THIRD DIVISION
|
SPOUSES ARTURO CONDES and NORA CONDES, Petitioners, - versus - THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. PACIFICO A.
DISTURA, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 161304
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: July 27,
2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76927, dated
The antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On P665,504.81
(P572,296.58 at 5% interest per month for three months, plus P3,000.00,
attorney’s fees). They averred that, contrary to what was agreed upon, Josephine
was made to sign a deed of sale instead of a mortgage contract.
The petitioners further narrated that
on P665,504.81,
plus 5% interest for one month or P33,275.24, for a total of P698,780.05.
They were allegedly able to raise the amount of P665,504.81 on September
4, 1995, and they expressed willingness to pay the additional interest due but
the respondent told them that he will only sell back the property for P1
million. The petitioners averred that they found out later that the respondent
had the Deed of Sale notarized on P68,000.00. As a result,
the respondent succeeded in obtaining a new title, TCT No. T-110767,
in his name. The petitioners averred that the last time they contacted the
respondent, the latter was willing to sell back the property for P1,070,678.78.
The petitioners prayed that the Deed
of Sale dated
In his Answer with Counterclaim,[3]
the respondent contended that the petitioners sold the property to him on the
condition that they will be given a right to repurchase the property for a
period of one month; thus, he executed the Agreement of Option to Repurchase.
He asserted that when the petitioners failed to repurchase the property, he
insisted that the certificate of title be transferred to his name. The petitioners
allegedly agreed provided that the consideration appearing in the deed of sale
be reduced to P250,000.00 so that they can save
on the payment of taxes. He said that he found out later on that there was
another deed of sale for P68,400.00 registered
in the Registry of Deeds.
After pre-trial, the petitioners, as
plaintiffs, presented their witnesses. Josephine Condes-Jover
testified that she offered to transfer the mortgage on the petitioners’
property to the respondent for P665,504.81; that the respondent agreed and
made her sign a deed of sale; that she wondered why she was made to sign a deed
of sale when their understanding was that the property will only be mortgaged; that
she trusted him because they were close, and the latter assured him that the property
will be redeemed in the future;[4] and
that she did not appear before a notary public for the acknowledgment of the
said deed of sale.[5]
Petitioner Nora Condes
likewise testified that she only agreed to transfer the mortgage on the
property, not to sell the same to the respondent; the latter agreed and gave
her three months within which to pay the mortgage and an additional one month
as grace period.[6] She
narrated that when the loan was about to become due, she arranged to sell the
property to a certain Dr. Latañafrancia for P1.2
million[7]
but the respondent and his wife asked her to let them buy the property for P1
million.[8]
After consulting with her husband, she agreed to sell the property to the
respondent only to be told that he needed more time because his buyer was still
in P300,000.00 but she refused. The respondent told her then that
the property was already his and that they have no right over it anymore. His
statement made her anxious, and so she went to the Registry of Deeds to verify
the condition of their title and was relieved to learn that it was still
intact.[9]
Petitioner Arturo Condes
corroborated his wife’s testimony that the agreement was only to mortgage the
property. He added that he obtained from the Registry of Deeds a copy of the
Deed of Sale which resulted in the transfer of their title. He identified the
same as the Deed of Sale dated P68,400.00. He confronted Josephine with the said document, and
the latter denied executing the deed.[10]
The petitioners also employed the
services of Col. Pedro Elvas, Jr., a practicing Questioned
Documents Examiner, who testified that based on his examination, the signature
of Josephine Condes-Jover appearing in the Deed of
Definite Sale dated
The trial court admitted the
documentary evidence offered by the petitioners,[11]
which consisted of the following:
Exh. B – Certified machine copy
of the Deed of Sale dated P68,400.00
allegedly executed by Josephine Condes-Jover in favor of Dr. Pacifico Distura, notarized by Florecita Gelvezon;
Exh. C – Certified machine copy of TCT No. T-110767 registered in the name of Dr. Pacifico Distura;
Exh. F – Machine copy of the
Special Power of Attorney dated
Exh. G – Bio-data of Col. Pedro S. Elvas, Jr., alleged handwriting expert;
Exh. H – Certificate of
Achievement of Col. Pedro S. Elvas, Jr. by the
Department of State, Agency of International Development of the Government of
the
Exh. I – Questioned Document
Report No. 17-0997 dated
Exh. J – Certified machine
copy of Deed of Sale dated
Exh. K – Machine copy of the letter of plaintiff Arturo Condes addressed to the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City;
Exh. L – Comparison Chart of the enlarged photographs of the questioned signatures of Josephine Condes-Jover and the standard specimen signatures;
Exh. M –
Exh. N – Official Receipt of
driver’s license dated
Exh. O – Sworn Statement of
Josephine Condes-Jover dated
Exhs. P and P-1 – Two (2)
Sworn Statements of Josephine Condes-Jover dated
Exh. Q – Community Tax Certificate
of Josephine Condes-Jover dated
Exh. R – COMELEC VRR No.
