ANDY
QUELNAN y QUINO, G.R. No. 166061
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondent.
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
This petition for review seeks the
reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004, affirming
the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498, that
found Andy Quelnan y Quino[3]
(petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The accusatory portion of the Information
against petitioner reads:
That
on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of
Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated
drug.
Contrary
to law.[4]
During arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.
Witnesses[5]
for the prosecution testified as to the following set of facts:
On 27 August 1996, a team from the
Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos
Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag,
SPO2 Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3
Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo Lectura,[6] was
formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on
At around
At their knocking, a male person
naked from the waist up opened the door.[8] He was later identified as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to
petitioner.[9] Upon entry, the police operatives searched
the unit, which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider separating
the sala from the bedroom.[10] In the presence of petitioner and Punsaran, the
group started searching the place and eventually found on top of the bedroom
table three (3) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances later confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) forensic chemist as shabu,
plastic tubings, weighing scales, an improvised burner, and empty transparent
plastic sachets.[11] Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of
the properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly signed by
petitioner in their presence and that of Punsaran.[12]
Meanwhile, the group also went to
Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant and search the place. The police operatives did not find any
occupant in the room.
Petitioner was then brought to the
PARAC office for investigation. The pieces
of evidence gathered by the police operatives were brought to the NBI for
examination. That same day, NBI Forensic
Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a certification stating that upon examination,
the specimen submitted yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[13] The
following day, the Arrest Report and Joint Affidavit of Apprehension were
executed by the police operatives leading to the arrest and charging of petitioner
for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.
In his defense, petitioner testified
that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300,
knocking at the door and he opened
it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who
suddenly barged into the room. The
officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim and petitioner introduced
himself as the owner of the condominium unit. The police operatives then
proceeded to search the house for the next half hour while petitioner was
waiting in the sala. Petitioner was also
forced to sign some documents at gunpoint.
Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office. Two days
later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutor’s Office for inquest and a case
was subsequently filed against him.[16]
In behalf of petitioner, Luis
Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium, testified that Lee was the
actual occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was arrested.[17] Celso
Fiesta, petitioner’s driver, also stated in court that petitioner resides at
After trial, the RTC found petitioner
guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional
as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.[19] In convicting petitioner, the trial court relied
heavily on the clear, straightforward, and candid testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses:
They were all
present when the search warrant was implemented at Unit 615 Cityland
Condominium. No infirmity or flaw
affecting their credibility exists.
Further, the Court considered that they are public officers and there
was no showing that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies or bad faith to
falsely testify against the accused.
There was no evidence of intent to harass the accused. The presumption of regularity in the performance
of their functions can be fairly applied.[20]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, modifying however the penalty to be imposed
on petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor as minimum to three
(3) years and six (6) months of prision
correccional as maximum.[21]
Petitioner now seeks the reversal of
said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the validity of the
warrantless arrest. The prosecution
proffers that petitioner was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of the subject shabu justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises, that of the
validity of the enforcement of the
search warrant as basis for the presence of the police operatives in the
Cityland Condominium unit. Therefore,
these matters may be summarized into two issues for our resolution: whether the
search warrant was properly enforced and whether petitioner was validly
arrested without warrant.
The issue as to whether the search
warrant was validly implemented necessitates a review of the tenor of the search
warrant, vis-à-vis the conduct of the police operatives enforcing such warrant.
Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff
-
versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585
FOR: VIOLATION OF
R.A. 6425
BERNARD LIM[22] (Dangerous Drug Act 1972)
Room 615 Cityland Condominium
South Superhighway,
Respondent.
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It
appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP
SPO4 ISAGANI J. ILAS and his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to
believe that VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 6425 has been committed or is about to be
committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that still
undetermined Quantity of Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) has [sic] in
his possession and control.
You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises abovementioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the abovementioned MET[H]AMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of the offense and bring to this Court said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. You are further directed to submit return within ten (10) days from today.
