THIRD DIVISION
|
SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG
and ANGELO T. ARRASTIA, represented herein by Attorney-in-Fact REMEDIOS
BERENGUER LINTAG, Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 158609
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses
Marian Berenguer-Lintag and Angelo T. Arrastia (petitioners) are the registered
owners of a property with an area of 80,001 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24855 and located at Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
On
P2,468.09.
NPC averred that such acquisition was necessary and urgent for the construction
and maintenance of NPC's 350 KV
On
January 17, 1997, after the deposit of the initial assessed value of the
subject property amounting to P2,468.09 with the Philippine National
Bank, the RTC, upon an ex-parte motion of NPC, ordered the issuance of a
Writ of Possession on the subject property[5] consonant
with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 42.[6]
On
On
On
On
P49,665.63, as the
tentative value of the damaged improvements.
On
P49,665.63.[12]
NPC paid the said amount.
On
However,
on
On
P700.00
per square meter. Thus, petitioners prayed that NPC be directed to pay P5,635,000.00 for the subject
property.
The Ruling of the RTC
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants the amount equivalent to one hundred (100%) percent of the current Bureau of Internal Revenue's zonal valuation of their property consisting of eight thousand fifty (8,050) square meters affected by the electrical project involved in this case within fifteen (15) days after receipt of this Order.
Set the continuation of hearing for
the determination of just compensation to
SO ORDERED.
NPC
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in its Order[15]
dated
The CA's Ruling
In
its November 29, 2002 Decision, the CA declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be
applied retroactively since an initial deposit had already been made and
possession of the subject property had already been obtained by NPC. Moreover,
the CA held that the retroactive application of said law would impose a greater
burden on the part of the State where none had existed before. It would inflict substantial injury to a
substantive right. Finally, the CA opined that RA No. 8974 itself made no mention
of retroactivity. The CA disposed, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition at bench is GRANTED, and the impugned orders are SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon the same bond posted by the petitioner. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
On
Hence,
this Petition based on the following grounds:
1)
The CA committed a reversible error when it declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be
applied retroactively because it is a substantive law and not a remedial
statute; and
2)
Assuming for the sake of argument that RA No. 8974 is not retroactive, how
should the petitioners be promptly paid just compensation?
Petitioners
contend that the Government's deliberate delay of payment of just compensation
is the evil sought to be remedied by RA No. 8974; that despite the issuance of
Administrative Order (AO) No. 50 and NPC Resolution No. 98-184, NPC never had
the intention of making prompt payment of just compensation; and that just
compensation does not only mean correct determination of the amount to be paid
but also the prompt payment thereof. Petitioners manifest that NPC, as observed
by the RTC, failed to pay the initial deposit of P32,930.00 as mandated
by PD 42.[19] Thus,
petitioners submit that they are entitled to the prompt payment of just
compensation and on account of NPC's delay in the payment thereof, the imposition of legal interest is
warranted.[20]
On
the other hand, NPC through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters
that RA No. 8974 is not a remedial statute that can be given retroactive
effect, and submits that Sec. 4 thereof is a substantive provision as it vests
substantive rights; that the legislature did not intend RA No. 8974 to have
retroactive application; that the silence of the Implementing Rules of RA No.
8974 as to prospectivity does not ipso facto render it
retroactive; that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to amend its final Order
dated January 17, 1997 for initial deposit and possession; and that the
valuation fixed by the RTC is improper since the case involves an easement, and
thus, NPC should be required to pay only an easement fee.[21]
The Court's Ruling
The
petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners'
first ground must fail.
In
the case of Republic v. Gingoyon,[22]
this Court held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit:
It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession.
This
ruling was reiterated in this Court's Resolution[23]
of
[I]f the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.
It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained, it could very well lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not points of substantive law.
It
is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules
and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication[24] because
the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested.[25] This is
based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward,
not backward).
In
the application of RA No. 8974, the Court finds no justification to depart from
this rule. First, RA No.
8974 is a substantive law. Second,
there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Third, neither is retroactivity necessarily implied
from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the silence of RA No. 8974 and its
Implementing Rules on the matter cannot give rise to the inference that it can
be applied retroactively. In the two (2)
cases[26] wherein this Court applied the provisions of
RA No. 8974, the complaints were filed at the time the law was already in full
force and effect. Thus, these cases
cannot serve as binding precedent to the case at bench.
As
to petitioners' second ground, the parties may be guided by the following
principles.
