SECOND DIVISION
MEGA-LAND
RESOURCES AND G.R. No. 156211
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
represented by its President and Present:
General Manager, SY SIONG LATO,
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
C-E CONSTRUCTION CORPO-
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
RATION and CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION BOARD, Promulgated:
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
Rarely would affixing the correct docket number to the pleading spell the difference between a live and an extinct petition. This is one such rare instance.
This unusual case involved a set of facts that are ultimately simpler than meets the eye. Petitioner Mega-Land Resources and Development Corporation and private respondent C-E Construction Corporation were the disputants in a matter submitted for arbitration to public respondent Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). The subject and cause of the dispute is of no relevance to this petition.
On
P18.6 Million,
plus interest.
Petitioner received a copy of the
adverse CIAC decision on
However, on
Petitioner would later claim that the filing made by Fajardo Law Offices in the first case was without its prior knowledge.[7]
The first case was raffled to the
Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division. Despite the apparent termination of
services of the Fajardo Law Offices, no move was undertaken to withdraw or
otherwise disavow the motion earlier filed by that counsel. On the other hand, the
second case was raffled to the Court of Appeals Fifth Division. Both divisions
of the Court of Appeals granted both motions for extension, similarly
prolonging the period to appeal until
In the meantime, petitioner secured
the services of Atty. Richard S. Flores to represent it before the Court of
Appeals. Atty. Flores duly filed in behalf of petitioner a Motion for Second
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review with Formal Entry of Appearance,[10]
offering as reason the fact that his services were contracted only on
The caption used in the new motion for
extension, as prepared and filed by Atty. Flores is that of the second case
which was initiated by the motion filed by Sy in behalf of petitioner. By this
time, the former Fifth Division hearing that case had been reorganized, and the
second motion for extension of time was assigned to the Special Third Division.
In a Resolution dated
It is useful at this point to recount
the status then of the two pending cases before the Court of Appeals, involving
the same set of petitioners and respondents, and assailing the same decision of
the CIAC. In the first case, no further pleading was filed by petitioner or the
Fajardo Law Offices after the granting of the initial motion for extension
therein. Thus, the period within which to file the petition in the first case
elapsed on
The act that animates this present
case is the filing on
Unfortunately
for petitioner, its right to file the Petition on
Owing to the stated docket number in
the caption of the Petition for Review being that of the first case, the same
was submitted for deliberation to the Sixteenth Division to which the first
case had been assigned. On
In the meantime, the second case had
since been reassigned to the reconstituted Third Division of the Court of
Appeals. On
The
Instead, petitioner turned its sole
focus to the first case. On
Atty. Flores also gave the following explanation relating the second motion for extension of time:
[W]ith regards to the filing of a second extension of
time to file petition for review, the same was filed on July 18, 2002[.] [H]owever,
undersigned counsel was confused with the case number since petitioner
corporation did not informed [sic]
the undersigned that the corporation likewise filed a Motion for [E]xtension of
time to file Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals and paid the
necessary docket fees which was also filed by the previous handling counsel, the
Law firm of FAJARDO LAW OFFICES, thus, there are two docket number[s] in the instant case, namely, CA-G.R.
SP No. 71485 and CA-G.R. SP No. 71504; x x x
[T]he Motion for Second Extension of Time to file Petition for Review
with Formal Entry of Appearance was filed under CA-G.R. SP No. 71504 and was
raffled to the Special Third Division and the same was given due course x x x
x.[21]
The explanation was capped with an acknowledgment of “the fiasco created,” with Atty. Flores “profusely beg[ging] the indulgence of the Honorable Sixteenth Division.”[22]
All for naught. In a Resolution dated
Inasmuch
as the second motion for extension of time to file petition for review was
filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 71504, the petition for review should thus have been
filed in said case. Consequently, it should have been the Resolution dated
Hence the present petition before us, which relevantly assails only the rulings penned by Justice Buzon for the Sixteenth Division and Special Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in the first case. Since no motion for reconsideration was filed as regards the Resolution of the Third Division in the second case dismissing the petition, such ruling should be deemed as having lapsed into finality.
