FIRST
DIVISION
WT
CONSTRUCTION, INC. G.R.
No. 163352
and CHIARA
CONSTRUCTION
(represented
by its Proprietor, Efren
N. Rigor),
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA, JJ.
DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC
WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, BIDS Promulgated:
AND AWARDS
COMMITTEE –
DPWH-REGION
VII and WTG
CONSTRUCTION
and
DEVELOPMENT
CORP.,
Respondents. July 31, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
This case is a Petition for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Temporary Restraining Order filed by
petitioners WT Construction, Inc. and Chiara Construction (represented by its
proprietor, Efren N. Rigor) (the Joint Venture) against the respondents
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Bids and Awards
Committee-DPWH-Region VII (BAC Region VII), and WTG Construction and
Development Corporation (WTG). The
petition seeks the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against public respondents DPWH and BAC
Region VII to direct the latter to award the contract for the construction of
the “2nd Archbishop Reyes Avenue Flyover, Archbishop Reyes Avenue
corner N. Escuario Extension and Mindanao Avenue, Cebu City” (the Flyover
Project) to the petitioners. It likewise
prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against DPWH and
private respondent WTG from undertaking the aforesaid project.[1]
Petitioner WT Construction, Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law, and petitioner
Chiara Construction, a single proprietorship, formed a joint venture for the
purpose of participating in the bidding for and undertaking the construction of
the Flyover Project, should it be so awarded.
On
On
December 27, 2002, the day of the opening of the bids, public respondent BAC
Region VII excluded the bid of the petitioners from the opening of bids and
disqualified the same from participating on the ground that petitioners failed
to inform BAC Region VII that it has formed a joint venture to bid on the
Flyover Project and has failed to present a special license from the Philippine
Construction Accreditation Board (PCAB) as such joint venture. The two sealed bid envelopes of the
petitioners were then forwarded by BAC Region VII to the Office of the DPWH
Regional Director, Region VII,
BAC
Region VII proceeded to open and evaluate the remaining bids and thereafter
declared the bid of private respondent WTG, in the amount of P61,995,000.00,
as the lowest bid. After WTG’s bid
documents were post-evaluated and post-qualified by BAC Region VII’s Technical
Working Group as having passed all the legal, technical and financial
requirements of the contract, BAC Region VII issued a resolution declaring the
bid of WTG as the lowest responsive bid and recommending the approval of the
award of the contract for the Flyover Project to WTG to then DPWH Secretary
Simeon A. Datumanong.[4]
On
Pursuant
to the above decision, BAC Region VII scheduled the opening of the petitioners’
bid on
On
P52,770,947.29, the petitioners’ bid, however,
lacked certain vital requirements such as the special license as a joint
venture from the PCAB and the required surety bond under Section 19.2 of
Executive Order No. 40.[7]
On
On
Hence,
this petition.
The
petitioners allege that as the bidder who submitted the lowest numerical bid, they
are entitled to the award of the contract on the Flyover Project. It is their position that the PCAB special
license is necessary only after the award of the contract has been made and the
bidder’s bond they submitted should be considered as a surety bond which is
sufficient compliance with the requirements.
They likewise contend that bad faith attended their disqualification and
the subsequent award of the contract to private respondent WTG. They allege, among others, that the award of
the contract to WTG was premature considering they have filed an appeal to the
DPWH Secretary and that the approval of the contract by then Acting Secretary
Soriquez was a forgery. They further
insist that the decision of the DPWH Secretary on the letter-complaint of the
petitioners after the opening of their bid is of doubtful origin and validity.
Public
respondent BAC Region VII, on the other hand, disputes the allegations made by
the petitioners. They contend that they
complied with the
Private
respondent WTG, for its part, maintains that the petitioners were rightfully
disqualified due to lack of a special license for the joint venture and the
failure to submit a surety bond. It also
contends that the submission of the lowest bid alone does not give the
petitioners the right to insist that the contract be awarded to them. The bid is still subject to post evaluation
and acceptance of the Government which reserved the right to reject any and all
bids that are not deemed responsive or compliant to its requirements.[9]
The petition is without merit.
