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JOSEFINA
COGTONG, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 160729
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- versus - KYORITSU INTERNATIONAL,
INC., EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF |
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. |
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PEPITO Respondents. |
Promulgated: |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure are the Decision[1] dated
This case involves a parcel of land and a house located
at
For its part, Kyoritsu denies petitioner’s
allegation of forgery and alleges that she is its legitimate creditor. To refute the allegation, Kyoritsu presented
in court Mr. George Gusilatar, Jr., the head of its credit investigation
panel. Gusilatar testified that on P339,000 to cover
the loan.
To ensure payment, Kyoritsu required Lao to issue
postdated checks. Since some of the
checks bounced, verbal demands were made upon the petitioner and Lao to
pay. Despite the extension, they did not
pay. When petitioner received the demand
letter, she called up Kyoritsu’s office and promised to pay. However, she failed to do so. Hence, the foreclosure proceedings.
After hearing, the court a quo granted the injunctive relief prayed for by petitioner. On
Aggrieved,
Kyoritsu appealed. The appellate court reversed
and set aside the judgment of the trial court.
It held that petitioner’s signatures on the REM and promissory note were
not forged, and should be given effect. The
dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
given DUE COURSE. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied. Dissatisfied with the
Court of Appeals’ ruling, petitioner now comes before this Court raising
a single issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF FORGERY IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW AND GUIDELINES SET
Essentially, the
issue is whether the appellate court committed grave reversible error. It hinges on whether petitioner Cogtong’s signature was forged.
We rule in
the negative.
In the petition before us, petitioner insists that her
signatures on the questioned deed of REM and promissory note were forged and
that the trial court properly used her signatures on her prayer booklets as sample
specimen and standard to compare with her questioned signatures on the deed of
REM and promissory note. Also,
petitioner avers that Gusilatar is not a credible witness and his testimony is inconsistent
and muddled.[6]
The question of forgery is one of fact. Well-settled is the rule that in
the exercise of our power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court. However, there are recognized exceptions,
among which is when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court are conflicting.[7]
In this case, the disagreement between
the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion, with regard
to the alleged forgery of the signatures on the questioned deed of REM and the promissory
note, has constrained us to examine the evidence submitted by the parties.
First, petitioner maintains that her signature was forged. In
her petition, she asserts that the signatures in her prayer booklets, which
appear in print (in mechanical form where
the letters are not continuously connected by rapid or rhythmic lines), are
her authentic signatures, while the signatures in the questioned deed of REM
and promissory note, which are in cursive style (in flowing strokes with the letters joined together), are forgeries.
This Court rejects petitioner’s claim that her signature was
forged.
Our Rules of
Court provide that the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved by a
comparison made by the court of the questioned handwriting and writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.[8]
It bears
stressing that the Court may validly determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence at hand. Hence,
this Court scrutinized the evidence on record to determine whether the
signature of petitioner was in fact forged.
In a recent case, this Court held that
passage of time and a person’s increase in age may have a decisive influence in
his handwriting characteristics.[9] In order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the
standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the
suspected signature.[10]
The standards should, if possible, have
been made at the same time as the suspected document. The standards should embrace the time of the
origin of the document, so that one part comes from the time before the origin
and one part from the time after the origin.[11]
A careful examination of the following documents: (1) a signature card which petitioner endorsed
when she opened her savings account with China Banking Corporation on January
10, 1979;[12]
(2) Credit Application form executed on March 21, 1994;[13]
(3) dorsal portion of her Fortune Care ID card dated August 1, 1992;[14]
(4) Community Tax Certificate which she obtained on April 21, 1994;[15]
(5) letter to Kyoritsu on April 28, 1994;[16]
(6) at the back of the China Bank check[17]
when she endorsed the same before depositing it to her savings account; and,
(7) in her Savings Account Withdrawal Slip dated March 6, 1994, which were
executed before, at the time of and immediately after the execution of the
questioned documents, reveals that her signatures on the promissory note (April
29, 1994)[18] and deed
of REM (July 8, 1994)[19]
have very close resemblance to the signatures contained in the aforementioned
documents.