GIVEN
UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 26[th] day of August 1996 in
HON.
WILLIAM M. BAYHON
Executive
Judge, RTC
Branch
XXIII,
NOTE: This Search
Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue.[23]
Petitioner assails the improper
enforcement of the search warrant in that despite the knowledge that petitioner
was not the subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway
with the search and his resulting arrest.
According to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a
search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises and
not of a person, the omission of the name of the owner or occupant of such
property in the warrant does not invalidate the same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine
applies only if the search warrant does not indicate with all certainty the
owner or occupant of the premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the
subject search warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject
thereof is Kim.
This
argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites for
the issuance of search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Nowhere in said rule or any other
provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that the
search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises. In Uy
v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,[24]
the Court has definitively ruled that where the search warrant is issued for
the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a
person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the
affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the
name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted
in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the
premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to
the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.
A cursory reading of the search
warrant reveals that the police officers were ordered to make an immediate
search of the premises mentioned and to seize and take possession of shabu.
Furthermore, they were directed to bring “persons to be dealt with as
the law may direct.” While petitioner may not be the person subject of the
search, the fact that he was caught in
flagrante delicto necessitated his valid warrantless arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioner’s name
was not indicated in the search warrant is immaterial.
Turning to the second issue, petitioner
insists that his apprehension cannot be considered in flagrante delicto because he was not in possession of the
forbidden drug.
In every prosecution for the illegal
possession of shabu, the following
essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession
of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly
constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug
is a regulated drug.[25]
More importantly, the prosecution
must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the drug. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where
it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact of
possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the
place under his control and dominion, as well as the character of the drug.
Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drug in
the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same
may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place
over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation.[26]
For the trial court, the fact of
possession was clearly and convincingly established by the prosecution, to wit:
Prosecution
has presented in Court the three (3) plastic sachet[s] containing 27.7458 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride as well as all paraphernalia seized from the
accused consisting of an improvised burner, two (2) pieces of weighing scale,
plastic tubing, aluminum foil, empty transparent plastic sachets, Icom radio,
Calculator, Cellular phone, disposable lighters, and two (2) pieces [of] blank
cartridge. SPO4 Ilas and SPO2 Sinag
clearly testified that they were found on top of a table in a room of [sic] Unit 615 in the
afternoon of
The Court of Appeals pointed out that
possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled
substances may be actual or constructive:
Although
the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the bedroom
of the subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was
the only person in said premises.
Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching team in the subject
premises, appellant was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court
correctly concluded, only “indicates extreme familiarity and gives the
impression of he being at home” in the premises, of which he was the registered
owner.[28]
Petitioner counters that he was in
all his right to be in the leased premises because he had to collect the
rentals due him from his tenant. He
further argues that the shabu was
allegedly found on top of the table inside the bedroom and not within the
immediate location where he was positioned. When he was found half-naked by
police operatives in another person’s house, petitioner defends his act by invoking
his “long bond of friendship” with Lee which made the former treat Lee’s home
like his own.[29]
In support of the appellate court’s
ruling, the Solicitor General maintained that petitioner was in constructive
possession of the subject shabu by
citing several circumstances showing petitioner’s control and dominion over the
same. First, the shabu was
found on top of a table in Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium when and where only
petitioner was present inside the premises. Second,
petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium. Third, petitioner admitted that he was
at the subject premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee. Fourth, petitioner was found naked from
the waist up by the police operatives upon entering Unit 615. The Solicitor
General stresses that petitioner’s actuation of being naked from the waist up
while opening the door to greet visitors is natural only to someone who owns
the premises.[30] Fifth, Unit 615 is a studio unit with a
divider and a sala. There was no room
with a door to be closed and locked which can prevent petitioner from having
free access to the shabu found on the
table.
