VIRGINIA PEREZ CLAUDIO, G.R. No.
165962
Represented
by ERNESTO BROSAS,
as
Attorney-in-fact, Present:
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
FRANCISCA QUEBRAL,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
July 6, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
In this Rule 45 Petition for Review, petitioner
seeks the reversal of the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 May 2004 that dismissed the case of
forcible entry which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City had ordered[2]
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Dagupan City.
Petitioner
Virginia Perez-Claudio, through her representative and attorney-in-fact Ernesto
Brosas,[3]
lodged a complaint for forcible entry with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction[4]
before the MTCC of Dagupan City. She
alleged that on 25 August 1999, Proceso Perez (Proceso) and herein respondent
Francisca Quebral, by means of stealth and strategy and without authority of
law, entered into the western half portion of a piece of land situated in
Tapuac District, Dagupan City and identified as Lot No. 5267 in the cadastral
survey.[5] Claiming to be the owner of the said portion,
she asserted that she had purchased the same from her father, Alberto Perez
(Alberto), in 1973[6]
and had since been in peaceful possession thereof until Proceso and respondent committed
acts of disposition such as building a hut, cutting off trees and removing the
barbed-wire fence.
Both Proceso and respondent refuted
petitioner’s claim of ownership and prior possession of the land in question. Proceso,
in his Answer, countered that the property was and still is owned by his
grandfather, Juan Perez, Sr., who died in 1938 leaving his three children,
Juan, Jr., Patricia and Maria, to become co-owners thereof. The property,
according to him, remained to be in his grandfather’s name and had never been
partitioned.[7] Respondent’s defense ran along the same line.
She pointed out that she had become a co-owner of the property by way of
succession and by right of representation upon the death of her mother,
Patricia. Alberto, she revealed, was
Maria’s illegitimate son.[8]
Respondent attached documents[9]
to her Answer tending to show that the alleged sale between Alberto and
petitioner was fictitious, simulated and without consideration and, therefore,
null and void.
At the preliminary conference, the
parties agreed on a set of facts. The
common stipulation of facts, as embodied in the Pre-trial Order dated 15 September
2000, reads, thus:
At the pre-trial conference this
morning, Atty. Hermogenes Decano, counsel for the plaintiff, Atty. Roberto
Callanta, counsel for the defendant Francisca Quebral, Atty. Edgardo Martin,
counsel for the defendant Proceso Perez and the defendants appeared. The
parties discounted any amicable settlement.
However, they entered into the following stipulations of facts:
1.
The identity of the parties;
2.
The identity of the subject property;
3.
That the original owner of the subject property was Juan
Perez, Sr. as per OCT No. 40174;
4.
That Juan Perez, Sr. has three (3) heirs[,] namely[,]
Juan Perez, Jr., Patricia Perez and Maria Perez;
5.
That defendant Francisca Quebral is one of [the] heirs
of Patricia Perez, who is one of the children of Juan Perez, Sr.;
6.
That defendant Proceso Perez is the heir of Juan Perez,
Jr., son of Juan Perez, Sr.[10]
When the
parties were ordered by the MTCC to file their position papers, only petitioner
and Proceso complied. Respondent was
duly notified of the order,[11]
but she failed to comply.
On 20 November
2000, the MTCC rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants[,] ordering the
latter:
1.
To vacate the subject western half portion of Lot No.
5267 and to restore peacefully the possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2.
To pay to the plaintiff, proportionately, the
reasonable compensation for their use of the subject premises in the amount of P3,000.00
per month from August 25, 1999 until they have fully vacated the same;
3.
To pay to the plaintiff, proportionately, the sum of P15,000.00
as and for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved
by the adverse decision, Proceso and
respondent appealed to the RTC of Dagupan City.