03395358 dated
Exh. S – Plain sheet of bond paper with the specimen signatures Josephine Condes-Jover;
Exh. T – Certified machine copy of TCT No. T-78260 registered in the name of the plaintiffs;
Exh. V and V-1 – Medical
Certificate of plaintiff Nora Condes with the
signature of attending physician dated
Exh. W and W1 – Medical
Certificate of plaintiff Nora Condes with the
signature of attending physician dated
Exh. X – Certified machine copy of Official Receipt No. 059880 issued by the City Treasurer of Iloilo City;
Exh. Y – Authority to accept
payment under Nos. 2580033, 2361465 and 2361466 for the sale of P68,400.00 dated
Exh. Z – Capital Gains Tax
Return on the sale for P68,400.00;
Exh. AA – BIR Certificate No. 774924;
Exh. EE – Primary Entry Book;
Exh. FF – Releasing Book of Title;
Thereafter, the petitioners rested
their case.
On P68,000.00 executed by Josephine
Jover and acknowledged before Notary Public Joenel T. Alipao,[13]
not Notary Public Florecita Gelvezon.
Hence, even if the said Deed of Definite Sale dated
On
Unconvinced, the respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. He succeeded in obtaining a favorable
decision when the CA rendered its decision on
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Orders, dated
SO ORDERED.[15]
The petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the CA’s decision, but the CA denied the same on
I. THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO RESOLVE ALL THE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. 22566 BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN THE TRIAL COURT, FOREMOST OF WHICH IS THE ISSUE ON EQUITABLE MORTGAGE;
II. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF RESPONDENT DR. DISTURA IS INSUFFICIENT IN FORM AND IN SUBSTANCE BECAUSE IT FAILED AND OMITTED TO PRESENT TO THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALL THE EVIDENCE TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AS BASIS BY THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING RESPONDENT’S DR. DISTURA’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
III. THE PETITIONERS HAVE PROVEN BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE ALL THEIR CAUSES OF ACTION AS WELL AS ALL THE ISSUES AGREED BY THE PARTIES IN CIVIL CASE NO. 22566 BY THEIR EVIDENCE, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY;
IV.
THE PETITIONERS’ CAUSES OF ACTION ARE NOT ANCHORED ONLY ON THE FORGED DEED OF
Briefly, the issues posed by the
petitioners are as follows: (a) whether the CA erred when it failed to resolve
all the issues in its decision granting the demurrer to evidence considering
that such a decision is in effect an adjudication on the merits; (b) whether
the petition for certiorari before
the CA should have been dismissed for being defective in form; and (c) whether the
CA erred in granting the demurrer to evidence.
The petition is meritorious.
Before proceeding to the merits of
the case, we first delve into the procedural issue raised by the petitioners—that
the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to attach important testimonial and
documentary evidence. We do not agree. The CA committed no reversible error in
giving due course to the petition for certiorari
even without the said documents being attached thereto.
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court enumerates the essential documents required to be attached to a petition
for certiorari:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — x x x x
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
The rule does not specify the precise
documents, pleadings, or parts of the records that should be appended to the
petition other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being
assailed. These documents and pleadings are generally the ones needed by
the reviewing courts to decide whether to give due course to the petition.[18]
The initial determination of
what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and pertinent to the petition
rests on the petitioner.[19] Thereafter,
the CA will review the petition and determine whether additional pleadings,
documents or orders should have been attached thereto.