The issues raised in the petition are arcane, pertaining as they do to the internal processes of the Court of Appeals. Particularly, petitioner argues that the Sixteenth Division should have forwarded the Petition for Review filed before it to the Third Division, instead of dismissing the same;[25] and that the second motion for extension of time to file the petition for review should have bound the Sixteenth Division.[26] Still, we do have to consider the ultimate broad question of whether the consequent extinction of petitioner’s right to appeal the adverse decision of the CIAC occurred in accord with our established rules of procedure, or with procedural due process for that matter.
Private respondents, in
their Comment,[27] dwell
on the fact that petitioner’s predicament arose due to the negligence of its
counsels in tandem with the general principle that the simple negligence of
counsel binds the clients. Such negligence which is inescapably obvious in this
instance is determinative of this petition. It was Atty. Flores himself who
drafted and filed the second Motion for Extension in the second case; thus, it
should have been a simple matter of writing in the petition he eventually
filed, the same and only docket number he had used earlier when he filed the
motion. But he did not do so. Settled is the rule that the negligence of
counsel binds the client.[28]
Still, there is another principle that warrants appreciation in this case – the proscription against forum-shopping.
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[29] It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[30] There certainly is all the opportunity to accomplish the wrong intended by forum-shopping through the filing of two petitions for review with a collegiate court such as the Court of Appeals, as each petition would be docketed separately and assigned to a division of that court, thus allowing two different divisions to act independently as each considers and treats the petition. Thus, no petition for review on certiorari may be filed in the Court of Appeals if there is already a similar petition already filed or pending with that same court.[31]
There is no requirement that motions for extension of time be accompanied by a certification against forum-shopping.[32] At the same time, our Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide that if the petitioner/appellant were to file the said motion for extension of time, they were obligated as well to make a payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the original reglementary
period. In effect, the payment of the full docket fees must be made
simultaneously with the filing of the motion for extension. This holds true
whether the extension is sought to undertake an appeal under Rule 43[33]
(as in this case), or whether the extension is sought to file a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42.[34]
Thus, the filing of each
motion for extension along with the corresponding full docket fees gives rise
to a separate case before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court that is
accordingly docketed and raffled for evaluation and eventual deliberation. If
each of the cases involve the same petitioner, the same respondents, and seek
the extension of time to file a petition or appeal concerning the same decision
of the lower court or tribunal, then all the opportunity and dangers of forum
shopping are imminent. The evil itself would finally be actualized once a
separate appeal or petition for each case is actually filed.
Thus, even if forum-shopping had not yet been
consummated, the steps undertaken by petitioner herein may give rise to a prima facie indication that it was about
to commit forum-shopping. Neither would there have been any rational or legal
justification for having filed two separate motions for extension, as such
steps are not oriented towards any valid legal outcome. Accordingly, a party
who commits such error in good faith has the obligation to correct the same
upon becoming aware of the anomaly.
That petitioner was under such an obligation in this case is inescapably evident. The fact that the petition for review intended for filing in the second case bore instead the docket number of the first case indicates that petitioner and its new counsel, Atty. Flores, knew of the first case earlier initiated by Fajardo Law Offices. In short, at the time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner had known that there were two similar cases involving the same parties and causes of action.
There were a variety of options petitioner could have resorted to in order to rectify the anomaly. Upon learning that there were actually two different cases pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner could have moved to withdraw either any of the motions for extension of time, so that there would be only one case pending with the appellate court. It really would not matter if it were the first case or the second case which was withdrawn, since either case was a viable vehicle for petitioner’s intended appeal. Had petitioner done this at the onset, even if later the filed petition itself stated the wrong docket number, the Court of Appeals could have easily recorded the pleading under the case that remained in existence since it would anyway be incapable of filing the same under the records of a case that had already been withdrawn. Our procedural rules were not crafted with the intent of unilaterally conferring fatal consequences on simple typographical errors.