A preliminary mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy
that parties may avail of for the preservation or protection of their rights or
interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal
action.[10] Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction,
however, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously
regarded for the reason that it requires the performance of particular acts
that go beyond the maintenance of the status quo.[11] As such, the requirements for its issuance
are more stringent. Generally, a
preliminary mandatory injunction may only issue in cases of extreme urgency and
where the rights of the requesting party are clear and unmistakable. It may also issue in cases where the relative
inconvenience bears strongly in the requesting party’s favor, and where the
effect of the mandatory injunction is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing
continuing relation between the parties, which was recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by another party, rather than to establish a new relationship
between and among the parties. Being an
extraordinary remedy, the burden is on the requesting party to clearly show
entitlement to the issuance thereof.[12] The requesting party or movant must show the
existence of the right to be protected and that the subject of the injunction
violates such right. Further, the movant
must show that the invasion of such right is material and substantial and that
there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent serious damage.[13]
The petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.
In the case
at bar, the petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to direct public respondent BAC Region VII to award the
contract to the Flyover Project to the petitioners. The petitioners claim that they are entitled
to the award as the lowest bidder for the construction of the said infrastructure
project of the Government. In support of
their claim, the petitioners allege fraud and bad faith on the part of public respondent
BAC Region VII. They allege conspiracy, forgery and fraud on the part of the
public respondent in awarding the subject contract to private respondent
WTG. These grave allegations were not
sufficiently substantiated.
As correctly pointed out by the
respondents, the mere submission of the lowest bid does not automatically
entitle the petitioners to the award of the contract. The bid must still undergo evaluation and
post qualification in order to be declared the lowest responsive bid and
thereafter be awarded the contract. As
provided in the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid, “the Government
reserve[s] the right to reject any and all bids, waive any minor defect
therein, and accept the offer most advantageous to the Government.”[14] Such reservation subjects the bidders to the
right of the Government to reject, and consequently accept, any and all bids at
its discretion. Unless such discretion
has been arbitrarily exercised causing patent injustice, the Court will not
supplant its decision to that of the agency or instrumentality which is
presumed to possess the technical expertise on the matters within its
authority.[15]
In
the case of the petitioners, while both the technical and financial envelopes
were opened in accordance with the May 28, 2003 Decision of the DPWH Secretary,
a post evaluation and qualification of the said bids is still essential in
order to determine whether the lowest bid is responsive to and in compliance
with the requirements of the project, the laws, rules and regulations. With regard to the PCAB license, despite the
assurance of the petitioners that the same was inside the sealed envelopes,
what was actually submitted was a notarized application for the license which
does not indicate that it has been filed with the PCAB. Further, what was submitted by the
petitioners was a bidder’s bond instead of a surety bond. For the foregoing defects, the petitioners’
bid was disqualified by public respondent BAC Region VII. The said decision of public respondent BAC
Region VII was thereafter affirmed by the DPWH Secretary, notwithstanding the
subsequent presentation of a special license issued on
The
same may be said of the allegation of forgery on the signature of DPWH Secretary Soriquez on the contract with private
respondent WTG. The petitioners’
allegation, without more, is not sufficient to determine whether or not the
alleged forgery was committed. This
involves a factual issue that requires evidentiary proof as forgery cannot be
presumed but must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally,
we reject the contention of the pubic respondents that the filing of the
present petition with this Court violates the policy on hierarchy of
courts. Pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 8975 (R.A. 8975), only the Supreme Court has the
authority to issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Government or any of its
instrumentalities, officials and agencies in cases such as those filed by
bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such
contract or project. R.A. 8975 prohibits
lower courts from issuing injunctive orders in connection with the
implementation of government infrastructure projects unless the case pertains
to matters of extreme urgency involving constitutional issues such that unless
a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise.[16] The foregoing provisions, however, do not
deprive the lower courts of the authority to take cognizance of the issues
raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought
are within their jurisdiction.[17]
In
the instant case, the controversy arose from the complaint filed by a bidder
seeking to enjoin the award and implementation of a government infrastructure
project. As such, the petition for
preliminary mandatory injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order
was properly filed with this Court in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
8975.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Rollo, p. 4.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 234-241.
[10] The Commissioner of Customs v. The Honorable Judge Cloribel, 125 Phil. 651 (1967); Uniciano Paramedical College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 285.
[11] Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005; Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 30, 37 (1999).
[12] The Commissioner of Customs v. The Honorable
Judge Cloribel, see note at 10; Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Walfrido de
[13] Rimeo
Gustillo v. Ricardo Real, Sr., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250,
[14] Rollo, p. 287.
[15] Eduardo J. Jalandoni v. National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration, 108 Phil. 486, 491 (1960); Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 101678,
[16] An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by
Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for
Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes, November 7, 2000.
[17] Heherson Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162243,