Also, the Court rejects the allegation of petitioner that her
signature on the prayer booklets is her authentic signature. The Court agrees with the findings of the
Court of Appeals in this wise:
x x x x The lower
court’s reliance on the alleged signatures of Josefina in her prayer booklets …
was erroneous because these are self-serving documents. The prayer books were personal effects and
private writings in the custody of Josefina which could easily be manipulated
to suit her purpose. The authenticity of
the alleged signature of Josefina appearing in the complaint … is, likewise,
doubtful considering that the document had been executed long after the
execution of the questioned deed of real estate mortgage and the promissory
note and, thus, the possibility of altering her signature is not remote. We, likewise, observed that the name Josefina Cogtong appearing on the
prayer booklets was so written in capital letters merely for the purpose of
identifying who the owner of the booklets is.[20] (Emphasis ours.)
Hence, we
cannot utilize the signatures on the prayer booklets as standard for comparison
in determining whether petitioner’s signature was forged.
Furthermore, the Court has held in a
number of cases that forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence,[21]
and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same,[22]
a burden which petitioner failed to discharge convincingly. Here, petitioner failed to override the
evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of REM and promissory note. As a notarized document, the deed of REM and
promissory note enjoy the presumption of due execution. However, no evidence was presented by
petitioner to overcome this presumption. Other than her own declaration that her signatures
on the questioned documents were forged and the prayer booklets which she presented
during trial, petitioner presented no other proof to corroborate her claim. Such an allegation and evidence are
insufficient to overcome a notarized document’s presumption of due execution. Hence, this Court cannot accept the claim of
forgery in the absence of other witnesses, save for petitioner herself, who
would testify that petitioner’s signatures on the prayer booklets are in fact
her customary way of signing.
Second,
petitioner avers that Gusilatar’s testimony is inconsistent because he testified
that petitioner signed Kyoritsu’s cash voucher, yet the records show that the
voucher was received and signed by William Lao.
We are not persuaded by petitioner’s averment.
Nothing in the transcript of
stenographic notes supports it. What the
witness, Gusilatar, clearly averred is that petitioner received the loan
proceeds as evidenced by a cash voucher issued by Kyoritsu to her and the
corresponding check was issued in her favor which check was later deposited and
encashed by the petitioner in her account and not William Lao.[23]
Moreover, petitioner questions the fact that Gusilatar did
not sign as a witness when in fact it was in his presence that petitioner
signed. She also asserts that
Gusilatar’s testimony with respect to the Community Tax Certificate and Fortune
Care ID card is muddled.
These arguments deserve scant
consideration. The failure of Gusilatar
to sign the document and his alleged fuzzy testimony regarding the Community
Tax Certificate and Fortune Care ID card refer only to minute details which do
not destroy his credibility as a witness. Also, the best evidence of the existence and
authenticity of petitioner’s signature in the Community Tax Certificate and
Fortune Care ID card are the documents themselves and not the credibility or
incredibility of the testimony of Gusilatar.
Finally, we would like to quote the Court of Appeals’ remark
in its assailed Decision:
Further,
Josefina’s claim that it was her son William Lao who stole her title, forged
her signature and mortgaged the same to Kyoritsu deserves scant consideration. A
reputable lending institution for that matter would certainly not deal in a
loan transaction with any person whose collateral is in the name of another
person. For their own protection, it is,
likewise, common practice among lending institutions to conduct a series of
investigation before approval of the loan is recommended... It would be
impossible for William Lao to convince Kyoritsu that he was the owner of the
property sought to be mortgaged when on the face of the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 117150, the registered owner is Josefina Cogtong.[24]
(Emphasis ours.)
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1]
Rollo,
pp. 70-80. Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño, with Acting Presiding Justice Cancio
C. Garcia (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. concurring.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 543-559.
[4]
Rollo, p. 79.
[5]
[6]
[7]
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 135098,
[8] Revised Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 22.
[9]
Domingo
v. Domingo, G.R. No. 150897,
[10]
[11] O. Herrera, VI Remedial Law, 287 (1999).
[12] Records, p. 459.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[19]
[20]
[21]
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 153119,
[22]
Fernandez
v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 143256,
[23]
TSN,
[24] Rollo, p. 79.