But because petitioner was delinquent in ensuring that only one of the two cases remained extant, as properly should be, the “fiasco”
ensued merely from applying the correct legal procedures. Even as no petition was timely filed in the first case after no second motion for extension was sought therein, said case had not yet been closed and terminated upon the belated filing of the appeal. Since the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period, its dismissal was in accord with the rules of procedure. At the same time, since no petition was filed at all in the second case despite the providential granting of two successive motions for extension, the appeal was correctly dismissed. Had petitioner been diligent enough to correct from the onset the anomalous circumstances, the twin embarrassments would not have occurred.
Thus, petitioner is left to raising extremely weak and wholly unsupported arguments before us to allow its cause of action a ghost of a chance. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there was no obligation on the part of the Sixteenth Division to forward the petition filed to the Third Division instead of dismissing the same. The docket number indicated in the caption of that petition made it clear that the same was addressed to the Sixteenth Division instead of the Third. Since both cases involved the same parties and were pivoted on the same ruling of the CIAC, it could not have been indubitably obvious that the “misfiled” petition actually pertained to a different case.
The only indication in the petition that it was intended for filing in a different case was the statement therein that a second motion for extension had been previously filed, as it had been in the second case, but not the first case. Yet even such fact would not have elicited the
ineluctable conclusion on the part of the Sixteenth Division that the petition had been misfiled under a wrong docket number. The more plausible assumption for the appellate court, in fact, would be that petitioner was lying in order to make it appear that the petition had been timely filed. After all, the Sixteenth Division at that point would not have had basis to know of the existence of the second case, their information being limited to the averments made by petitioner before the Sixteenth Division through its pleadings. And it was only in the Motion for Reconsideration that the Sixteenth Division was first alerted to the existence of the second case.
Petitioner now suggests that the duty to rectify the anomaly fell with the Sixteenth Division. The notion is balderdash. The duty falls solely on the party-litigants, especially on the party whose fault caused the anomaly. It should be remembered that there is no inherent right of appeal, as appeals are purely statutory.[35] Since the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[36] In the matter of perfection of appeals in accordance with substantive and procedural law, the function of appellate courts is not to act as nannies to the appellants, clearing the pitfalls that impede the perfected appeal. The responsibility is petitioner’s alone as appellant, and petitioner’s theory wrongly implies that the appellate courts also share that burden.
The other argument raised by petitioner is that its second motion for extension filed in the second case should have bound the Sixteenth Division hearing the first case. Suffice it to say, a pleading filed in one case does not bind the proceedings in another case, even if both cases are heard by just one court. A contrary rule would simply lead to chaos.
We have duly considered that perhaps this entire untidiness could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals at the outset consolidated the two cases. Yet such consideration is ultimately of no moment to petitioner. For one, under the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), there is no mandatory obligation to consolidate related cases. The language utilized in Rule 3, Section 3 of the RIRCA, which authorizes consolidation is cases, is merely directory in character, providing as it does: “[w]hen related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned to one Justice.”[37] More importantly perhaps, the consolidation of cases was never intended to cure the defect of forum-shopping. If one litigant has filed multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, the consolidation of these suits is not the correct palliative. These suits should instead be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping.
Petitioner lastly invokes the liberal construction of the rules to effect substantial justice, in order that the case may be set aside on the
merits and not mere technicalities. However, petitioner through its negligence failed to perfect the appeal under Rule 43 in accord with the jurisdictional requirements. It would have been a different story if petitioner had from the beginning acted within the boundaries of our procedural rules, by properly withdrawing any one of the two cases it knew had been filed in its behalf. But since it failed to do so, it should bear the consequences of its own neglect. Equitable relief is not the supremacy of pity but the entitlement of due process previously denied the litigant.[38] There was no denial of due process in this case that would warrant us to restore jurisdiction lost upon the initiative and fault of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[8]
[9]
[11]See id. at 44. Resolution was concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño.
[14]
[17]
[23]
[24]
[28]Boaz International Trading Corp. v. Woodward Japan, Inc., 463 Phil. 676, 687 (2003), citing Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 409, 417, 27 June 1995, per Padilla, J.
[30]Municipality of Taguig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142619, 13 September 2005, 469 SCRA 588, 594-595
.
[31]See
[35]See
[36]