical and paramedical professionals
and; 3) Conduct relevant studies and research thereby enhancing the quality of
medical and health care delivery systems.
As an incentive and in recognition for their commitment to remain as Members of the hospital staff for a longer period for continuous improvement of the health care delivery service of the facility, private practice is allowed.
[5] Rollo, pp. 96-98.
[6]
[7] SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) For a Barangay:
x x x x
(ii) Health and social welfare services
which include maintenance of barangay health center
and day-care center;
x x x x
(2) For a municipality:
x x x x
(iii) Subject
to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which
include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health
care, maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease
control services; access to secondary and tertiary health services;
purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the
services herein enumerated;
x x x x
(3) For a Province:
x x x x
(iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five,
Book I of this Code, health services which include hospitals and other tertiary
health services;
x x x x
(4) For a City:
All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition thereto, the following:
[8] Rollo, pp. 131-151.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7305 reads:
SEC. 2. No transfer nor reassignment shall be made three months before any local or national elections.
[16] Rollo, p. 78.
[17]
[18] Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA 408, 473; Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 684.
[19] 338 Phil. 546, 580-581 (1997).
[20] 274 Phil. 323 (1991).
[21] G.R. No. 115455,
[22] Kilosbayan v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 697-698 (1995); and Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82, 102-103 (1997).
[23] Supra note 19.
[24] 274 Phil. 323 (1991).
[25] Supra note 21.
[26] Supra note 18 at 686.
[27] Tanada, v. Angara, supra note 19 at 581.
[28] Rollo, p. 132.
[29] Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, 455 Phil. 761, 774-775 (2003); Domingo v. Zamora, 445 Phil. 7, 12-13 (2003); Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications v. Mabalot, 428 Phil. 154, 164-165 (2002); Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281, 291 (2001); Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, 280 SCRA 713, 729-730.
[30]
[31] Section 21, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code.
[32] Section 1, Chapter 1, Book IV of the Administrative Code reads:
SECTION 1. Purpose and Number of Departments. - The Executive Branch shall have Departments as are necessary for the functional distribution of the work of the President and for the performance of their functions.
[33] Rollo, pp. 384-388.
[34]
[35]
[36] Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications v. Mabalot, supra note 29 at 166-167.
[37] Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463-465 (1939).
[38] Secretary
of the Department of Transportation and Communications v. Mabalot,
supra note 29 at 170; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
[39] The procedure for appeals, as provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000, reads:
General Guidelines on Appeals
In order to properly and immediately address the appeals, issues and concerns of personnel, the following rules shall apply:
1. Appeals, oversights, issues and concerns related to personnel selection and placement shall be handled by an Appeals Committee.
2. For proper documentation, all appeals shall be made in writing. An Appeals Form shall be made available for all personnel.
3. All personnel concerned shall be given opportunity to present their side to assure utmost objectivity and impartiality. If and when necessary, hearings shall be conducted.
4. The Appeals Committee shall be expected to resolve issues, recommend options to the EXECOM or the concerned personnel within 15 working days upon receipt of the said appeal.
[40] David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 258.
[41] Agan, Sr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil.
744, 803-804 (2003); Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 526-528 (2002); and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. 113375,
[42] G.R. No. 161065,
[43] National
Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin,
G.R. No. 67752,
[44] Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections, 433 Phil. 620, 635-636 (2002).
[45] 352 Phil. 153, 168-169 (1998).