Proceso
argued that the MTCC erred in finding him liable under the complaint[13]
and in disregarding his affidavit attesting to the supposed fact that he had no
reason to forcibly take possession of the disputed portion of the land because
he established his residence in Malued District, Dagupan City since birth. He
claimed that the court also disregarded his witnesses’ affidavits which tend to
prove that he was not the one who entered the subject premises and felled the
trees therein.[14]
For her
part, respondent contended, among other things, that she had been denied due
process when the court decided the case in the absence of her position
paper—a procedural lapse that she
attributed to the negligence and ineffectiveness of her counsel.[15]
On April 5,
2001, the RTC rendered its decision, reversing the MTCC insofar as Proceso was
concerned and, as regards respondent, ordering the remand of the case back to
the MTCC for further proceedings and for the reception of respondent’s position
paper.[16]
Questioning
the order of remand, petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42
before the Court of Appeals. She
asserted that the negligent failure of respondent’s counsel to file the
necessary position paper despite due notice should be binding on respondent especially
so where the counsel had not been adequately shown to be in bad faith or
grossly negligent. She emphasized that respondent was unable to show any reason
for such failure and instead merely made a foregone conclusion that her counsel
was negligent and incompetent.[17]
Incidentally,
in her petition, petitioner had impleaded Proceso since the latter’s name appeared
in the caption of the petition. Be that as it may, in view of the lone issue
that she raised before the appellate court and the positive statement that she
was abandoning the case against Proceso because of the latter’s claim that he
did not enter the subject premises,[18]
petitioner, in effect, did not appeal from the order of the RTC dismissing the
case against said defendant.
On 31 May
2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the
complaint for forcible entry. After her motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
Resolving
the issue of whether the instant case warrants a remand to the MTCC, the Court
of Appeals held that the negligence imputed by respondent to her counsel had
not been satisfactorily shown. According to the appellate court, such omission
was nothing more than a manifestation of professional lapse, inefficiency and
carelessness. And even hypothetically
admitting it to be true, the same would nevertheless be binding on respondent
following the principle that any act performed by counsel within the scope of
his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Thus, the
MTCC could not have been in error in deciding the case even in the absence of
the said pleading.[19]
We
agree. The rule is that a client will
suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his
counsel. While this Court is always
mindful of this rule, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions thereto
may be made depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.[20] However, we do not consider the instant case
as an exception to the said rule for two reasons: first, it cannot be said that
respondent was deprived of her day in court and second, she failed to
positively validate with proof her charge of gross and inexcusable negligence
against her counsel.
The Court
of Appeals is correct in finding that there is no compelling ground to remand
the case back to the court of origin for the sole purpose of allowing
respondent to submit her position paper. Remand would serve no useful purpose as
it would only cause unwanted and unnecessary delay in the proceedings. After
all, upon being apprised of the adverse decision rendered by the MTCC,
respondent lost no time in availing of the appropriate remedy which is an
appeal to the RTC, and thereafter actively resisted the claim of petitioner.
We now determine whether the Court of
Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the complaint against respondent.
The
appellate court, invoking its equity jurisdiction, undertook to inquire into
the merits of the case in order not to delay the proceedings. It observed that doubt was cast on the exact
identity of the disputed portion of the land the rightful possession of which
was being claimed by petitioner. The
1973 deed of sale provides that Federico and petitioner were to get the
northern and southern halves of the land, respectively; but since the northern
portion was smaller, Federico was empowered to acquire so much from
petitioner’s portion as to complete his own proportionate half. The property, however, remained undivided and
the said deed of sale unregistered which is why the transfer certificate of
title covering the entire lot remained in the name of Alberto. [21] For this reason, and considering the allegation
in the complaint that it is the western half of the land which was forcibly
entered into, the appellate court ruled that petitioner had failed to identify the
portion of the property over which she claimed rightful possession as an owner.[22]
Petitioner
maintains that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
dismissed the complaint for forcible entry on the ground that the subject
property has not been sufficiently identified by the allegations in the
complaint as well as by the evidence. She advances that the appellate court has
made a “preconceived conclusion of lack of identity of [the] subject land”
based solely on the 1973 deed of sale[23]
and in the process ignored the affidavits attached to her position paper independently executed by
her and by
her caretaker as well as the sketch of the entire Lot No. 5267.[24] Moreover, she believes that when the parties
at the pre-trial conference freely admitted and stipulated on the identity of
the contested property, they became bound by the same and, accordingly, no
other questions regarding the same admitted issue may further be considered
even on appeal.[25]
The
contention is imbued with merit.
The Court
of Appeals committed a reversible error when it found that the subject property
has not been sufficiently identified by petitioner. On the face of the complaint, it abundantly
appears that petitioner is referring to only a portion of the entire lot in
question. Admittedly, the complaint
refers to the western half portion whereas the 1973 deed of sale attached to it
shows that it is the southern portion of the lot that was sold by Alberto to petitioner. Despite this ostensible discrepancy, however,
all the parties proceeded to the preliminary conference and, with their counsel,
entered into a stipulation of facts thereby admitting, among others, the
identity of the subject premises—an admission that is binding on them. Thus, respondent’s contention that what has
been admitted is the identity of the entire Lot No. 5267 and not the unidentified
portion claimed by petitioner,[26]
must fail. Notably, none of the
defendants in the lower court raised this question in their answer or in their
pre-trial brief.
