THIRD DIVISION
|
SPOUSES RICHARD B. PASCUAL
and CRISTINA D. PASCUAL, Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES REYNALDO P.
CORONEL and Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 159292
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: July 12,
2007 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71323, dated
Respondents, spouses Reynaldo and
Asuncion Coronel, are the registered owners of two parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 68436,[3]
located in Barrios San Roque and San
Rafael, Tarlac, with a total area of 253 sq.m., and the house standing thereon.
They resided on the said property until sometime in 1969 when they decided to
transfer to a new residence close to their business operations. The respondents
then entrusted the property and the owner’s copy of TCT No. 68436 to
On
On
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[6]
the petitioners contended that the respondents are no longer the lawful owners
of the subject house and lot because they already sold the same to Alberta as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate[7]
dated February 18, 1975 (1975 Deed).
Apparently,
the respondents also filed a case for annulment of deed of sale with the RTC of
Tarlac City, docketed as Civil Case No. 9169. In the complaint, the respondents
admitted that respondent
After
the petitioners filed their answer in the case for unlawful detainer (Civil
Case No. 7821), the respondents amended[10]
their complaint in the case for annulment (Civil Case No. 9169) to include
Melu-Jean as defendant, and to pray for the nullification of the 1989 Deed in
favor of Melu-Jean. The respondents alleged that
On
The respondents appealed to the RTC
on the ground that the MTCC erred in relying on the deed of sale transferring
the property to Melu-Jean. On
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed is hereby reversed and judgment is issued ordering the defendants and all other persons acting under their command to:
i. Immediately vacate from the subject property and turn over possession of the same unto the plaintiffs;
ii. To pay the plaintiffs the sum Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus Php 2,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing;
iii. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In
so ruling, the RTC found that the petitioners’ possession was by the tolerance of
the respondents, thus, lawful until the latter sent the petitioners a demand to
vacate. According to the RTC, the lower court failed to grasp the distinction
between possession de jure or
possession arising from ownership, and possession de facto or physical possession. It pointed out that the only
issue in a case for unlawful detainer is possession de facto, which, in this case, should be decided in favor of the
respondents. It ruled that the lower court erred in relying on the deeds of
sale in determining who has the better right to possess the property as the
same pertains to possession as an attribute of ownership (possession de jure). Further, the RTC held that the
deed of sale executed by respondent Asuncion was simulated, thus, void from the
beginning, and the second deed of sale executed by Alberta seemed falsified, and
so, it cannot be the basis of a valid transfer of ownership.
On
The petitioners filed an appeal with
the CA. The petitioners argued, inter
alia, that they have a superior right because they are in actual physical
possession of the property by authority of the real owner, Melu-Jean, who
should have been impleaded as defendant. They contended that the action for
unlawful detainer is not proper since the issue of ownership is raised; the
proper action is to file an accion
publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria
cognizable by the RTC.
On
On
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS STILL REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENTS, THEY, HOWEVER, WERE NO LONGER OR CEASED TO BE THE RIGHTFUL AND LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE SAID PROPERTY WHEN THEY EXECUTED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL ESTATE ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975 IN FAVOR OF ALBERTA MALIG, RESPONDENT ASUNCION MALIG CORONEL’S MOTHER, AND WHO IN TURN SOLD THE SAME PROPERTY TO DR. MELU-JEAN PASCUAL, PETITIONER RICHARD PASCUAL’S OLDER SISTER, AS EVIDENCED BY THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL ESTATE EXECUTED ON MARCH 6, 1989.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SINCE THE RESPONDENTS ARE STILL THE REGISTERED OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION THEREOF.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS’ STAY ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF THE RESPONDENTS AND NOT BY DR. MELU-JEAN PASCUAL AND THAT THERE IS UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DR. MELU-JEAN PASCUAL IS GUILTY OF LACHES.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WAS (sic) NULL AND VOID FOR NONJOINDER OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT CAN REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE.[16]
The petitioners contend that the
respondents are no longer the owners of the property; therefore, they are not
entitled to its possession. Their theory is that the 1975 Deed validly
transferred ownership of the property to
The petition has no merit.