This
Court is convinced that petitioner’s control and dominion over the shabu found on top of the table were
sufficiently established by his questionable presence in Unit 615. Petitioner’s explanation that he went to
Lee’s unit to collect rentals and was left by the maid to fend for himself
while the latter went out to buy refreshments is highly suspicious. The maid never came back. The maid’s testimony would have corroborated
that of petitioner’s.
Despite the presentation of the testimonies
of Cityland Condominium Administrator Luis Alvarez and other witnesses tending
to prove that petitioner is the owner and lessor of Unit 615 and his actual
place of residence is in
Petitioner,
in fact, affirmed this fact in his earlier testimony that he allowed Lee, whom
he barely knew, to occupy the unit with only one month rental deposit:
Q: Is
it your practice to go personally to that unit to receive the rental?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q:
That’s your practice?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
How much is the lease price?
A:
P6,500.00.
Q:
Payable monthly?
A:
At the second week of the month.
Q:
For what month was that rental
where [sic] you were suppose to collect?
A:
June and July[,] your Honor.
Q: Is
it not a practice[,] Mr. Witness[,] that now lessee should pay the deposit and
a few months in advance?
A:
Yes, but he promise he does not
have any money and to produce later on.[sic]
Q:
Which rental he is going to pay?
A:
The deposit and the monthly rental.
Q:
What you are saying [sic] when he
entered the premises of this property he does not paid [sic] anything?
A: He just paid for the month of May.
Q: What
you are saying you entered into a lease contract with a person you do not know
during the said month, that he entered the unit he was not able to pay you even
the deposit [sic]?
A:
He paid me just one month.
Q:
And you agreed?
A:
Yes, sir. [H]e promised to pay
later on.[32]
Equally
doubtful is the existence of the lease contract allegedly executed between
petitioner and Lee which purportedly validates the presence of the former in
Unit 615, which was to collect rentals from the latter. As the Solicitor General correctly observed, the
lease agreement is undated and unnotarized.[33] During cross-examination, the building
administrator who presented a copy of the lease agreement could not even
remember when the contract was executed.[34] Petitioner
also testified that the rentals are payable at the second week of each month.[35] His statement is inconsistent with his avowed
effort to collect payment in the last week of the month, particularly on
We further find the Solicitor
General’s conclusion that petitioner was privy to the existence of the shabu on top of the table credible
because the unit was a small room with a piece of plywood dividing the sala and
the bedroom. With petitioner seemingly
comfortable in moving about the unit, the shabu
and other paraphernalia could not have escaped his vision.
Even
more telling are the testimonies of the police operatives who conducted the
search and subsequent arrest of petitioner.
Inspector Acosta testified that his team conducted a search on Unit 615
and found petitioner inside the room alone and that the search resulted in the
discovery of the shabu, to wit:
Q:
In connection with your duties then
as the member of the PARAC[,] do you recall if there was any occasion if you
meet a certain person whose name [was] Andy Quelman?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:
During what occasion did you meet
this person?
A:
During [sic] when we conducted the
search of the Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,]
Q: If this person Andy Quelman is present in this Courtroom[,] can you point him out in the Court?
COURT:
Will you step down
on the witness stand and tap on his shoulder?
A: Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Make of record that
the witness stepped down on the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of a
person seated on the gallery who when asked of his name answered his name as
Andy Quelman.
Q:
You said that you conducted a
search, when was this?
A:
Q:
What time?
A:
Q:
Where did you conduct the search?
A:
At room 615 Cityland Condominium[,]
South Superhighway[,]
x
x x x
Q:
By what authority did you conduct
your search at room or [U]nit 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,]
A:
We are armed with [a] search
warrant.
Q:
Issued by whom?
A:
The RTC Judge Hon. Bayhon, City of
x x x x
Q:
So upon arriving at the 6th floor
what did you do, or what did you do?
A:
We knocked at the door of [R]oom
615.
Q:
And what happened next?
A:
Somebody opened the door.
Q:
And after the door was opened[,]
what did you and your team do next?
