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CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 163561
Present: |
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- versus - |
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA,
and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. |
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LITO CAGAMPAN, Respondents. |
Promulgated: July
24, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision[1]
dated
The facts are undisputed.
Private respondent Lito Cagampan was the Acting
Power Use Coordinator of petitioner Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (CENPELCO). On P100,831 from Aurora B. Bonifacio as partial payment for the installation of a
transformer in her building and expansion of a three-phase line.
In a letter[5]
dated
Upon investigation, it appeared that Cagampan knowingly entered into an unauthorized contract for the installation of a transformer, and that he was not authorized to accept payment. Hence, Cagampan was found guilty of violating CENPELCO’s Code of Ethics and Discipline, namely: (1) unauthorized acceptance of payments for new connection; (2) dishonest or unauthorized activity whether for personal gain or not; and (3) defrauding others by using the name of the company. He was dismissed from service.[6]
Cagampan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for
payment of backwages and damages, and reinstatement. In a decision dated
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The respondent corporation is,
however, ordered to pay the complainant P99,345.00 (P9,934.50 ÷ 2 = P4,967.25 x
20) by way of separation pay.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
Both
parties appealed to the NLRC. In a
decision dated
Hence,
this petition where petitioner raises the lone issue of –
Whether the
Honorable Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the award of separation pay to
private respondent Cagampan who was legally dismissed for gross misconduct and
acts of dishonesty is contrary to the existing jurisprudence.[9]
Simply
stated, at issue in this case is the propriety of the award of separation pay
to private respondent.
Petitioner
maintains that private respondent is not entitled to separation pay since he
was dismissed for gross misconduct and acts of dishonesty. It contends that separation pay or financial
assistance is not awarded to employees lawfully dismissed for serious
misconduct or for cause reflecting on his moral character.[10]
Private
respondent for his part claims that payment of separation pay for humanitarian
reasons is proper considering that he had served petitioner for almost
twenty-one years prior to his termination.[11]
The
Court of Appeals in affirming the NLRC decision held that the NLRC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in awarding the benefits of compassionate justice. It ratiocinated that considering his long
years of service, it did not necessarily follow that no award of separation pay
could be made if there was no illegal dismissal.[12]
We
find for petitioner. Separation pay
should not be awarded.
Section
7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides
that when the employee is dismissed for any of the just causes under Article
282[13]
of the Labor Code, he shall not be entitled to termination pay without
prejudice to applicable collective bargaining agreement or voluntary employer
policy or practice.[14] Separation pay shall be allowed only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.[15] Separation pay in such case is granted to
stand as a “measure of social justice.”[16]
If the cause for the termination of employment cannot be considered as one of
mere inefficiency or incompetence but an act that constitutes an utter
disregard for the interest of the employer or a palpable breach of trust in
him, the grant by the Court of separation benefits is hardly justifiable.[17]
In this case, private respondent was found by the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC to have been validly dismissed for violations of company rules, and
certain acts tantamount to serious misconduct.
Such findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded
respect and even finality by this Court.[18]
Although
long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation
benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of
termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner
for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal,
in our view of this case, does not call
for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of
loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be
regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such
gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting
the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse
its ranks of undesirables.[19]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-35. Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz, with Associate Justices Eliezer R. De Los Santos and Jose C. Mendoza concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] ART. 282. Termination by Employer.—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e)
Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[14] Section 7. Termination of employment by employer.—The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.
[15] Etcuban, Jr. v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No.
148410,
[16] San
Miguel Corporation v. Lao, G.R. Nos. 143136-37,
[17]
[18] Tres
Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, G.R. No. 140853,
[19] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra at 532, citing Flores v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 96969, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 350, 355.