In an unlawful detainer case, the
sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.[17] However, where the issue of ownership is
raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property.[18] We
stress, however, that this adjudication is only an initial determination of
ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of
ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court’s adjudication of
ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[19]
It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership,[20]
which is the subject matter of a separate case for annulment of deeds of sale filed
by respondent.
In the present case, both the petitioners and the respondents raise the
issue of ownership. The petitioners aver that the real owner is Melu-Jean based
on the two deeds of sale and that it is by her tolerance that they are
occupying the property. On the other hand, the respondents claim that they
themselves are the owners of the property as evidenced by the certificate of
title in their names. The resolution of this case will therefore boil down to
which of the parties’ respective documentary evidence deserves more weight.
At this juncture, it would be fitting to mention that under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised for the simple reason
that the Court is not a trier of facts.[21] It
is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below.[22] This
is especially true where the trial court’s factual findings are adopted and
affirmed by the CA as in the present case. Factual findings of the trial court,
affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[23] Here,
both the RTC and the CA gave more credence to the respondents’ title and found
that the petitioners’ occupation of the subject property was by the mere
tolerance of the respondents. Accordingly,
as far as this Court is concerned, these findings are already final.
In any case, we sustain the appellate court’s finding that the
respondents have the better right to possess the subject property. As opposed
to the unregistered deeds of sale, the certificate of title certainly deserves
more probative value. Indeed, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of indefeasible
title of property in favor of the person in whose name appears therein—such
holder is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is
nullified.[24]
The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve more credence
because they are valid contracts that legally transferred ownership of the
property to Melu-Jean. They argue that (a) the 1975 Deed, being a public
document, is presumed to be valid and there was no evidence sufficient to
overturn such presumption or show that it was simulated; (b) the fact that the
person who notarized the said deed of sale is not commissioned as a notary
public has no bearing on its validity; (c) registration of the deed of sale was
not necessary to transfer ownership; (d) Melu-Jean is not guilty of laches in
asserting her ownership over the property since she is actually in possession
of the property through the petitioners; and (e) the filing of the annulment
case is an admission that the two deeds of sale are merely voidable, or valid
until annulled.
However, it should be noted that the CA merely affirmed the power of the
trial court to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership, which consequently
includes the power to determine the validity of the deeds of sale. As previously
stated, such determination is not conclusive, and the issue of ownership and
the validity of the deeds of sale would ultimately be resolved in the case for
annulment of the deeds of sale.
Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the deeds of
sale are valid contracts, it would still not bolster the petitioners’ case. In
a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners’ superior right
to possess the property. In Co v.
Militar,[25] the
Court was confronted with a similar issue of which between the certificate of
title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative weight in
resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There, the Court
held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of
title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale
of the respondents. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.[26]
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v.
Mercado,[27]
the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight
to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-à-vis
the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab,[28]
the Court held that the registered owner is preferred to possess the property
subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who
has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[29]
Still the petitioners unrelentingly
argue that the proceedings below were null for failure to implead Melu-Jean, the
alleged owner, as an indispensable party-defendant. As previously mentioned,
the sole issue in an unlawful detainer case is who has the right to the
physical possession of the property. Consequently, in an action for unlawful
detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in
possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and
only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Such occupant is bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate the premises upon demand.[30] As earlier pronounced in Domalsin v. Valenciano,[31]
an action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against one in
possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one who does not
in fact hold the land.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 187-195.
[2]
[3] Rollo, p. 49.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Barba v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 598, 609-610 (2002).
[18] Section 16 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
[19] Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003).
[20] Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No.
158166,
[21] Asian
Construction and Development Corporation v. Tulabut, G.R. No. 161904,
[22] Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation, G.R. Nos.
123346, 134385 & 148767, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 305, 335.
[23] Child
Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920,
[24] Baloloy
v. Hular, G.R. No. 157767,
[25] Co v. Militar, 466 Phil. 217 (2004).
[26]
[27] Supra note 20, at 238.
[28] G.R. No. 156581,
[29]
[30] Lao
v. Lao, G.R. No. 149599,
[31] G.R. No. 158687,