A:
We presented our search warrant.
Q:
To whom?
COURT:
Would you know who
open[ed] the door?
A:
Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
GARVIDA:
Q:
Who?
A:
Andy Quelman.
PROSECUTOR
GARVIDA:
Q:
Can you describe[,] Mr. Witness[,]
the appearance of Mr. Andy Quelman when he opened the door?
A: He is half[-]naked wearing pants.
Q:
What about the upper body?
A:
Naked.
Q:
Upon presenting the search warrant[,]
what did you do next?
A:
We proceeded to the room to
conduct the search.
x
x x x
Q:
You said you proceeded to conduct
the search. [W]hat was Mr. Quelman doing while you are conducting the search?
A:
He was sitting at the table inside
the room.
x
x x x
Q:
Now can you describe to this Court
how you conducted the search[,] Mr. Witness?
A:
First we proceeded to his room and
I saw Mr. Quelman sitting at his table.
Later on we found at his table all the paraphernalia.
Q:
Can you enumerate to this Court
what[,] if any[,] did you find [sic] during the search?
A:
We found 3 transparent plastic
containing white crystalline substance.
Q:
Where did you find [sic]?
A:
Atop the table.
x x x x
Q:
What did you do with Mr. Quelman
after you found these items which you [have] just enumerated?
A:
We bring [sic] Andy Quelman to our
office.[36]
The foregoing testimony was
substantially corroborated by SPO4 Isagani Ilas and SPO1 Teodoro Sinag who were
both part of the arresting team. These
witnesses positively identified petitioner as the occupant of Unit 615 at the
time the search was conducted and that he was caught in flagrante delicto when the shabu
was found in his constructive possession.
The
trial court placed great weight on the testimonies of these police officers and
accorded them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
functions.[37] The prosecution of drug cases largely depends
on the credibility of the police officers.
The factual findings of the trial court especially
those which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be
respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the
facts or no speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gleaned
from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is best undertaken by the
trial court because
of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination.[38] In
this case, the RTC was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner has not
convinced this Court of the existence of any of the recognized exceptions[39]
to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts.
In
sum, petitioner’s unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and dominion
over the shabu found on top of the
table, was duly established by the following evidence: his presence in Unit 615
at the time of his arrest;[40] his
representation to the police that he was the owner of the unit;[41] his
half-naked state when he opened the door, strongly implying that he had stayed
in the house longer than he claimed to be; and finally, the fact that the shabu was found on top of a table beside
the bed which appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere
divider between the sala and bedroom.[42]
Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police
operatives are obligated to apprehend him even without a warrant of arrest.
We shall now
determine the imposable penalty. Both
the lower courts erred as to the respective penalties they imposed. Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, provides that if the quantity of the regulated drug involved, in this
case, shabu, is less than 200 grams,
the penalty to be imposed shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion
perpetua. Since petitioner was charged
with the possession of 27.7458 grams
of shabu, the imposable penalty is prision correccional.[43] Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum, to three (3) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO is sentenced
to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day of arresto mayor in its medium
period as minimum to Three (3) Years of prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On
Official Leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Penned
by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Jose C. Mendoza.
[5]The following witnesses testified for the prosecution: Inspector Carlos Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Teodoro L. Sinag, and NBI Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo.
[17]TSN,
[22]While the search warrant indicates Bernard Lim as respondent, it appears that there is a typographical error in that Lim should have been spelled as “Kim.”
[25]Abuan v.
People, G.R. No. 168773,
[26]People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, 28 May
2004, 430 SCRA 134, 152, citing People v.
Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 (1990).
[39] These are some of the recognized exceptions:
“1) when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
2) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
3) when
the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
4) when
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
5) when
the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
6) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
7) when
the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion;
8) when
the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence
on which they are based; and
10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.” (Fuentes
v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997); Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105540, 5 July 1993, 224
SCRA 494, 498-499; Angelo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 83392, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 402.
[40]TSN,