Ejectment
cases in general involve a perturbation of social order which must be restored
as promptly as possible.[27] Thus, the Rules on Summary Procedure, which
govern the proceedings in these cases and which were designed to meet that end,
are intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
right of possession of property.[28]
A mere reading of the summary rules reveals the basic objective, through the
procedural requirements and prohibitions therein, to obviate dilatory practices
and unnecessary delay which have long been the bane of ejectment proceedings.[29] It is within the context of this policy of
the law that we rule that respondent’s challenge against the identity of the
subject property is barred. A contrary
ruling would render useless the proceedings had at the preliminary conference
and would in fact be antithetical to the very purpose of a preliminary
conference—which is, among others, to allow the parties to admit and stipulate
on a given set of facts and to simplify the issues involved. Our pronouncement in Custodio v. Corrado[30] is instructive on this point—
x
x x Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic
issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial
and resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and
expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal
precept that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during
the pre-trial.[31]
Besides, in
much the same way that a complaint in ordinary procedure which fails to state a
cause of action may be cured by the evidence presented at the trial, a
defective complaint in an ejectment case may likewise be cured by the
allegations in the position paper.[32]
We take
notice of the fact that petitioner’s claim of prior physical possession of the
property in question rests on the 1973 deed of sale executed by Alberto. It
appears that the latter had in turn acquired the property from Pedro and
Eulogio Patani under two deeds of sale.[33]
He thereafter declared the same for taxation purposes, religiously discharged
the tax obligations thereon[34]
and remained in possession thereof until the southern portion was usurped by
one Fausto Carvajal in 1950—a controversy (action for recovery of possession) that
had been resolved in favor of Alberto.[35]
It was likewise established that both
petitioner and her brother had been in open and adverse possession of their
respective shares of the lot until the defendants committed the acts complained
of.[36]
In a bid to
defeat petitioner’s claim, respondent assails the validity of the 1973 deed of
sale and alleges that the same is null and void for being simulated, fictitious
and for having been executed without consideration. Respondent likewise asserts that the property
remains undivided between petitioner and Federico and that the spurious TCT remains
to be in the name of their father.
We
acknowledge that these allegations of respondent may, in the appropriate forum,
merit a bona fide consideration;
however, we are not inclined to rule on these contentions inasmuch as this
Court is not the proper forum before which these issues may be ventilated. Needless to say, the long settled rule is
that the issue of ownership or title to property cannot be collaterally
attacked. Section 48, Presidential
Decree No. 1529 materially provides that a certificate of title cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. Issues as to the validity of
title to property can be assailed only in an action expressly instituted for
that specific purpose[37]
either in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. A proceeding for forcible entry, which by
nature is an accion interdictal, is
merely a quieting process and never determines actual title to an estate.[38]
It is
hornbook doctrine that in an ejectment case, it is not the prime function of
the courts to resolve questions relating to title to or ownership of the
property in litigation. What is involved
in ejectment cases is merely the issue of material or physical possession
(possession de facto) independent of
any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants,[39]
such that any one of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner
himself—regardless of the character of such possession—provided that he has in
his favor priority in time.[40]
From the
records we conclude that petitioner enjoys priority in time of possession. The
1973 deed of sale well supports the claim that since the date of the execution
thereof petitioner had been in possession of her share of the property. The affidavit of petitioner’s witness is
likewise supportive of the stance that as far as petitioner was concerned, she
had filled her portion with soil up to road level, enclosed the same with
barbed wire and appointed a caretaker to look after the property during the
interim that she was residing in the United States.[41] Possession, under the law, is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is
subject to
the action of our will or by the proper acts or legal formalities established
for acquiring such right.[42] There is no doubt that petitioner has
positively established her possession of the subject premises when she
performed the above-mentioned acts thereby establishing material occupation
over the same and subjecting it to the action of her will, regardless of the
character of her right as such possessor.