The appellate court found the present
petition sufficient in form when it proceeded to decide the case on the merits,
without raising any question as to the sufficiency of the petition. Acceptance
of a petition for certiorari,
as well as granting due course thereto is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court.[20] Where
it does not appear, as in this case, that in giving due course to the petition
for certiorari, the CA committed any
error that prejudiced the substantial rights of the parties, there is no reason
to disturb its determination that the copies of the pleadings and documents
attached to the petition were sufficient to make out a prima facie case.[21]
Generally, interlocutory orders are
neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.[22] Though
interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to
evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the
petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that
appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances.[23]
It must be stressed that a writ
of certiorari may be issued only for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Where the issue or
question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision—not
the jurisdiction of the court--the same is beyond the province of a petition
for certiorari.[24]
However, even as the CA did not err
in not dismissing the respondent’s petition on the strength of the documents
attached thereto, we find that neither did the RTC commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the demurrer to evidence. This is evident from the
said Order, which ratiocinated, thus:
While
it may be true that the evidence presented by the plaintiff would run counter
to some allegations in this complaint, there are
evidence[s] which could satisfactorily support other allegations unless
rebutted by the defendant. It will also be noted that the existence of a number
of deeds of sale could support the claim of irregularity as to the transfer of
the lot subject matter thereof if not controverted by
other evidence. In short, in the absence of controverting
evidence, there are claims which could be supported by the evidence presented
by the plaintiff.[25]
The petitioners insist that the
demurrer to evidence should not have been granted since they have been able to
establish some, if not all, of their claims through a preponderance of
evidence. They point out that the decision which granted the demurrer to
evidence was, in effect, adjudication on the merits of the case. Thus, they claim that the CA should have
ruled on all the issues submitted by them, particularly the issue on whether
the deed of sale should be declared as an equitable mortgage.
It is clear from these arguments that
the petitioners misunderstood the essence of a demurrer to evidence and the
meaning of preponderance of evidence. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to
dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is filed after the
plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced, is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.[26] The
question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in
chief, has been able to establish a prima
facie case.
In civil cases, the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by
preponderance of evidence.[27]
“Preponderance of evidence” means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.[28] It is, therefore, premature to speak of
“preponderance of evidence” in a demurrer to evidence because it is filed before
the defendant presents his evidence. The purpose of a demurrer to evidence is
precisely to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the defendant’s
evidence. It authorizes
a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by
plaintiff’s evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief sought.[29]
It would have been unnecessary, if
not antithetical, for the CA to resolve all the issues submitted by the
petitioners when it found that the evidence of the plaintiffs was not
sufficient. The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is
whether the plaintiffs have been able to show that they are entitled to their claim
and it was incumbent upon the CA to make such a determination. A perusal of the
CA Decision however shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter.
After a careful review of the
petitioners’ evidence, we find that the CA erred in dismissing the petitioners’
complaint. The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a
demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.[30]
Collectively, the petitioners’
evidence, testimonial and documentary, sufficiently proved the essential averments
of the complaint, that is, that their attorney-in-fact was made to sign the
Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1995 when what was actually agreed upon was only the
mortgage of their property; and that their attorney-in-fact only signed the said
Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1995, and that the other deeds of sale, particularly
the Deed of Definite Sale dated August 29, 1995 for P68,400.00, were forged.
The respondent, however, contends
that the petitioners failed to prove that the Deed of Definite Sale dated P68,400.00, notarized by Florecita Gelvezon, was the deed
of sale used in transferring the title to respondent’s name. The respondent
anchors his contention on the fact that the description of the deed of sale
that resulted in the cancellation of petitioners’ title differed from that of
the Deed of Definite Sale. In the
petitioners’ certificate of title, it was annotated therein that it was
cancelled by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated P68,000.00, notarized by Joenel Alipao. The respondent, therefore, posits that, even
if the Deed of Definite Sale is declared as void, his title would not be
cancelled.
We do not agree. Petitioner Arturo Condes testified that the deed of sale which he obtained
from the Registry of Deeds was the Deed of Definite Sale dated
All told, without prejudice to the
trial court’s findings, we hold that the petitioners’ evidence, in the absence
of any controverting evidence, will stand and would
be sufficient to prove some, if not all, of their claims. In order to arrive at a just decision on the
contending claims of the parties, trial on the merits is, therefore, necessary.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No, 76927, dated
August 28, 2003 and November 21, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial court is directed to REINSTATE
Civil Case No. 22566. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Arturo D. Brion, concurring; rollo, pp. 9-13.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 31-32.
[3] Rollo, pp. 61-64.
[4] TSN,
[5] Id at 7; id. at 79.
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] Rollo, p. 256.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No.
150321.
[19] Garcia v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160798,
[20] Floren Hotel v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 155264,
[21]
[22] Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 181 (2002).
[23]
[24] Deutsche Bank
[25] Rollo, p. 271.
[26] Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, G.R. No. 161817,
[27] Ong v.
[28] Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 742 (1998).
[29] Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, G.R. No. 160832, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 665, 679.
[30]