Expropriation
of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x.[27]
It
is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to
have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just
compensation.[28] Accordingly,
the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis
to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it
is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.[29]
We
observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority of the NPC to exercise
the power of eminent domain nor the propriety of its exercise. While the
constitutional restraint of public use has been overcome, the imperative just
compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for the prompt
payment of just compensation. Indeed, just compensation is not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the
payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered “just.”[30]
This
Court understands the plight of petitioners.
It has been ten (10) years since they were divested of possession of
their property, but they still have to be paid just compensation. It may be noted that the expropriation case
still pends at the RTC, and it is in that case where a determination of the
amount of just compensation shall be made.
Inasmuch as this determination necessarily involves factual matters, and
considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, at this point, we can only
direct the RTC to try the case expeditiously, so that the amount of just
compensation for the subject property can be fixed and promptly paid, as
justice and equity dictate.
For
this purpose, the RTC must bear in mind that it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first, not the value of the land at the time of the rendition of judgment
which should be considered.[31]
In this case, where the institution of
an expropriation action preceded the
taking of the subject property, just compensation is based on the value of
the land at the time of the filing of the complaint. This is provided by
the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily
being conditioned on its deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of
the amount equivalent to the value of the property as provisionally ascertained
by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.[32]
Finally,
this Court takes cognizance of petitioners' manifestation that the NPC, as
found by the RTC, failed to pay the initial deposit of P32,930.00 as required
in PD 42.[33] The RTC
had already fixed this amount on the basis of its initial factual
findings. The assailed CA Decision
adopted the RTC's factual findings. NPC's Comment filed with this Court and
even its petition for certiorari before the CA did not address, much
less contest, this fact. Because this factual finding was not disputed by the
NPC in its pleadings before the CA and before this Court, it is, therefore,
deemed admitted.[34]
However, inasmuch as petitioners made no mention of this amount in their prayer
before this Court, the same shall simply be considered by the RTC and included in
the determination of the final just compensation.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, guided by the foregoing principles, is hereby directed to proceed
with the hearing of the expropriation case, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-6295,
and to resolve the issue of just compensation with utmost dispatch. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 22-40.
[2] Particularly docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 67700, penned by now retired Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate
Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Danilo B. Pine, concurring; id. at 47-60.
[3] Particularly docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-6295; id. at 63-69.
[4] Rollo, pp. 112-117.
[5]
[6] PD No. 42 entitled “AUTHORIZING
THE PLAINTIFF IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE POSSESSIONS OF THE PROPERTY
INVOLVED UPON DEPOSITING THE ASSESSED VALUE, FOR PURPOSE OF TAXATION” was
issued on
[7]
[8] Per
RTC Order, supra note 3 and assailed CA Decision, supra note 2, it appears that
petitioners questioned the said writ of possession for lack of notice, and the
amount of deposit for not being in accordance with PD 42. Thus, these issues
were raised to the CA on certiorari. On December 4, 1998, the CA, Second
Division issued its decision in favor of the petitioners reversing the orders
involved and ordering the RTC to comply with the requirements of notice for NPC
to deposit the amount of P32,930.00 required by PD 42 and to hear the
case to determine just compensation. On P297,992.50.
[9] Rollo, p. 121.
[10] Supra
note 3 at 64.
[11] CA
rollo, pp. 154-155.
[12] Rollo, p. 122.
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, p. 42.
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 62.
[19] Supra note 8.
[20] Petitioners' Memorandum dated
[21] OSG's Comment dated
[22] G.R.
No. 166429,
[23] G.R.
No. 166429, 481 SCRA 457, 468, citing the case of Fabian v. Desierto,
356 Phil. 787, 809 (1998).
[24] BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 451, 460
(2003).
[25] Paloma v. Mora, G.R. No.
157783,
[26] These cases are: (1) Republic v. Gingoyon, supra note 22, at 507, wherein the
Government filed the complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City RTC on
December 21, 2004; and (2) Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006 wherein PHIVIDEC,
represented by the Government Corporate Counsel, re-filed on November 24,
2003 an expropriation case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2003-346, and
raffled to Branch 20 of RTC of Misamis Oriental.
[27] Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005, 462
SCRA 265, 282-283, citing Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, G.R. No.
69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584.
[28] Republic v. Salem Investment
Corporation, G.R. No. 137569,
[29] Republic
v. Gingoyon, supra note 22, at 538 (emphasis
supplied).
[30] Republic v. Lim, supra note 27, at 289, citing Cosculluela
v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77765,
[31] Republic of the Philippines v. Ker
and Company Limited, 433 Phil. 70, 77-78 (2002); Section 4, Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint
whichever came first.
[32] Republic v. Sarabia, G.R. No.
157847,
[33] Supra note 8.
[34] Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 482, 489-490.