We can only infer that from then on she has remained in material
possession of the subject lot inasmuch as the law presumes that possession,
once acquired, is continuous and uninterrupted.[43]
Interestingly,
respondent, for her part, does not appear to claim prior material or physical
possession of the property in her favor.
The arguments embodied in her pleadings are consistent in asserting her
right as co-owner together with the other heirs/descendants of the primitive
owner of the property to the exclusion of petitioner. To support her contention, she seeks to
destroy petitioner’s claim of ownership by attacking the validity of the 1973
deed of sale and of Alberto’s TCT. Regrettably, respondent’s challenge must
fail inasmuch as the same cannot warrant a definite ruling in this case in view
of the presumption of validity that the law accords to said documents.
The reinstatement of the original MTCC
decision against respondent is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. Respondent
Francisca Quebral is ORDERED to vacate the subject premises and to restore the
peaceful possession thereof to petitioner.
Respondent is further ordered to pay petitioner the reasonable
compensation for the use of the subject premises in the amount of P3,000.00
a month from August 25, 1999 until she has fully vacated the same. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On
Official Leave)
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]CA G.R. No. 65557, penned by Associate Justice Edgardo
F. Sundiam, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Japar B.
Dimaampao; Rollo, pp. 35-45.
[2]In a decision dated 5 April 2001 in Civil Case No.
12177, penned by Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr.; id. at 61-75.
[3]Appointed as such by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
executed by Virginia Perez Claudio in San Francisco, California, USA before
Philippine Consulate General Roberto Mascardo on 7 September 1999; Records, pp.
4-5.
[6]Deed of Sale dated 7 July 1973 executed by Alberto
Perez in favor of Virginia R. Perez and Federico R. Perez married to Florita
Claveria; id. at 6.
[9]Namely, a certification issued by the Lands Management
Bureau to the effect that the said office did not have any record on file of
any public land application/land patent covering the subject lot; another
certification from the Register of Deeds stating that there was no instrument
on file effecting the transfer of the property to Alberto; and a document
procured from the Land Registration Authority certifying that there was no
record as to the existence of a decree relating to the same; id. at 32-34.
[11]A copy of the pre-trial order with the directive for
the filing of position paper was received by Atty. Roberto Callanta on October
6, 2000 as per Postal Receipt No. 3179; id.
[14]See affidavits of Eric Cruz and of Manuel de Guzman to
the effect that the former had been contracted by a certain Agustin Perez to
cut the trees on the property; id. at 68-69.
[24]Id. at 18-19.
On the one hand, the Affidavit of Virginia
Perez-Claudio reads in part: “xxx I am
the owner and in peaceful possession of the south-western portion of the
following described property: x x x Sometime on 25 August 1999 the defendant by
means of stealth and strategy and without authority of law entered the western
part of southern part of the above-described property, effectively excluding the plaintiff and her agent by means
of intimidation and threats of violence x x x.”
On the other hand, the sketch of Lot No. 5267 attached
to Julieta Perez’s Affidavit shows that the portion of the lot being claimed by
Claudio is located on the southwestern portion and identified therein as Lot
No. 5267-C, and the share of Proceso Perez which is the northern half extending
a little over the southeastern portion is labeled as Lot No. 5267-A. Lot No. 5267-B is that portion occupied by
the National Road.
[25]Id. at 20-22.
[34]In her Position Paper, petitioner exhibited
photocopied receipts tending to show that Alberto Perez had been paying real
property taxes on Lot No. 5267; id. at 137, 117-121.
[35]CA G.R. No. 37309-R, entitled Alberto Perez and Inocencia Ramirez v. Fausto Carvajal; id. at
92-106.
[36]Affidavit of Julieta Perez who served as caretaker of
the property while petitioner was residing abroad, id. at 122.
[37]Ross Rica
Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No.
132197, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 35,
51; Apostol
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125375, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 351, 359.
[38]Somodio v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82680, 15 August
1994, 235 SCRA 307, 313.
[39]Habagat Grill
v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.,
G.R. No. 155110, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA
653, 670; Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v.
Ong, supra note 36 at 48; Gener v. De
Leon, 419 Phil. 920; Somodio v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 37 at 311; Drilon
v. Guarana, G.R. No. L-35482, 30 April 1987, 149 SCRA 342, 348.
[40]Somodio v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 37 at 311-312;
De Luna v. Court of Appeals, G. R.
No. 94490, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 276.
[41]Rollo, pp. 151-152.
[43]The New Civil Code, Art. 529.